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Sartre’s intention in the Critique of Dialectical Reason is to establish the heuristic value of the dialectical method when applied to the social sciences. Toward this end, he furnishes an account of how, on the basis of natural needs, rational choices, burgeoning social ensembles, natural and social contingencies and unintended consequences, human beings make their history. I shall argue that his dialectical method, especially when modified, opens up interesting possibilities for clarifying the two most important and enduring meta-issues in the philosophy of social science: (1) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of the beliefs, desires and actions of individuals or the rules and practices of social institutions (“Methodological Individualism” or “Methodological Holism”) and (2) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of causes, as in the natural sciences, or in terms of what they mean in their social contexts, as in hermeneutics and other interpretive approaches (...

In this essay, I argue that a common reading of Max Weber’s social science and its treatment of interpretation as either insufficiently or excessively “scientific” on the model of the natural sciences is inadequate. Freed from the either/or opposition of naturalism and humanism, and read through the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Weber can be read as offering a way forward for the social sciences that embraces both the subjective orientation of social scientists and the objective aspirations of social science.

Much of the excitement in social media analytics revolves around, a) capturing large-scale collections of naturally-occurring talk, b) repurposing them as data, and, c) finding ways to speak sociologically about them. Researchers have raised concerns over the use of social media data in research (for example, boyd and Crawford, 2012; Housley et al, 2014; Tinati et al, 2014), exploring the ontological and epistemological grounding of the emerging field. We contribute to this debate by drawing on Wittgensteinian philosophy to elucidate hitherto neglected aspects; namely that it is not just social scientists who are in the business of analysing social media, but users themselves. We explore how mainstream social media analytics research (1) overinflates the importance of sociological theories, concepts and methodologies (which do not typically feature in the accounts of social media users), (2) downplays the extent to which social media platforms already exhibit order prior to any sociological accounting of them, and, (3) thereby produces findings which explain social scientific perspectives rather than the phenomena themselves. We reformulate the ontological and epistemological basis of social media analytics research from a Wittgensteinian perspective concerned with what it makes sense to say about social media, as members of society and as researchers studying those members. Such a project aims to explore social media users’ language as a practice embedded within the context of social life and online communication. This reflects the everyday use of language as an evolving toolkit for undertaking social interaction, pointing towards an alternative conception of social media analytics.

Question runs as follows: is an inquiry a preliminary step to a theory, or does a theory (evidently, found by chance, or by luck) give rise to an inquiry? This is a logical circle, or maybe an ellipsis. Or maybe this circle/ellipsis is a hermeneutical one. In this case it is hard to distinguish between a source of scientific thought and its aim, or the fruits of it. Be it a logical or hermeneutical circle of the current of human thought and activity, in both cases it is an important problem for science and for a philosophy of science reflecting it. I argue that, among all sciences, social sciences and humanities, making use of interpretation rather than of demonstration, have better chance to have the circle/ellipsis torn in order to solve the problem of passing from theory/inquiry to practice. It is decades-long positivistic tradition to think of a scientific theory as of a physical theory considered as an etalon for all scientific knowledge. Even epistemology, social it itself, tends to be constructed as a physical theory. The same could be said about philosophy of science. Recently, however, in Russian philosophy of science there appeared a philosophy of post-theoretical thinking. Its author is V.I. Przhilenskiy. It can well be treated as an inquiry following and negating a modern theory of knowledge (i.e., epistemology and analytical philosophy as its branch) – which in its turn had its origin in general gnoseology as an inquiry. Following and negating general gnoseology as something non-theoretical in the positivistic view, theory of knowledge is now being replaced in philosophy of social sciences by an inquiry in a form of post-theoretical thinking. This, indeed, is not merely a circle, but a spiral – a Hegelian emblem of development.

