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Introduction: Following harmonization efforts by the Belgian National Reference Center for SARS-CoV-2, semi-quantitative PCR test (SQ-PCR) results, used as a proxy for viral load, were routinely collected after performing RT-qPCR tests., Methods: We investigated both the personal characteristics associated with SQ-PCR results and the transmission dynamics involving these results. We used person-level laboratory test data and contact tracing data collected in Belgium from March 2021 to February 2022. Personal characteristics (age, sex, vaccination, and laboratory-confirmed prior infection) and disease stage by date of symptom onset were analyzed in relation to SQ-PCR results using logistic regression. Vaccine effectiveness (VE) against a high viral load (≥10 7 copies/mL) was estimated from the adjusted probabilities. Contact tracing involves the mandatory testing of high-risk exposure contacts (HREC) after contact with an index case. Odds ratios for test positivity and high viral load in HREC were calculated based on the SQ-PCR result of the index case using logistic regression models adjusted for age, sex, immunity status (vaccination, laboratory-confirmed prior infection), variant (Alpha, Delta, Omicron), calendar time, and contact tracing covariates., Results: We included 909,157 SQ-PCR results of COVID-19 cases, 379,640 PCR results from index cases, and 72,052 SQ-PCR results of HREC. High viral load was observed more frequently among recent cases, symptomatic cases, cases over 25 years of age, and those not recently vaccinated (>90 days). The vaccine effectiveness (VE) of the primary schedule in the first 30 days after vaccination was estimated at 47.3% (95%CI 40.8-53.2) during the Delta variant period. A high viral load in index cases was associated with an increased test positivity in HREC (OR 2.7, 95%CI 2.62-2.79) and, among those testing positive, an increased likelihood of a high viral load (OR 2.84, 95%CI 2.53-3.19)., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2024 Braeye, Proesmans, Van Cauteren, Brondeel, Hens, Vermeiren, Hammami, Rosas, Taame, André and Cuypers.)

Sequencing of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has generated a wealth of data on viral evolution across populations, but only a few studies have so far explored SARS-CoV-2 evolution across large connected transmission networks. Here, we couple data from SARS-CoV-2 sequencing with contact tracing data from an outbreak with a single origin in a rural Norwegian community where samples from all exposed persons were collected prospectively. A total of 134 nasopharyngeal samples were positive by PCR. Among the 121 retrievable genomes, 81 were identical to the genome of the introductor, thus demonstrating that genomics beyond clustering genotypically similar viral genomes to confirm relatedness offers limited additional value to manual contact tracing. In the cases where mutations were discovered, five small genetic clusters were identified. We observed a household secondary attack rate of 77%, with 92% of household members infected among households with secondary transmission, suggesting that SARS-CoV-2 introduction into large families is likely to affect all household members., Importance: In outbreak investigations, obtaining a full overview of infected individuals within a population is seldom achieved. We here present an example where a single introduction of B1.1.7 SARS-CoV-2 within a rural community allowed for tracing of the virus from an introductor via dissemination through larger gatherings into households. The outbreak occurred before widespread vaccination, allowing for a "natural" outbreak development with community lockdown. We show through sequencing that the virus can infect up to five consecutive persons without gaining mutations, thereby showing that contact tracing seems more important than sequencing for local outbreak investigations in settings with few alternative introductory transmission pathways. We also show how larger households where a child introduced transmission appeared more likely to promote further spread of the virus compared to households with an adult as the primary introductor., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Enforcing strict protocols that prevent transmission of airborne infections in prisons is challenging. We examine a large severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 outbreak in a Catalan penitentiary center in February-April 2021, prior to vaccination deployment. The aim was to describe the evolution of the outbreak using classical and genomic epidemiology and the containment strategy applied. The outbreak was initially detected in 1 module but spread to 4, infecting 7 staff members and 140 incarcerated individuals, 6 of whom were hospitalized (4.4%). Genomic analysis confirmed a single origin (B.1.1.7). Contact tracing identified transmission vectors between modules and prevented further viral spread. In future similar scenarios, the control strategy described here may help limit transmission of airborne infections in correctional settings., Competing Interests: Potential conflicts of interest. The authors: No reported conflicts of interest. All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest. Conflicts that the editors consider relevant to the content of the manuscript have been disclosed., (© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Infectious Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved. For commercial re-use, please contact reprints@oup.com for reprints and translation rights for reprints. All other permissions can be obtained through our RightsLink service via the Permissions link on the article page on our site—for further information please contact journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Background: Candida auris (C auris) is a fungal pathogen that has the potential for environmental persistence leading to outbreaks in health care settings. There has been a worldwide surge in C auris outbreaks during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this report, we describe an outbreak of C auris, its control, patient outcomes, and lessons learned., Methods: The outbreak occurred in a 600-bed adult academic tertiary care hospital. Contact tracing was initiated immediately after identification of the index case and surveillance testing for C auris was obtained from patients who were exposed to the index case. Infection prevention measures were closely followed., Results: A total of 560 cultures were performed on 453 unique patients between August 2021 and December 2021. Of those, 31 cultures (5.5%) were positive for C auris; 27 (87.1%) were colonized with C auris, while 4 patients developed a clinical infection (12.9%). The secondary attack rate was 6.8% (31/453). The 30-day all-cause mortality rate for all patients who tested positive for C auris was 9.7%., Discussion: C auris can cause protracted outbreaks that result in colonization and invasive infections. Multidisciplinary work to improve adherence to infection prevention measures as well as targeted admission screening are essential to limit outbreaks., (Copyright © 2024 Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Case investigation and contact tracing (CICT) are public health measures that aim to break the chain of pathogen transmission. Changes in viral characteristics of COVID-19 variants have likely affected the effectiveness of CICT programs. We estimated and compared the cases averted in Vermont when the original COVID-19 strain circulated (Nov. 25, 2020-Jan. 19, 2021) with two periods when the Delta strain dominated (Aug. 1-Sept. 25, 2021, and Sept. 26-Nov. 20, 2021). When the original strain circulated, we estimated that CICT prevented 7180 cases (55% reduction in disease burden), compared to 1437 (15% reduction) and 9970 cases (40% reduction) when the Delta strain circulated. Despite the Delta variant being more infectious and having a shorter latency period, CICT remained an effective tool to slow spread of COVID-19; while these viral characteristics did diminish CICT effectiveness, non-viral characteristics had a much greater impact on CICT effectiveness., (© 2024. This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply.)

Purpose: Examine how school-based COVID-19 prevention strategy implementation varied over time, including by local characteristics., Methods: School administrators (n = 335) from a nationally representative sample of K-12 public schools completed four surveys assessing COVID-19 prevention strategies at two-month intervals between October 2021 and June 2022. We calculated weighted prevalence estimates by survey wave. Generalized estimating equations (GEE) were used to model longitudinal changes in strategy implementation, accounting for school and county covariates., Results: Opening doors/windows, daily cleaning, and diagnostic testing were reported by ≥ 50 % of schools at each survey wave. Several strategies were consistently implemented across the 2021-2022 school year (i.e., daily cleaning, opening doors and windows, diagnostic testing) while other strategies increased initially and then declined (i.e., contact tracing, screening testing, on-campus vaccination) or declined consistently throughout the school year (i.e., mask requirement, classroom distancing, quarantine). Although longitudinal changes in strategy implementation did not vary by school characteristics, strategy implementation varied by urban-rural classification and school level throughout the school year., Conclusions: Strategies that were consistently implemented throughout the school year were also reported by a majority of schools, speaking toward their feasibility for school-based infection control and prevention and potential utility in future public health emergencies., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

This study examines the epidemiological and genomic characteristics, along with the transmission dynamics, of SARS-CoV-2 within prison units I and II in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazil. Conducted between May and October 2022, it reveals how the virus spreads in the confined settings of prisons, emphasizing the roles of overcrowded cells, frequent transfers, and limited healthcare access. The research involved 1927 participants (83.93% of the total prison population) and utilized nasopharyngeal swabs and RT-qPCR testing for detection. Contact tracing monitored exposure within cells. Out of 2108 samples, 66 positive cases were identified (3.13%), mostly asymptomatic (77.27%), with the majority aged 21-29 and varying vaccination statuses. Next-generation sequencing generated 28 whole genome sequences, identifying the Omicron variant (subtypes BA.2 and BA.5) with 99% average coverage. Additionally, the study seeks to determine the relationship between immunization levels and the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 cases within this enclosed population. The findings underscore the necessity of comprehensive control strategies in prisons, including rigorous screening, isolation protocols, vaccination, epidemiological monitoring, and genomic surveillance to mitigate disease transmission and protect both the incarcerated population and the broader community.

