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The search for the subjective nature of our self is intensely debated in philosophy and neuroscience. However, despite all progress, the subjectivity of self and how it fits into the seemingly objective world remains elusive. Drawing on recent empirical data, we show how the self is shaped by the brain's scale-free activity, that is, long-range temporal correlation (LRTC) and the world's ecological context. We assume that the scale-free LRTC of the world–brain relation provides the ontological basis for the point of view as the foundation of subjectivity within the world. We conclude that the temporal, that is, scale-free based point of view through the world–brain relation provides the ontologically necessary a posteriori condition for the subjectivity of self on a deeper neuro-ecological level. This extends phenomenological concepts like subjectivity and world beyond both Heidegger's fundamental ontology and Sartre's phenomenological ontology: it complements their subjectivity-based ontologies with a truly world-based ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound impact on individuals' sense of self perturbating the sense of connectedness with the others, touching upon deep existential fears and deep intersubjective and cultural layers, emphasizing the importance of a neuro-socio-ecological alignment for the sense of security of psychological self. We can still observe after years how social distancing measures, quarantines, and lockdowns have disrupted social connections and routines, leading to feelings of isolation, anxiety and depressive symptomatology. Furthermore, from a physiological perspective, some people continue to experience health problems long after having COVID-19, and these ongoing health problems are sometimes called post-COVID-19 syndrome or post-COVID conditions (PASC). In this complex scenario, through the operationalization of the sense of self and its psychological and physiological baseline, our aim is to try to shed some new light on elements of resilience vs. vulnerability. Here we intend the self and its baseline as the crossroads between psychology and physiology and we show how COVID-19 pandemic, especially in post-COVID-19 syndrome (PACS), left traces in the mind-body-brain system at a neuro-socio-ecological and inflammatory level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meditation can exert a profound impact on our mental life, with proficient practitioners often reporting an experience free of boundaries between a separate self and the environment, suggesting an explicit experience of "nondual awareness." What are the neural correlates of such experiences and how do they relate to the idea of nondual awareness itself? In order to unravel the effects that meditation has on the brain's spatial topography, we review functional magnetic resonance imaging brain findings from studies specific to an array of meditation types and meditator experience levels. We also review findings from studies that directly probe the interaction between meditation and the experience of the self. The main results are (i) decreased posterior default mode network (DMN) activity, (ii) increased central executive network (CEN) activity, (iii) decreased connectivity within posterior DMN as well as between posterior and anterior DMN, (iv) increased connectivity within the anterior DMN and CEN, and (v) significantly impacted connectivity between the DMN and CEN (likely a nonlinear phenomenon). Together, these suggest a profound organizational shift of the brain's spatial topography in advanced meditators—we therefore propose a topographic reorganization model of meditation (TRoM). One core component of the TRoM is that the topographic reorganization of DMN and CEN is related to a decrease in the mental-self-processing along with a synchronization with the more nondual layers of self-processing, notably interoceptive and exteroceptive-self-processing. This reorganization of the functionality of both brain and self-processing can result in the explicit experience of nondual awareness. In conclusion, this review provides insight into the profound neural effects of advanced meditation and proposes a result-driven unifying model (TRoM) aimed at identifying the inextricably tied objective (neural) and subjective (experiential) effects of meditation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What kind of neuroscience does psychoanalysis require? At his time, Freud in his "Project for a Scientific Psychology" searched for a model of the brain that could relate to incorporate the psyche's topography and dynamic. Current neuropsychoanalysis builds on specific functions as investigated in Affective and Cognitive (and Social) Neuroscience including embodied approaches. The brain's various functions are often converged with prediction as operationalized in predictive coding (PC) and free energy principle (FEP) which, recently, have been conceived as core for a "New Project for Scientific Psychology." We propose to search for a yet more comprehensive and holistic neuroscience that focuses primarily on its topography and dynamic analogous to Freud's model of the psyche. This leads us to what we describe as "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience" that focuses on the spatial topography and temporal dynamic of the brain's neural activity including how they shape affective, cognitive, and social functions including PC and FEP (first part). That is illustrated by the temporally and spatially nested neural hierarchy of the self in the brain's neural activity (second and third part). This sets the ground for developing our proposed "Project for a Spatiotemporal Neuroscience," which complements and extends both Freud's and Solms' projects (fourth part) and also carries major practical implications as it lays the ground for a novel form of neuroscientifically informed psychotherapy, namely, "Spatiotemporal Psychotherapy." In conclusion, "Spatiotemporal Neuroscience" provides an intimate link of brain and psyche by showing topography and dynamic as their shared features, that is, "common currency." