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Conflicts over the independence of judiciary as one of the European Union's core democratic values is one indicator of democratic backsliding among its member states. Based on the Europeanization framework, we compare this conflict in German, Polish and Spanish print media and Twitter from 2019 to 2021. In the countries that are strongly affected by the value conflict, Poland and Spain, Europeanization is less evident. In contrast, the German discourse shows a high degree of Europeanization. We demonstrate that the print media is strongly elite-centric, while Twitter shows a higher actor visibility and inclusivity. However, we also identify important country differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human rights abuses have been one of the challenges facing Nigeria since the First Republic in 1960 up untill date. On these premises, this study elucidates the interconnectedness and intricate relationships among human rights, democratic governance, and the rule of law in Nigeria. Specifically, the study examines factors undermining Nigeria's democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights. The study adopted mixed methods design with 600 respondents chosen across the study area. The descriptive analysis technique was employed in the analysis of the collected data. The research is theoretically grounded in elite theory. The findings of the study revealed Nigeria's ability to sustain long-term national peace, security, development, and prosperity is jeopardised by numerous instances of fundamental human rights abuses and violations of the rule of law. Equally, the socio-religious dimensions of these challenges are integral to understanding the complexities of human rights and governance issues in Nigeria. The study concludes that allowing the instantaneous development of Nigeria's three levels of government holds the potential to instil typical democratic norms, foster political stability, and pave the way for long-term peace, security, and development in the country. The study recommends that the independence of the judiciary must be strengthened, press freedom preserved, democratic norms and principles upheld, and public awareness increased in order to decrease human rights violations and promote good governance in Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Europarecht (05312485) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The past decade has seen the rise of the semi-authoritarian regimes within the European Union. EU law scholars are rightfully concerned that, in the absence of a meaningful response, this leads to an existential crisis for the Union, as these regimes threaten respect for the Union’s foundational values. The Union did respond to what it has framed as a rule of law crisis by means of a constitutional transformation, asserting Union power to protect judicial independence within the Member States even in areas previously thought beyond the reach of Union law. This paper contends that the Union’s response to the authoritarian threat is flawed for its legalist faith in law and courts. In institutional terms, it was the Court of Justice of the European Union, rather than the Union’s political branches, that took the lead in this transformation. In substantive terms, the Union has transformed its constitutional framework to protect the organisational infrastructure of the judiciary, but it failed to do the same in response to various other strategies in the authoritarian playbook. By framing the authoritarian threat as, above all else, a threat to the judiciary, the Union’s response contributes to the reification of political debate at Union level and risks the alienation of the European polity.

The past decade has seen the rise of the semi-authoritarian regimes within the European Union. EU law scholars are rightfully concerned that, in the absence of a meaningful response, this leads to an existential crisis for the Union, as these regimes threaten respect for the Union's foundational values. The Union did respond to what it has framed as a rule of law crisis by means of a constitutional transformation, asserting Union power to protect judicial independence within the Member States even in areas previously thought beyond the reach of Union law. This paper contends that the Union's response to the authoritarian threat is flawed for its legalist faith in law and courts. In institutional terms, it was the Court of Justice of the European Union, rather than the Union's political branches, that took the lead in this transformation. In substantive terms, the Union has transformed its constitutional framework to protect the organisational infrastructure of the judiciary, but it failed to do the same in response to various other strategies in the authoritarian playbook. By framing the authoritarian threat as, above all else, a threat to the judiciary, the Union's response contributes to the reification of political debate at Union level and risks the alienation of the European polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution analyses the conflict between the Constitutional Court of Romania (the 'CCR') and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the 'CJEU') from the perspective of the affirmation of constitutional identity by the Constitutional Court of Romania as a national independent court, to the detriment of the principle of primacy of EU law enshrined in the settled case-law of the European Court of Justice. The following analysis focuses on two aspects of this conflict. The first involves consideration of the use of the concept of constitutional identity by the Constitutional Court of Romania as a tool to limit the principle of primacy of EU law, with the main argument being that the Constitutional Court is the supreme national institution the task of which is to ensure the supremacy of the Romanian Constitution on Romanian territory even insofar as concerns EU law and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The second aspect focused upon in this analysis consists of the effects of the conflict between the two jurisdictions - the constitutional and the European Union – as seen in the constitutional decisions adopted by the Constitutional Court of Romania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines two rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on the rights of independent Polish judges in Juszczyszyn v. Poland and Tuleya v. Poland, focusing on two key aspects. First, it addresses the Court's finding that the Polish authorities aimed to undermine judicial independence and deter the applicants from questioning the Government's controversial judicial reforms. Secondly, it explores the potential evolution