We calculated attack rates for household contacts of COVID-19 patients during the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron BA.2-dominant period in Japan. Attack rates among household contacts without recent (<3 months) vaccination was lower for contacts of index patients with complete vaccination than for contacts of index patients without complete vaccination, demonstrating indirect vaccine effectiveness.

Background: SARS-CoV-2 pandemic mitigation efforts resulted in reallocation of public health personnel, likely impacting provision of timely sexually transmitted infection partner services (PS). We describe PS outcomes before and during the pandemic in King County, WA., Methods: We examined PS outcomes for syphilis and gonorrhea cases diagnosed in 2019 and 3 periods in 2020 (pre-lockdown: January 1, 2020-March 23, 2020; lockdown: March 24, 2020-June 5, 2020; post-lockdown: June 6, 2020-December 31, 2020). We described changes over time in 3 PS outcomes: cases initiated, interviewed, and with named sex partners. We calculated adjusted prevalence ratios (aPRs) with Poisson regression comparing these outcomes in the 2020 periods with 2019., Results: Reported gonorrhea (4611 vs. 4179) and syphilis (665 vs. 586) cases declined from 2019 to 2020. In 2019, 60.7% of cases were initiated, compared with 42.1% before lockdown (aPR, 0.74; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.70%-0.78%), 41.7% during lockdown (aPR, 0.79; 95% CI, 0.73-0.85), and 41.7% after lockdown (aPR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.77-0.85). Among initiated cases, the proportion interviewed also seemed to drop in the 3 lockdown periods (52.4%, 41.0%, 44.1%) compared with 2019 (55.7%). However, in adjusted analyses, the prevalence of interview among case patients was only lower pre-lockdown (aPR, 0.91; 95% CI, 0.85-0.99), and higher during (aPR, 1.10; 95% CI, 1.01-1.20) and after (aPR, 1.12; 95% CI, 1.06-1.19). Interviewed patients named partners more often during (21.4%; aPR, 1.35; 95% CI, 1.05-1.74) and less often after lockdown (16.0%; aPR, 0.63; 95% CI, 0.51-0.79), compared with 2019 (26.6%)., Conclusions: These results underscore the need for a trained public health worker reserve, and plans for deployment of existing workers and prioritization of cases to continue essential sexually transmitted infection public health activities during public health crises., Competing Interests: Conflict of Interest and Sources of Funding: The study was funded by grant CDC/NCHHSTP 1 NH25PS005185-01-00, STD Surveillance Network, and the authors declare no conflicts of interest., (Copyright © 2024 American Sexually Transmitted Diseases Association. All rights reserved.)

Introduction: This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of COVID-19 transmission dynamics using an infection network derived from epidemiological data in South Korea, covering the period from January 3, 2020, to July 11, 2021. The network illustrates infector-infectee relationships and provides invaluable insights for managing and mitigating the spread of the disease. However, significant missing data hinder conventional analysis of such networks from epidemiological surveillance., Methods: To address this challenge, this article suggests a novel approach for categorizing individuals into four distinct groups, based on the classification of their infector or infectee status as either traced or untraced cases among all confirmed cases. The study analyzes the changes in the infection networks among untraced and traced cases across five distinct periods., Results: The four types of cases emphasize the impact of various factors, such as the implementation of public health strategies and the emergence of novel COVID-19 variants, which contribute to the propagation of COVID-19 transmission. One of the key findings is the identification of notable transmission patterns in specific age groups, particularly in those aged 20-29, 40-69, and 0-9, based on the four type classifications. Furthermore, we develop a novel real-time indicator to assess the potential for infectious disease transmission more effectively. By analyzing the lengths of connected components, this indicator facilitates improved predictions and enables policymakers to proactively respond, thereby helping to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on global communities., Conclusion: This study offers a novel approach to categorizing COVID-19 cases, provides insights into transmission patterns, and introduces a real-time indicator for better assessment and management of the disease transmission, thereby supporting more effective public health interventions., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2024 Lee, Choi, Lee, Lee and Kim.)

Background: Australian states and territories used test-trace-isolate-quarantine (TTIQ) systems extensively in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021. We report on an analysis of Australian case data to estimate the impact of test-trace-isolate-quarantine systems on SARS-CoV-2 transmission., Methods: Our analysis uses a novel mathematical modelling framework and detailed surveillance data on COVID-19 cases including dates of infection and dates of isolation. First, we directly translate an empirical distribution of times from infection to isolation into reductions in potential for onward transmission during periods of relatively low caseloads (tens to hundreds of reported cases per day). We then apply a simulation approach, validated against case data, to assess the impact of case-initiated contact tracing on transmission during a period of relatively higher caseloads and system stress (up to thousands of cases per day)., Results: We estimate that under relatively low caseloads in the state of New South Wales (tens of cases per day), TTIQ contributed to a 54% reduction in transmission. Under higher caseloads in the state of Victoria (hundreds of cases per day), TTIQ contributed to a 42% reduction in transmission. Our results also suggest that case-initiated contact tracing can support timely quarantine in times of system stress (thousands of cases per day)., Conclusion: Contact tracing systems for COVID-19 in Australia were highly effective and adaptable in supporting the national suppression strategy from 2020-21, prior to the emergence of the Omicron variant in November 2021. TTIQ systems were critical to the maintenance of the strong suppression strategy and were more effective when caseloads were (relatively) low., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: Jodie McVernon reports financial support was provided by Australian Government Department of Health and Aged Care., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Background: While many investigations examined the association between environmental covariates and COVID-19 incidence, none have examined their relationship with superspreading, a characteristic describing very few individuals disproportionally infecting a large number of people., Methods: Contact tracing data of all the laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases in Hong Kong from February 16, 2020 to April 30, 2021 were used to form the infection clusters for estimating the time-varying dispersion parameter (k t ), a measure of superspreading potential. Generalized additive models with identity link function were used to examine the association between negative-log k t (larger means higher superspreading potential) and the environmental covariates, adjusted with mobility metrics that account for the effect of social distancing measures., Results: A total of 6,645 clusters covering 11,717 cases were reported over the study period. After centering at the median temperature, a lower ambient temperature at 10 th percentile (18.2 °C) was significantly associated with a lower estimate of negative-log k t (adjusted expected change: -0.239 [95 % CI: -0.431 to -0.048]). While a U-shaped relationship between relative humidity and negative-log k t was observed, an inverted U-shaped relationship with actual vapour pressure was found. A higher total rainfall was significantly associated with lower estimates of negative-log k t ., Conclusions: This study demonstrated a link between meteorological factors and the superspreading potential of COVID-19. We speculated that cold weather and rainy days reduced the social activities of individuals minimizing the interaction with others and the risk of spreading the diseases in high-risk facilities or large clusters, while the extremities of relative humidity may favor the stability and survival of the SARS-CoV-2 virus., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Background: Investigating the prevalence of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) infection in asymptomatic children who have been in close contact with symptomatic individuals is instrumental for refining public health approaches, protecting vulnerable populations, and mitigating the broader impact of the pandemic. Accordingly, this study aimed to evaluate the incidence of COVID-19 infection in asymptomatic children who had been in close contact with parents exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms. Study Design: A cross-sectional study., Methods: The present cross-sectional study was conducted on 175 asymptomatic children who had been in close contact with COVID-19 confirmed cases in Hamadan County from March 2021 to August 2021. Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing was performed on all asymptomatic children who had been in close contact with an individual with COVID-19. Furthermore, multiple logistic regressions were conducted to determine the predictors of COVID-19 transmission from family members to children., Results: Out of the 175 children in close contact with index cases, 53 (30.29%) tested positive for COVID-19 through PCR. Regarding factors related to the index case, male cases (Adjusted odds ratio [AOR]=2.29; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.03-5.09, P =0.041), rural dwellers (AOR=3.22; 95% CI: 1.02-10.16, P =0.046), illiterate cases (AOR=8.45; 95% CI: 1.76-40.65, P =0.008), and cases presenting with nasal congestion symptoms (AOR=9.12; 95% CI: 2.22-37.40, P =0.002) were more prone to transmitting the virus to children who had close contact with them., Conclusion: The findings of the present study suggested that asymptomatic COVID-19 infection in household contacts is significant in children who were in close contact with a COVID-19-positive patient. Therefore, it is crucial to continue to monitor this group closely., (© 2024 The Author(s); Published by Hamadan University of Medical Sciences. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.)