A value judgment says what is good or bad, and value-free social science simply means social science free of value judgments. Yet many sociologists regard value-free social science as undesirable or impossible and readily make value judgments in the name of sociology. Often they display confusion about such matters as the meaning of value-free social science, value judgments internal and external to social science, value judgments as a subject of social science, the relevance of objectivity for value-free social science, and the difference between the human significance of social science and value-free social science. But why so many sociologists are so value-involved - and generally so unscientific - is sociologically understandable: The closest and most distant subjects attract the least scientific ideas. And during the past century sociologists have become increasingly close to their human subject. The debate about value-free social science is also part of an epistemological counterrevolution of humanists (including many sociologists) against the more scientific social scientists who invaded and threatened to expropriate the human subject during the past century.

One reason the Unity of Science Movement thrived in 1930s America was that most intellectuals at the time were socialist. Agreeing that comprehensive scientific planning required a comprehensive, or unified, science, most of these intellectuals automatically respected Neurath and the Unity of Science Movement as ideological allies. The need for social action demands that social science be unencumbered by doctrines which have no active, operative significance. Twenty years later, at the end of the 1950s, American philosophy of science was quite a different business. Politics had nothing to do with philosophy of science, and the Unity of Science Movement was effectively dead. Philosophy of social science, in other words, was the closest professional philosophy of science could get to social philosophy, but it still did not get there. Philosophy of science was about structural, semantic and pragmatic features of scientific theories, which in turn had nothing to do with debates or theories concerning 'the worth of some social arrangements'.

In this essay, the authors consider the challenge made by two keynote speakers at recent social work research conferences, one in the United States and the other in Europe. Both spoke of a knowledge crisis in social work. Both John Brekke (Society for Social Work and Research) and Peter Sommerfeld (First Annual European Conference for Social Work Research) proposed some version of realism as a solution to the crisis. The authors will deepen the argument for realism, however, by discussing how a critical realist perspective allows us to rethink positivist and conventionalist assumptions about the fact/value relation. Using a critical realist philosophy of social science, the authors discuss how social work has taken up positivism and myriad forms of conventionalism and also identify how practical knowledge gradually loses its place and thus contribute to social work’s ongoing knowledge crisis. The authors then offer a way of thinking about practice. The authors will consider forms of practice knowledge and propose that social work has four kinds that unfold in essentially open systems: discursive, visual, embodied, and liquid systems, and that each of these have both tacit and explicit dimensions. These forms of practice, moreover, are inevitably situated in theory-to-practice gaps (the authors call them phenomenological practice gaps), which are the source of social work’s knowledge crisis. The authors conclude with a discussion of the role of reflexivity in a science of social work.

Why should we introduce the notion of ‘analytical sociology’ into the field of sociology, and why should it be linked to the concept of ‘mechanism’? With these two principal questions, Pierre Demeulenaere, Professor of Sociological Theory and Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, opens his Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of thirteen papers written by social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences (1). Not every contributor should be considered an analytical sociologist. Rather than being a manifesto either pro or contra analytical sociology and the use of mechanisms, it is an attempt to reflect upon the key issues involved in sociological explanation (3). Even though several chapters raise very interesting points, the overall impression one gets from this book is that analytical sociology fails to redeem its main promise, viz. to add clarity, precision, and conceptual rigor to sociology, especially regarding one of its most central concepts: ‘mechanism’. Analytical sociology is not a new sociological paradigm, but an effort to clarify analytically the basic epistemological, theoretical, and methodological principles underlying any satisfactory way of doing social science (1). It provides an updated version of methodological individualism, often called structural individualism, which combines its predecessor’s basic focus on the individual actors underlying all social phenomena with an updated view of these individuals, including a new theory of action and special attention for the actors’ (social) environment (10–12). One of the central concepts figuring in analytical sociology is ‘social mechanism’: ‘‘Whenever we start explaining ‘why’ something happens, beyond mere description, we are necessarily led to introduce some type of causal linkage of

Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism, and the Social Sciences. By Peter Baehr (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 231 pp. $39.95 paper. There are many challenges to a book on Hannah Arendt w...