of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding recognising the subjective right of judges under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to have their independence protected and respected by the State. The article also discusses problems concerning implementation of the two judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judicial independence and impartiality have been developed by a number of international soft law rules, as well as by abundant case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Lately, concern has focused particularly on the cases of Hungary and Poland, but they are by no means the only ones to be taken into account, as other EU countries also have dysfunctions that fully affect independence and impartiality, with the case of Spain beginning to stand out. This paper analyses some of these dysfunctions, focusing finally on salary, transfer, demotion and early retirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, governing parties in Central and Eastern Europe have dismantled liberal democracy, violating the rule of law and limiting the power of judges. This article examines the opposition to these transformations, focusing on the role of judges in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Drawing on an original survey, as well as a set of interviews with judges, the article shows that while in Poland judges have developed a unified opposition to the government in defending their independence, in Romania, in contrast, governmental measures have polarized judges into a divided opposition, while their mobilization has been rather non-existent in Hungary. Why do judges oppose governmental action limiting judicial independence in some contexts but not in others? The article shows that the nature and the sequencing of domestic transformations, coupled with ideational factors and interests-based calculations, explain judges' opposition at the collective and individual levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An efficient, impartial, and independent judiciary is a major demand for Moroccan citizens. In online advocacy, citizens denounce the flawed judiciary, sometimes virally circulating content on its corruption and susceptibility to interference. On TV, non-fiction programs respond to frequent requests for legal advice from audiences. Meanwhile, dramas employ frames that reflect codes on how society should perceive the judiciary and the rule of law. This article assesses the dominant frames of the judiciary on TV dramas. Two programs, Moudāwala and Al-Māḍī Lā Yamūt , are selected based on their relevance and popularity. The qualitative analysis of these programs incorporates character and narrative portrayals into thematic and frame analyses. As the two programs illustrate judicial struggles from within and without, they exemplify portrayals of the legal system that uncover discrepancies between normative practices and ruthless realities. The judiciary's dominant frames focus on individual solutions and blame citizens for ignoring judicial texts or institutions. Frames reflect how media avoid watchdogging the judiciary and extend, directly or otherwise, hegemony over both the judiciary and the media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Derecho UNED is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Erciyes Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Erciyes University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Judicial independence is immanently connected with the rule of law and as such is regularly scrutinized by multiple international organizations. Bodies such as the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission have issued numerous "soft law" instruments establishing guidelines for judicial independence standards. Meanwhile, the European judiciary system, on its part, has analyzed and ruled on specific issues on a case by case basis. The judiciary reforms introduced in Poland within the past decade have sparked immense discussions as to whether they remain in line with the EU rule of law, in particular whether the judicial independence standard has been upheld or jeopardized. As a result, an ideal environment has been created for the European Court of Justice to shape the EU standards, as the number of recent rulings on the matter of judicial independence has grown rapidly. While the European Court of Justice is key in establishing common standards across the EU, the Court seemingly avoids creating general, common standard of judicial independence. Recently, while assessing the judicial independence the European Court of Justice has focused on aspects such as social perception and impressions of individuals involved in the proceedings, thus stressing the importance of the "context", rather than working towards establishing a clear European standard for the assessment of the independence (or lack thereof) of judges. With such ambiguous rules, however, it cannot be excluded that an objectively independent court could fail the test due to e.g. a widespread misinformation campaign, while a judiciary subjected to numerous minor reforms kept under the radar of the public eye, which effectively undermine its independence, could avoid the ECJ's scrutiny. As the concerns regarding the future of the rule of law in the European Union spread, the need for a clear and objective roadmap becomes more evident. In this context, this article aims at analyzing a sample of three recent ECJ cases: Land Hessen (Case C-272/19), W. B. et al. (Joined Cases C 748/19 to C 754/19) and Asociația "Forumul Judecătorilor din România" (Case C-216/21) in order to assess whether such roadmap has been created -- or whether steps towards its creation have been taken by the European institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most scholarly writings focus on the harmful effects of informal institutions. This article explores the positive influence of informal judicial institutions on the fundamental values of judicial systems. It develops a framework for assessing such institutions. The paper argues that the normative evaluation of informal judicial institutions is highly context-specific. Depending on their historical trajectories, different jurisdictions may emphasize different interests. Because of this, when evaluating informal judicial institutions, balancing the same values may yield different results in different jurisdictions. The recent trend towards formalization, supported by supranational institutions, goes hand-in-hand with the spreading narrative of good governance, emphasizing principles such as transparency or inclusion, principles that generally stand in tension with informality. This article cautions against emerging supranational templates insensitive to local practice.