Background: In custodial settings such as jails and prisons, infectious disease transmission is heightened by factors such as overcrowding and limited healthcare access. Specific features of social contact networks within these settings have not been sufficiently characterized, especially in the context of a large-scale respiratory infectious disease outbreak. The study aims to quantify contact network dynamics within the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia., Methods: Jail roster data were utilized to construct social contact networks. Rosters included resident details, cell locations, and demographic information. This analysis involved 6702 male residents over 140,901 person days. Network statistics, including degree, mixing, and dissolution (movement within and out of the jail) rates, were assessed. We compared outcomes for two distinct periods (January 2022 and April 2022) to understand potential responses in network structures during and after the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant peak., Results: We found high cross-sectional network degree at both cell and block levels. While mean degree increased with age, older residents exhibited lower degree during the Omicron peak. Block-level networks demonstrated higher mean degrees than cell-level networks. Cumulative degree distributions increased from January to April, indicating heightened contacts after the outbreak. Assortative age mixing was strong, especially for younger residents. Dynamic network statistics illustrated increased degrees over time, emphasizing the potential for disease spread., Conclusions: Despite some reduction in network characteristics during the Omicron peak, the contact networks within the Fulton County Jail presented ideal conditions for infectious disease transmission. Age-specific mixing patterns suggested unintentional age segregation, potentially limiting disease spread to older residents. This study underscores the necessity for ongoing monitoring of contact networks in carceral settings and provides valuable insights for epidemic modeling and intervention strategies, including quarantine, depopulation, and vaccination, laying a foundation for understanding disease dynamics in such environments.Top of Form., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors of this paper have no conflicts of interest to declare., (Copyright © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Background: Infection prevention (IP) measures are designed to mitigate the transmission of pathogens in healthcare. Using large-scale viral genomic and social network analyses, we determined if IP measures used during the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic were adequate in protecting healthcare workers (HCWs) and patients from acquiring SARS-CoV-2., Methods: We performed retrospective cross-sectional analyses of viral genomics from all available SARS-CoV-2 viral samples collected at UC San Diego Health and social network analysis using the electronic medical record to derive temporospatial overlap of infections among related viromes and supplemented with contact tracing data. The outcome measure was any instance of healthcare transmission, defined as cases with closely related viral genomes and epidemiological connection within the healthcare setting during the infection window. Between November 2020 through January 2022, 12 933 viral genomes were obtained from 35 666 patients and HCWs., Results: Among 5112 SARS-CoV-2 viral samples sequenced from the second and third waves of SARS-CoV-2 (pre-Omicron), 291 pairs were derived from persons with a plausible healthcare overlap. Of these, 34 pairs (12%) were phylogenetically linked: 19 attributable to household and 14 to healthcare transmission. During the Omicron wave, 2106 contact pairs among 7821 sequences resulted in 120 (6%) related pairs among 32 clusters, of which 10 were consistent with healthcare transmission. Transmission was more likely to occur in shared spaces in the older hospital compared with the newer hospital (2.54 vs 0.63 transmission events per 1000 admissions, P < .001)., Conclusions: IP strategies were effective at identifying and preventing healthcare SARS-CoV-2 transmission., Competing Interests: Potential conflicts of interest. K. G. A. reports consulting fees from Adagio Therapeutics (consulting and Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)) and Ring Therapeutics (consulting); a role of SAB for Adagio Therapeutics; stock or stock options with Ring Therapeutics; and grants or contracts from National National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, NIAID, Prebys 211—Prebys Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2016 Pew Scholar—Pew Charitable Trust, National Institute of General Medical Sciences, and CDC. C. A. L. reports serving as equity holder and advisor (unrelated to this work) for Doximity. L. E. H. reports consulting fees from Gilead; payment or honoraria for lectures, presentations, speakers bureaus, manuscript writing, or educational events from AstraZeneca, the Infectious Diseases Association of California, the Medical Education Speakers Network, and CME consultants; support for attending meetings and/or travel from AstraZeneca; stock or stock options from Pfizer; and is a salaried employee of Pfizer. S. B. reports an NIH and an unrestricted departmental grant from Research to Prevent Blindness (no role in design of the study and no payment) and receipt of equipment, materials, drugs, medical writing, gifts, or other services from Optomed and Topcon. L. C. L. reports stock or stock options from Illumina, Inc and equipment and reagents for sequencing purchased from Illumina via UCSD Institute for Genomic Medicine. R. K. reports consulting fees from DayTwo (consultant and SAB member), Cybele (stock and consultant), and Biomesense (stock, consultant, SAB member); participation on a data safety monitoring board or advisory board from Gencirq (stock and SAB member) and Micronoma (stock, SAB member, and cofounder); and owning stock and serving as cofounder of Biota. J. O. W. reports grants or contracts to their institution from the CDC and consulting fees as an expert witness (consulting fees paid to author) from Charles Russell Speechlys, LLP. All other authors report no potential conflicts. All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest. Conflicts that the editors consider relevant to the content of the manuscript have been disclosed., (© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Infectious Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

South Korea's remarkable success in controlling the spread of COVID-19 during the pre-Omicron period was based on extensive contact tracing and large-scale testing. Here we suggest a general criterion for tracing and testing based on South Korea's experience, and propose a new framework to assess tracing and testing. We reviewed papers on South Korea's response to COVID-19 to capture its concept of tracing and testing. South Korea expanded its testing capabilities to enable group tracing combined with preemptive testing, and to conduct open testing. According to our proposed model, COVID-19 cases are classified into 4 types: confirmed in quarantine, source known, source unknown, and unidentified. The proportion of the first two case types among confirmed cases is defined as "traced proportion", and used as the indicator of tracing and testing effectiveness. In conclusion, South Korea successfully suppressed COVID-19 transmission by maintaining a high traced proportion (> 60%) using group tracing in conjunction with preemptive testing as a complementary strategy to traditional contact tracing., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Contact tracing forms a crucial part of the public-health toolbox in mitigating and understanding emergent pathogens and nascent disease outbreaks. Contact tracing in the United States was conducted during the pre-Omicron phase of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This tracing relied on voluntary reporting and responses, often using rapid antigen tests due to lack of accessibility to PCR tests. These limitations, combined with SARS-CoV-2's propensity for asymptomatic transmission, raise the question "how reliable was contact tracing for COVID-19 in the United States"? We answered this question using a Markov model to examine the efficiency with which transmission could be detected based on the design and response rates of contact tracing studies in the United States. Our results suggest that contact tracing protocols in the U.S. are unlikely to have identified more than 1.65% (95% uncertainty interval: 1.62-1.68%) of transmission events with PCR testing and 1.00% (95% uncertainty interval 0.98-1.02%) with rapid antigen testing. When considering a more robust contact tracing scenario, based on compliance rates in East Asia with PCR testing, this increases to 62.7% (95% uncertainty interval: 62.6-62.8%). We did not assume presence of asymptomatic transmission or superspreading, making our estimates upper bounds on the actual percentages traced. These findings highlight the limitations in interpretability for studies of SARS-CoV-2 disease spread based on U.S. contact tracing and underscore the vulnerability of the population to future disease outbreaks, for SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Background: It is not yet fully understood to what extent in-flight transmission contributed to the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). This study aimed to determine the occurrence and extent of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in-flight and assess factors associated with transmission risk to inform future control strategies., Methods: Retrospective cohort study using data obtained from contact tracing of international flights arriving in England between 02/08/2021-15/10/2021. Transmission risk was estimated by calculating the secondary attack rate (SAR). Univariable and multivariable analyses of the SAR by specific risk factors was undertaken, including: number of in-flight index cases; number of symptomatic index cases; contact vaccination status; flight duration; proximity to the index case(s); contact age., Results: 11,307 index cases linked to 667,849 contacts with 5,289 secondary cases reported. In-flight SAR was 0.79% (95% CI: 0.77-0.81). Increasing numbers of symptomatic cases (when > 4 index cases compared to one index case aOR 1.85; 95% CI: 1.40-2.44) and seating proximity to an index case (seated within compared to outside of two rows OR 1.82; 95% CI: 1.50-2.22) were associated with increased risk of secondary cases. Full vaccination history was protective (aOR 0.52; 95% CI: 0.47-0.57)., Conclusions: This study confirms that in-flight transmission of SARS-CoV-2 occurred. There are factors associated with increased risk of infection. Contact tracing identified exposed persons who subsequently developed infection. A targeted approach to contact tracing passengers with the highest exposure risk could be an effective use of limited public health resources., (© 2024. Crown.)