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Interest in disordered sense of self in schizophrenia has recently re-emerged in the literature. It has been proposed that there is a basic self disturbance, underlying the diagnostic symptoms of schizophrenia, in which the person's sense of being a bounded individual continuous through time loses stability. This disturbance has been documented phenomenologically and at the level of cognitive tasks. However, the neural correlates of basic self disorder in schizophrenia are poorly understood. Methods: A search of PubMed was used to identify studies on self and schizophrenia that reported EEG or MEG data. Results: Thirty-three studies were identified, 32 using EEG and one using MEG. Their operationalizations of the self were divided into six paradigms: self-monitoring for errors, proprioception, self-other integration, self-referential processing, aberrant salience, and source monitoring. Participants with schizophrenia were less accurate on self-referential processing tasks and had slower response times across most studies. Event-related potential amplitudes differed across many early and late components, with reduced N100 suppression in source monitoring paradigms being the most replicated finding. Several studies found differences in one or more frequency band, but no coherent overall finding emerged in this area. Various other measures of brain dynamics also showed differences in single studies. Only some of the study designs were adequate to establish a causal relationship between the self and EEG or MEG measures. Conclusion: The broad range of changes suggests a global self disturbance at the neuronal level, possibly carried over from the resting state. Further studies that successfully isolate self-related effects are warranted to better understand the temporal-dynamic and spatial-topographic basis of self disorder and its relationship to basic self disturbance on the phenomenological level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID‐19 crisis is affecting our sense of self and touches upon our existential fears. This extends to the self–other relationship, as there is both being infected and infecting the other. What does this pandemic crisis tell us about our self and relatedness, its cultural differences, and how these are rooted in the brain's relation to the world? First, we discuss the psychological and neuronal features of self and self–other relation and how they are rooted in a deeper layer of the brain's neural activity complementing its cognitive surface layer. Second, we demonstrate cultural differences of Eastern and Western concepts of the self (i.e., independency and interdependency) and how these reflect the manifestation of the brain's neuro‐social and neuro‐ecological alignment. Finally, we highlight the intersubjective and cultural nature of the self and its surface in the COVID‐19 crisis. Discussing various lines of empirical data showing the brain's intimate alignment to both social and ecological environmental contexts, our results support the assumption of the brain's deep layer features by laying bare a continuum of different degrees of neuro‐social and neuro‐ecological alignment. This entails a two‐stage model of self with neuro‐social‐ecological and psychological levels that extends the previously suggested basis model of self‐specificity. We conclude that the current pandemic shows the importance of the deeper intersubjective and cultural layers of both the self and brain; their neglect can be life‐threatening for the self and others and, paradoxically, might reduce, rather than enlarge, the self's sense of freedom and independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The self is a multifaceted phenomenon that integrates information and experience across multiple time scales. How temporal integration on the psychological level of the self is related to temporal integration on the neuronal level remains unclear. To investigate temporal integration on the psychological level, we modified a well‐established self‐matching paradigm by inserting temporal delays. On the neuronal level, we indexed temporal integration in resting‐state EEG by two related measures of scale‐free dynamics, the power law exponent and autocorrelation window. We hypothesized that the previously established self‐prioritization effect, measured as decreased response times or increased accuracy for self‐related stimuli, would change with the insertion of different temporal delays between the paired stimuli, and that these changes would be related to temporal integration on the neuronal level. We found a significant self‐prioritization effect on accuracy in all conditions with delays, indicating stronger temporal integration of self‐related stimuli. Further, we observed a relationship between temporal integration on psychological and neuronal levels: higher degrees of neuronal integration, that is, higher power‐law exponent and longer autocorrelation window, during resting‐state EEG were related to a stronger increase in the self‐prioritization effect across longer temporal delays. We conclude that temporal integration on the neuronal level serves as a template for temporal integration of the self on the psychological level. Temporal integration can thus be conceived as the "common currency" of neuronal and psychological levels of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The self is the core of our mental life. Previous investigations have demonstrated a strong neural overlap between self‐related activity and resting state activity. This suggests that information about self‐relatedness is encoded in our brain's spontaneous activity. The exact neuronal mechanisms of such "rest‐self containment," however, remain unclear. The present EEG study investigated temporal measures of resting state EEG to relate them to self‐consciousness. This was obtained with the self‐consciousness scale (SCS) which measures Private, Public, and Social dimensions of self. We demonstrate positive correlations between Private self‐consciousness and three temporal measures of resting state activity: scale‐free activity as indexed by the power‐law exponent (PLE), the auto‐correlation window (ACW), and modulation index (MI). Specifically, higher PLE, longer ACW, and stronger MI were related to higher degrees of Private self‐consciousness. Finally, conducting eLORETA for spatial tomography, we found significant correlation of