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People are self-biased for rewards. We place a higher value on rewards if we receive them than if other people do. However, existing work has ignored one of the most powerful theorems from behavioural ecology of how animals seek resources in everyday life, the Marginal Value Theorem (MVT), which accounts for optimal behaviour for maximising resources intake rate. Does this self-bias help humans maximise rewards when foraging for their own benefit compared to foraging for the benefit of others? Participants had to decide when to leave patches where reward intake was gradually depleting, in environments with different average reward rates. Half of the time participants foraged for themselves, and in the other half they collected rewards for an anonymous stranger. The optimal MVT derived solution states people should leave when the instantaneous reward intake in a patch equals the average rate in an environment. Across two studies, people were more optimal when foraging for self, showing a reduced sensitivity to instantaneous rewards when foraging for other. Autistic traits were linked to reduced sensitivity to reward rates when foraging for self but not for other. These results highlight that the self-bias may be adaptive, helping people maximise reward intake., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Choosing whether to exert effort to obtain rewards is fundamental to human motivated behavior. However, the neural dynamics underlying the evaluation of reward and effort in humans is poorly understood. Here, we report an exploratory investigation into this with chronic intracranial recordings from the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and basal ganglia (BG; subthalamic nuclei and globus pallidus) in people with Parkinson's disease performing a decision-making task with offers that varied in levels of reward and physical effort required. This revealed dissociable neural signatures of reward and effort, with BG beta (12 to 20 Hz) oscillations tracking effort on a single-trial basis and PFC theta (4 to 7 Hz) signaling previous trial reward, with no effects of net subjective value. Stimulation of PFC increased overall acceptance of offers and sensitivity to reward while decreasing the impact of effort on choices. This work uncovers oscillatory mechanisms that guide fundamental decisions to exert effort for reward across BG and PFC, supports a causal role of PFC for such choices, and seeds hypotheses for future studies., Competing Interests: Competing interests statement:M.H. has received honoraria from Eli Lilley, Otsuka and Sumitomo Pharma for lectures/participation in advisory panels, and is a founding member of the Oxford University spin-out NeuHealth. P.A.S. receives grant support from Medtronic. S.L. has honoraria from Medtronic and is a consultant for Iota Biosciences. All other authors declare no competing interests.

Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is vital for decision-making. Functional neuroimaging links vmPFC to processing rewards and effort, while parallel work suggests vmPFC involvement in prosocial behaviour. However, the necessity of vmPFC for these functions is unknown. Patients with rare focal vmPFC lesions (n = 25), patients with lesions elsewhere (n = 15) and healthy controls (n = 40) chose between rest and exerting effort to earn rewards for themselves or another person. vmPFC damage decreased prosociality across behavioural and computational measures. vmPFC patients earned less, discounted rewards by effort more, and exerted less force when another person benefited, compared to both control groups. Voxel-based lesion mapping revealed dissociations between vmPFC subregions. While medial damage led to antisocial behaviour, lateral damage increased prosocial behaviour relative to patients with damage elsewhere. vmPFC patients also showed reduced effort sensitivity overall, but reward sensitivity was limited to specific subregions. These results reveal multiple causal contributions of vmPFC to prosocial behaviour, effort and reward., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Research suggests that the temporal order in which people receive information about costs and benefits whilst making decisions can influence their choices. But, do people have a preference for seeking information about costs or benefits when making effort-based decisions, and does this impact motivation? Here, participants made choices about whether to exert different levels of physical effort to obtain different magnitudes of reward, or rest for low reward. Prior to each effort-based choice, they also had to decide which information they wanted to see first: how much physical effort would be required, or how large the reward would be. We found no overall preference for seeking reward or effort information first, but motivation did change when people saw reward or effort information first. Seeking effort information first, both someone's average tendency to do so and their choice to see effort first on a given trial, was associated with reductions in the willingness to exert higher effort. Moreover, the tendency to prefer effort information first was associated with reduced vigorous exercise and higher levels of fatigue in everyday life. These findings highlight that preferences for seeking effort information may be a bias that reduces people's willingness to exert effort in the lab and in everyday life., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Prosocial behaviors-actions that benefit others-are central to individual and societal well-being. Although the mechanisms underlying the financial and moral costs of prosocial behaviors are increasingly understood, this work has often ignored a key influence on behavior: effort. Many prosocial acts are effortful, and people are averse to the costs of exerting them. However, how the brain encodes effort costs when actions benefit others is unknown. During fMRI, participants completed a decision-making task where they chose in each trial whether to "work" and exert force (30%-70% of maximum grip strength) or "rest" (no effort) for rewards (2-10 credits). Crucially, on separate trials, they made these decisions either to benefit another person or themselves. We used a combination of multivariate representational similarity analysis and model-based univariate analysis to reveal how the costs of prosocial and self-benefiting efforts are processed. Strikingly, we identified a unique neural signature of effort in the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) for prosocial acts, both when choosing to help others and when exerting force to benefit them. This pattern was absent for self-benefiting behaviors. Moreover, stronger, specific representations of prosocial effort in the ACCg were linked to higher levels of empathy and higher subsequent exerted force to benefit others. In contrast, the ventral tegmental area and ventral insula represented value preferentially when choosing for oneself and not for prosocial acts. These findings advance our understanding of the neural mechanisms of prosocial behavior, highlighting the critical role that effort has in the brain circuits that guide helping others., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests The authors declare no competing interests., (Copyright © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Social cohesion relies on prosociality in increasingly aging populations. Helping other people requires effort, yet how willing people are to exert effort to benefit themselves and others, and whether such behaviors shift across the life span, is poorly understood. Using computational modeling, we tested the willingness of 95 younger adults (18-36 years old) and 92 older adults (55-84 years old) to put physical effort into self- and other-benefiting acts. Participants chose whether to work and exert force (30%-70% of maximum grip strength) for rewards (2-10 credits) accrued for themselves or, prosocially, for another. Younger adults were somewhat selfish, choosing to work more at higher effort levels for themselves, and exerted less force in prosocial work. Strikingly, compared with younger adults, older people were more willing to put in effort for others and exerted equal force for themselves and others. Increased prosociality in older people has important implications for human behavior and societal structure.

