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As artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled social robots continue to enter our lifeworlds, we will need to grapple with challenges to assumptions about our relationship to and even with these technological objects. This essay works at the intersection of social robotics, legal studies, and human–machine communication to explore the concept of ownership in human–machine relations. In particular, we draw on more-than-human approaches to ask: To what extent should (need) we retire the concept of ownership in the context of AI-enabled social robots? With a particular emphasis on companion robots, we explore alternatives to the ownership modality by investigating concepts such as personhood, a degrees-of-relationship perspective, and a situational approach to understanding human–robot relationships. The goal is to re-imagine human–robot relationships beyond legal confinements by engaging a pragmatic perspective that supplements existing philosophical approaches. We conclude the paper by discussing practical implications of our proposed perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The great technological achievements in the recent past regarding artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and computer science make it very likely, according to many experts in the field, that we will see the advent of intelligent and autonomous robots that either match or supersede human capabilities in the midterm (within the next 50 years) or long term (within the next 100–300 years). Accordingly, this article has two main goals. First, we discuss some of the problems related to ascribing moral status to intelligent robots, and we examine three philosophical approaches—the Kantian approach, the relational approach, and the indirect duties approach—that are currently used in machine ethics to determine the moral status of intelligent robots. Second, we seek to raise broader awareness among moral philosophers of the important debates in machine ethics that will eventually affect how we conceive of key concepts and approaches in ethics and moral philosophy. The effects of intelligent and autonomous robots on our traditional ethical and moral theories and concepts will be substantial and will force us to revise and reconsider many established understandings. Therefore, it is essential to turn attention to debates over machine ethics now so that we can be better prepared to respond to the opportunities and challenges of the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robots have the potential to transform our existing categorical distinctions between "property" and "persons." Previous research has demonstrated that humans naturally anthropomorphize them, and this tendency may be amplified when a robot is subject to abuse. Simultaneously, robots give rise to hopes and fears about the future and our place in it. However, most available evidence on these mechanisms is either anecdotal, or based on a small number of laboratory studies with limited ecological validity. The present work aims to bridge this gap through examining responses of participants (N = 160) to four popular online videos of a leading robotics company (Boston Dynamics) and one more familiar vacuum cleaning robot (Roomba). Our results suggest that unexpectedly human-like abilities might provide more potent cues to mind perception than appearance, whereas appearance may attract more compassion and protection. Exposure to advanced robots significantly influences attitudes toward future artificial intelligence. We discuss the need for more research examining groundbreaking robotics outside the laboratory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay responds to the machine question in the affirmative, arguing that artifacts, like robots, AI, and other autonomous systems, can no longer be legitimately excluded from moral consideration. The demonstration of this thesis proceeds in four parts or movements. The first and second parts approach the subject by investigating the two constitutive components of the ethical relationship-moral agency and patiency. In the process, they each demonstrate failure. This occurs not because the machine is somehow unable to achieve what is considered necessary and sufficient to be a moral agent or patient but because the characterization of agency and patiency already fail to accommodate others. The third and fourth parts respond to this problem by considering two recent alternatives-the all-encompassing ontocentric approach of Luciano Floridi's information ethics and Emmanuel Levinas's eccentric ethics of otherness. Both alternatives, despite considerable promise to reconfigure the scope of moral thinking by addressing previously excluded others, like the machine, also fail but for other reasons. Consequently, the essay concludes not by accommodating the alterity of the machine to the requirements of moral philosophy but by questioning the systemic limitations of moral reasoning, requiring not just an extension of rights to machines, but a thorough examination of the way moral standing has been configured in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]