Private self‐consciousness with activity in cortical midline structures such as the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex and posterior cingulate cortex. These results were reinforced with a data‐driven analysis; a machine learning algorithm accurately predicted an individual as having a "high" or "low" Private self‐consciousness score based on these measures of the brain's spatiotemporal structure. In conclusion, our results demonstrate that Private self‐consciousness is related to the temporal structure of resting state activity as featured by temporal nestedness (PLE), temporal continuity (ACW), and temporal integration (MI). Our results support the hypothesis that self‐related information is temporally contained in the brain's resting state. "Rest‐self containment" can thus be featured by a temporal signature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who am I? What is the self and where does it come from? This may be one of the oldest problems in philosophy. Beyond traditional philosophy, only very recently approaches from neuroscience (in particular imaging studies) have tried to address these questions, too. So what are neural substrates of our self? An increasing body of evidence has demonstrated that a set of structures labeled as cortical midline structures are fundamental components to generate a conscious self. Moreover, recent theories on embodied cognition propose that this conscious self might be supplemented by additional structures, for example, in the somatosensory cortices, which enable our brain to create an "embodied mind". While the self based on cortical midline structures may be related to a conscious self, we here propose that the embodied facet of the self may be linked to something we call unconscious self. In this article we describe problems of this model of a conscious and unconscious self and discuss possible solutions from a theoretical point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate concerning the pathogenesis and the maintaining factors of eating disorders, anorexia nervosa in particular, is ongoing especially since therapeutic interventions do not result in satisfactory and enduring rates of remission. This paper presents a model for the pathogenesis of eating disorders, based on the hypothesis of a deficiency in the development of the self. We present the theory in light of new evidence concerning the role of attachment insecurity in the development and maintenance of eating disorders. In particular, we define the self in eating disorders in a comprehensive way by taking into account recent evidence from experimental psychology and neurobiology. The paper considers the development of the self in terms of its synchronic (i.e., experienced in the moment) and diachronic (i.e., experienced as continuous over time) aspects. Both synchronic and diachronic aspects of the self are relevant to the expression of eating disorder symptoms. Further, the maturation of the self is interwoven with the development of attachment functioning from infancy to adolescence. This interplay between these developmental processes of the self and of attachment could be crucial in understanding the pathogenesis of eating disorders. The final part of the paper suggests a neurobiological link between the theory of the self in the eating disorders and the spatiotemporal functioning of the brain. Disturbances in spatiotemporal functioning may represent the neurobiological pathway by which deficiencies in the self is related to attachment functions in individuals with eating disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretically, stimuli can be related to the self as subject (“I”) or object (“ME”) of experience. This event-related brain potential (ERP) study investigated whether listening to personal and possessive pronouns elicits different modes of self-processing regarding time-course and neural sources. Going beyond previous research, first (1PP) and second person (2PP) pronouns were included to determine the specificity of self-processing. Participants listened passively to German pronouns while the electroencephalogram was recorded. Modulation of ERPs revealed a processing advantage for the 2PP personal pronoun “du” (“you”) already in early time windows. Regarding possessive pronouns, N1 amplitudes indicated increased attention orientation to the 1PP pronoun “mein” (“my”), whereas during later time windows, processing of 1PP and 2PP possessive pronouns did not differ but differed from the third person pronoun “sein” (“his”). ERP source imaging suggests that primary sensory brain regions (auditory cortex), the insula and cortical midline structures are differentially involved into these two processing modes. The results support the idea of distinct self-processing modes (“I” and “ME”) and confirm their dynamic nature. Moreover, they demonstrate that on a neural level neither “I” or “ME” are invariantly tied to the first person, in line with the hypothesis that self-processing is relational and context-dependent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the self? This is a question that has long been discussed in (Western) philosophy where the self is traditionally conceived a higher-order function at the apex or pinnacle of all functions. This tradition has been transferred to recent neuroscience where the self is often considered to be a higher-order cognitive function reflected in memory and other high-level judgements. However, other lines of research demonstrate a close and intimate relationship between self-specificity and more basic functions like perceptions, emotions and reward. This paper focuses on the relationship between self-specificity and other basic functions relating to emotions, reward and perception. I propose the basis model that conceives self-specificity as a fundamental feature of the brain's spontaneous activity. This is supported by recent findings showing rest-self overlap in midline regions as well as findings demonstrating that the resting state can predict subsequent degrees of self-specificity. I conclude that such self-specificity in the brain's spontaneous activity may be central in linking the self to either internal or external stimuli. This may also provide the basis for coding the self as subject in relation to internal (i.e., self-consciousness) or external (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) mental events. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The self is central in our experience and has often been assumed to be necessary for any kind of consciousness in philosophy. Recent investigations in neuroscience demonstrate a particular set of regions such as the cortical midline regions to be associated with the processing of stimuli specifically related to the self as distinguished from those remaining unrelated to the self. Furthermore, findings show a close overlap between self-related activity and high levels of resting state activity in especially anterior midline regions. Interestingly, recent findings in psychiatric disorders such as depression and schizophrenia show resting state abnormalities in exactly these regions, that is in the cortical midline structures. Based on phenomenal and neural observations, I here suggest a neurophenomenal approach that directly links neuronal and phenomenal features (without sandwiching cognitive or sensorimotor functions) to psychopathological symptoms of self in depression and schizophrenia. © 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self and emotion have been discussed separately in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience whereas their relationship has been rather neglected. We here suggest that they are intrinsically linked by demonstrating that self-relatedness accounts for the subjectivity of emotions, and emotional valence reflects affectivity of the self. Based on functional imaging studies, we discuss different possible spatio-temporal patterns of neural activity in anterior cortical mid-line structures (aCMS) that allow us to link and, at the same time, to distinguish self-relatedness and emotional valence. We conclude that the aCMS may be crucial in affectively colouring our self and associating our emotional feelings with the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have experience and are conscious of the world. Who though is conscious? This is the subject or self of experience. While in the past the concept of self has been matter of philosophical discussion, psychoanalysis shifted it into the domain of psychology where it surfaced as ego. More recently, brain imaging allows to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying our subjective experience of a self. The article focuses on discussing different concepts of self as based on the philosophical accounts. These are then complemented by neuroscientific data on self and self-reference. Finally both philosophical and neuroscientific accounts are directly compared with each other while at the same time their relevance for psychoanalysis of self and ego are pointed out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies suggest that there may be a distinct relationship between spontaneous neural activity and subsequent or concurrent self-specific stimulus-induced activity. This study aims to test the impact of spontaneous activity as recorded in an eyes-open (EO) resting state as opposed to eyes-closed (EC) on self-specific versus non-self-specific auditory stimulus-induced activity in fMRI. In our first experiment we used self-specific stimuli comprised of the subject's own name and non-self-specific stimuli comprised of a friend's name and an unknown name, presented during EO versus EC baselines in a 3 name condition×2 baseline design. In Experiment 2 we directly measured spontaneous activity in the absence of stimuli during EO versus EC to confirm a modulatory effect of the two baseline conditions in the regions found to show an interaction effect in Experiment 1. Spontaneous activity during EO was significantly higher than during EC in bilateral auditory cortex and non-self-specific names yielded stronger signal changes relative to EO baseline than to EC. In contrast, there was no difference in response to self-specific names relative to EO baseline than to EC despite the difference between spontaneous activity levels. These results support an impact of spontaneous activity on stimulus-induced activity, moreover an impact that depends on the high-level stimulus characteristic of self-specificity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The problem of the self has been of increasing interest in recent neuroscience. Brain imaging studies have raised the question of whether neural activity in cortical midline regions is self-specific and whether self-specific activity is related to resting state activity (RSA). A quantitative meta-analysis that included 87 studies, representing 1433 participants, was conducted to discuss these questions. First, the specificity of the self (e.g. hearing one''s own name, seeing one''s own face) was tested and compared across familiar (using stimuli from personally known people) and other (non-self–non-familiar, i.e. strangers and widely-known figures) conditions. Second, the relationship between the self and resting state activity, as reflected by the default-mode network (DMN), was tested. The results indicated that the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC) is specifically involved in self-processing when compared to familiarity, other, and task/stimulus effects. On the contrary, other midline regions, i.e., medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) were functionally unspecific as they were recruited during the processing of both self-specific and familiar stimuli. Finally, the PACC was recruited during self-specific stimuli and this activity overlapped with DMN activity during resting state, thus distinguishing the self-related processing from both that of the familiar and other conditions. Taken together, our data suggest that our sense of self may result from a specific kind of interaction between resting state activity and stimulus-induced activity, i.e., rest–stimulus interaction, within the midline regions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Neuroscience has increasingly explored the neural mechanisms underlying our sense of self. Recent studies have demonstrated the recruitment of regions like the ventral tegmental area, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the ventral striatum to self-specific stimuli—regions typically associated with reward-related