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Due to its enormous potential, artificial intelligence (AI) can transform healthcare on a seemingly infinite scale. However, as we continue to explore the immense potential of AI, it is vital to consider the ethical concerns associated with its development and deployment. One specific concern that has been flagged in the literature is the responsibility gap (RG) due to the introduction of AI in healthcare. When the use of an AI algorithm or system results in a negative outcome for a patient(s), to whom can or should responsibility for that outcome be assigned? Although the concept of the RG was introduced in Anglo-American and European philosophy, this paper aims to broaden the debate by providing an Ubuntu-inspired perspective on the RG. Ubuntu, deeply rooted in African philosophy, calls for collective responsibility, and offers a uniquely forward-looking approach to address the alleged RG caused by AI in healthcare. An Ubuntu-inspired perspective can serve as a valuable guide and tool when addressing the alleged RG. Incorporating Ubuntu into the AI ethics discourse can contribute to a more ethical and responsible integration of AI in healthcare., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

The commentary "Public health ethics and the Kerala Public Health Act, 2023" published on January 27, 2024 in the Indian Journal of Medical Ethics (IJME) has received a response from members of the State Health Systems Resource Centre and Government Medical College, Malappuram, Kerala. They explain that the Kerala Public Health Act (KPHA) is a legal document and not required to explicitly include accountability mechanisms and social obligations of the state. Given the very real danger of state over-reach as was evident during the Covid pandemic, these checks and balances should, in fact, be non-negotiable. The position of KPHA on healthcare of migrant workers and patients with tuberculosis goes against existing public healthcare principles. There is therefore a need to revisit the Act to explicitly include state accountability.

The role and importance of solidarity for effective health provision is the subject of lengthy and heated debate which has been thrown into even sharper relief by the COVID-19 pandemic. In various ways, and by various authorities we have all been asked, even instructed, to engage in solidarity with one another in order to collectively respond to the current crisis. Under normal circumstances, individuals can engage in solidarity with their compatriots in the context of public health provision in a number of ways, including paying taxes which fund welfare state initiatives, and avoiding others when ill. While there has been significant engagement in solidarity worldwide, there have also been high profile examples of refusals and failures to engage in solidarity, both by individual agents, and governments. In this paper I examine the consequence of these failures with reference to the actions of the current British government, which has failed to deliver an effective response to the crisis. This failure has effectively devolved responsibility for responding to the crisis to people who are simultaneously more vulnerable to infection, and less able to do anything about it. I argue that such responses represent mismanagement of a public health crisis, and a rejection of important democratic and egalitarian norms and values., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

This article presents an argument related to justice obligations during a pandemic and explores implications of the argument. A just society responds to a serious threat to the well-being of its people such as a viral pandemic to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the well-being of its members. This creates identifiable societal obligations which are discharged by the institutions and individuals within society that are situated to do so. There are therefore identifiable obligations resting on various societal institutions, such as government, churches, schools, and corporate institutions, as well as obligations resting on individuals. Should an institution or individual fail to act in ways consistent with these social obligations, they perpetrate an injustice on society and its members.

Patients are generally assumed to have the right to choices about treatment, including the right to refuse treatment, which is constrained by considerations of cost-effectiveness. Independently, many people support the idea that patients who are responsible for their ill health should incur penalties that non-responsible patients do not face. Surprisingly, these two areas have not received much joint attention. This paper considers whether restricting the scope of responsibility to pre-treatment decisions can be justified, or whether a demand to hold people responsible for 'usual suspect' choices such as smoking or failure to exercise commits us to also holding people responsible for their treatment choices. I argue that there is no good reason to support this restriction: those who advocate responsibility for (some) pre-treatment choices should also advocate responsibility for (some) treatment choices. However, I also note that, as with pre-treatment choices, patients may sometimes have reason to choose in ways that do not optimize their health. As such, I also consider a process, based on the idea of public reasons, for deciding which treatment choices patients cannot legitimately be held responsible for, along with a method for considering proposed changes to this category., (© 2019 The Author. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Mission statements communicate health care organizations' fundamental purposes and can help potential patients choose where to seek care and employees where to seek employment. They offer limited benefit, however, when patients do not have meaningful choices about where to seek care, and they can be misused. Ethical implementation of mission statements requires health care organizations to be truthful and transparent about how their mission influences patient care, to create environments that help clinicians execute their professional obligations to patients, and to amplify their obligations to communities., (© 2020 American Medical Association. All Rights Reserved.)

