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During the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, many countries directed substantial resources toward genomic surveillance to detect and track viral variants. There is a debate over how much sequencing effort is necessary in national surveillance programs for SARS-CoV-2 and future pandemic threats. We aimed to investigate the effect of reduced sequencing on surveillance outcomes in a large genomic data set from Switzerland, comprising more than 143k sequences. We employed a uniform downsampling strategy using 100 iterations each to investigate the effects of fewer available sequences on the surveillance outcomes: (i) first detection of variants of concern (VOCs), (ii) speed of introduction of VOCs, (iii) diversity of lineages, (iv) first cluster detection of VOCs, (v) density of active clusters, and (vi) geographic spread of clusters. The impact of downsampling on VOC detection is disparate for the three VOC lineages, but many outcomes including introduction and cluster detection could be recapitulated even with only 35% of the original sequencing effort. The effect on the observed speed of introduction and first detection of clusters was more sensitive to reduced sequencing effort for some VOCs, in particular Omicron and Delta, respectively. A genomic surveillance program needs a balance between societal benefits and costs. While the overall national dynamics of the pandemic could be recapitulated by a reduced sequencing effort, the effect is strongly lineage-dependent-something that is unknown at the time of sequencing-and comes at the cost of accuracy, in particular for tracking the emergence of potential VOCs.IMPORTANCESwitzerland had one of the most comprehensive genomic surveillance systems during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such programs need to strike a balance between societal benefits and program costs. Our study aims to answer the question: How would surveillance outcomes have changed had we sequenced less? We find that some outcomes but also certain viral lineages are more affected than others by sequencing less. However, sequencing to around a third of the original effort still captured many important outcomes for the variants of concern such as their first detection but affected more strongly other measures like the detection of first transmission clusters for some lineages. Our work highlights the importance of setting predefined targets for a national genomic surveillance program based on which sequencing effort should be determined. Additionally, the use of a centralized surveillance platform facilitates aggregating data on a national level for rapid public health responses as well as post-analyses., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Genome sequences from evolving infectious pathogens allow quantification of case introductions and local transmission dynamics. We sequenced 11,357 severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes from Switzerland in 2020-the sixth largest effort globally. Using a representative subset of these data, we estimated viral introductions to Switzerland and their persistence over the course of 2020. We contrasted these estimates with simple null models representing the absence of certain public health measures. We show that Switzerland's border closures decoupled case introductions from incidence in neighboring countries. Under a simple model, we estimate an 86 to 98% reduction in introductions during Switzerland's strictest border closures. Furthermore, the Swiss 2020 partial lockdown roughly halved the time for sampled introductions to die out. Last, we quantified local transmission dynamics once introductions into Switzerland occurred using a phylodynamic model. We found that transmission slowed 35 to 63% upon outbreak detection in summer 2020 but not in fall. This finding may indicate successful contact tracing over summer before overburdening in fall. The study highlights the added value of genome sequencing data for understanding transmission dynamics.

Rapid antigen tests (RATs) are widely used for point-of-care or self-testing to identify SARS-CoV-2 (SCoV2), but currently circulating Omicron variants may impair detection. In this study, we prospectively evaluated the Roche-SARS-CoV-2-Antigen and Acon-FlowFlex-SARS-CoV-2-Antigen in 150 consecutively collected nasopharyngeal patient swabs (50 SCoV2 RNA undetectable; 100 SCoV2 Omicron BA.1). Omicron BA.1 results were compared to 92 Ct-matched early-pandemic SCoV2 variants (B.1.160 and B.1.177), to 100 Omicron BA.2 positive and to 100 Omicron BA.5 positive samples. For Omicron BA.1, Roche-SARS-CoV-2-Antigen detected 87% of samples having Ct-values <29 reflecting 3.6% lower rates compared to B.1.160 and B.1.177. Acon-FlowFlex-SARS-CoV-2-Antigen was less affected and detected 90% of Omicron BA.1 with Ct-values <29. Omicron BA.2 and BA.5 detection rates were significantly reduced by 20% and 10%, respectively, for the Roche-SARS-CoV-2-Antigen in samples with Ct-values <29 but remained similar for Acon-FlowFlex-SARS-CoV-2-Antigen. RATs need to be continuously evaluated as new SCoV2-variants emerge. Spreading of Omicron-BA.2, and the recently emerged Omicron BA.5 variant, may not only result from escape from postvaccine or postinfection immunity, but also from false-negative RATs misguiding point-of-care and self-testing decisions at times of restricted molecular testing. IMPORTANCE Antigen tests are widely used for rapid identification of SCoV2-positive cases and their increased risk of transmission. At present, there are several FDA- and CE-cleared tests available in North America and Europe. However, their diagnostic performance has been evaluated with early-pandemic variants. This study provides evidence that variation within the nucleocapsid protein as seen in recently emerged and now globally spreading Omicron BA.2 and BA.5 variants significantly impairs detection rates of widely used antigen tests. Consequently, antigen tests need to be reevaluated when new pandemic SCoV2 variants emerge and start to predominate globally.