Objectives: Calculations of SARS-CoV-2 transmission networks at a population level have been limited. Networks that estimate infections between individuals and whether this results in a mutation, can be a way to evaluate fitness of a mutational clone by how much it expands in number as well as determining the likelihood a transmission results in a new variant., Methods: Australian Delta and Omicron SARS-CoV-2 sequences were downloaded from GISAID. Transmission networks of infection between individuals were estimated using a novel mathematical method., Results: Many of the sequences were identical, with clone sizes following power law distributions driven by negative binomial probability distributions for both the number of infections per individual and the number of mutations per transmission (median 0.74 nucleotide changes for Delta and 0.71 for Omicron). Using these distributions, an agent-based model was able to replicate the observed clonal network structure, providing a basis for more detailed COVID-19 modelling. Possible recombination events, tracked by insertion/deletion (indel) patterns, were identified for each variant in these outbreaks., Conclusions: This modelling approach reveals key transmission characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 and may complement traditional contact tracing. This methodology can also be applied to other diseases as genetic sequencing of viruses becomes more commonplace., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: John Murray reports financial support, article publishing charges, and travel were provided by Australian Research Council., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Background: During the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, nurses of primary health care has been an important role in Spain. Even so, the data obtained in the tracing have been scarcely used to investigate the possible mechanisms of transmission. Few studies focused on community transmission, evaluating the effectiveness of individual protective measures and exposure environment. The main aim of the study was to evaluate the association between individual protective measures and SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the community and to compare secondary attack rates in different exposure settings., Methods: A case-control study from contact tracing of SARS-CoV-2 index patients. COVID-19 contact tracing was led by nurses at the COVID-19 Coordinating Centre in Majorca (Spain). During the systematic tracing, additional information for this study was collected from the index patient (social-demographic variables, symptoms, the number of close contacts). And also, the following variables from their close contacts: contact place, ventilation characteristics mask-wearing, type of mask, duration of contact, shortest distance, case-contact relationship, household members, and handwashing, the test result for SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic. Close contacts with a positive test for SARS-CoV-2 were classified as "cases" and those negative as "controls.", Results: A total of 1,778 close contacts from 463 index patients were identified. No significant differences were observed between the sexes but between age groups. Overall Secondary Attack Rate (SAR) was 24.0% (95% CI: 22.0-26.0%), 36.9% (95% CI: 33.2-40.6%) in closed spaces without ventilation and 50.7% (95% CI: 45.6-55.8%) in exposure time > 24 h. A total of 49.2% of infections occurred among household members. Multivariate logistic regression analysis showed that open-air setting (OR 0.43, 95% CI: 0.27-0.71), exposure for less than 1 h (OR 0.19, 95% CI: 0.11-0.32), and wearing a mask (OR 0.49, 95% CI: 0.28-0.85) had a protective effect transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the community., Conclusion: Ventilation of the space, mask-wearing and shorter exposure time were associated with a lower risk of transmission in the community. The data obtained allowed an assessment of community transmission mechanisms and could have helped to improve and streamline tracing by identifying close contacts at higher risk., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. The author(s) declared that they were an editorial board member of Frontiers, at the time of submission. This had no impact on the peer review process and the final decision., (Copyright © 2024 Huguet-Torres, Castro-Sánchez, Capitán-Moyano, Sánchez-Rodríguez, Bennasar-Veny and Yáñez.)

Public holidays have been associated with SARS-CoV-2 incidence surges, although a firm link remains to be established. This association is sometimes attributed to events where transmissions occur at a disproportionately high rate, known as superspreading events. Here, we describe a sudden surge in new cases with the Omicron BA.1 strain amongst higher education students in Belgium. Contact tracers classed most of these cases as likely or possibly infected on New Year's Eve, indicating a direct trigger by New Year celebrations. Using a combination of contact tracing and phylogenetic data, we show the limited role of superspreading events in this surge. Finally, the numerous simultaneous transmissions allowed a unique opportunity to determine the distribution of incubation periods of the Omicron strain. Overall, our results indicate that, even under social restrictions, a surge in transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 can occur when holiday celebrations result in small social gatherings attended simultaneously and communitywide., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Aim: The aim of this study is to evaluate the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection and the prevalence of COVID-19-related symptoms in relation to pandemic phases and some relevant variables in a cohort of 8,029 HCWs from one of the largest Italian University Hospitals., Methods: A single-center retrospective study was performed on data collected during SARS-CoV-2 infection surveillance of HCWs. Cox's multiple regression was performed to estimate hazard ratios of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Logistic multivariate regression was used to assess the risk of asymptomatic infections and the onset of the most frequent symptoms. All analyses were adjusted for sociodemographic and occupational factors, pandemic phases, vaccination status, and previous infections., Results: A total of 3,760 HCWs resulted positive (2.0%-18.6% across five study phases). The total incidence rate of SARS-CoV-2 infection was 7.31 cases per 10,000 person-days, significantly lower in phase 1 and higher in phases 4 and 5, compared to phase 3. Younger HCWs, healthcare personnel, and unvaccinated subjects showed a higher risk of infection. Overall, 24.5% were asymptomatic infections, with a higher probability for men, physicians, and HCWs tested for screening, fully vaccinated, and those with previous infection. The clinical presentation changed over the phases in relation to vaccination status and the emergence of new variants., Conclusion: The screening activities of HCWs allowed for the early detection of asymptomatic cases, limiting the epidemic clusters inside the hospital wards. SARS-CoV-2 vaccination reduced infections and symptomatic cases, demonstrating again its paramount value as a preventive tool for occupational and public health., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2023 Liviero, Volpin, Furlan, Battistella, Broggio, Fabris, Favretto, Mason, Cocchio, Cozzolino, Baldo, Moretto and Scapellato.)

BackgroundThe NHS Test and Trace (NHSTT) programme was established in May 2020 in England to deliver SARS-CoV-2 testing and contact tracing in order to identify infected individuals and reduce COVID-19 spread. To further control transmission, people identified as contacts were asked to self-isolate for 10 days and test only if they became symptomatic. From March 2021, eligibility criteria for PCR testing expanded to include asymptomatic contacts of confirmed cases.AimTo analyse testing patterns of contacts before and after the change in testing guidance in England to assess the impact on PCR testing behaviour with respect to symptom status and contact type.MethodsTesting and contact tracing data were extracted from the national data systems and linked. Subsequently, descriptive statistical analysis was applied to identify trends in testing behaviour.ResultsBetween 1 January and 31 July 2021, over 5 million contacts were identified and reached by contact tracers; 42.3% took a PCR test around the time they were traced. Overall positivity rate was 44.3% and consistently higher in symptomatic (60-70%) than asymptomatic (around 20%, March-June) contacts. The proportion of tests taken by asymptomatic contacts increased over time, especially after the change in testing guidance. No link was observed between uptake of PCR tests and vaccination coverage. Fully vaccinated contacts showed lower positivity (23.8%) than those with one dose (37.2%) or unvaccinated (51.0%).ConclusionAlmost 1 million asymptomatic contacts were tested for SARS-CoV-2, identifying 214,056 positive cases, demonstrating the value of offering PCR testing to this group.

We conducted a systematic literature review of general population testing, contact tracing, case isolation and contact quarantine interventions to assess their effectiveness in reducing SARS-CoV-2 transmission, as implemented in real-world settings. We designed a broad search strategy and aimed to identify peer-reviewed studies of any design provided there was a quantitative measure of effectiveness on a transmission outcome. Studies that assessed the effect of testing or diagnosis on disease outcomes via treatment, but did not assess a transmission outcome, were not included. We focused on interventions implemented among the general population rather than in specific settings; these were from anywhere in the world and published any time after 1 January 2020 until the end of 2022. From 26 720 titles and abstracts, 1181 were reviewed as full text, and 25 met our inclusion criteria. These 25 studies included one randomized control trial (RCT) and the remaining 24 analysed empirical data and made some attempt to control for confounding. Studies included were categorized by the type of intervention: contact tracing (seven studies); specific testing strategies (12 studies); strategies for isolating cases/contacts (four studies); and 'test, trace, isolate' (TTI) as a part of a package of interventions (two studies). None of the 25 studies were rated at low risk of bias and many were rated as serious risk of bias, particularly due to the likely presence of uncontrolled confounding factors, which was a major challenge in assessing the independent effects of TTI in observational studies. These confounding factors are to be expected from observational studies during an on-going pandemic, when the emphasis was on reducing the epidemic burden rather than trial design. Findings from these 25 studies suggested an important public health role for testing followed by isolation, especially where mass and serial testing was used to reduce transmission. Some of the most compelling analyses came from examining fine-grained within-country data on contact tracing; while broader studies which compared behaviour between countries also often found TTI led to reduced transmission and mortality, this was not universal. There was limited evidence for the benefit of isolation of cases/contacts away from the home environment. One study, an RCT, showed that daily testing of contacts could be a viable strategy to replace lengthy quarantine of contacts. Based on the scarcity of robust empirical evidence, we were not able to draw any firm quantitative conclusions about the quantitative impact of TTI interventions in different epidemic contexts. While the majority of studies found that testing, tracing and isolation reduced transmission, evidence for the scale of this impact is only available for specific scenarios and hence is not necessarily generalizable. Our review therefore emphasizes the need to conduct robust experimental studies that help inform the likely quantitative impact of different TTI interventions on transmission and their optimal design. Work is needed to support such studies in the context of future emerging epidemics, along with assessments of the cost-effectiveness of TTI interventions, which was beyond the scope of this review but will be critical to decision-making. This article is part of the theme issue 'The effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions on the COVID-19 pandemic: the evidence'.