Yanchar, Slife, and their colleagues have described how mainstream psychology‟s notion of critical thinking has largely been conceived of as “scientific analytic reasoning” or “method-centered critical thinking.” We extend here their analysis and critique, arguing that some version of the one-sided instrumentalism and confusion about tacit values that characterize scientistic approaches to inquiry also color phenomenological, critical theoretical, and social constructionist viewpoints. We suggest that hermeneutic/dialogical conceptions of inquiry, including the idea of social theory as itself a form of ethically motivated human practice, give a fuller account of critical thinking in the social disciplines.

Alexis de Tocqueville, the First Social Scientist. By Jon Elster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 212p. $80.00 cloth, $22.99 paper.Alexis de Tocqueville is surely one of the most widely cited, discussed, and celebrated political theorists in the world. Jon Elster's book, Alexis de Tocqueville: the First Social Scientist proceeds from a provocative premise: that Tocqueville's major works were lacking in “system” and were “hugely incoherent,” and that Tocqeuville himself “was not a major political thinker” (xi). Elster argues that instead Tocqueville ought to be viewed as a penetrating historical sociologist and an exemplary social scientist who might well be considered the first true social scientist. Elster's argument is important for at least two reasons: first, because it offers a striking and challenging reading of Tocqueville; and second, because it expands on Elster's own contributions in the philosophy of social science, and develops interesting understandings of “causal mechanisms,” methodological individualism, and social explanation more generally. As Elster writes in his Introduction, “the main task of this book is to argue for the relevance of Tocqueville for social science in the twenty-first century (p. 5).” The purpose of this Perspectives symposium is to assess Elster's argument in broad terms. What are the strengths and limits of Elster's reading of Tocqueville? How ought we to assess Elster's understanding of Tocqueville's deficiencies as a “political theorist?” What is the relevance of Tocqueville for contemporary social science? And, most importantly, what are the challenges and possible trajectories facing social science in the twenty-first century, and to what extent does Elster's essay point us in the right direction?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

The paper begins by outlining the approaches to the development of a philosophy of social science in the work of Bourdieu, Passeron, and Habermas. The discussion of the positions of Comte and Mill which follows is an historical case-study of the tensions between competing stances adopted in the 1960s — between the tendency to formulate a logic of the social sciences and the tendency to ground a philosophy of social science in ontology or in the socio-political conditions of its production. The method adopted to compare the contributions to the philosophy of social science made by Comte and Mill displays sympathy with Bourdieu’s inclination to analyse the social conditions for the genesis of theory. The paper first considers comparatively the contexts in France and England for the emergence of social science and philosophy about social science. It then examines separately the developments of the projects of Comte and Mill before turning to an articulation of the contrasts between their positions, focusing on aspects of their correspondence as subsequently published and introduced by Lévy-Bruhl. The purpose of the paper is to raise the general question whether international intellectual exchange in relation to the analysis of society can occur within a universal discourse possessing a priori validity or through socio-cultural exchanges which assist the construction of universality through the mutual recognition of difference.

(2010). ‘W.B. Gallie and Essentially Contested Concepts’. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 257-270.

This paper articulates the commitments, contours and justifications for a pluralist but non-eclectic critical, realist, reflexive social science with emancipatory aims. In it, we stress that social science can and should be used to guide the conceptualization of desirable and viable forms of social organization and their conditions of realization. In this regard, we advocate explanatory theorizing as an ethical duty of social scientists and as a moral good in itself as well as being an inherent epistemological component of scientific practice. This entails that we take seriously the research strategies apposite to our disciplinary, intertextual and inter-discursive locations to make a serious theoretical case and practical case for the kind of social science here advocated. In our view, such a social science must acknowledge the path-breaking work of Roy Bhaskar, but must also recognize that the arguments deployed in texts as a resource in intellectual work can never be treated as the axiomatic gr...

