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This paper studies the interactions between harvesters that depend on the renewable resource as a vital factor of production (i.e., fisheries) and industries that can have important impacts on the renewable resource but whose production does not depend on it (i.e., off-shore oil extraction) in the context of a growing economy. We examine these issues in the context of a closed economy focusing on how the co-existence between these two sectors affects the potential for sustainable development and how the well-being of the poor, i.e., the harvesters, is affected. We identify conditions under which existence and expansion of a resource-impacting sector may make sustainable development more likely. However, if these conditions are not met growth of the resource-impacting sector leads to resource depletion or even complete extinction and thus to the disappearance of the harvesting activity over the long run.

Three new structural factors underlie the latest great world crisis: (1) the incorporation of highly populated countries into the growth process; (2) The increasing scarcity of the environment and certain natural resources; (3) the dramatic concentration of wealth and income in the advanced economies over the last two decades. These structural changes have significantly tightened the links between world growth and commodity demand, made the world commodity supply increasingly inelastic, and rendered economic growth more dependent on lax monetary and financial policies, respectively. All this may make the world economy highly vulnerable to crises and may make the recovery from the current crisis more difficult.

This paper examines how certain new structural factors have contributed to the latest great financial crisis and world recession of 2008-09. We focus on three of these structural factors: (i) the incorporation of highly populated countries into the growth process; (ii) The increasing scarcity of the environment and certain natural resources; (iii) the unprecedented concentration of wealth and income in the advanced economies over the last three decades. These structural changes have significantly tightened the links between world growth and commodity prices, have made the world commodity supply to become increasingly inelastic, and have made growth to become more dependent on lax monetary policies, respectively. All this may make the recovery from the current crisis much more difficult, implying a deeper and more protracted crisis than most previous crises. With this framework in mind we focus on the likely affect of the financial crisis upon the natural resources in the developing world, by drawing implications from the 1995 Mexico-originated Peso crisis and the 1998-99 Asia crises. We find that the impact of the current crisis is likely to degrade further the environmental resources and the tightening of environmental policies in response to such degradation may make the commodity supply curve of commodities even steeper in the future.

This paper focuses on the interactions between local communities having at least some degree of informal claims over natural resources and external agents, particularly firms interested in commercial resource exploitation. The paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, unlike the literature on devolution and communal resource management, rather than concentrating on intra-community decisions, we extend the analysis to examine interactions between the community and outside agents. Second, unlike both the literature on conflict and bargaining, we integrate these two strands of the literature, so that we can endogenously derive the conditions under which community-firm interactions result in conflict or, alternatively, in bargaining agreements. Third, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that formally models the endogenous participation by third parties that may attempt to support communities in the process. We show that, in a context of weak property rights, improvements in the community's bargaining power vis-á-vis the firm are likely to increase resource extraction and thereby harm the environment. Moreover, an increase in the wage rate may increase or decrease resource extraction depending on initial conditions.

This paper focuses on the interactions between local communities having at least some degree of informal claims over natural resources and external agents, particularly firms interested in commercial resource exploitation. The paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, unlike the literature on devolution and communal resource management, rather than concentrating on intra-community decisions, we extend the analysis to examine interactions between the community and outside agents. Second, unlike both the literature on conflict and bargaining, we integrate these two strands of the literature, so that we can endogenously derive the conditions under which community-firm interactions result in conflict or, alternatively, in bargaining agreements. Third, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that formally models the endogenous participation by third parties that may attempt to support communities in the process. We show that, in a context of weak property rights, improvements in the community's bargaining power vis-á-vis the firm are likely to increase resource extraction and thereby harm the environment. Moreover, an increase in the wage rate may increase or decrease resource extraction depending on initial conditions.