Japan has implemented a cluster-based approach for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) from the pandemic's beginning based on the transmission heterogeneity (overdispersion) of severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). However, studies analyzing overdispersion of transmission among new variants of concerns (VOCs), especially for Omicron, were limited. Thus, we aimed to clarify how the transmission heterogeneity has changed with the emergence of VOCs (Alpha, Delta, and Omicron) using detailed contact tracing data in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan. We estimated the time-varying dispersion parameter ([Formula: see text]) by fitting a negative binomial distribution for each transmission generation. Our results showed that even after the emergence of VOCs, there was transmission heterogeneity of SARS-CoV-2, with changes in [Formula: see text] during each wave. Continuous monitoring of transmission dynamics is vital for implementing appropriate measures. However, a feasible and sustainable epidemiological analysis system should be established to make this possible., (© 2023. Springer Nature Limited.)

In the context of the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, reliable and cost-efficient screening and testing strategies are crucial to prevent disease transmission and reduce socioeconomic losses. To assess the efficiency of a rapid antigen test (RAT)-based SARS-CoV-2 contact-tracing and screening regime, we conducted a retrospective analysis of RAT and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test data over a 1-year period, assessed test characteristics and estimated cost-effectiveness. The RAT had a sensitivity of 70.2% overall and 89.3% for people with a high risk of infectivity. We estimated inpatient treatment and quarantined healthcare worker costs of over € 5860.83, whereas the cost of identifying one SARS-CoV-2 positive person by RAT for our patient cohort was € 1210.75. In contrast, the estimated respective PCR cost was € 5043.32. Therefore, a RAT-based contract tracing and screening regime may be an efficient and cost-effective way to contribute to the early identification and prevention of SARS-CoV-2 transmission., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Background: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) control on college campuses is challenging given communal living and student social dynamics. Understanding SARS-CoV-2 transmission among college students is important for the development of optimal control strategies., Methods: SARS-CoV-2 nasal swab samples were collected from University of Pittsburgh students for symptomatic testing and asymptomatic surveillance from August 2020 through April 2021 from 3 campuses. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on 308 samples, and contact tracing information collected from students was used to identify transmission clusters., Results: We identified 31 Pangolin lineages of SARS-CoV-2, the majority belonging to B.1.1.7 (Alpha) and B.1.2 lineages. Contact tracing identified 142 students (46%) clustering with each other; WGS identified 53 putative transmission clusters involving 216 students (70%). WGS identified transmissions that were missed by contact tracing. However, 84 cases (27%) could not be linked by either WGS or contact tracing. Clusters were most frequently linked to students residing in the same dormitory, off-campus roommates, friends, or athletic activities., Conclusions: The majority of SARS-CoV-2-positive samples clustered by WGS, indicating significant transmission across campuses. The combination of WGS and contact tracing maximized the identification of SARS-CoV-2 transmission on campus. WGS can be used as a strategy to mitigate, and further prevent transmission among students., Competing Interests: Potential conflicts of interest. All authors: No reported conflicts. All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest. Conflicts that the editors consider relevant to the content of the manuscript have been disclosed., (Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Infectious Diseases Society of America 2023.)

Background: Understanding the drivers of SARS-CoV-2 transmission can inform the development of interventions. We evaluated transmission identified by contact tracing investigations between March-May 2020 in Salt Lake County, Utah, to quantify the impact of this intervention and identify risk factors for transmission., Methods: RT-PCR positive and untested symptomatic contacts were classified as confirmed and probable secondary case-patients, respectively. We compared the number of case-patients and close contacts generated by different groups, and used logistic regression to evaluate factors associated with transmission., Results: Data were collected on 184 index case-patients and up to six generations of contacts. Of 1,499 close contacts, 374 (25%) were classified as secondary case-patients. Decreased transmission odds were observed for contacts aged <18 years (OR = 0.55 [95% CI: 0.38-0.79]), versus 18-44 years, and for workplace (OR = 0.36 [95% CI: 0.23-0.55]) and social (OR = 0.44 [95% CI: 0.28-0.66]) contacts, versus household contacts. Higher transmission odds were observed for case-patient's spouses than other household contacts (OR = 2.25 [95% CI: 1.52-3.35]). Compared to index case-patients identified in the community, secondary case-patients identified through contract-tracing generated significantly fewer close contacts and secondary case-patients of their own. Transmission was heterogeneous, with 41% of index case-patients generating 81% of directly-linked secondary case-patients., Conclusions: Given sufficient resources and complementary public health measures, contact tracing can contain known chains of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Transmission is associated with age and exposure setting, and can be highly variable, with a few infections generating a disproportionately high share of onward transmission., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist., (Copyright: This is an open access article, free of all copyright, and may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose. The work is made available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication.)

Genomic epidemiology can facilitate an understanding of evolutionary history and transmission dynamics of a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreak. We used next-generation sequencing techniques to study SARS-CoV-2 genomes isolated from patients and health care workers (HCWs) across five wards of a Canadian hospital with an ongoing SARS-CoV-2 outbreak. Using traditional contact tracing methods, we show transmission events between patients and HCWs, which were also supported by the SARS-CoV-2 lineage assignments. The outbreak predominantly involved SARS-CoV-2 B.1.564.1 across all five wards, but we also show evidence of community introductions of lineages B.1, B.1.1.32, and B.1.231, falsely assumed to be outbreak related. Altogether, our study exemplifies the value of using contact tracing in combination with genomic epidemiology to understand the transmission dynamics and genetic underpinnings of a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak. IMPORTANCE Our manuscript describes a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak investigation in an Ontario tertiary care hospital. We use traditional contract tracing paired with whole-genome sequencing to facilitate an understanding of the evolutionary history and transmission dynamics of this SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in a clinical setting. These advancements have enabled the incorporation of phylogenetics and genomic epidemiology into the understanding of clinical outbreaks. We show that genomic epidemiology can help to explore the genetic evolution of a pathogen in real time, enabling the identification of the index case and helping understand its transmission dynamics to develop better strategies to prevent future spread of SARS-CoV-2 in congregate, clinical settings such as hospitals., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

During the COVID-19 pandemic in Senegal, contact tracing was done to identify transmission clusters, their analysis allowed to understand their dynamics and evolution. In this study, we used information from the surveillance data and phone interviews to construct, represent and analyze COVID-19 transmission clusters from March 2, 2020, to May 31, 2021. In total, 114,040 samples were tested and 2153 transmission clusters identified. A maximum of 7 generations of secondary infections were noted. Clusters had an average of 29.58 members and 7.63 infected among them; their average duration was 27.95 days. Most of the clusters (77.3%) are concentrated in Dakar, capital city of Senegal. The 29 cases identified as super-spreaders, i.e., the indexes that had the most positive contacts, showed few symptoms or were asymptomatic. Deepest transmission clusters are those with the highest percentage of asymptomatic members. The correlation between proportion of asymptomatic and degree of transmission clusters showed that asymptomatic strongly contributed to the continuity of transmission within clusters. During this pandemic, all the efforts towards epidemiological investigations, active case-contact detection, allowed to identify in a short delay growing clusters and help response teams to mitigate the spread of the disease., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Objectives: To evaluate the impact of early implementation of public health and social measures (PHSMs) on contact rates over time and explore contact behavior of asymptomatic versus symptomatic cases., Methods: We used the largest contact tracing data in China thus far to estimate the mean contacts over time by age groups and contact settings. We used bootstrap with replacement to quantify the uncertainty of contact matrixes. The Pearson correlation was performed to demonstrate the number of contacts over time in relation to the evolution of restrictions. In addition, we analyzed the index cases with a high number of contacts and index cases that produced a high number of secondary cases., Results: Rapidly adapted PHSMs can reduce the mean contact rates in public places while increasing the mean contact rates within households. The mean contact rates were 11.81 (95% confidence interval, 11.61-12.01) for asymptomatic (at the time of investigation) cases and 6.70 (95% confidence interval, 6.54-6.87) for symptomatic cases. The percentage of asymptomatic cases (at the time of investigation) meeting >50 close contacts make up more than 65% of the overall cases. The percentage of asymptomatic cases producing >10 secondary cases account for more than 80% of the overall cases., Conclusion: PHSMs may increase the contacts within the household, necessitating the need for pertinent prevention strategies at home. Asymptomatic cases can contribute significantly to Omicron transmission. By making asymptomatic people aware that they are already contagious, hence limiting their social contacts, it is possible to lower the transmission risk., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors have no competing interests to declare., (Copyright © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

