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The ethics of research representation are rarely discussed. Yet representation can have a significant impact on research participants and audiences. This paper draws on some of the limited body of accounts of ethical challenges experienced in representing others in qualitative research. These accounts make clear that researchers often have to choose between ‘competing goods’ when representing others, such as participant control over what is presented and how, researchers’ ‘interpretive authority’, and how to represent participants’ speech. These decisions frequently involve researchers choosing between ‘literal’ (empirical, evidence-based) and ‘real’ (authentic, experiential) truths. To resolve these dilemmas, some researchers are turning to creative methods of representation, such as poems, songs, plays and dance. Like all forms of representation, these methods require compromise: in particular, some detail, depth, or location may be sacrificed in return for accessible engagement with participants and wider audiences. Conversely, traditional methods of presentation may sacrifice some scope for engagement and accessibility in return for greater detail and depth. We argue that such sacrifices are a necessary component of all forms of qualitative representation and consequently require a reflexive approach to choices about representation. It is this reflexive approach which we argue constitutes an ethics of engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The matter of presentation and re-presentation has been crucial for the entire legacy of Western philosophy in general and to traditional aesthetics in particular. This paper uses a documentary about the 2001 anti-G8 protests in Genoa to illustrate a number of theoretical questions raised by presentation and re-presentation. I will demonstrate that presentation is always a matter of (involuntary) traces or imprints of a certain movement, which must be opposed to re-presentations, inasmuch as the latter can be seen as a will to presence, as a will to capture and re-iterate presence for various artistic, ideological or scientific purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Truth regime" is a much used but little theorized concept, with the Foucauldian literature presupposing that truth in modernity is uniformly scientific/quasi-scientific and enhances power. I argue that the forms of truth characteristic of our present are wider than Foucault recognized, their relations to power more various, and their historicity more complex. The truth regime of advanced modernity is characterized by multiple, irreducible truth formulae that co-exist and sometimes vie for dominance. A truth formula stabilizes a network of elements: a relation between representation and presentation (words and things), truth and non-truth, and the place of the subject in discourse. Our contemporary truth regime comprises radically heterogeneous truthful knowledges — science, governance, religion/politics, and common culture — that have distinct histories and relations to power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the semiotic philosophy of Charles S. Peirce in relation to his characterizations of representationism and presentationism. Accordingly, Pierce in definitions, overtly pits the representationists, who treat percepts as representatives, against the presentationists, according to whom percepts do not stand for hidden realities. He advocates an inferentialist approach as evident in hs His essay writing "On the Doctrine of Immediate Perception" advocate an inferentialist approach.

The article focuses on the concepts of representation and presentation in relation to the image as thought by Gilles Deleuze, an expert in phenomenology. The purpose of this article is to look at the role of the image, from a cognitive perspective, as an interaction between notions of presentation and representation, and to use this distinction in order to begin to develop an understanding of how the image might work in art. Representations do occur, but they are not the result of brain adding something to perceptions of images; rather, conscious perception involves the process of realizing representations by subtracting what does not interest one from an image and concentrating on those aspects of it with which one might potentially interact.