Copyright of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review is the property of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article analyses the main consequences of Żurek v Poland, decided by the European Court of Human Rights in June 2022. The Court developed its interpretation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to judges' public speech in dealing with judicial independence and the rule of law. In this context, the article discusses judicial mobilisation regarding the undermining of judicial independence in Poland and judges becoming 'rule of law actors' when rule of law backsliding threatens constitutional principles such as judicial independence or the separation of powers. It also discusses the role of judicial associations in coordinating such mobilisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two contrasting claims regarding the Hungarian judiciary. The Government asserts that it is in the best shape, while many other voices label it as captured or dependent. This article shows how both of these claims can be true, depending on the interplay between formality and informality and shows how a few small loopholes allow some actors to rig the judicial system. Therefore, the Hungarian judiciary is similar to Schrödinger's cat, which is claimed to be dead and alive at the same time. The synergy between formality and informality requires a network of a handful of trusted people in managerial positions to administer case allocation, promotion, and disciplinary systems, which seem to be very effective tools. Few small technical loopholes and some special remedies suffice to micromanage important cases precisely because key positions are captured which work as gatekeepers or emergency brakes. Most of these tools are legal in a very formal technical sense of the word because they rely on acts of Parliament. A formal legalism, a very thin understanding of the Rule of law, and a majoritarian mindset serve as a legitimizing ideology for the whole legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most scholarly writings focus on the harmful effects of informal institutions. This article explores the positive influence of informal judicial institutions on the fundamental values of judicial systems. It develops a framework for assessing such institutions. The paper argues that the normative evaluation of informal judicial institutions is highly context-specific. Depending on their historical trajectories, different jurisdictions may emphasize different interests. Because of this, when evaluating informal judicial institutions, balancing the same values may yield different results in different jurisdictions. The recent trend towards formalization, supported by supranational institutions, goes hand-in-hand with the spreading narrative of good governance, emphasizing principles such as transparency or inclusion, principles that generally stand in tension with informality. This article cautions against emerging supranational templates insensitive to local practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article explores the manner in which, faced with the rule of law crisis generated by the 2017-2019 national legislative reforms, the Romanian judicial associations, organized as NGOs, have fulfilled their declared purpose of safeguarding judicial independence. By relying on effective communication tactics--including international networking and lobbying or informal discussions with high-level EU representatives--coupled with a strategic use of preliminary references, they have shed light on some of the most sensitive elements of the Romanian context, garnering both internal and international support in the process. In particular, by taking advantage of the CJEU's increased willingness to engage with questions concerning the rule of law and the organization of the national judicial systems, the Romanian judicial associations have managed to design strategies capable of triggering preliminary rulings on the most heated and politically charged questions concerning the judiciary. This Article seeks to highlight the specific features and informal elements of such strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Israeli democracy regulates the operation of the judiciary through the constraints of formal rules that check the political actors, the individual judges, and the judiciary. Basic laws, laws and regulations prescribe the operation of every subject. Yet beyond these formal rules, informal institutions and practices are sometimes equally important in the operation of the judiciary, as they are in any constitutional system. In Israel, some of these informal institutions are crucial for the flourishing of democracy and the rule of law, through their protection of judicial independence from external political interference. The imminent possibility that political actors may set some of them aside is nothing less than a potential transformation in the constitutional order. Over the past few decades, judges and court administrators have introduced other