There is a growing interest in critical realism and its application to social work. This article makes a case for adopting this philosophical position in qualitative social work research. More specifically, it suggests that there is a concordance between critical realist premises and action research with its cyclical inquiry and advancement of social change. This combination of philosophy and method, it is argued, promotes anti-oppressive social work research and illuminates the processes shaping outcomes in programme evaluations. Overall, the article underscores the importance of ‘depth’ in qualitative inquiry by conceiving the social world in terms of five interlacing, social domains.

This paper examines the ways in which social scientific discourse and classification interact with the objects of social scientific investigation. I examine this interaction in the context of the traditional philosophical project of demarcating the social sciences from the natural sciences. I begin by reviewing Ian Hacking’s work on interactive classification and argue that there are additional forms of interaction that must be treated.

Patrick Baert Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005 viii + 210 pp., ISBN 9780745622460, £50.00, €62.50 (hardback); ISBN 9780745622477, £17.99, €22.50 (paperback) Hans Dooremalen, Herman de Regt & Maurice S...

Many, and perhaps most, American philosophers will, if pressed, say that they are pragmatists. What they typically mean by this is that they think there is some class of philosophical questions that can't be answered philosophically. If you don't think that in the end philosophical arguments can possibly settle metaphysical questions, pragmatism is an appealing response. Pragmatism becomes a kind of default position which one reverts to when one removes a topic from the list of topics that can be reasonably addressed using philosophical methods. When Richard Rorty characterized himself as a pragmatist, he meant that he was in favor of removing topics from philosophy on a wholesale basis, which implied for him the end of philosophy at least as traditionally conceived. Philosophical students of pragmatism weren't very happy with this formulation, not so much for its conclusions, but because it omitted the content of the default that John Dewey himself had in mind, namely something like the scientific method, or the scientific method understood and generalized as something like an experimental approach (Dewey 1946, p. 179). The people who thought Rorty had travestied pragmatism focused, correctly, on the difference in their attitudes toward science. Patrick Baert has written a very interesting textbook on the philosophy of social science which winds up embracing at least the term pragmatism and reflecting on Rorty in a way that arrives at a novel position. As his concluding argument is the most original part of the book and the one that is most relevant in this setting, I shall confine my comments to the question of what both a pragmatist approach to social science and to a "philosophy" of social science might be, and further confine it to the Deweyan and Rortyian variations on this general theme.

The dominant schools in the philosophy of social science, as they are presented in a variety of articles, textbooks, and monographs, are often broken down analytically along three lines. These schools are given different names but are roughly grouped under naturalist, interpretive, and critical headings. However, there are also a growing number of attempts to go beyond these established categories and offer something novel in the philosophy of social science and Patrick Baert's Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Towards Pragmatism can be seen as such an attempt (Baert 2005). His call for a pragmatist philosophy of social science is in part a reading of a variety of main conceptual positions in the philosophy of social science and a recommendation given the problems and shortcomings of each of the programs he discusses. In these remarks

Despite the extensive commentary on the work of Peter Winch, there has been inadequate recognition of how his Idea of a Social Science discerned the implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for confronting issues regarding the nature and interpretation of social phenomena. Winch’s subsequent confrontation with anthropology can be further illuminated by examining one of the most contentious contemporary debates in this field. This case illustrates the paradoxes involved in meta-practices such as philosophy and social science seeking to make descriptive and normative claims about conceptually preconstituted forms of life, and it indicates the limitations of philosophical realism as a social scientific meta-theory.

After sorting different structuralist claims, I argue that structural realist ideas are instantiated in the social sciences, providing both clarification of social science research and support for some components of structural realism. My main focus is on three distinct ways that the social sciences can be about structural relations—exemplified by claims about social structure, reduced form structures in causal modeling, and equilibrium explanations—and on the implication of structuralist ideas for thinking about issues concerning causal explanation and nonreductive pictures of the unity of the science.

In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences—refining the conceptual tools of social scientists—and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.

