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In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision.

In contrast to the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), the revised risk-based capital standards (Basel II) propose regulatory capital requirements based on credit ratings. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze how banks will adjust their low and high credit risk commercial loans under the proposed newer standard. Capital-constrained banks respond to an adverse capital shock by reducing high credit risk loans, while under certain circumstances, low credit risk loans may actually increase. When compared to Basel I, it is shown that high-risk loans are reduced more under Basel II, but whether a bank reduces total lending more under Basel I or under the revised standards depends on a complex interaction of factors.

In recent decades, bank regulators have become increasingly reliant upon quantitative regulatory capital standards as a means of ensuring that banks hold adequate capital. The risk-based capital standards, from the 1988 Accord through the current Basel II standards, have primarily relied upon a building block approach to capital through the use of risk weights assigned to assets and off-balance sheet activities. Despite enhancements to improve the accuracy of risk-based capital standards, they continue to result in unintended consequences as the use of risk weights brings with it errors in the measurement of risk. Given the ongoing efforts by bank regulators to quantitatively assess risk, and correspondingly required capital, this study asks whether it is necessary for regulators to accurately assess risk weights in the risk-based capital standards. The simulation results suggest that, in order to minimize the unintended consequences associated with regulatory capital requirements, it is necessary for regulatory requirements to accurately mimic banks’ internal capital allocation processes.