To investigate the class-dependent properties of anti-viral IgM antibodies, we use membrane antigen capture activated cell sorting to isolate spike-protein-specific B cells from donors recently infected with SARS-CoV-2, allowing production of recombinant antibodies. We isolate 20, spike-protein-specific antibodies of classes IgM, IgG, and IgA, none of which shows any antigen-independent binding to human cells. Two antibodies of class IgM mediate virus neutralization at picomolar concentrations, but this potency is lost following artificial switch to IgG. Although, as expected, the IgG versions of the antibodies appear to have lower avidity than their IgM parents, this is not sufficient to explain the loss of potency., (© 2022 The Authors. Published under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.)

This first pilot trial on external quality assessment (EQA) of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) whole-genome sequencing, initiated by the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (ESCMID) Study Group for Genomic and Molecular Diagnostics (ESGMD) and the Swiss Society for Microbiology (SSM), aims to build a framework between laboratories in order to improve pathogen surveillance sequencing. Ten samples with various viral loads were sent out to 15 clinical laboratories that had free choice of sequencing methods and bioinformatic analyses. The key aspects on which the individual centers were compared were the identification of (i) single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and indels, (ii) Pango lineages, and (iii) clusters between samples. The participating laboratories used a wide array of methods and analysis pipelines. Most were able to generate whole genomes for all samples. Genomes were sequenced to various depths (up to a 100-fold difference across centers). There was a very good consensus regarding the majority of reporting criteria, but there were a few discrepancies in lineage and cluster assignments. Additionally, there were inconsistencies in variant calling. The main reasons for discrepancies were missing data, bioinformatic choices, and interpretation of data. The pilot EQA was overall a success. It was able to show the high quality of participating laboratories and provide valuable feedback in cases where problems occurred, thereby improving the sequencing setup of laboratories. A larger follow-up EQA should, however, improve on defining the variables and format of the report. Additionally, contamination and/or minority variants should be a further aspect of assessment.

The new SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant (B.1.1.529) has been recently declared a Variant of Concern due to a series of important mutations in the viral spike protein and especially in the receptor-binding domain. While investigations into the spread of this new variant are ongoing, the first cases have been detected in Switzerland. Important questions have been raised: (1) Will the PCR assays commonly used to detect SARS-CoV-2 still work for the Omicron variant? (2) Can specific PCR features, e.g. S-gene dropout, be used to identify potential Omicron samples? In this minireview we provide current knowledge on the Omicron variant and guidance on its PCR validation.