Helping a friend move house, donating to charity, volunteering assistance during a crisis. Humans and other species alike regularly undertake prosocial behaviors-actions that benefit others without necessarily helping ourselves. But how does the brain learn what acts are prosocial? Basile and colleagues show that removal of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) prevents monkeys from learning what actions are prosocial but does not stop them carrying out previously learned prosocial behaviors. This highlights that the ability to learn what actions are prosocial and choosing to perform helpful acts may be distinct cognitive processes, with only the former depending on ACC., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Motivation is underpinned by cost-benefit valuations where costs-such as physical effort or outcome risk-are subjectively weighed against available rewards. However, in many environments risks pertain not to the variance of outcomes, but to variance in the possible levels of effort required to obtain rewards (effort risks). Moreover, motivation is often guided by the extent to which cognitive-not physical-effort devalues rewards (effort discounting). Yet, very little is known about the mechanisms that underpin the influence of cognitive effort risks or discounting on motivation. We used two cost-benefit decision-making tasks to probe subjective sensitivity to cognitive effort (number of shifts of spatial attention) and to effort risks. Our results show that shifts of spatial attention when monitoring rapidly presented visual stimuli are perceived as effortful and devalue rewards. Additionally, most people are risk-averse, preferring safe, known amounts of effort over risky offers. However, there was no correlation between their effort and risk sensitivity. We show for the first time that people are averse to variance in the possible amount of cognitive effort to be exerted. These results suggest that cognitive effort sensitivity and risk sensitivity are underpinned by distinct psychological and neurobiological mechanisms.

Empathy--the capacity to understand and resonate with the experiences of others--can depend on the ability to predict when others are likely to receive rewards. However, although a plethora of research has examined the neural basis of predictions about the likelihood of receiving rewards ourselves, very little is known about the mechanisms that underpin variability in vicarious reward prediction. Human neuroimaging and nonhuman primate studies suggest that a subregion of the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg) is engaged when others receive rewards. Does the ACCg show specialization for processing predictions about others' rewards and not one's own and does this specialization vary with empathic abilities? We examined hemodynamic responses in the human brain time-locked to cues that were predictive of a high or low probability of a reward either for the subject themselves or another person. We found that the ACCg robustly signaled the likelihood of a reward being delivered to another. In addition, ACCg response significantly covaried with trait emotion contagion, a necessary foundation for empathizing with other individuals. In individuals high in emotion contagion, the ACCg was specialized for processing others' rewards exclusively, but for those low in emotion contagion, this region also responded to information about the subject's own rewards. Our results are the first to show that the ACCg signals probabilistic predictions about rewards for other people and that the substantial individual variability in the degree to which the ACCg is specialized for processing others' rewards is related to trait empathy., Significance Statement: Successfully cooperating, competing, or empathizing with others can depend on our ability to predict when others are going to get something rewarding. Although many studies have examined how the brain processes rewards we will get ourselves, very little is known about vicarious reward processing. Here, we show that a subregion of the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg) shows a degree of specialization for processing others' versus one's own rewards. However, the degree to which the ACCg is specialized varies with people's ability to empathize with others. This new insight into how vicarious rewards are processed in the brain and vary with empathy may be key for understanding disorders of social behavior, including psychopathy and autism., (Copyright © 2015 Lockwood et al.)