The opening topic whose thesis needs clarification is, "The Question of Objectivity, its Implications for the Social Sciences in the Era of Postmodernism: Africa in Perspective", published in the Special Issue of this journal on Postmodernism and African Philosophy (Volume 3, Number 2, July-December 2014, pp.50-61). The sequence of the argument in this paper which was meant to create a liberating ground from the suspicious position of the African mind in relation to globalization takes the following pattern: can the social sciences be regarded as science? Must the social science be reduced to the methods in the natural sciences before it can be called science? Does the social science retain any capacity for objective truth? To the above questions, what could be gleaned from the paper is that, the social sciences can justifiably be regarded as science, the social science must not necessarily meet the requirements of the methods of the natural sciences to be called science and that the social science has a right claim to objectivity.

Daniel Bromley argues against Oran Young's FIT model as a basis for environmental governance, on the grounds that humans cannot manage nature and that attempts to do so are based on a scientistic, modernist conceit. At issue is the role of natural and social scientists in adjudicating questions about what we ought to do to close governance gaps and address unsustainable behaviors. If Bromley is right, then the lessons of the American pragmatist tradition recommend against attempts to "fit" social institutions to the natural world. The first objective of this paper is to argue that Bromley's view is not in keeping with the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, which actually places a high value on natural and social scientific modes of inquiry in the service of social ends. I argue that Young's proposal is in fact a development of the pragmatist idea that social institutions must be fit in the sense of fitness, i.e., resilient and able to navigate uncertainty. Social institutions must also evolve to accommodate the emerging values of the agents who operate within them. The second objective of this paper is to examine the role of social science expertise in the design of social policies. Governance institutions typically rely on the testimony of natural scientists, at least in part, to understand the natural systems they operate within. However, natural systems are also social systems, so it seems pertinent to ask whether there is a role for social systems experts to play in helping to design environmental governance institutions. I argue that social scientists can make a unique contribution as experts on social institutions, and as such, are necessary to bring about a transformation of the unsustainable institutions that are preventing us from achieving stated sustainable development goals.

This article contributes to the revision of the concept of system in social theory using complexity theory. The old concept of social system is widely discredited; a new concept of social system can more adequately constitute an explanatory framework. Complexity theory offers the toolkit needed for this paradigm shift in social theory. The route taken is not via Luhmann, but rather the insights of complexity theorists in the sciences are applied to the tradition of social theory inspired by Marx, Weber, and Simmel. The article contributes to the theorization of intersectionality in social theory as well as to the philosophy of social science. It addresses the challenge of theorizing the intersection of multiple complex social inequalities, exploring the various alternative approaches, before rethinking the concept of social system. It investigates and applies, for the first time, the implications of complexity theory for the analysis of multiple intersecting social inequalities.

Ontological debates have always been prominent in the philosophy of social science. Philosophers have typically conceived of such debates as pre-scientific attempts to reform social scientific practice, rather than as post-scientific reflections on a firm body of scientific knowledge. Two celebrated contemporary research programs in social ontology – collective intentionality and evolutionary game theory – also follow this approach. In this paper I illustrate their central elements and criticize their weak empirical foundations. I finish by reviewing some work that combines empirical evidence with theoretical reflection, and suggest that it constitutes the way forward in the philosophy of social science.

How should critical realism affect the practice of social science? This paper responds to this and related questions by suggesting some methodological implications of the realist theory of emergence. Given that critical realism understands causation as the interaction of emergent causal powers, and that the theory of emergence describes the type of structural relations that underpins such powers, we can practise social ontology by seeking to identify these structural relations in the social domain. Such methods, however, cannot stand or fall purely on philosophical grounds; their validity also depends on whether they work. Hence this paper briefly illustrates the application of the method to social ontology, using examples from the theory of social institutions.