Background : The Arab states suffer from high levels of corruption. The UNDP's team there developed an approach to tackle corruption and enhance transparency and accountability in healthcare as part of its broader efforts to support the Sustainable Development Goals. This work evolved into a proper tool, the Conceptual Framework for Corruption Risk Assessment at Sectoral Level (hereafter 'Framework'), with implementation guides that enable tailoring to sector and country context. Objectives : This article documents the development of the Framework, its methodology and observed added value. Methods : Qualitative methods were utilized comprising desk research, field experience, stakeholder outreach, and focus group observation and documentation. It was most appropriate because the objective was to develop a methodology with specific characteristics. Results : The new approach uses anti-corruption as an explicit entry point to governance reforms. It articulates a structured evidence-based method to apply risk management methodology - tailored to the specificities of corruption as a risk - in healthcare whereby assessment and mitigation are (a) within institutions (b) focused on decision points and (c) around transactions while bringing together health and anti-corruption communities towards designing measurable results-oriented reforms. Conclusions : The Framework may be effective in driving concrete governance reform efforts that demonstrably reduce corruption by means of creating a common language and agenda among different stakeholders, changing the mindset towards reform, and developing targeted solutions with higher return on investment. As such, it may be capable of generating observable and sustainable progress towards healthcare reform.

Policy-makers, implementing organizations, and funders of global health programs aim to improve health care services and health outcomes through specific projects or systemic change. To mitigate the risk of corruption and its harmful effects on those initiatives, health programs often use multiple anti-corruption mechanisms, including codes of conduct, documentation and reporting requirements, and trainings. Unfortunately, the introduction of anti-corruption mechanisms tends to occur without an explicit consideration of how each mechanism will affect health services and health outcomes. This may overlook potentially more effective approaches. In addition, it may result in the introduction of too many controls (thereby stymying service delivery) and a focus on financial or procurement-related issues (at the expense of service delivery objectives). We argue that anti-corruption efforts in health programs can be more effective if they prioritize addressing issues according to their likelihood and level of harm to key program objectives. Recalibrating the anti-corruption formula in this way will require: (i) extending responsibility and ownership over anti-corruption from subject experts to public health and health system specialists, and (ii) enabling those specialists to apply the Fraud Risk Assessment methodology to develop tailored anti-corruption mechanisms. We fill a documented gap in guidance on how to develop anti-corruption mechanisms by walking through the seven analytical steps of the Fraud Risk Assessment methodology as applicable to health programs. We then outline best practices for any anti-corruption mechanism, including a focus on quality health delivery; the alignment of actors' incentives around the advancement of health objectives; and being minimally corruptible by design.

Digital health is transforming healthcare systems worldwide. It promises benefits for population health but might also lead to health inequities. From an ethical perspective, it is hence much needed to adopt a fair approach. This article aims at outlining chances and challenges from an ethical perspective, focusing especially on the dimension of justice-a value, which has been described as the core value for public health. Analysed through the lenses of a standard approach for health justice-Norman Daniels' account of just health and accountability for reasonableness-most recent and relevant literature was reviewed and challenges from a justice point of view were identified. Among them are challenges with regard to digital illiteracy, resulting inequities in access to healthcare, truthful information sharing to end users demanding fully informed consent, dignity and fairness in storage, access, sharing and ownership of data. All stakeholders involved bear responsibilities to shape digital health in an ethical and fair way. When all stakeholders, especially digital health providers and regulators, ensure that digital health interventions are designed and set up in an ethical and fair way and foster health equity for all population groups, there is a chance for this transformation resulting in a fair approach to digital health., (© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Public Health Association.)