internal informal institutions in the administration of the Israeli Judiciary, which qualify formal judicial accountability mechanisms in ways that may prove to be detrimental to democratic principles. This article discusses informal institutions that are important in the operation of the Israeli judiciary, separating the former external kind that are conducive to the rule of law--such as the illegitimacy of political and partisan considerations in judicial appointments--and whose disregard may signal democratic decay from the latter internal kind that may prove detrimental to the courts--such as opaquely changing who is responsible for court administration. Lastly, the political attempt to change informal institutions, detailed herein, can be seen as a harbinger of the current attempt to change formal institutions in the constitutional status of the judiciary in Israel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2023, Israel's newly formed coalition under the leadership of the Likud party began to promote a reform that would alter the nature of the regime and undermine the democratic tenets of the separation of powers, judicial review, and the independence of the judicial branch. The article determines that the planned government overhaul diverges sharply from the historic path of "The Likud," and directly contradicts the worldview and policies held by the party's founding father and leader for over three decades, Menachem Begin. In this respect, what is referred to by the current government as a "judicial reform" is in fact a two-fold project that aims to reform the regime as well as the foundational policies of law upheld by the ruling political party in Israel for the past four decades. The article sheds light on the substantive ideology attributed to the "right" and the "left" in Israel's political historiography and determines that the essential principles of the proposed reform are not intrinsic to right-wing ideology and should not be identified as such. The sharp departure revealed by the right-wing reform policy and its ideas on questions of democracy and governance at this watershed moment provide a theoretical-historical basis for the analysis of their motivations and processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This abstract critically assesses judicial performance in subordinate judiciary in Pakistan, scrutinizing its efficacy and challenges. It examines key factors influencing judicial effectiveness, including institutional capacity, transparency, and legal infrastructure. Through empirical analysis, it evaluates the impact of judicial decisions on legal certainty, access to justice, and societal harmony. Furthermore, it addresses prevalent issues such as case backlog, corruption, and judicial independence, shaping the narrative of Pakistan's legal landscape. The abstract concludes by highlighting avenues for reform and enhancement, emphasizing the crucial role of a competent judiciary in upholding the rule of law and fostering socio-political stability in Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Spanish amnesty for the Catalan independence movement is a victory for the rule of law, rather than a defeat. It is not an exemption from punishment otherwise due, but instead a reflection of the fact that the acts now amnestied should never have been subject to criminal prosecution in the first place. It is thus also a way for Spain to return to compliance with its obligations under European and international human rights law.

There are important reasons for states to recognize and enforce the judgments of other states' courts. There are also reasons that may militate against recognition or enforcement of certain foreign judgments, making it appropriate to calibrate or "fine tune"the presumption favoring recognition and enforcement so it is not applied too broadly. Most calibration principles, such as the principle that a judgment from a court lacking jurisdiction should not be recognized, are case-specific. However, one calibration principle that is, to our knowledge, unique to the law of the United States stands out: The principle of systemic calibration, according to which U.S. courts must not recognize or enforce foreign judgments "rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law."In this Article, we aim to shed empirical light on how U.S.-style systemic calibration operates in practice. We find that state-of-origin indicator scores related to systemic adequacy are on average higher when U.S. courts recognize or enforce foreign judgments than when they refuse to do so. Moreover, the probability of recognition and enforcement increases as these indicator scores increase. However, in only six of the 587 opinions in our dataset did a court refuse recognition or enforcement based explicitly on the systemic inadequacy ground. Thus, while the level of systemic calibration in U.S. courts is high, it is mostly achieved implicitly. Finally, even judgments from states with low systemic adequacy scores are sometimes recognized or enforced by U.S. courts.