processing. This raises the question of whether there is a relationship between self and reward and, if so, how these different fields can be linked. Three relationship models that aim to explore the relationship between self and reward are discussed here: integration, segregation, and parallel processing. Their pros and cons are reviewed in light of the most recent findings. The conclusion is that both the fields of self and reward may benefit from increased interaction. This interaction may help to fill in some of the missing pieces regarding reward-related processing, as well as illuminate how brain function can bring forward the philosophical concept and psychological reality of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper we consider two major issues: conceptual–experimental approaches to the self, and the neuroanatomical substrate of the self. We distinguish content- and processed-based concepts of the self that entail different experimental strategies, and anatomically, we investigate the concept of midline structures in further detail and present a novel view on the anatomy of an integrated subcortical–cortical midline system. Presenting meta-analytic evidence, we show that the anterior paralimbic, e.g. midline, regions do indeed seem to be specific for self-specific stimuli. We conclude that future investigation of the self need to develop novel concepts that are more empirically plausible than those currently in use. Different concepts of self will require novel experimental designs that include, for example, the brain’s resting state activity as an independent variable. Modifications of both conceptual and anatomical dimensions will allow an empirically more plausible account of the relationship between brain and self. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The self has been addressed extensively by philosophers and psychologists from different cultures. Recent cognitive neuroscience studies have uncovered neural substrates underlying the processing of different aspects of the self. As social psychologists have shown evidence for differences in self-construal styles between Western and East Asian cultures, recent transcultural neuroimaging research sought to find potential neural mechanisms mediating cultural specific self-related processing. The findings of transcultural neuroimaging research help to understand the culture-dependent nature of the self and its underlying neural substrates. This also sheds light on how to conceptualize the self in psychological and philosophical terms. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The nature of “the self” has been one of the central problems in philosophy and more recently in neuroscience. This raises various questions: (i) Can we attribute a self to animals? (ii) Do animals and humans share certain aspects of their core selves, yielding a trans-species concept of self? (iii) What are the neural processes that underlie a possible trans-species concept of self? (iv) What are the developmental aspects and do they result in various levels of self-representation? Drawing on recent literature from both human and animal research, we suggest a trans-species concept of self that is based upon what has been called a “core-self” which can be described by self-related processing (SRP) as a specific mode of interaction between organism and environment. When we refer to specific neural networks, we will here refer to the underlying system as the “core-SELF.” The core-SELF provides primordial neural coordinates that represent organisms as living creatures—at the lowest level this elaborates interoceptive states along with raw emotional feelings (i.e., the intentions in action of a primordial core-SELF) while higher medial cortical levels facilitate affective-cognitive integration (yielding a fully-developed nomothetic core-self). Developmentally, SRP allows stimuli from the environment to be related and linked to organismic needs, signaled and processed within core-self structures within subcorical-cortical midline structures (SCMS) that provide the foundation for epigenetic emergence of ecologically framed, higher idiographic forms of selfhood across different individuals within a species. These functions ultimately operate as a coordinated network. We postulate that core SRP operates automatically, is deeply affective, and is developmentally and epigenetically connected to sensory-motor and higher cognitive abilities. This core-self is mediated by SCMS, embedded in visceral and instinctual representations of the body that are well integrated with basic attentional, emotional and motivational functions that are apparently shared between humans, non-human mammals, and perhaps in a proto-SELF form, other vertebrates. Such a trans-species concept of organismic coherence is thoroughly biological and affective at the lowest levels of a complex neural network, and culturally and ecologically molded at higher levels of neural processing. It allows organisms to selectively adapt to and integrate with physical and social environments. Such a psychobiologically universal, but environmentally diversified, concept may promote novel trans-species studies of the core-self across mammalian species. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The nature of the self has been one of the central problems in philosophy and most recently in neuroscience. Here, we suggest that animals and humans share a ‘core self’ represented in homologous underlying neural networks. We argue that the core self might be constituted by an integrative neuronal mechanism that enables self-related processing (SRP). Because mammalian organisms are capable of relating bodily states, intrinsic brain states (e.g. basic attentional, emotional and motivational systems) and environmental stimuli to various life-supporting goal-orientations, SRP appears to be a core ability preserved across numerous species. Recent data suggest that SRP is operating via a central integrative neural system made up of subcortical–cortical midline structures (SCMSs), that are homologous across mammalian species. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Background: The question of the self has intrigued philosophers and psychologists for a long time. More recently distinct concepts of self have also been suggested in neuroscience more specifically in neuroimaging. Aims: The aim here is to apply these findings to abnormalities of the self in depression and to develop neuropsychiatric hypothesis. Methods and results: Patients with depression suffer from an increased self-focus, attribution of negative emotions to the self, and increased cognitive processing of the own self. We assume that in major depressive disorder (MDD), the abnormal self-focus may be related to altered neural activity in the ventral cortical midline structures (CMS), the one-sided attribution of negative emotions to the self with neural activity in the amygdala and the ventral striatum/N. accumbens, and the abnormal cognitive processing of one''s self with reciprocal modulation between ventral CMS and lateral prefrontal cortical regions. Conclusions: It is concluded that the transdisciplinary investigation of the self between neuroscience, psychiatry and philosophy yields novel insights into the psychopathology and pathophysiology of the self in depression as well as into the neurophilosophical concept of the self in general. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The question of the self has intrigued philosophers and psychologists for a long time. More recently, distinct concepts of self have also been suggested in neuroscience. However, the exact relationship between these concepts and neural processing across different brain regions remains unclear. This article reviews neuroimaging studies comparing neural correlates during processing of stimuli related to the self with those of non-self-referential stimuli. All studies revealed activation in the medial regions of our brains'' cortex during self-related stimuli. The activation in these so-called cortical midline structures (CMS) occurred across all functional domains (e.g., verbal, spatial, emotional, and facial). Cluster and factor analyses indicate functional specialization into ventral, dorsal, and posterior CMS remaining independent of domains. Taken together, our results suggest that self-referential processing is mediated by cortical midline structures. Since the CMS are densely and reciprocally connected to subcortical midline regions, we advocate an integrated cortical–subcortical midline system underlying human self. We conclude that self-referential processing in CMS constitutes the core of our self and is critical for elaborating experiential feelings of self, uniting several distinct concepts evident in current neuroscience. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

For a long time philosophers and psychologists have been intrigued by the question of the self. More recently, this has become a topic of discussion in neuroscience. In this article, we suggest that the processing of self-referential stimuli in cortical midline structures (CMS) is a fundamental component in generating a model of the self. Drawing from neuroimaging studies, we distinguish between representation, monitoring, evaluation and integration of self-referential stimuli. All of these subfunctions are related to distinct regions within the CMS. This relationship between self-referential processing and CMS might provide novel insight into the neural correlates underlying the constitution of the self. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Various studies demonstrate a special role of the right compared to the left anterior insula in mediating our self. However, the neural features of the right insula that allow for its special role remain unclear. Presupposing a spatiotemporal model of self—"Basis model of self-specificity" (BMSS)—we here address the following question: what spatial-topographic and temporal-dynamic features render neural activity in the right insula to be more suitable in mediating self-specificity than the left insula? First, applying fMRI, we demonstrate that the right insula (i) exhibits higher degrees of centrality in rest, and (ii) higher context-dependent functional connectivity in a self-specific task among regions of distinct layers of self (intero-, extero-proprioceptive, and mental). Second, using EEG in rest and task, we show that the right insula shows longer autocorrelation window (ACW) in its neural activity than both left insula and other regions of the different layers of self. Together, we demonstrate special topographic, i.e., high functional connectivity, and dynamic, i.e., long ACW, neural features of the right insula compared to both left insula and other regions of the distinct layers of self. This suits neural activity in the right insula ideally for high functional integration and temporal continuity as key features of the self including its intero-, extero-proprioceptive, and mental layers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The self is an increasingly central topic in current neuroscience. Understanding the neural processes that are involved in self-referential processing and functioning may also be crucial to understanding consciousness. The current short communication goes beyond the typical concept that the self is singular, as has been assumed from neuroanatomical descriptions of the self by fMRI and PET studies. Long ago, theoretically, the idea of multiple aspects of the human self-arose, highlighting a dynamic organizational structure, but an increasing number of electrophysiological brain imaging studies, searching for the temporal dynamics of self-referential brain processes, now has empirical evidence supporting their existence. This short communication focuses on the theoretical idea of a dynamic self and provides first preliminary empirical evidence, including results from own studies of the authors, in support of, and highlights the serial dynamics of the human self, suggesting a primitive Me1 and an elaborate Me2 (a non-personal and a personal self). By focusing on the temporal dimension of the self, we propose that multiple aspects of the self can be distinguished based on their temporal sequence. A multiple aspects Self Theory (MAST) is proposed. This model is meant as a theoretical framework for future studies providing further support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by a fundamental change in self-awareness including seemingly paradoxical features like increased ego-centeredness and weakened