This article explores the relationship between obligation and publicly funded healthcare. Taking the National Health Service (NHS) as the focal point of discussion, the article presents a historical analysis of the shifting nature and function of obligation as it relates to this institution. Specifically, and drawing inspiration from recent literature that takes seriously the notion of the tie or bond at the core of obligation, the article explores how the forms of social relation and bonds underpinning a system like the NHS have shifted across time. This is undertaken via an analysis of Aneurin Bevan's vision of the NHS at its foundation, the importance today of the patient (and the individual generally) within publicly funded healthcare, and the role of contract as a contemporary governance mechanism within the NHS. A core feature of the article is its emphasis on the impact that a variety of economic factors-including privatisation, marketisation, and the role of debt and finance capital-are having on previously settled understandings of obligation and the forms of social relation underpinning them associated with the NHS. It is therefore argued that an adequate analysis of obligation in healthcare law and related fields must extend beyond the doctor-patient relationship and that of state-citizen of the classical welfare state in order to incorporate new forms of relation, such as that between creditor and debtor, and new actors, including private healthcare providers and financial institutions., (© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press; All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

In their daily clinical work, healthcare professionals generally apply what seems to be a double standard for the responsibility of patients. On the one hand, patients are encouraged to take responsibility for lifestyle changes that can improve their chances of good health. On the other hand, when patients fail to follow such recommendations, they are not held responsible for the failure. This seeming inconsistency is explained in terms of the distinction between task responsibility and blame responsibility. The double standard for responsibility is shown to be epistemologically rational, ethically commendable, and therapeutically advantageous. However, this non-blaming approach to patient responsibility is threatened by proposals to assign lower priority in healthcare to patients who are themselves responsible for their disease. Such responsibility-based priority setting requires that physicians assign blame responsibility to their patients, a practice that would run into conflict with the ethical foundations of the patient-physician relationship. Therefore, such proposals should be rejected.

This paper argues against incorporating assessments of individual responsibility into healthcare policies by expanding an existing argument and offering a rebuttal to an argument in favour of such policies. First, it is argued that what primarily underlies discussions surrounding personal responsibility and healthcare is not causal responsibility, moral responsibility or culpability, as one might expect, but biases towards particular highly stigmatised behaviours. A challenge is posed for proponents of taking personal responsibility into account within health policy to either expand the debate to also include socially accepted behaviours or to provide an alternative explanation of the narrowly focused discussion. Second, a critical response is offered to arguments that claim that policies based on personal responsibility would lead to several positive outcomes including healthy behaviour change, better health outcomes and decreases in healthcare spending. It is argued that using individual responsibility as a basis for resource allocation in healthcare is unlikely to motivate positive behaviour changes, and is likely to increase inequality which may lead to worse health outcomes overall. Finally, the case of West Virginia's Medicaid reform is examined, which raises a worry that policies focused on personal responsibility have the potential to lead to increases in medical spending overall., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Climate change threatens health, health care, and the industries and resources upon which these depend. The growing prevalence and severity of its health consequences and economic costs are alarming health professionals and organizations as their professional obligations, grounded in the core value of health, include protecting against these harms. One means of fulfilling these obligations is to lead or support sustainability initiatives that are built upon current, reliable, accurate, and unbiased evidence and collaboratively tailored to meet specific needs and respond to specific contexts. We consider why and how health professionals and organizations should lead or support such initiatives., (© 2017 American Medical Association. All Rights Reserved.)