In Antwerp, Belgium's second largest city, a COVID-19 surge in July 2020 predominantly affected neighborhoods with high ethnic diversity. Local volunteers reacted and set up an initiative to support contact tracing and self-isolation. We describe the origin, implementation, and transfer of this local initiative, based on semi-structured interviews of five key informants and document review. The initiative started in July 2020, when family physicians signaled a surge of SARS-CoV-2 infections among people of Moroccan descent. Family physicians feared that the mainstream contact tracing organized by the Flemish government through centralized call centers would not be efficient in halting this outbreak. They anticipated language barriers, mistrust, inability to investigate case clusters, and practical problems with self-isolation. It took 11 days to start up the initiative, with logistical support from the province and city of Antwerp. Family physicians referred SARS-CoV-2-infected index cases with complex needs (including language and social situation) to the initiative. Volunteer COVID coaches contacted cases, got a contextualized understanding of their living conditions, assisted with backward and forward contact tracing, offered support during self-isolation, and checked if infected contacts also needed support. Interviewed coaches were positive about the quality of the interaction: they described extensive open conversations with cases. The coaches reported back to referring family physicians and coordinators of the local initiative, who took additional action if necessary. Although interactions with affected communities were perceived as good, respondents considered that the number of referrals by family physicians was too low to have a meaningful impact on the outbreak. In September 2020, the Flemish government assigned the tasks of local contact tracing and case support to the local health system level (primary care zones). While doing so, they adopted elements of this local initiative, such as COVID coaches, tracing system, and extended questionnaires to talk with cases and contacts. This community case study illustrates how urgency can motivate people to action yet support from people with access to resources and coordination capacity is vital for effective organization and transition to long-term sustainability. From their conception, health policies should consider adaptability of new interventions to local contexts., Competing Interests: SM worked as a FP in the involved community and was board member of a local FP organization. The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2023 Verdonck, Morreel, Vanhamel, Vuylsteke, Nöstlinger, Laga and van Olmen.)

Objectives: As the genetic variants of SARS-CoV-2 continuously pose threats to global health, evaluating superspreading potentials of emerging genetic variants is of importance for region-wide control of COVID-19 outbreaks., Methods: By using detailed epidemiological contact tracing data of test-positive COVID-19 cases collected between July and August 2021 in Nanjing and Yangzhou, China, we assessed the superspreading potential of outbreaks seeded by SARS-CoV-2 Delta variants. The transmission chains and case-clusters were constructed according to the individual-based surveillance data. We modelled the disease transmission as a classic branching process with transmission heterogeneity governed by negative binomial models. Subgroup analysis was conducted by different contact settings and age groups., Results: We reported a considerable heterogeneity in the contact patterns and transmissibility of Delta variants in eastern China. We estimated an expected 14% (95% CI: 11-16%) of the most infectious cases generated 80% of the total transmission., Conclusions: Delta variants demonstrated a significant potential of superspreading under strict control measures and active COVID-19 detecting efforts. Enhancing the surveillance on disease transmissibility especially in high-risk settings, along with rapid contact tracing and case isolations would be one of the key factors to mitigate the epidemic caused by the emerging genetic variants of SARS-CoV-2., Competing Interests: Conflict of Interests All authors declare that they have no conflict of interest or financial conflicts to disclose. The funding agencies have no role in the study design, in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; and in the decision to submit the manuscript for publication., (Copyright © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron variant (B.1.1.529) rapidly replaced Delta (B.1.617.2) to become dominant in England. Our study assessed differences in transmission between Omicron and Delta using two independent data sources and methods. Omicron and Delta cases were identified through genomic sequencing, genotyping and S-gene target failure in England from 5-11 December 2021. Secondary attack rates for named contacts were calculated in household and non-household settings using contact tracing data, while household clustering was identified using national surveillance data. Logistic regression models were applied to control for factors associated with transmission for both methods. For contact tracing data, higher secondary attack rates for Omicron vs. Delta were identified in households (15.0% vs. 10.8%) and non-households (8.2% vs. 3.7%). For both variants, in household settings, onward transmission was reduced from cases and named contacts who had three doses of vaccine compared to two, but this effect was less pronounced for Omicron (adjusted risk ratio, aRR 0.78 and 0.88) than Delta (aRR 0.62 and 0.68). In non-household settings, a similar reduction was observed only in contacts who had three doses vs. two doses for both Delta (aRR 0.51) and Omicron (aRR 0.76). For national surveillance data, the risk of household clustering, was increased 3.5-fold for Omicron compared to Delta (aRR 3.54 (3.29-3.81)). Our study identified increased risk of onward transmission of Omicron, consistent with its successful global displacement of Delta. We identified a reduced effectiveness of vaccination in lowering risk of transmission, a likely contributor for the rapid propagation of Omicron.

Background: Understanding the overall effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions to control the COVID-19 pandemic and reduce the burden of disease is crucial for future pandemic planning. However, quantifying the effectiveness of specific control measures and the extent of missed infections, in the absence of early large-scale serological surveys or random community testing, has remained challenging., Methods: Combining data on notified local COVID-19 cases with known and unknown sources of infections in Singapore with a branching process model, we reconstructed the incidence of missed infections during the early phase of the wild-type SARS-CoV-2 and Delta variant transmission. We then estimated the relative effectiveness of border control measures, case finding and contact tracing when there was no or low vaccine coverage in the population. We compared the risk of ICU admission and death between the wild-type SARS-CoV-2 and the Delta variant in notified cases and all infections., Results: We estimated strict border control measures were associated with 0.2 (95% credible intervals, CrI 0.04-0.8) missed imported infections per notified case between July and December 2020, a decline from around 1 missed imported infection per notified case in the early phases of the pandemic. Contact tracing was estimated to identify 78% (95% CrI 62-93%) of the secondary infections generated by notified cases before the partial lockdown in Apr 2020, but this declined to 63% (95% CrI 56-71%) during the lockdown and rebounded to 78% (95% CrI 58-94%) during reopening in Jul 2020. The contribution of contact tracing towards overall outbreak control also hinges on ability to find cases with unknown sources of infection: 42% (95% CrI 12-84%) of such cases were found prior to the lockdown; 10% (95% CrI 7-15%) during the lockdown; 47% (95% CrI 17-85%) during reopening, due to increased testing capacity and health-seeking behaviour. We estimated around 63% (95% CrI 49-78%) of the wild-type SARS-CoV-2 infections were undetected during 2020 and around 70% (95% CrI 49-91%) for the Delta variant in 2021., Conclusions: Combining models with case linkage data enables evaluation of the effectiveness of different components of outbreak control measures, and provides more reliable situational awareness when some cases are missed. Using such approaches for early identification of the weakest link in containment efforts could help policy makers to better redirect limited resources to strengthen outbreak control., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Postacute sequelae of SARS-CoV-2 infection, commonly known as long COVID, is estimated to affect 10% to 80% of COVID-19 survivors. We examined the prevalence and predictors of long COVID from a sample of 1,338 COVID-19 cases among university members in Washington, DC, USA, during July 2021‒March 2022. Cases were followed up after 30 days of the initial positive result with confidential electronic surveys including questions about long COVID. The prevalence of long COVID was 36%. Long COVID was more prevalent among those who had underlying conditions, who were not fully vaccinated, who were female, who were former/current smokers, who experienced acute COVID-19 symptoms, who reported higher symptom counts, who sought medical care, or who received antibody treatment. Understanding long COVID among university members is imperative to support persons who have ongoing symptoms and to strengthen existing services or make referrals to other services, such as mental health, exercise programs, or long-term health studies.