Speed-accuracy trade-off is an intensively studied law governing almost all behavioral tasks across species. Here we show that motivation by reward breaks this law, by simultaneously invigorating movement and improving response precision. We devised a model to explain this paradoxical effect of reward by considering a new factor: the cost of control. Exerting control to improve response precision might itself come at a cost--a cost to attenuate a proportion of intrinsic neural noise. Applying a noise-reduction cost to optimal motor control predicted that reward can increase both velocity and accuracy. Similarly, application to decision-making predicted that reward reduces reaction times and errors in cognitive control. We used a novel saccadic distraction task to quantify the speed and accuracy of both movements and decisions under varying reward. Both faster speeds and smaller errors were observed with higher incentives, with the results best fitted by a model including a precision cost. Recent theories consider dopamine to be a key neuromodulator in mediating motivational effects of reward. We therefore examined how Parkinson's disease (PD), a condition associated with dopamine depletion, alters the effects of reward. Individuals with PD showed reduced reward sensitivity in their speed and accuracy, consistent in our model with higher noise-control costs. Including a cost of control over noise explains how reward may allow apparent performance limits to be surpassed. On this view, the pattern of reduced reward sensitivity in PD patients can specifically be accounted for by a higher cost for controlling noise., (Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Evaluating the costs and benefits of our own choices is central to most forms of decision-making and its mechanisms in the brain are becoming increasingly well understood. To interact successfully in social environments, it is also essential to monitor the rewards that others receive. Previous studies in nonhuman primates have found neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that signal the net value (benefit minus cost) of rewards that will be received oneself and also neurons that signal when a reward will be received by someone else. However, little is understood about the way in which the human brain engages in cost-benefit analyses during social interactions. Does the ACC signal the net value (the benefits minus the costs) of rewards that others will receive? Here, using fMRI, we examined activity time locked to cues that signaled the anticipated reward magnitude (benefit) to be gained and the level of effort (cost) to be incurred either by a subject themselves or by a social confederate. We investigated whether activity in the ACC covaries with the net value of rewards that someone else will receive when that person is required to exert effort for the reward. We show that, although activation in the sulcus of the ACC signaled the costs on all trials, gyral ACC (ACC(g)) activity varied parametrically only with the net value of rewards gained by others. These results suggest that the ACC(g) plays an important role in signaling cost-benefit information by signaling the value of others' rewards during social interactions.

The mesolimbic dopaminergic system exerts a crucial influence on incentive processing. However, the contribution of dopamine in dynamic, ecological situations where reward rates vary, and decisions evolve over time, remains unclear. In such circumstances, current (foreground) reward accrual needs to be compared continuously with potential rewards that could be obtained by traveling elsewhere (background reward rate), to determine the opportunity cost of staying versus leaving. We hypothesized that dopamine specifically modulates the influence of background, but not foreground, reward information when making a dynamic comparison of these variables for optimal behavior. On a novel foraging task based on an ecological account of animal behavior (marginal value theorem), human participants of either sex decided when to leave locations in situations where foreground rewards depleted at different rates, either in rich or poor environments with high or low background reward rates. In line with theoretical accounts, people's decisions to move from current locations were independently modulated by changes in both foreground and background reward rates. Pharmacological manipulation of dopamine D2 receptor activity using the agonist cabergoline significantly affected decisions to move on, specifically modulating the effect of background reward rates. In particular, when on cabergoline, people left patches in poor environments much earlier. These results demonstrate a role of dopamine in signaling the opportunity cost of rewards, not value per se. Using this ecologically derived framework, we uncover a specific mechanism by which D2 dopamine receptor activity modulates decision- making when foreground and background reward rates are dynamically compared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors comment on the article "Noradrenaline and Dopamine Neurons in the Reward/Effort Trade-off: A Direct Electrophysiological Comparison in Behaving Monkeys" by C. Varazzani et al. They highlight the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and locus coeruleus (LC) in monkeys when they declined or accepted offers. The relationship between SNc activity and cost-benefit valuation is also investigated.