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights asserts that governments are morally obliged to promote health and to provide access to quality healthcare, essential medicines and adequate nutrition and water to all members of society. According to UNESCO, this obligation is grounded in a moral commitment to promoting fundamental human rights and emerges from the principle of social responsibility. Yet in an era of ethical pluralism and contentions over the universality of human rights conventions, the extent to which the UNESCO Declaration can motivate behaviors and policies rests, at least in part, upon accepting the moral arguments it makes. In this essay I reflect on a state's moral obligation to provide healthcare from the perspective of Islamic moral theology and law. I examine how Islamic ethico-legal conceptual analogues for human rights and communal responsibility, ḥuqūq al-'ibād and farḍ al-kifāyah and other related constructs might be used to advance a moral argument for healthcare provision by the state. Moving from theory to application, I next illustrate how notions of human rights and social responsibility were used by Muslim stakeholders to buttress moral arguments to support American healthcare reform. In this way, the paper advance discourses on a universal bioethics and common morality by bringing into view the concordances and discordances between Islamic ethico-legal constructs and moral arguments advanced by transnational health policy advocates. It also provides insight into applied Islamic bioethics by demonstrating how Islamic ethico-legal values might inform the discursive outputs of Muslim organizations., (© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

In this article, I address what kinds of claims are of the right kind to ground conscientious refusals. Specifically, I investigate what conceptions of moral responsibility and moral wrongness can be permissibly presumed by conscientious objectors. I argue that we must permit HCPs to come to their own subjective conclusions about what they take to be morally wrong and what they take themselves to be morally responsible for. However, these subjective assessments of wrongness and responsibility must be constrained in several important ways: they cannot involve empirical falsehoods, objectionably discriminatory attitudes, or unreasonable normative beliefs. I argue that the sources of these constraints are the basic epistemic, relational, and normative competencies needed to function as a minimally decent health-care professional. Finally, I consider practical implications for my framework, and argue that it shows us that the objection raised by the plaintiffs in Zubik v. Burwell is of the wrong sort., (© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

The Swedish solution to the legal handling of professional conscientious refusal in healthcare is described. No legal right to conscientious refusal for any profession or class of professional tasks exists in Sweden, regardless of the religious or moral background of the objection. The background of this can be found in strong convictions about the importance of public service provision and related civic duties, and ideals about rule of law, equality and non-discrimination. Employee's requests to change work tasks are handled on a case-by-case basis within the frames of labour law, ensuring full voluntariness, and also employer's privilege regarding the organisation and direction of work, and duties of public institutions to provide services. Two complicating aspects of this solution related to the inclusion of 'alternative medical' service providers in a national health service, and professional insistence on conscientious refusal rights to accept legalised assisted dying are discussed. The latter is found to undermine the pragmatic reasons behind recent attempts by prolife groups to challenge the Swedish solution related to legal abortion in courts., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

This article examines current trends and prospects in Finnish healthcare literature and discussion. The Finnish healthcare system was long considered to manifest an equal, universal, and solidaristic welfare scheme. However, recent data reveals structural inequalities in access to healthcare that result in health differences among socioeconomic groups. The political will aims at tackling these inequalities, but the ideological trend toward responsibilization of the individual taking place across political spheres elsewhere in Europe creates potential challenges to this goal. The applications of this trend have a theoretical background in the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian-or luck egalitarian-tradition. The theory, which is unfit for real-life policy applications, has explicit appeal in considerations aiming at the responsibilization of the individual within the healthcare sector. It remains to be seen in which direction the Finnish welfare schemes will continue to develop.

Advancing the health of the poor requires aligning a wide array of interests, all of which influence how health care is delivered. Global health professionals often face difficult decisions that can affect their working relationships with government officials, local colleagues, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector interests. This article proposes a "compass-based" framework that urges global health professionals to act in a way that is both morally sound and pragmatically effective. Global health professionals must follow their "moral compass" and act in alignment with the interests of the communities they seek to serve while, at the same time, utilizing their "effectiveness compass" to navigate complex situations in ways that ensure achievement of practicable change that can motivate better health outcomes for those in need., (© 2016 American Medical Association. All Rights Reserved. ISSN 2376-6980.)