In 2020, the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, caused a pandemic, which is still raging at the time of writing this. Here, we present results from SpikeSeq, the first published Sanger sequencing-based method for the detection of Variants of Concern (VOC) and key mutations, using a 1 kb amplicon from the recognized ARTIC Network primers. The proposed setup relies entirely on materials and methods already in use in diagnostic RT-qPCR labs and on existing commercial infrastructure offering sequencing services. For data analysis, we provide an automated, open source, and browser-based mutation calling software (https://github.com/kblin/covid-spike-classification, https://ssi.biolib.com/covid-spike-classification). We validated the setup on 195 SARS-CoV-2 positive samples, and we were able to profile 85% of RT-qPCR positive samples, where the last 15% largely stemmed from samples with low viral count. We compared the SpikeSeq results to WGS results. SpikeSeq has been used as the primary variant identification tool on > 10.000 SARS-CoV-2 positive clinical samples during 2021. At approximately 4€ per sample in material cost, minimal hands-on time, little data handling, and a short turnaround time, the setup is simple enough to be implemented in any SARS-CoV-2 RT-qPCR diagnostic lab. Our protocol provides results that can be used to choose antibodies in a clinical setting and for the tracking and surveillance of all positive samples for new variants and known ones such as Alpha (B.1.1.7), Beta (B.1.351), Gamma (P.1) Delta (B.1.617.2), Omicron BA.1(B.1.1.529), BA.2, BA.4/5, BA.2.75.x, and many more, as of October 2022., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In recent years, it became clear that super-spreader events play an important role, particularly in the spread of airborne infections. We investigate a novel model for super-spreader events, not based on a heterogeneous contact graph but on a random contact rate: Many individuals become infected synchronously in single contact events. We use the branching-process approach for contact tracing to analyze the impact of super-spreader events on the effect of contact tracing. Here we neglect a tracing delay. Roughly speaking, we find that contact tracing is more efficient in the presence of super-spreaders if the fraction of symptomatics is small, the tracing probability is high, or the latency period is distinctively larger than the incubation period. In other cases, the effect of contact tracing can be decreased by super-spreaders. Numerical analysis with parameters suited for SARS-CoV-2 indicates that super-spreaders do not decrease the effect of contact tracing crucially in case of that infection., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Introduction: Unlike other communal living environments (universities, boarding schools, and camps) that have been suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic, the deployed military force must continue its mission. Early challenges in the 2020 deployed environment included limited availability of living and quarantine space and limited testing capacity. This is a brief report of stringent quarantine strategies employed to newly arriving cohorts at a NATO and U.S. military base to prevent release of SARS-CoV-2 into a larger base population., Methods: With awareness of the worldwide pandemic, beginning in late February 2020, all personnel arriving to the Hamid Karzai International Airport NATO base were quarantined for 14 days to prevent interaction with the wider base population. Testing capacity was limited. Names, locations, and dates of those within quarantine were tracked to improve contact tracing. Between February and April 2020, the first cases of SARS-CoV-2 were diagnosed on a military base in Afghanistan within quarantine., Results: Within quarantine, 11 males became PCR positive for SARS-CoV-2 during April 2020. Five of the 11 were PCR tested for symptoms of fever, cough, or loss of taste. A sixth individual, who had been asymptomatic upon leaving the base after completion of quarantine, later developed symptoms and tested positive. Another five asymptomatic individuals were found with antibody testing just before planned release from 14 days of quarantine post-exposure and confirmed with PCR testing. All PCR-positive individuals were diagnosed before being released into the general population of the base because of strict screening, quarantine, and exit criteria., Conclusion: Quarantine creates significant strain on resources in a deployed environment. Group quarantine facilities where social distancing is limited allow for the possibility for intra-quarantine transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Ideally, PCR testing is done upon entry into quarantine and upon exit. With the possibility of false-negative PCR or limited PCR testing, we recommend daily symptom screening, pulse oximetry, temperature checks, and small quarantine groups that must "graduate" together-all meeting exit criteria. Any introduction of new individual, even with negative testing, to a group increases risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission.Upon exit of quarantine, testing should be performed, regardless of entry testing. If PCR is limited, serology testing should be done, followed by PCR, if positive. Serology testing can be combined with clinical judgment to conserve PCR testing for quarantine release of asymptomatic individuals., (Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States 2021. This work is written by (a) US Government employee(s) and is in the public domain in the US.)

Background: School closures and distance learning have been extensively adopted to counter the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the contribution of school transmission to the spread of SARS-CoV-2 remains poorly quantified., Methods: We analyzed transmission patterns associated with 976 SARS-CoV-2 exposure events, involving 460 positive individuals, as identified in early 2021 through routine surveillance and an extensive screening conducted on students, school personnel, and their household members in a small Italian municipality. In addition to population screenings and contact-tracing operations, reactive closures of class and schools were implemented., Results: From the analysis of 152 clear infection episodes and 584 exposure events identified by epidemiological investigations, we estimated that approximately 50%, 21%, and 29% of SARS-CoV-2 transmission was associated with household, school, and community contacts, respectively. We found substantial transmission heterogeneities, with 20% positive individuals causing 75% to 80% of ascertained infection episodes. A higher proportion of infected individuals causing onward transmission was found among students (46.2% vs. 25%, on average), who also caused a markedly higher number of secondary cases (mean: 1.03 vs. 0.35). By reconstructing likely transmission chains from the entire set of exposures identified during contact-tracing operations, we found that clusters originated from students or school personnel were associated with a larger average cluster size (3.32 vs. 1.15) and a larger average number of generations in the transmission chain (1.56 vs. 1.17)., Conclusions: Uncontrolled SARS-CoV-2 transmission at school could disrupt the regular conduct of teaching activities, likely seeding the transmission into other settings, and increasing the burden on contact-tracing operations., (© 2022 The Authors. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Background: The impact of children on the transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) remains uncertain. This study provides an insight into distinct patterns of SARS-CoV-2 household transmission in case of pediatric and adult index cases as well as age-dependent susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection., Methods: Immune analysis, medical interviewing, and contact tracing of 26 families with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection cases have been conducted. Blood samples were analyzed serologically with the use of a SARS-CoV-2-specific IgG assay and virus neutralization test (VNT). Uni- and multivariable linear regression and mixed effect logistic regression models were used to describe potential risk factors for higher contagiousness and susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection., Results: SARS-CoV-2 infection could be confirmed in 67 of 124 family members. Fourteen children and 11 adults could be defined as index cases in their households. Forty of 82 exposed family members were defined as secondarily infected. The mean secondary attack rate in households was 0.48 and was significantly higher in households with adult than with pediatric index cases (0.85 vs 0.19; p < 0.0001). The age (grouped into child and adult) of index case, severity of disease, and occurrence of lower respiratory symptoms in index cases were significantly associated with secondary transmission rates in households. Children seem to be equally susceptible to acquire a SARS-CoV-2 infection as adults, but they suffer milder courses of the disease or remain asymptomatic., Conclusion: SARS-CoV-2 transmission from infected children to other household members occurred rarely in the first wave of the pandemic, despite close physical contact and the lack of hygienic measures., (© 2023 The Authors. Pediatric Allergy and Immunology published by European Academy of Allergy and Clinical Immunology and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

New SARS-CoV-2 variants causing COVID-19 are a major risk to public health worldwide due to the potential for phenotypic change and increases in pathogenicity, transmissibility and/or vaccine escape. Recognising signatures of new variants in terms of replacing growth and severity are key to informing the public health response. To assess this, we aimed to investigate key time periods in the course of infection, hospitalisation and death, by variant. We linked datasets on contact tracing (Contact Tracing Advisory Service), testing (the Second-Generation Surveillance System) and hospitalisation (the Admitted Patient Care dataset) for the entire length of contact tracing in the England - from March 2020 to March 2022. We modelled, for England, time delay distributions using a Bayesian doubly interval censored modelling approach for the SARS-CoV-2 variants Alpha, Delta, Delta Plus (AY.4.2), Omicron BA.1 and Omicron BA.2. This was conducted for the incubation period, the time from infection to hospitalisation and hospitalisation to death. We further modelled the growth of novel variant replacement using a generalised additive model with a negative binomial error structure and the relationship between incubation period length and the risk of a fatality using a Bernoulli generalised linear model with a logit link. The mean incubation periods for each variant were: Alpha 4.19 (95% credible interval (CrI) 4.13-4.26) days; Delta 3.87 (95% CrI 3.82-3.93) days; Delta Plus 3.92 (95% CrI 3.87-3.98) days; Omicron BA.1 3.67 (95% CrI 3.61-3.72) days and Omicron BA.2 3.48 (95% CrI 3.43-3.53) days. The mean time from infection to hospitalisation was for Alpha 11.31 (95% CrI 11.20-11.41) days, Delta 10.36 (95% CrI 10.26-10.45) days and Omicron BA.1 11.54 (95% CrI 11.38-11.70) days. The mean time from hospitalisation to death was, for Alpha 14.31 (95% CrI 14.00-14.62) days; Delta 12.81 (95% CrI 12.62-13.00) days and Omicron BA.2 16.02 (95% CrI 15.46-16.60) days. The 95th percentile of the incubation periods were: Alpha 11.19 (95% CrI 10.92-11.48) days; Delta 9.97 (95% CrI 9.73-10.21) days; Delta Plus 9.99 (95% CrI 9.78-10.24) days; Omicron BA.1 9.45 (95% CrI 9.23-9.67) days and Omicron BA.2 8.83 (95% CrI 8.62-9.05) days. Shorter incubation periods were associated with greater fatality risk when adjusted for age, sex, variant, vaccination status, vaccination manufacturer and time since last dose with an odds ratio of 0.83 (95% confidence interval 0.82-0.83) ( P value < 0.05). Variants of SARS-CoV-2 that have replaced previously dominant variants have had shorter incubation periods. Conversely co-existing variants have had very similar and non-distinct incubation period distributions. Shorter incubation periods reflect generation time advantage, with a reduction in the time to the peak infectious period, and may be a significant factor in novel variant replacing growth. Shorter times for admission to hospital and death were associated with variant severity - the most severe variant, Delta, led to significantly earlier hospitalisation, and death. These measures are likely important for future risk assessment of new variants, and their potential impact on population health.

