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Given any set E of expressions freely generated from a set of atoms by syntactic operations, there exist trivially compositional functions on E (to wit, the injective and the constant functions), but also plenty of non-trivially compositional functions. Here we show that within the space of non-injective functions (and so a fortiori within the space of non-injective and non-constant functions), compositional functions are not sufficiently abundant in order to generate the consequence relation of every propositional logic. Logical consequence relations thus impose substantive constraints on the existence of compositional functions when coupled with the condition of non-injectivity (though not without it). We ask how the apriori exclusion of injective functions from the search space might be justified, and we discuss the prospects of claims to the effect that any function can be "encoded" in a compositional one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Semantics in the Montagovian tradition combine two basic tenets. One tenet is that semantic value of a sentence is an intension, a function from points of evaluations into truth-values. The other tenet is that the semantic value of a composite expression is the result of applying the function denoted by one component to arguments denoted by the other components. Many philosophers object to intensional semantics on the grounds that intensionally equivalent sentences do not substitute salva veritate into attitude ascriptions. They propose instead that the semantic values of sentences must be structured propositions. In rejecting intensional semantics, philosophers who endorse structured propositions also usually reject functional compositionality. Undermining both tenets of the Montagovian programme. I defend a semantic theory that incorporates both structured propositions and functional compositionality. I argue that this semantic theory can preserve many explanatory benefits of Montague semantics. Finally, I show how treating composition functional application can resolve core problems internal to a theory of structured propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a preliminary semantic framework for Dependency Grammar in which lexical words are semantically defined as contextual distributions (sets of contexts) while syntactic dependencies are compositional operations on word distributions. More precisely, any syntactic dependency uses the contextual distribution of the dependent word to restrict the distribution of the head, and makes use of the contextual distribution of the head to restrict that of the dependent word. The interpretation of composite expressions and sentences, which are analyzed as a tree of binary dependencies, is performed by restricting the contexts of words dependency by dependency in a left-to-right incremental way. Consequently, the meaning of the whole composite expression or sentence is not a single representation, but a list of contextualized senses, namely the restricted distributions of its constituent (lexical) words. We report the results of two large-scale corpus-based experiments on two different natural language processing applications: paraphrasing and compositional translation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most important forms of idioms in Chinese, chengyus (CYs), have a fixed length of four Chinese characters. Most CYs are joined structures of two, two-character words-subject-verb units (SVs), verb-object units (VOs), structures of modification (SMs), or verb-verb units-or of four, one-character words. Both the first and second pairs of words in a four-word CY form an SV, a VO, or an SM. In the present study, normative measures were obtained for knowledge, familiarity, subjective frequency, age of acquisition, predictability, literality, and compositionality for 350 CYs, and the influences of the CYs' syntactic structures on the descriptive norms were analyzed. Consistent with previous studies, all of the norms yielded a high reliability, and there were strong correlations between knowledge, familiarity, subjective frequency, and age of acquisition, and between familiarity and predictability. Unlike in previous studies (e.g., Libben & Titone in Memory & Cognition, 36, 1103-1121, 2008), however, we observed a strong correlation between literality and compositionality. In general, the results seem to support a hybrid view of idiom representation and comprehension. According to the evaluation scores, we further concluded that CYs consisting of just one SM are less likely to be decomposable than those with a VOVO composition, and also less likely to be recognized through their constituent words, or to be familiar to, known by, or encountered by users. CYs with an SMSM composition are less likely than VOVO CYs to be decomposable or to be known or encountered by users. Experimental studies should investigate how a CY's syntactic structure influences its representation and comprehension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on considerations about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I shall grant Dummett his general bias towards verificationism, encapsulated in the slogan 'meaning is use'. The second general assumption I see no need to question is Dummett's particular breed of molecularism. Some of Dummett's assumptions will have to be given up, if classical logic is to be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. A major result of this paper will be that the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference in the Dummettian framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary debates on the principle of compositionality provoke a perplexing problem about its import on natural language. Whether the principle of compositionality makes any substantial constraints on the meaningfulness of natural language has an indeterminate answer. In this paper, I try to argue against the principle of compositionality for natural language by considering its significance for understanding. Part one is a general survey of the principle of compositionality pertaining to the meaning of a complex expression; and in part two, I will focus on the issue of understanding a sentence or more complex expression, pointing out that principle of compositionality is neither sufficient nor necessary for understanding, even though compositionality is true for natural language, it is trivial and useless; the final part aims to criticize the principle of compositionality from its underspecification of meaning, which is at odds with our general idea of the representational feature of natural language and the hypothesis of isomorphism among mind, language and reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence's meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The principle of compositionality models the way in which an agent determines the meaning of a complex expression depending on the meanings of its parts. It is often considered that the agents' flexibility in interpreting the linguistic expressions and the pragmatic intrusions in determining their meanings justify leaving the compositionality out. In this article I show that even if pragmatic factors intervene in the process by means of which the meaning of an expression is determined, it is possible to formulate more complex versions of the principle of compositionality which are compatible with the data offered by the pragmatic theories of meaning. This is the first part of a two-part article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the atomistic conception of language being explored at the book "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," by Ludwig Wittgenstein. It discusses the semantic contextualism being tackled at the book and associates it with the philosophy of Stanley Cavell. The conception of nonsense and the theory of sense are evaluated. It also analyzes the atomistic construal of the compositionality of language by identifying the atomistic view of the meanings of words as well as philosophical theories of language.