This essay offers a Confucian evaluation of Article 14 of the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, with a focus given to its statement that "the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being." It indicates that "a right to health" contained in the statement is open to two different interpretations, one radically egalitarian, another a decent minimum. It shows that Confucianism has strong moral considerations to reject the radical egalitarian interpretation, and argues that a Confucian nonegalitarian health distribution ethics of differentiated and graded love and obligation can reasonably be supported with a right to the decent minimum of health at the international level.

It is widely accepted that translational research practitioners need to acquire special skills and knowledge that will enable them to anticipate, analyze, and manage a range of ethical issues. While there is a small but growing literature that addresses the ethics of translational research, there is a dearth of scholarship regarding how this might apply to engineers. In this paper we examine engineers as key translators and argue that they are well positioned to ask transformative ethical questions. Asking engineers to both broaden and deepen their consideration of ethics in their work, however, requires a shift in the way ethics is often portrayed and perceived in science and engineering communities. Rather than interpreting ethics as a roadblock to the success of translational research, we suggest that engineers should be encouraged to ask questions about the socio-ethical dimensions of their work. This requires expanding the conceptual framework of engineering beyond its traditional focus on "how" and "what" questions to also include "why" and "who" questions to facilitate the gathering of normative, socially-situated information. Empowering engineers to ask "why" and "who" questions should spur the development of technologies and practices that contribute to improving health outcomes.

The article analyses such tendency in modern foreign medical ethics as paying particular attention to relationship physician-society. The modern tendency to entrust physicians with main responsibility for expenses control and economical expenditure of health care resources is considered The analysis is founded on publications of World medical association and codes of medical ethics of the USA and Canada.

It is a common belief that obesity is wholly or partially a question of personal choice and personal responsibility. It is also widely assumed that when individuals are responsible for some unfortunate state of affairs, society bears no burden to compensate them. This article focuses on two conceptualizations of responsibility: backward-looking and forward-looking conceptualizations. When ascertaining responsibility in a backward-looking sense, one has to determine how that state of affairs came into being or where the agent stood in relation to it. In contrast, a forward-looking conceptualization of responsibility puts aside questions of the past and holds a person responsible by reference to some desirable future state of affairs and will typically mean that he or she is subjected to criticism, censure, or other negative appraisals or that he or she is held cost-responsible in some form, for example, in terms of demanded compensation, loss of privileges, or similar. One example of this view is the debate as to whether the obese should be denied, wholly or partially, free and equal access to healthcare, not because they are somehow personally responsible in the backward-looking sense but simply because holding the obese responsible will have positive consequences. Taking these two conceptions of responsibility into account, the authors turn their analysis toward examining the relevant moral considerations to be taken into account when public policies regarding obesity rely on such a conception of responsibility.

Background: The concept of the social accountability of medical schools has garnered many followers, in response to a broad desire for greater social justice in health care. As its use has spread, the term 'social accountability' has become a meta-narrative for social justice and an inevitable and unquestionable good, while at the same time becoming increasingly ambiguous in its meaning and intent. In this article, we use the lenses of postmodernism and critical reflexivity to unpack the multiple meanings of social accountability. In our view, subjecting the concept of 'social accountability' to critique will enhance the ability to appraise the ways in which it is understood and enacted., Discussion: We contend that critical reflexivity is necessary for social accountability to achieve its aspirations, and hence we must be prepared to become accountable not only for our actions, but also for the ideologies and discourses underlying them.

This paper argues that societal duties of health promotion are underwritten (at least in large part) by a principle of beneficence. Further, this principle generates duties of justice that correlate with rights, not merely "imperfect" duties of charity or generosity. To support this argument, I draw on a useful distinction from bioethics and on a somewhat neglected approach to social obligation from political philosophy. The distinction is that between general and specific beneficence; and the approach from political philosophy has at times been called equality of concern. After clarifying the distinction and setting out the basis of the equality of concern view, I argue that the result is a justice-based principle of "specific" beneficence that should be reflected in a society's health policy. I then draw on this account to criticize, refine, and extend some prominent health care policy proposals from the bioethics literature.