Quantitative information on epidemiological quantities such as the incubation period and generation time of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants is scarce. We analysed a dataset collected during contact tracing activities in the province of Reggio Emilia, Italy, throughout 2021. We determined the distributions of the incubation period for the Alpha and Delta variants using information on negative polymerase chain reaction tests and the date of last exposure from 282 symptomatic cases. We estimated the distributions of the intrinsic generation time using a Bayesian inference approach applied to 9724 SARS-CoV-2 cases clustered in 3545 households where at least one secondary case was recorded. We estimated a mean incubation period of 4.9 days (95% credible intervals, CrI, 4.4-5.4) for Alpha and 4.5 days (95% CrI 4.0-5.0) for Delta. The intrinsic generation time was estimated to have a mean of 7.12 days (95% CrI 6.27-8.44) for Alpha and of 6.52 days (95% CrI 5.54-8.43) for Delta. The household serial interval was 2.43 days (95% CrI 2.29-2.58) for Alpha and 2.74 days (95% CrI 2.62-2.88) for Delta, and the estimated proportion of pre-symptomatic transmission was 48-51% for both variants. These results indicate limited differences in the incubation period and intrinsic generation time of SARS-CoV-2 variants Alpha and Delta compared to ancestral lineages.

Background: Point-of-care and decentralized testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is critical to inform public health responses. Performance evaluations in priority use cases such as contact tracing can highlight trade-offs in test selection and testing strategies., Methods: A prospective diagnostic accuracy study was conducted among close contacts of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases in Brazil. Two anterior nares swabs (ANS), a nasopharyngeal swab (NPS), and saliva were collected at all visits. Vaccination history and symptoms were assessed. Household contacts were followed longitudinally. Three rapid antigen tests and 1 molecular method were evaluated for usability and performance against reference reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on nasopharyngeal swab specimens., Results: Fifty index cases and 214 contacts (64 household) were enrolled. Sixty-five contacts were RT-PCR positive during ≥1 visit. Vaccination did not influence viral load. Gamma variants were most prevalent; Delta variants emerged increasingly during implementation. The overall sensitivity of evaluated tests ranged from 33% to 76%. Performance was higher among symptomatic cases and those with cycle threshold (Ct) values <34 and lower among oligosymptomatic or asymptomatic cases. Assuming a 24-hour time to results for RT-PCR, the cumulative sensitivity of an anterior nares swab rapid antigen test was >70% and almost 90% after 4 days., Conclusions: The near-immediate time to results for antigen tests significantly offsets lower analytical sensitivity in settings where RT-PCR results are delayed or unavailable., Competing Interests: Potential conflicts of interest. All authors: No reported conflicts. All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest. Conflicts that the editors consider relevant to the content of the manuscript have been disclosed., (© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Infectious Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Background: Universities are vulnerable to infectious disease outbreaks, making them ideal environments to study transmission dynamics and evaluate mitigation and surveillance measures. Here, we analyze multimodal COVID-19-associated data collected during the 2020-2021 academic year at Colorado Mesa University and introduce a SARS-CoV-2 surveillance and response framework., Methods: We analyzed epidemiological and sociobehavioral data (demographics, contact tracing, and WiFi-based co-location data) alongside pathogen surveillance data (wastewater and diagnostic testing, and viral genomic sequencing of wastewater and clinical specimens) to characterize outbreak dynamics and inform policy. We applied relative risk, multiple linear regression, and social network assortativity to identify attributes or behaviors associated with contracting SARS-CoV-2. To characterize SARS-CoV-2 transmission, we used viral sequencing, phylogenomic tools, and functional assays., Findings: Athletes, particularly those on high-contact teams, had the highest risk of testing positive. On average, individuals who tested positive had more contacts and longer interaction durations than individuals who never tested positive. The distribution of contacts per individual was overdispersed, although not as overdispersed as the distribution of phylogenomic descendants. Corroboration via technical replicates was essential for identification of wastewater mutations., Conclusions: Based on our findings, we formulate a framework that combines tools into an integrated disease surveillance program that can be implemented in other congregate settings with limited resources., Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation, the Hertz Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Massachusetts Consortium on Pathogen Readiness, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, the Flu Lab, and the Audacious Project., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests P.C.S. is a co-founder of, shareholder in, and scientific advisor to Sherlock Biosciences, Inc.; she is also a Board member of and shareholder in Danaher Corporation. P.C.S. has filed IP related to genome sequencing and analysis., (Copyright © 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Background: Diagnostic testing plays a critical role in the global COVID-19 response. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests are highly accurate, but in resource-limited settings, limited capacity has led to testing delays; whereas lateral flow assays (LFAs) offer opportunities for rapid and affordable testing. We examined the potential epidemiological impact of different strategies for LFA deployment., Methods: We developed a deterministic compartmental model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, parameterised to resemble a large Indian city. We assumed that PCR would be used to test symptomatic individuals presenting to outpatient settings for care. We examined how the second epidemic wave in India could have been mitigated by LFA deployment in its early stages by comparing two strategies: (i) community-based screening, using LFAs to test a proportion of the population, irrespective of symptoms (in addition to symptom-driven PCR), and (ii) symptom-driven outpatient testing, using LFAs to replace PCR., Results: Model projections suggest that a stock of 25 million LFAs, used over a 600-day period in a city of 20 million people, would reduce the cumulative symptomatic incidence of COVID-19 by 0.44% if used for community-based screening, and by 13% if used to test symptomatic outpatients, relative to a no-LFA, PCR-only scenario. Sensitivity analysis suggests that outpatient testing would be more efficient in reducing transmission than community-based screening, when at least 5% of people with symptomatic COVID-19 seek care, and at least 10% of SARS-CoV-2 infections develop symptoms. Under both strategies, however, 2% of the population would be unnecessarily isolated., Interpretation: In this emblematic setting, LFAs would reduce transmission most efficiently when used to test symptomatic individuals in outpatient settings. To avoid large numbers of unnecessary isolations, mass testing with LFAs should be considered as a screening tool, with follow-up confirmation. Future work should address strategies for targeted community-based LFA testing, such as contact tracing., (Copyright © 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has been described as having an overdispersed offspring distribution, i.e. high variation in the number of secondary transmissions of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) per single primary COVID-19 case. Accordingly, countermeasures focused on high-risk settings and contact tracing could efficiently reduce secondary transmissions. However, as variants of concern with elevated transmissibility continue to emerge, controlling COVID-19 with such focused approaches has become difficult. It is vital to quantify temporal variations in the offspring distribution dispersibility. Here, we investigated offspring distributions for periods when the ancestral variant was still dominant (summer, 2020; wave 2) and when Alpha variant (B.1.1.7) was prevailing (spring, 2021; wave 4). The dispersion parameter ( k ) was estimated by analysing contact tracing data and fitting a negative binomial distribution to empirically observed offspring distributions from Nagano, Japan. The offspring distribution was less dispersed in wave 4 ( k = 0.32; 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.24-0.43) than in wave 2 ( k = 0.21 (95% CI 0.13-0.36)). A high proportion of household transmission was observed in wave 4, although the proportion of secondary transmissions generating more than five secondary cases did not vary over time. With this decreased variation, the effectiveness of risk group-focused interventions may be diminished.

Background: Asymptomatic COVID-19 cases have complicated the surveillance and tracking of the pandemic. Previous studies have estimated that 15-25% of all infectees remain asymptomatic., Methods: Based on contact tracing data from Oslo, Norway, we estimated transmission and susceptibility dynamics among symptomatic and asymptomatic cases and their contacts as identified by manual contact tracing between September 1, 2020, and September 1, 2021., Results: Among 27,473 indexes and 164,153 registered contacts, the secondary attack rate (SAR-14) was estimated to be 28% lower through asymptomatic exposure (13%) compared to symptomatic exposure (18%). Furthermore, those infected by asymptomatic cases were almost three times more likely to be asymptomatic compared to those infected by symptomatic cases., Conclusions: Symptomatic cases spread the virus to a greater extent than asymptomatic, and infectees are more likely to be asymptomatic if their assumed infector was asymptomatic., (© 2022. The Author(s).)