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We examine the impact of cooperation between legal advisors and issuers on bank securitization pricing using 6,624 European ABS tranches issued in the European market over the period of 1998 to 2018. We find that previous cooperation is negatively related to initial yield spreads of ABS. Investors seem to attach value to previous cooperation between issuers and legal advisors and consider such transactions less risky by asking for lower yields. We observe that the magnitude of the past relationships is also of importance. Moreover, previous cooperation becomes more important as the risk of the transaction increases. This is especially noticeable when prime (AAA rated) tranches are compared to non‐prime (non‐AAA rated) tranches. Our results also show that the number of legal advisors in a deal does not matter for investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined the perceived risk of Brexit referendum (BR) in the United Kingdom (UK) securitization market, using 1,021 securitized bonds issued between 2011 and 2018. We find an unexpected negative relationship between the BR outcome and the initial yield spreads of asset-backed securities (ABS), even after accounting for the downward-adjusted credit ratings in the post-BR period. We do not observe this effect on mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Our findings imply that investors diversified into ABS bonds under uncertainty in the post-BR period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider the role of trustees–who are nominated to protect the interests of investors–in securitization pricing and whether investors rely on them to mitigate risks. In particular, we examine the effect of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of European mortgage‐backed security (MBS) issuances between 1999 and the first half of 2007. We find that engaging reputable trustees led to lower spreads during the credit boom period prior to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Our findings suggest that trustees' reputation was considered by investors to be more important when risk assessment became more challenging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assess the effect of securitization activity on relative credit quality employing a uniquely detailed dataset from the euro‐denominated syndicated loan market. We find that at issuance, based on observable characteristics, banks do not seem to select and securitize loans of lower credit quality. Following securitization, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorates more than those in the control group. We find that poorer performance by borrowers of securitized loans seems to be connected to banks' reduced monitoring incentives. Our results are supported by two additional methodologies and robust to controlling for predetermined borrower–lender matching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assess the relative effect of securitization activity on banks’ lending rates employing a uniquely detailed dataset from the euro-denominated syndicated loan market. We find that in the run-up to the 2007–2009 crisis banks more active at originating asset-backed securities did not price their loans more aggressively (i.e. with narrower lending spreads) than non-active banks. We show that also within the set of loans that were previously securitized, the relative level of securitization activity by the originating bank is not related to narrower lending spreads. Our findings, which are limited to the cross-sectional impact of securitization, suggest that the effect of securitization on the cost of corporate funding appears to be quite limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We examine whether reputation functions as a self-disciplining mechanism in providing higher quality MBS. • We find that issuer banks' reputational capital predicts future performance. • However, the asset pools securitized by reputable issuers during the pre-GFC credit boom period were of worse quality. • We find that foreign issuers are more likely to produce lower quality MBS. We examine the link between issuer bank reputation and the performance of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the European market. We find that MBS sold by reputable issuer banks are collateralised by higher quality asset pools with lower delinquency rates and are less likely to be downgraded. However, during boom periods – characterized by declining credit standards, MBS originated by reputable issuer banks tend to be collateralised by lower quality assets, compared to normal periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]