Societal aging raises challenging ethical questions regarding the just distribution of health care between young and old. This article considers a proposal for age-based rationing of health care, which is based on the prudential life span account of justice between age groups. While important objections have been raised against the prudential life span account, it continues to dominate scholarly debates. This article introduces a new objection, one that develops out of the well-established disability critique of social contract theories. I show the implications of this critique for the prudential life span account and for the special case of age-group justice. The result is that age-based rationing based on the prudential life span approach is not supported, and that the prudential life span approach itself is not the best way to think about allocating health care between age groups. I propose an alternative approach that avoids the disability objection, and consider its implications for specific proposals for age-based rationing of health care.

This paper aims to critique the phenomenon of advanced patient autonomy and choice in healthcare within the specific context of self-testing devices. A growing number of self-testing medical devices are currently available for home use. The premise underpinning many of these devices is that they assist individuals to be more autonomous in the assessment and management of their health. Increased patient autonomy is assumed to be a good thing. We take issue with this assumption and argue that self-testing provides a specific example how increased patient autonomy and choice within healthcare might not best serve the patient population. We propose that current interpretations of autonomy in healthcare are based on negative accounts of liberty to the detriment of a more relational understanding. We also propose that Kantian philosophy is often applied to the healthcare arena in an inappropriate manner. We draw on the philosophical literature and examples from the self-testing process to support these claims. We conclude by offering an alternative account of autonomy based on the interrelated concepts of relationality, care and responsibility.

The question is what the mandated medical minimum for all should be. The correct answer is zero. That is to say, the government should not be forcing anyone to pay for anyone. The most popular arguments within the liberal framework, presumed to be shared by all, are briefly surveyed. Health care is provided by someone to someone else, and that someone else should either be paying for it, or recognize that someone is providing it charitably to him or her. Compelling someone else to pay for it is something we have no basic right to do.

Discussions concerning whether there is a natural right to health care may occur in various forms, resulting in policy recommendations for how to implement any such right in a given society. But health care policies may be judged by international standards including the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The rights enumerated in the UDHR are grounded in traditions of moral theory, a philosophical analysis of which is necessary in order to adjudicate the value of specific policies designed to enshrine rights such as a right to health care. We begin with an overview of the drafting of the UDHR and highlight the primary influence of natural law theory in validating the rights contained therein. We then provide an explication of natural law theory by reference to the writings of Thomas Aquinas, as well as elucidate the complementary "capabilities approach" of Martha Nussbaum. We conclude that a right to health care ought to be guaranteed by the state.

What should be the content of a package of health care services that we would want to guarantee to all Americans? This question cannot be answered adequately apart from also addressing the issue of fair health care rationing. Consequently, as I argue in this essay, appeal to the language of "basic," "essential," "adequate," "minimally decent," or "medically necessary" for purposes of answering our question is unhelpful. All these notions are too vague to be useful. Cost matters. Effectiveness matters. The clinical circumstances of a patient matters. But what we must ultimately determine is what we mutually agree are the just claims to needed health care of each American in a relatively complex range of clinical circumstances. Answering this question will require a public moral conversation, a fair process of rational democratic deliberation aimed at defining both just claims to needed health care and just limits.

This article tries to analyze the meaning of a decent minimum of health care, by confronting the idea of decent care with the concept of justice. Following the ideas of Margalith about a decent society, the article argues that a just minimum of care is not necessarily a decent minimum. The way this minimum is provided can still humiliate individuals, even if the end result is the best possible distribution of the goods as seen from the viewpoint of justice. This analysis is combined with an analysis from the perspective of solidarity, particularly of reflective solidarity, as a way to develop decent care, which is care that does not humiliate individuals and maintains their dignity.