Naturalism is still facing a strong opposition in the philosophy of social science from influential scholars who argue that philosophical analysis must be autonomous from scientific investigation. The opposition exploits philosophers’ traditional diffidence toward social science and fuels the ambition to provide new foundations for social research. A classic anti-naturalist strategy is to identify a feature of social reality that prevents scientific explanation and prediction. An all-time favorite is the dependence of social phenomena on human representation. This article examines two prominent versions of the dependence thesis and concludes that they both fail. Contemporary social science is capable of accounting for the causal dependence of social reality on representation, and there is no reason to believe that social entities are ontologically dependent on the collective acceptance of a constitutive rule.

Sosyal bilimler felsefesinin yoğunlukla üzerinde durduğu alanlardan birisi olan metodoloji, bilimsel pratiğin ontolojik ve epistemolojik pozisyonunu ortaya koyar. Bu çalışma, sosyal bilimsel pratikteki pozitivist epistemoloji ve metodolojiyi eleştirel olarak analiz etme ve yorumcu geleneğin sosyal bilimler için kaçınılmaz olduğunu gösterme çabasındadır. Diğer bir ifade ile çalışma, bilimde değer yargılarını ve normatif geleneği sosyal bilimci ve onun araştırma konusu olan toplum/birey özelinde gündeme getirecektir. Böylelikle, toplumsalın incelenmesinde salt fenomenler arası neden-sonuç ilişkisine odaklanan natüralist yaklaşımın sosyal bilim algısına ters düştüğü de çalışmanın iddialarından birisi olacaktır. Bu noktada, sosyal bilim için sosyal bilim gibi bir anlayıştan ziyade toplum için sosyal bilim gibi bir anlayış da gündeme gelecektir., Methodology, which is one of the most important areas subjected by philosophy of the social sciences, determines the epistemological and ontological position of scientific practice. At this point, the current study proposes to critically analyze positivist epistemology in the social scientific practice while shedding light on the inevitable character of interpretivist methodology for this area. More specifically, study will illustrate the values and normative tradition in specific to research subjects and actors of social sciences. In doing so, study will assert that naturalistic approach, which focuses on cause and effect relations when examining social phenomena, will be shown as an inappropriate tradition in the social sciences in comparison to interpretivist methodology. On the other hand, understanding of social science for the sake of society instead of the idea of social science for the sake of social science will be examined.

The analysis here is an attempt to show how the current epistemological theory of response-dependence (R-D) may be relevant to understanding putative ontological claims of the empirical social sciences. To this end I argue that the constitutive features of human response, central to R-D theory, can be made explicit for social science. I conclude that for the empirical social sciences the implication of combining R-D and certain forms of statistical analyses leads to the possibility of an events-based ontology.

This essay explores of the relationship between religion and science using Max Weber's insights into the philosophy of social science, C. S. Peirce's philosophy of religion and the Qur’anic treatment of material reality. The Weber-Peirce-Qur’an conversation opens up the possibility of a (social) scientific affirmation of religion and a religious affirmation of science. Scriptural Reasoning (SR) has already demonstrated that it is capable of creating “mutual ground” between the different religious traditions. This exploration of the exchange between SR and the social sciences suggests that SR has the potential of contributing to the creation of mutual ground between the religious traditions and the “secular” academy.

All three of the books under review— Science and Social Science by Malcolm Williams, Rethinking Science by Jan Faye, and Open the Social Sciences by the members of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (Immanuel Wallerstein, chair)—argue for a broadly naturalist approach in which the social sciences are seen as of a piece with the natural sciences. Fortunately, all three do so in a discriminating way that avoids simple options and that appreciates the important ways the social-scientific disciplines require their own approach. Open the Social Sciences in particular also contains detailed and wise advice as to how the contemporary social sciences should proceed if they want to fulfill their ambition to explain human social behavior in a scientific way.

The aim of this article is to argue for a conception of critical social science based on the model of constitutive rules. The author argues that this model is pragmatically superior to those models that employ notions like “illusion” and “ ideology,” as it does not demand a specification of the “real (but hidden) interests” of social actors.

