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Motivated by recent EC proposals to “strengthen risk management tools” in the CAP in relation to farmers’ increased exposure to market price risk, this paper draws attention to a potential negative consequence of such a change in the CAP – an associated increase in cheating behaviour by farmers in the context of environmental stewardship. A theoretical framework for this policy problem is developed and used not just to illustrate the problem, but also to propose a solution – specifically to combine the introduction of CAP-supported policy changes which reduce farmers’ exposure to market-based risk with changes in environmental stewardship policies which increase the riskiness of cheating and thereby discourage such behaviour.

This paper contributes to the understanding of the impact of removing quarantine restrictions on the income risk of domestic producers. It develops a model of this impact on a producer's perception of income risk. Four effects of the introduction of imports on the perceived income risk of domestic producers are identified, as well as a range of factors which influence the magnitude of these effects. A numerical analysis evaluates the role of each of these factors in determining the producer's perception of income risk following the introduction of imports. This evaluation provides a range of conclusions relevant to quarantine policy.

This paper contributes to the understanding of the impact of removing quarantine restrictions on the income risk of domestic producers. It develops a model of this impact on a producer's perception of income risk. Four effects of the introduction of imports on the perceived income risk of domestic producers are identified, as well as a range of factors which influence the magnitude of these effects. A numerical analysis evaluates the role of each of these factors in determining the producer's perception of income risk following the introduction of imports. This evaluation provides a range of conclusions relevant to quarantine policy.

This article examines the case of a risk‐averse mining firm facing a resource rent tax in order both to incorporate the role of the risk‐sharing quality of such a tax and to assess its implications given a government’s lease allocation system. The model develops the conditions required for an investment‐neutral RRT characterised by a threshold rate of return and a rate of tax and suggests that for an auction system of lease allocation, government revenue could be maximised by setting the tax rate below 100 per cent, but that for a discretionary system, it is in the government’s interest to introduce an RRT which is effectively rate‐of‐return regulation.

In this paper a method for estimating a producer's willingness-to-pay for crop insurance is presented. The method includes formulae to capture the impact of crop insurance on the producer's expected income and variance of income. These impacts are evaluated in the context of a model of producer welfare which features both price and yield uncertainty, as well as risk aversion on the part of the producer. The method is applied to the Australian wheat industry and estimates of willingness-to-pay are shown to be relatively sensitive to the levels of coverage and yield variability.

In this paper a method for estimating a producer's willingness-to-pay for crop insurance is presented. The method includes formulae to capture the impact of crop insurance on the producer's expected income and variance of income. These impacts are evaluated in the context of a model of producer welfare which features both price and yield uncertainty, as well as risk aversion on the part of the producer. The method is applied to the Australian wheat industry and estimates of willingness-to-pay are shown to be relatively sensitive to the levels of coverage and yield variability.

In this paper a method for evaluating the supply response of individual producers to a price underwriting scheme is presented. The method includes precise formulae to take account of the impact of price underwriting on the producer's uncertain conditions. The Australian Wheat Board's guaranteed minimum price scheme is taken as a specific example of price underwriting in practice. Results show the scheme to lead to only relatively small supply responses. The impact on producer behaviour of an increase in price uncertainty in the presence of an underwriting scheme is also demonstrated in the paper.