Search

In reverse supply chain with IERs (Inspection Error Rates) and competition, which consists of one remanufacturer and two competing collectors, the two collectors collect the used-products from used-product market competitively, and then they carry out inspection activity with IERs. The competition means supply amount competition. Considering the competition, we study the optimal price decisions for reverse supply chain members by game theory. We present the optimal collecting prices for two collectors and the optimal reclaiming price for remanufacturer. By numerical example, we analyze the impacts of competitions on the optimal results under supply amount competition. The research results show that: under supply amount competition, when one collector reduces IERs, the other one can get small increasing of profits even though he does not reduce his IERs; the remanufacturer can get more profits.

In reverse supply chain under our study, IERs and UIC are the inspection-error-rates and the unit inspection cost respectively. This reverse supply chain consists of two members: remanufacturer and collector. The collector is responsible for collecting the used-products from the used-product market and inspecting the collected used-products. In order to reduce the IERs, the collector increases investment, namely, the unit inspecting cost increases. In this paper, considering IERs and UIC, we focus on the price decisions for reverse supply chain by game theory. We present the optimal price decisions, and analyze the impacts of IERs and UIC on the optimal results by numerical example. The research results can help the remanufacturer and the collector make their optimal price decisions for reverse supply chain considering both IERs and UIC.

The reverse supply chain with inspection-error-rates (IERs) under our study consists of two members: remanufacturer and collector. The collector is responsible for collecting the used-products from the end consumers, and inspecting the collected used-products. Owing to technical or non-technical factors, the collector may make inspection errors. In order to decrease the IERs, the collector will add more investment, namely, the unit inspecting cost will increase. In this paper, we focus on the dynamic analysis for reverse supply chain with IERs. The causal loop diagram for the reverse supply chain with IERs is developed using system dynamics methodology. We simulate the impacts of IERs and cost-share-ratio on profits of remanufacturer and collector. Based on the simulation results, the analyses of cost-sharing in the reverse supply chain with IERs are presented: under which conditions the remanufacturer should share the inspection cost with the collector so as to control the IERs.

In reverse supply chain under our study, there are four supply disruptions. As the source of the reverse supply chain, the supply disruption of used-products between end-consumers and collector will largely affect the profits of the reverse supply chain. In order to manage the profits of the reverse supply chain, we give an expanded stock-flow diagram with this supply disruption of the reverse supply chain by using system dynamics methodology, show the simulation results of collector's profit, disassembly center's profit, remanufacturer's profit and the mean of their profits under different disruption periods. By analyzing the simulation results, we present a strategy to ensure the members positive profits. The strategy is adding another channel of purchasing used-products for the collector. We show the simulation results of the members profits and their mean after using the strategy, and give the suitable range of purchase quantity of used-products for the strategy.

In a reverse supply chain which consists of the collector, the disassembly center and the remanufacturer, the collecting of used-products is very important. When a disruption risk occurs in the area of used-products market, the collector can't collect any used-products from the end-consumers during this disruption. We consider a mitigation strategy for this risk: the collector collects used-products from other areas by paying a higher collecting price. The question is how much the higher collecting price should be. Our goal is to investigate the reasonable scope of the higher collecting price. By expending our previous works, we find the reasonable scope of the collecting price is [p, 1.48p]. Herein, p is the collecting price of used-product without supply disruption. As a result, if the duration of supply disruption of used-products trends to be more than four periods, and the increasing rate of collecting price is no more than 48%, the collector should adopt the strategy: collecting. Otherwise: not.

The supply disruption of used-products between end-consumers and collector is one supply disruption of the reverse supply chain under our study. In order to analyze the impacts of this supply disruption on the reverse supply chain, we give an expanded stock-flow diagram with supply disruption of the reverse supply chain by using system dynamics methodology, show the simulation results of the collector's profit, the disassembly center's profit and the remanufacturer's profit, and analyze the simulation results and the mean of their profits. This simulation model and the results can help the members of the reverse supply chain make appropriate decisions to ensure positive profits under different supply disruption periods.

RFID-EPC plays an important role in Internet of Things which will be the new environment of application of the reverse supply chain. By using RFID-EPC, the reverse supply chain under Internet of Things will have some characteristics. In order to analyze the impacts of RFID-EPC on reverse supply chain, on the assumption that RFID-EPC can reduce the collection uncertainty of the used-products, we present a system dynamics model and show the changing of the inventories, the service levels, and the profits. By analyzing the simulation results of the reverse supply chain with and without RFID-EPC, we can obtain that the service levels and the profits of the collector, the disassembly center, and the remanufacturer will increase even though their inventories increase when RFID-EPC is used in reverse supply chain.

According to the relationship of the members in reverse supply chain and the members in forward supply chain, R/M integrated supply chain can be divided into two kinds: the strongly integrated R/M supply chain and the weakly integrated R/M supply chain. In the reverse supply chain of weakly integrated R/M supply chain, the manager of disassembly center wonder about the trend of future situation, including the collection amount, the inventory of the used-product, the collection price and the total profit. In this paper, we present the simulation of the latter reverse supply chain with different policies by system dynamics methodology, and give the analysis of the simulation results. By our simulation and analysis, the fluctuations of the used-product inventory, the collection amount and the collection price in policy II are smaller than that in policy I; the total profit of the reverse supply chain by policy II is better than that of policy I. As a result, the disassembly center should choose the policy II.