Background: In December 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) reported a SARS-CoV-2 Variant of Concern (VoC) which is now named B.1.1.7. Based on initial data from the UK and later data from other countries, this variant was estimated to have a transmission fitness advantage of around 40-80 % (Volz et al., 2021; Leung et al., 2021; Davies et al., 2021)., Aim: This study aims to estimate the transmission fitness advantage and the effective reproductive number of B.1.1.7 through time based on data from Switzerland., Methods: We generated whole genome sequences from 11.8 % of all confirmed SARS-CoV-2 cases in Switzerland between 14 December 2020 and 11 March 2021. Based on these data, we determine the daily frequency of the B.1.1.7 variant and quantify the variant's transmission fitness advantage on a national and a regional scale., Results: We estimate B.1.1.7 had a transmission fitness advantage of 43-52 % compared to the other variants circulating in Switzerland during the study period. Further, we estimate B.1.1.7 had a reproductive number above 1 from 01 January 2021 until the end of the study period, compared to below 1 for the other variants. Specifically, we estimate the reproductive number for B.1.1.7 was 1.24 [1.07-1.41] from 01 January until 17 January 2021 and 1.18 [1.06-1.30] from 18 January until 01 March 2021 based on the whole genome sequencing data. From 10 March to 16 March 2021, once B.1.1.7 was dominant, we estimate the reproductive number was 1.14 [1.00-1.26] based on all confirmed cases. For reference, Switzerland applied more non-pharmaceutical interventions to combat SARS-CoV-2 on 18 January 2021 and lifted some measures again on 01 March 2021., Conclusion: The observed increase in B.1.1.7 frequency in Switzerland during the study period is as expected based on observations in the UK. In absolute numbers, B.1.1.7 increased exponentially with an estimated doubling time of around 2-3.5 weeks. To monitor the ongoing spread of B.1.1.7, our plots are available online., (Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Objectives: Detecting severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is key to the clinical and epidemiological assessment of CoVID-19. We cross-validated manual and automated high-throughput testing for SARS-CoV-2-RNA, evaluated SARS-CoV-2 loads in nasopharyngeal-oropharyngeal swabs (NOPS), lower respiratory fluids, and plasma, and analyzed detection rates after lockdown and relaxation measures., Methods: Basel-S-gene, Roche-E-gene, and Roche-cobas®6800-Target1 and Target2 were prospectively validated in 1344 NOPS submitted during the first pandemic peak (Week 13). Follow-up cohort (FUP) 1, 2, and 3 comprised 10,999, 10,147, and 19,389 NOPS submitted during a 10-week period until Weeks 23, 33, and 43, respectively., Results: Concordant results were obtained in 1308 cases (97%), including 97 (9%) SARS-CoV-2-positives showing high quantitative correlations (Spearman's r > .95; p < .001) for all assays and high precision by Bland-Altman analysis. Discordant samples (N = 36, 3%) had significantly lower SARS-CoV-2 loads (p < .001). Following lockdown, detection rates declined to <1% in FUP-1, reducing single-test positive predictive values from 99.3% to 85.1%. Following relaxation, rates flared up to 4% and 12% in FUP-2 and -3, but infected patients were younger than during lockdown (34 vs. 52 years, p < .001). In 261 patients providing 936 NOPS, SARS-CoV-2 loads declined by three orders of magnitude within 10 days postdiagnosis (p < .001). SARS-CoV-2 loads in NOPS correlated with those in time-matched lower respiratory fluids or in plasma but remained detectable in some cases with negative follow-up NOPS, respectively., Conclusion: Manual and automated assays significantly correlated qualitatively and quantitatively. Following a successful lockdown, declining positive predictive values require independent dual-target confirmation for reliable assessment. Confirmatory and quantitative follow-up testing should be obtained within <5 days and consider lower respiratory fluids in symptomatic patients with SARS-CoV-2-negative NOPS., (© 2020 Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

The first case of SARS-CoV-2 in Basel, Switzerland was detected on February 26th 2020. We present a phylogenetic study to explore viral introduction and evolution during the exponential early phase of the local COVID-19 outbreak from February 26th until March 23rd. We sequenced SARS-CoV-2 naso-oropharyngeal swabs from 746 positive tests that were performed at the University Hospital Basel during the study period. We successfully generated 468 high quality genomes from unique patients and called variants with our COVID-19 Pipeline (COVGAP), and analysed viral genetic diversity using PANGOLIN taxonomic lineages. To identify introduction and dissemination events we incorporated global SARS-CoV-2 genomes and inferred a time-calibrated phylogeny. Epidemiological data from patient questionnaires was used to facilitate the interpretation of phylogenetic observations. The early outbreak in Basel was dominated by lineage B.1 (83·6%), detected first on March 2nd, although the first sample identified belonged to B.1.1. Within B.1, 68·2% of our samples fall within a clade defined by the SNP C15324T ('Basel cluster'), including 157 identical sequences at the root of the 'Basel cluster', some of which we can specifically trace to regional spreading events. We infer the origin of B.1-C15324T to mid-February in our tri-national region. The other genomes map broadly over the global phylogenetic tree, showing several introduction events from and/or dissemination to other regions of the world via travellers. Family transmissions can also be traced in our data. A single lineage variant dominated the outbreak in the Basel area while other lineages, such as the first (B.1.1), did not propagate. A mass gathering event was the predominant initial source of cases, with travel returners and family transmissions to a lesser extent. We highlight the importance of adding specific questions to epidemiological questionnaires, to obtain data on attendance of large gatherings and their locations, as well as travel history, to effectively identify routes of transmissions in up-coming outbreaks. This phylogenetic analysis in concert with epidemiological and contact tracing data, allows connection and interpretation of events, and can inform public health interventions. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov NCT04351503., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.