PurposeTo discuss systemic thinking in relation to the naturalistic position in the philosophy of social science. To develop the theme in two parts: Part I: systemic thinking and the naturalistic position; and Part II: the systemic position.Design/methodology/approachA cybernetic approach is taken, and a discussion on what is the foundation for the philosophy of social science for systemic thinking and the systemic position is developed.FindingsThe findings of Part I have been given. Part II analyses the systemic position and considers the classical controversy in social science between methodological individualism and methodological collectivism (holism). The pre‐condition on which the systemic position is based is given. The ideal requirements set up by the systemic position are presented under the headings: espistemology/methodology; ontology; axiology; and the ethical position.Practical implicationsProvided assistance to social scientists who study social systems from the systemic or cybernetic viewpoint and give a practical analysis of the systemic position. Provides researchers and others working in this field with an investigation of the role and conduct of social scientists.Originality/valueIt positioned systemic thinking in relation to the philosophy of social science.

The article reflects on the possibility of a social science that aims at self-referential knowledge-acquisition. This form of social research explores and questions deep-seated presuppositions prevalent in contemporary culture and strives to become aware of other forms of life. This view of social sciences, therefore, is perfectly in line with the pragmatist perspective that language and knowledge, rather than acts of representation, allow people to increase the scope of human possibilities. Various forms of social research, in a wide range of disciplines, have already explored this self-referential knowledge: for instance, genealogical history and sociology, post-processual archaeology and the critical turn in anthropology. The article locates this self-referential knowledge within the context of contemporary American pragmatism (e.g. Rorty, Bernstein). It is argued that this type of knowledge ties in with the radical tradition in neo-pragmatism, in particular its anti-foundationalist notion of critique.

PurposeTo discuss systemic thinking in relation to the naturalistic and anti‐naturalistic position in the philosophy of social science. To develop the theme in two parts: I and II.Design/methodology/approachA cybernetic approach is taken and a discussion on what is the foundation for the philosophy of social science for systemic thinking is developed.FindingsThe findings for Part I are that the rationalistic view of knowledge is based on reflection and reason. The empirical viewpoint on knowledge based on observations. The realistic view of knowledge is based on the link between the rationalistic and the empirical point of view. The systemic viewpoint is based on the realistic view of knowledge.Practical implicationsProvided assistance to social scientists who study social systems from the systemic or cybernetic point of view. Gives researchers studying problems/phenomena in social systems a systemic viewpoint.Originality/valueIt positioned systemic thinking in relation to the philosophy of social science.

The four sections of this article are reactions to a few interconnected problems that Mario Bunge addresses in his The Sociology-Philosophy Connection, which can be seen as a continuation and summary of his two recent major volumes Finding Philosophy in Social Science and Social Science under Debate: A Philosophical Perspective. Bunge’s contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences has been sufficiently acclaimed. (See in particular two special issues of this journal dedicated to his social philosophy: “Systems and Mechanisms. A Symposium on Mario Bunge’s Philosophy of Social Science,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34, nos. 2 and 3.) The author discusses therefore only those solutions in Bunge’s book that seem most problematic, namely, Bunge’s proposal to expel charlatans from universities; his treatment of social laws; his notions of mechanisms, “mechanismic explanation,” and systemism; and his reading of Popper’s social philosophy.

Social economists differ among themselves but are united in rejecting the rational actor model. They insist that individuals are more than economic actors; they arepersons with ethical values who live in community. That agreement over fundamentals leads social economists to embrace a methodological approach that differs substantially from the mainstream of economics. They (sometimes explicitly but usually implicitly), engage in a special form of storytelling known in the philosophy of social science as pattern modeling. Instead of using a pre-existing theoretical framework, such as rational choice theory, to logically construct a story, this type of story is constructed empirically from the bottom up through the use of case studies. The article concludes with a specific consideration of Albert Hirschman's methodology to illustrate the storytelling approach of a first rate and well-recognized social economist.