The paper proposes a semantic value for the logical constants (connectives and quantifiers) within the framework of proof-theoretic semantics, basic meaning on the introduction rules of a meaning conferring natural deduction proof system. The semantic value is defined based on Frege’s Context Principle, by taking “contributions” to sentential meanings as determined by the function-argument structure as induced by a type-logical grammar. In doing so, the paper proposes a novel proof-theoretic interpretation of the semantic types, traditionally interpreted in Henkin models. The compositionality of the resulting attribution of semantic values is discussed. Elsewhere, the same method was used for defining proof-theoretic meaning of subsentential phrases in a fragment of natural language. Doing the same for (the simpler and clearer case of) logic sheds more light on the proposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of early language development differ in the degree of abstraction granted to the early stages, and in the perspectives these adopt with regards to the interaction between lexicon and syntax. The paradigm associated with generative approaches and the continuity hypothesis attributes early complexity and abstraction to access to innate knowledge of structure. The paradigm generally identified with emergentist/general learning approaches assumes complexity is an emergent property that arises from experience. Comparing paradigms is difficult because they pursue different goals: one focuses on developmental stages and the other on the nature of representation at each stage. The core claim of generative approaches is that the product of lexical learning must interface explicitly with a system capable of formal productivity and of supporting compositionality. The present article reviews evidence for productivity in early negation, on the growth of syntactic recursion, and on ellipsis construction, and examines the notion of merge and compositionality and their explanatory role in language and language development. Las teorías del desarrollo temprano del lenguaje difieren en el grado de abstracción que se les otorga a las etapas tempranas, y en las premisas adoptadas con respecto a la relación léxico-sintaxis. El paradigma asociado con el generativismo y la hipótesis de la continuidad atribuye la complejidad y abstracción de las producciones tempranas al acceso al conocimiento innato de la estructura. El paradigma generalmente identificado con el constructivismo y un enfoque de aprendizaje general asumen que la complejidad es una propiedad que surge a partir de la experiencia. Es difícil comparar estos paradigmas puesto que en realidad persiguen objetivos distintos: uno se centra en el proceso de transición entre etapas de desarrollo, y el otro en la naturaleza de la representación en cada etapa. El supuesto principal del enfoque generativo es que el fruto del aprendizaje léxico debe ser interpretable desde un sistema capaz de una productividad formal y de apoyar un análisis composicional. El presente trabajo analiza los datos de productividad en la negación temprana, en el crecimiento de la capacidad para la recursión sintáctica y en las construcciones de elipsis. Asimismo, examina la noción de fusión (''merge'') y composicionalidad y su papel explicativo del lenguaje y del desarrollo lingüístico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to argue for two related statements: first, that formal semantics should not be conceived of as interpreting natural language expressions in a single model (a very large one representing the world as a whole, or something like that) but as interpreting them in many different models (formal counterparts, say, of little fragments of reality); second, that accepting such a conception of formal semantics yields a better comprehension of the relation between semantics and pragmatics and of the role to be played by formal semantics in the general enterprise of understanding meaning. For this purpose, three kinds of arguments are given: firstly, empirical arguments showing that the many models approach is the most straightforward and natural way of giving a formal counterpart to natural language sentences. Secondly, logical arguments proving the logical impossibility of a single universal model. And thirdly, theoretical arguments to the effect that such a conception of formal semantics fits in a natural and fruitful way with pragmatic theories and facts. In passing, this conception will be shown to cast some new light on the old problems raised by liar and sorites paradoxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis on the context and signification of Peter Abelard's mental language theory in Great Britain. It is said that Abelard has maintained individual works in a sentence which represent distinct semantic units from its overall meaning. He also employs two strategies to defend the position in the face of troublesome counterexamples. An example of his strategy evokes a fluid conception of what the signification of a word is and the considerable latitude to alter under the contextual influence of other words. As the evolution of the strategy is linked to a new willingness on Abelard's part to adopt the principle of charity in interpreting sentences, it also adopts the principle which is linked in developing vocation as an interpreter of biblical texts.

The article discusses the works of British analytic philosopher Paul Horwich on deflationary account of meaning as an alternative to truth-theoretic semantics. Horwich presented how the meaning properties of words constituted and provides deflationary alternative to the Davidsonian truth-theoretic perspective through compositionality. Moreover, Horwich described and defended a deflationary account of meaning as an alternative to truth theoretic semantics through syntactic analysis of the sentences in the language and the interpretation of expressions.

The article discusses the concept of construction-based grammatical theory which serves as best solution with the singular term theory. It elaborates singular term theory pertains which refers to that-clauses with complex singular terms designated propositions supported by the existence of oblique that-clauses in non-argument positions. The theory defies the traditional view of semantic compositionality by rejecting central dogma of semantics such as linguistic constructions on trivial logical or quasi-logical information to semantic interpretation.

The article discusses the concept of Surprise argument formulated by American philosopher Donald Herbert Davidson to resolve the dispute in contemporary formal semantics over the proper semantic value for a semantic theory. It states that the dispute are doubts raised by philosopher Paul Pietroski about the compositionality of truth-conditions semantics as the semantic value for a sentence. Pietroski has provided evidence that truth-conditions are not compositional and supported by his fellow philosophers Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore on their idea regarding the distinction between the truth expressed semantically and the truth of speech act content.

It is held by many grammarians that the relation of syntax and semantics is characterized by the Fregean principle of compositionality. The principle can be stated in various ways. In this article, the following formulation is adopted: the literal meaning of an expression is uniquely determined by the literal meanings of its subexpressions and their mode of composition. And the author believes that the validity of the formulation is beyond doubt and thus any grammar, whether organized to reflect it directly or not, may ultimately be required to satisfy it. And one of the systems that are precisely designed to reflect the principle is Montague Grammar.