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We demonstrate how an incumbent producer of commodities can use cash-settled derivatives contracts to deter entry and extract rents from a potential competitor. By selling more derivatives than total demand, the producer commits to low prices and forces the entrant to price low upon entry. By setting a high upfront derivatives price, the producer can extract the consumer's gains from those low prices. This exclusionary scheme becomes more difficult when the buyer becomes more risk averse and with multiple buyers.

Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use purely financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives to a large buyer for more than his expected production level. This exclusionary scheme comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry and creating too much risk for the buyer. We further show that it can still be used when contracts are offered anonymously through a broker, as the incumbent can signal its identity by adjusting the contracting terms.

Many countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, especially in South America, fared well during the global crisis and are now on a strong growth path. The region s recession in 2009 was relatively short lived and, with the notable exception of Mexico, remarkably mild. The current pace of economic recovery is exceeding expectations, with gross domestic product (GDP) projected to grow in the 5-6 percent range in 2010. This report discusses LAC's newfound resilience in the midst of financial globalization, examining key features of the cyclical behavior of LAC economies in comparison to other emerging economies and to its own past. Resilience is defined throughout this report in a broad sense to denote the ability of an economy to navigate with minimum disturbances through shocks, cushioning their negative spillovers in bad times, and recovering fast after a downturn. The report is structured as follows: first, it evaluates the relative performance of LAC countries during the contractionary period generated by the recent global crisis, to shed light on LAC's ability to shield its economies or soften the blow of a large external shock. Second, a similar exercise is conducted for the recovery phase of the cycle, when in the aftermath of an external shock more resilient countries will be expected to have a faster and more robust recovery. Third, it takes a deeper look at the different driving forces behind the recovery, including the role of domestic demand, commodity prices, and the connection to emerging Asia. Fourth, it provides evidence of the ability of different countries in LAC to conduct counter-cyclical policies in response to the global financial crisis. Lastly, a concluding section warns about the main macro-financial tensions and challenges lying ahead for the region.

Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. The incumbent can indeed sell insurance to a large buyer to commit himself to compete aggressively in the spot market and drive the price down for the entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives for more than his expected production level, i.e. by taking a speculative position. This comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry.

Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. The incumbent can indeed sell insurance to a large buyer to commit himself to compete aggressively in the spot market and drive the price down for the entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives for more than his expected production level, i.e. by taking a speculative position. This comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry.

Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. The incumbent can indeed sell insurance to a large buyer to commit himself to compete aggressively in the spot market and drive the price down for the entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives for more than his expected production level, i.e. by taking a speculative position. This comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry.

Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. The incumbent can indeed sell insurance to a large buyer to commit himself to compete aggressively in the spot market and drive the price down for the entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives for more than his expected production level, i.e. by taking a speculative position. This comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry.

Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. The incumbent can indeed sell insurance to a large buyer to commit himself to compete aggressively in the spot market and drive the price down for the entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives for more than his expected production level, i.e. by taking a speculative position. This comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry.

An earlier version of this paper was published as TILEC discussion paper 2010-027, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1651112 Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use purely financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives to a large buyer for more than his expected production level. This exclusionary scheme comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry and creating too much risk for the buyer. We further show that it can still be used when contracts are offered anonymously through a broker, as the incumbent can signal its identity by adjusting the contracting terms. Bert Willems’ work was funded under a Marie Curie Intra European Fellowship (PIEF-GA-2008-221085)