He analyzes in this context the most recent case-law of the Court of Justice based on Article 19(1)(2) of the TFEU, which requires Member States to establish the necessary remedies to ensure effective judicial protection in areas covered by EU law. This in turn enables the EU legal I system i to function properly, by ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of EU law throughout the EU. As a result, the term "general and persistent breach" of EU law was first brought forward by the Commission in relation to infringement proceedings concerning the violation of EU environmental rules. When, how and why does a breach of legal standards acquire a "systemic" dimension in European law?. [Extracted from the article]

Ensuring the integrity of elections is a foundational concern for any democratic state. Yet, it faces a grave challenge in Poland, emanating from the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court. Created in 2018 following controversial changes to the national judicial system and tasked with reviewing the validity of parliamentary elections, the Chamber fails to meet the essential criteria of an independent court. Confirmed by rulings of the European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court itself, the Chamber’s flawed origin and staffing, dependent on political influence and in departure from established rules of law, undermines its capacity to authenticate the fairness and legitimacy of elections. This echoes beyond Poland’s borders as well, since the Chamber’s defective status fails to meet European standards of effective judicial protection, thus raising concerns in the context of European integration. This blog delves into the Chamber’s position, examines its role in validating electoral process and its impact on the democratic legitimacy of Poland’s Parliament.

The rule of law crisis in Poland consists of several elements – undermining the independence of courts, politicization of disciplinary proceedings against judges, and lack of legal certainty. None of them, however, raises so many doubts and concerns as the status of judges appointed or promoted upon the request of the politically captured National Council of Judiciary (NCJ). In this blog post, we analyse the diverse composition of the group of judges appointed or promoted upon the motion of the NCJ from 2018. We also discuss the relevant jurisprudence of national and international courts and the current state of debate concerning this problem and possible solutions.

This article aims to analyze the interaction between the European Commission and a member state, Spain, in enforcing the rule of law. The case in point is the General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, CGPJ), whose composition has not been renewed for five years as a result of disagreements between the main political parties, the People's Party (Partido Popular, PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE). This situation has raised doubts about the judicial independence in the country. In this context, the article addresses the following research questions: How has the European Commission influenced political actors to remedy the situation regarding the CGPJ? And how have Spanish political actors used EU actions in the domestic debate on the renewal and reform of the CGPJ? The Spanish case shows that in a pro-European context, political actors strategically use the EU to justify their approach in a given situation. The EU is also perceived as a safeguard against a possible deterioration of the situation. In addition, the visibility of the problem due to the involvement of the EU level makes the politicians concerned about the international image of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judicial independence as a European constitutional principle – Freedom of expression of judges in connection with judicial independence – Rule of law backsliding – Catalan secession crisis – Spanish Constitutional Court disqualification doctrine of magistrates – Freedom of expression of judges in favour of the Catalan secessionist movement – Spanish soft law on judicial independence [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A body of jurisprudence is emerging in Africa's most active regional courts on the independence of national judiciaries. This article reveals that while regional case law relevantly echoes efforts by municipal courts to safeguard themselves, circumstances demonstrate that such case law requires greater contextualization across systems. In this regard, the traditional paradigm of linking independence to executive appointments does not empirically stand the test of the multiplicity of independence factors, executive-free regimes have not proved effective in safeguarding independence, and legal traditions or judicial systems have increasingly become irrelevant to the effectiveness of any independence regime. Factors that transcend the traditional determinants of executive control include the nature and functions of the court involved, and the history and background of the judicial structure of the country or region. Notably, the discussion also reveals the need to strike a critical balance between individual rights to a fair trial and inter-state directive policy towards judicial independence as set out in the African Charter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the conditions under which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) expanded the European Union's reach into issues of national judicial independence. The ECJ's 2018 ruling in a case known as Portuguese Judges contained a far-reaching constitutional interpretation that had a transformative impact on the European Union's rule of law crisis. We conduct a theoretically guided investigation into both the domestic origins and the judicial outcome in the Portuguese Judges case. We show how the ECJ, with implicit support from the majority of the Member States, strategically exploited suitable characteristics of an inconspicuous case to produce a landmark ruling that enabled unprecedented enforcement action against democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is often viewed as a revered champion of opposition to autocratic reforms in the Member States. In