self-referentiality. What is the neural basis of this so-called "self-paradox"? Conducting a meta-analytic review of fMRI rest and task studies, we show that ASD exhibits consistent hypofunction in anterior and posterior midline regions of the default-mode network (DMN) in both rest and task with decreased self–non-self differentiation. Relying on a multilayered nested hierarchical model of self, as recently established (Qin et al. 2020), we propose that ASD subjects cannot access the most upper layer of their self, the DMN-based mental self—they are locked-out of their own DMN and its mental self. This, in turn, results in strong weakening of their self-referentiality with decreases in both self-awareness and self–other distinction. Moreover, this blocks the extension of non-DMN cortical and subcortical regions at the lower layers of the physical self to the DMN-based upper layer of the mental self, including self–other distinction. The ASD subjects remain stuck and restricted to their intero- and exteroceptive selves as manifested in a relative increase in ego-centeredness (as compared to self-referentiality). This amounts to what we describe as "Hierarchical Model of Autistic Self" (HAS), which, characterizing the autistic self in hierarchical and spatiotemporal terms, aligns well with and extends current theories of ASD including predictive coding and weak central coherence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Art therapy plays important role in classical psychological assessment as it allows expressing the subject's sense of self. However, its effectiveness and validity could be impeded by lack of relationship to the patients' neuronal changes in their brain. The aim of our theoretical-empirical paper is to propose a novel brain-based quantitative objective measurement of the self and how it shapes the drawing process. We discuss recent data that how the autocorrelation window (ACW) is related to the temporal continuity of self in current neuroscience and further develop a method to use ACW to measure the temporal continuity of the drawing process, probing it in two case studies. As expected, the schizophrenic subject shows lower ACW values compared to the healthy subject and reflects the well-known deficit in the temporal continuity of the self in schizophrenia. We concluded that ACW and eventually other measures of the brain's spatiotemporal structure might be able to serve as objective markers of the self in the drawing process. As our approach connects brain, self, and drawing process, it provides the theoretical basis for the future development of a brain-based assessment of the self in the drawing process and art therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Identifies a three-level gradient neural mechanism in self-processing. • Establishes the crucial role of insula and interoceptive signals in self-processing. • Demonstrates the role played by the TPJ and AMPFC in bridging the bodily- and mental-self. • Highlights the importance of sensory signals in even non-bodily-self processing. • Summarizes the major neural correlates underlying various self-processing manipulations. Current researchers mostly agree that the self consists of both bodily and non-bodily environmental information. The neural mechanism underlying the integration of this information remains unclear. In this study, we propose a neural model subdividing self-processing into three intimately connected levels with different extension: Interoceptive-processing, Exteroceptive-processing and Mental-self-processing. We applied ALE meta-analyses on neuroimaging studies to analyze their neural patterns. Our results show common involvement of insula across all three levels including differentiation of self and familiarity. Common activities in Exteroceptive- and Mental-self-processing were found in the anteromedial prefrontal cortex (AMPFC) and the temporal parietal junction (TPJ), suggesting that the two regions likely serve basic functions in differentiation and integration of self-other information. Finally, Mental-self-processing involves extensive regions such as the cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex, in addition to the insula, AMPFC and TPJ, which could specialize in adding self-relatedness to environment information. We conclude that there is a gradient organization in self-processing, through which body-environment information is integrated for the self via propagation from Interoceptive-processing to Mental-self-processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the functions of the brain's midline regions, the different mental disorders, and the relations of self and the cortical midline structures (CMS).

• Neuroimaging studies of Self-Referential Processing (SRP) are reviewed. • Verbal (introspective, semantic) SRP is compared with Non-Verbal SRP (interoceptive, somatic)- Active (Task-based) SRP is compared with Passive (Off-task) SRP during resting state. • A conceptual and methodological framework for studying SRP occurring during foreground introspective and interoceptive tasks vs. during background resting state is described. • Psychological and Neurological Disorders of SRP are reviewed. We review neuroimaging research investigating self-referential processing (SRP), that is, how we respond to stimuli that reference ourselves, prefaced by a lexical-thematic analysis of words indicative of "self-feelings". We consider SRP as occurring verbally (V-SRP) and non-verbally (NV-SRP), both in the controlled, "top-down" form of introspective and interoceptive tasks, respectively, as well as in the "bottom-up" spontaneous or automatic form of "mind wandering" and "body wandering" that occurs during resting state. Our review leads us to outline a conceptual and methodological framework for future SRP research that we briefly apply toward understanding certain psychological and neurological disorders symptomatically associated with abnormal SRP. Our discussion is partly guided by William James' original writings on the consciousness of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The sense of self is related with perception of synchrony and connectedness. • Synchrony with self, body other and environment are key features of our self. • Perception of synchrony with self is a resilient factor