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This article presents philosophical-ethical arguments concerning the extent to which NCAA inter-collegiate ("American" or U.S.) football is a public good and some implausible implications of the claim that it constitutes a public good and ought to be publicly subsidized as part of a component of U.S. higher education generally as is currently the case. Underlying this main argument is one concerning who or what should have the responsibility for subsidizing the necessary costs of the sport, including its associated healthcare and medical costs.

Professor Keith Lehrer has recently argued for what this author shall refer to as his "preference compatibilism," according to which, among other things, knowledge of S's preferences is what a counterfactual intervener uses to decide when S will depart from the counterfactual intervener's plan. Lehrer assumes, among other things, Harry G. Frankfurt's notion of "effective wants," which are what Lehrer calls "preferences that reveal themselves in choice given the opportunity to act" (Lehrer 2016, 36). While the author here generally concurs with Lehrer's preference compatibilism, he shall make some suggestions with the intention of increasing its plausibility even further, especially with regard to its conception of free will when it is considered in light of certain matters of philosophy of law in particular and the ethics of responsibility (moral responsibility) more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article introduces various topics covered in the issue related to responsibility, including contemporary revolution in moral responsibility theory, the history of an agent's actions, and concepts like desert.

This paper provides a philosophical account of the issue of U.S. reparations to descendants of enslaved blacks in the U.S. (i.e., African Americans). Subsequent to defining "reparations," the different kinds, approaches and arguments for and against them are noted. While there are cases to be made against the U.S. Government in favor of reparations to certain African countries and peoples, this paper shall focus attention on the case for reparations by the U.S. Government to descendants of enslaved blacks in the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sport, Ethics & Philosophy is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Neither anti-illegal drug proponents nor their detractors have wholly plausible arguments for their positions, because neither takes responsibility for drug use sufficiently seriously. Instead, only a policy that places users’ responsibility at the forefront of the problem is acceptable, one that is sufficiently respectful of actual or potential nonusers’ rights not to be wrongfully harmed, directly or indirectly, by drug use, or coerced to support it in any way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the hundreds of articles and books that have been written in epistemology over the span of just the past few decades, relatively little has been written specifically on epistemic responsibility. What has been written rarely considers the nature of epistemic responsibility and its possible role in epistemic justification or knowledge. Instead, such work concerns philosophical analyses and arguments about related concepts such as epistemic virtues or duties, rather than epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.2 It is epistemic responsibility in the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness senses that is the primary concern of this paper, though the duty sense of epistemic responsibility is explored in terms of its pertinence to epistemic virtue. What is epistemic responsibility? And what, if anything, is its relationship to justification and knowledge? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the tradition of justified true belief theory, I provide an epistemic responsibility-based philosophical analysis of collective knowledge which is both coherentist and reliabilist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses some of the necessary conditions of collective moral responsibility. In doing so, it is assumed that collectives are at least of two kinds: aggregates and conglomerates. The former are random groups of persons, whereas the latter are organized, tend to have decision-making structure, etc. Of course, a collective is an aggregate or conglomerate to one degree or another, and there are collectives that do not fall easily into either of the aggregate or conglomerate categories. What are conditions of collective moral responsibility? Furthermore, do any collectives satisfy these conditions? To answer this, first, a plausible analysis of the nature of collective moral responsibility prior to figuring out which collectives qualify as morally responsible agents. Consider the principle of Collective Moral Liability. It states that it is justified for one to ascribe to a collective moral liability with respect to an outcome or a state if affairs to the extent that: the responsible collective is either an intentional, voluntary or epistemic agent concerning that outcome; the casually contributory conduct was in some way faulty; if the harmful outcome was truly the fault of the collective, the required causal connection exists between the faulty aspect of its conduct and the outcome.

This paper examines some of the essential features of Samuel Scheffler's hybrid theory of ethics. Scheffler posits and defends a moral theory which is intended to be neither act-consequentialist nor fully agents centered. Instead, it provides an agent-centered analysis of moral thinking; one that, unlike consequentialist theories, respects the personal integrity of the moral agent. In this paper I shall do the following; (1) Sketch some of the general points of Scheffler's proposal; (2) Apply Scheffler's ethical theory to the matter of corporate social responsibility; and (3) Raise some objections to this Schefflerian corporate social responsibility theory, along with some modifications of this hybrid theory of corporate social responsibility which are intended to evade such criticisms. The significance of this paper is that it shows that Scheffler's quite innovative ethical theory is problematic as a foundation for a theory of corporate social responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper in this journal Charles B. Saunders et al. argue that corporations have no social responsibility regarding alienation in the workplace in that there is no significant degree of alienation in the workplace, at least in white collar and management level positions in corporate America. Contrary to Saunders et al., this paper defines the concept of alienation. having done that, it proceeds to show that the argument Saunders et al. make flounders on logical grounds. I conclude that Saunders et al. provide no evidence for the claim that alienation is lacking (in any degree) in corporate America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the June 1, 2012 issue on topics including moral responsibility, free will and responsibility and philosophy.

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one on the metaphysics of moral responsibility and another on moral responsibility theory.