the context of the rule of law crisis in Poland, however, its resolute support for judicial independence contrasts notably with the limited improvements for judges on the ground. As the present investigation suggests, this discrepancy can be explained by a mode of incremental adjustments at national level that has allowed Polish lawmakers to repeatedly neutralise the effects of the Court's interventions. Resulting from this strategy are several instances of mutually responsive interaction between the Court of Justice and autocratic national lawmakers that have shaped developments in the rule of law crisis, both at national and supranational level. At national level, lawmakers have incrementally adjusted reforms to comply -- at least superficially -- with supranational judicial interventions, whereas the Court refined its interpretation of supranational safeguards of judicial independence in response to incremental adjustments in Polish law. Yet, more recently, this interaction of inadvertent mutual inspiration may have come to a halt. Rather than changing national law to superficially respond to supranational judicial interventions, Polish authorities may increasingly deny the Court's authority to adjudicate in matters of judicial independence in the Member States altogether. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the judicial reforms that have taken place in Central and Eastern European countries. Research will focus on the steps that have been taken to conform to the spirit of Article 2 of the TEU and take necessary measures to implement reforms required for EU accession. The core of the study focuses on the much-misunderstood concept of judicial independence which is increasingly becomes a much-debated concept in countries such as Hungary and Poland. A comparative legal method is used throughout the article to illustrate and help the reader to better understand the nuances of the problem in Central and Eastern European countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current crisis in the relationship between the Polish Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) is of crucial significance for the process of regional integration based on the values of liberal democracy taking place in the EU. The constitutional crisis in Poland that began in the end of 2015 has challenged the systemic position of the Polish Constitutional Court. It resulted in a new model of constitutional adjudication, and in this new model the Constitutional Court, stripped of its counter-majoritarian power, cannot be perceived as the guardian of liberal democracy. This article postulates that the assessment of the present case law of the Polish Constitutional Court in European matters is made through the prism of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence pre-2016 (i.e. before the constitutional crisis). Based on that assumption, the current reversal in the case law of the Polish Constitutional Court concerning the ECJ is analysed and assessed. It is argued that the root cause of the constitutional crisis in Poland is the departure from the principles of liberal democracy in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which are foundational—in light of the assumptions of the integration process—for the axiological identity of the EU and its Member States. This article also shows how the principles and concepts developed in the Polish constitutional jurisprudence pre-2016 could have served to avoid the current conflict with the ECJ, and how those notions are misused in the current jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The European Union (EU) is in the midst of what could be deemed the biggest threat to its current order since its inception: Member States backsliding on EU founding values. Indeed, the EU is showing no sign of having the rule of law backsliding crisis under control in states such as Hungary and Poland, a decade since the first signs of populist takeovers emerged. Since the foundational values of liberal constitutional democracy were first challenged in these two Central Eastern European (CEE) countries, similar issues in other Member States have also come to light, such as in the Czech Republic and Malta, amongst others. However, little information is available about the democratic stability of other States that also acceded to the EU in 2004. This paper is a stocktaking exercise which aims to address this gap in relation to the fidelity of Latvia to the founding EU value of the rule of law 18 years since it became an EU member. It will examine the state of judicial independence in Latvia during the past few years. Attacks on judicial independence are the main battleground on which the EU is fighting Hungary and Poland, and a value that is considered central to the EU’s understanding of the rule of law. It is important to understand Latvia’s current state of judicial independence in order to build a broader picture of the status of the rule of law in all Member States. This knowledge will help to fight the EU’s rule of law crisis and the rise of populism. This is something that needs to be achieved sooner rather than later so that the EU can stand united against an ever more aggressive Russia to the East.

Judicial independence and rule of law in Poland have been increasingly under challenge before national and European courts. Departing from a case study of Judge Żurek, an emblematic figure of the Polish judicial community prosecuted for criticizing the post-2015 judicial reforms, this article assesses how the European Human Rights framework can play out in a particular case of a judge defending the rule of law in his country. After having outlined the circumstances of his prosecution, it follows his journey to Luxembourg and Strasbourg. Namely, it lays out the legal issues before the Courts and examines the standards they establish, commenting on how they translate into prospects of redress. It finds that, while both the cjeu and the ECtHR establish standards on court transfers, judicial nominations, premature termination of office or the link to freedom of expression, the level of judicial independence required for their successful implementation creates a paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]