during times of uncertainty. • Low perception of synchrony is associated with internal vulnerability of the self. • Synchrony is not only a key feature of the biological world but also of our self. The self is the core of our mental life which connects one's inner mental life with the external perception. Since synchrony is a key feature of the biological world and its various species, what role does it play for humans? We conducted a large-scale psychological study (n = 1072) combining newly developed visual analogue scales (VAS) for the perception of synchrony and internal and external cognition complemented by several psychological questionnaires. Overall, our findings showed close connection of the perception of synchrony of the self with both internal (i.e., body and cognition) and external (i.e., others, environment/nature) synchrony being associated positively with adaptive and negatively with maladaptive traits of self. Moreover, we have demonstrated how external (i.e., life events like the COVID-19 pandemic) variables modulate the perception of the self's internal-external synchrony. These findings suggest how synchrony with self plays a central role during times of uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The cognitive bias in decision making is linked to temporal integration and segregation, and this particularly in the CMS/DMN. • In rest, the relationship between cognitive bias and intrinsic neural timescales (INT) follows a logarithmic function. • The cognitive bias Criterion C and Sensitivity d' follow have an antagonistic relationship with the INTs. Our perceptions and decisions are not always objectively correct as they are featured by a bias related to our self. What are the behavioral, neural, and computational mechanisms of such cognitive bias? Addressing this yet unresolved question, we here investigate whether the cognitive bias is related to temporal integration and segregation as mediated by the brain's Intrinsic neural timescales (INT). Using Signal Detection Theory (SDT), we operationalize the cognitive bias by the Criterion C as distinguished from the sensitivity index d'. This was probed in a self-task based on morphed self- and other faces. Behavioral data demonstrate clear cognitive bias, i.e., Criterion C. That was related to the EEG-based INT as measured by the autocorrelation window (ACW) in especially the transmodal regions dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and default-mode network (DMN) as distinct from unimodal visual cortex. Finally, simulation of the same paradigm in a large-scale network model shows high degrees of temporal integration of temporally distinct inputs in CMS/DMN and dlPFC while temporal segregation predominates in visual cortex. Together, we demonstrate a key role of INT-based temporal integration in CMS/DMN and dlPFC including its relation to the brain's uni-transmodal topographical organization in mediating the cognitive bias of our self. [Display omitted] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The self is characterized by an intrinsic temporal component consisting in continuity across time. On the neural level, this temporal continuity manifests in the brain's intrinsic neural timescales (INT) that can be measured by the autocorrelation window (ACW). Recent EEG studies reveal a relationship between resting state ACW and self-consciousness. However, it remains unclear whether ACW exhibits different degrees of task-related changes during self-specific compared to non-self-specific activities. To this end, participants in our study initially recorded an eight-minute autobiographical narrative. Following a resting-state session, participants were presented with their own narrative and the narrative of a stranger while undergoing concurrent EEG recording. Behaviorally, subjects evaluated both of the narratives and indicated their perceptions of positivity or negativity on a moment-to-moment basis by positioning a cursor relative to the center of the computer screen. Our results indicate: (a) greater spatial extension and velocity in the behavioral cursor movement during the self narrative assessment compared to the non-self narrative assessment; and (b) longer neural ACWs in response to the self- compared to the non-self narrative and rest. These findings demonstrate the importance of longer temporal windows in neural activity measured by ACW for self-specificity. More broadly, the results highlight the relevance of temporal continuity for the self on the neural level. Such temporal continuity may, correspondingly, also manifest on the psychological level as a "common currency" between brain and self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The self is the fundamental core of our mental life. • The self is the psychological counterpart of the default mode functionality of the brain. • The self serves as "psychological baseline" for its inner thoughts and cognition. • Self, ruminative thought, spontaneous mindwandering and depressive symptoms are closely related. • The self's ruminative spontaneous thought act as a "magnet" exacerbating depression symptoms. Self-consciousness is neuronally associated with the brain's default mode network as its "neuronal baseline" while, psychologically the self is characterized by different thought modes and dynamics. We here raise the question whether they reflect the "psychological baseline" of the self. We investigate the psychological relationship of the self with thought modes (rumination, reflection) and mind-wandering dynamics (spontaneous, deliberate), as well as with depressive symptomatology. Our findings show a relationship between self-consciousness and i) mind-wandering dynamics, and ii) thought functional modes, in their respective forms. At the same time, self-consciousness is more related to spontaneous mind-wandering than deliberate and to rumination than reflection. Furthermore, iii) rumination acts as a mediator between self-consciousness and spontaneous mind-wandering dynamics; and iv) the relationship between high levels of self-consciousness and depressive symptoms is mediated by ruminative modes and spontaneous mind-wandering dynamics. Together, these findings support the view of the self as "psychological baseline". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]