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In the past decade, Public Rental Housing (PRH) has become the program of providing affordable rental housing to low- and middle-income households in China. Even though descriptions of the governance results are numerous, the previous studies are not underpinned by a theoretical foundation from a governance perspective, nor have they empirically examined whether PRH governance works on the ground. This explorative and empirical paper aims to fill this gap of an outcome-oriented evaluation of the impacts of governance as perceived by the final user. Central government formulated the objective for PRH governance as maintaining stability in the society. Whether the tenants perceive the goal of social stability as achieved was measured along three governance outcome dimensions: satisfaction with housing quality, satisfaction with housing quantity, and willingness to communicate with the government about PRH governance. Data were collected from questionnaires to PRH-tenants in Chongqing, the most important pilot city of PRH provision in China. The findings show that the perceived governance outcomes were quite mixed as tenants were moderately satisfied with PRH housing quantity, but less satisfied with housing quality, and thought they could relatively easily communicate with local government. In view of these mixed outcomes, to strengthen the effectiveness of PRH governance in the eyes of the tenants, this study suggests local governments: (1) to rethink and redevelop the performance evaluation; (2) to rethink the relations with non-governmental actors and organise a monitoring system that will assist in optimizing housing quality; and (3) to facilitate tenants' communication with local government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, government intervention in welfare states has witnessed a shift from 'government' to 'governance': policy making shifted from hierarchical government steering to mixed forms involving government, market and civic actors. Such terminology has also entered Chinese policy language on public rental housing (PRH) provision. To unravel the perceived power distribution in the relationships between the involved actors, this article draws from in-depth interviews in two Chinese cities: Chongqing and Fuzhou. The article thereby contributes new insights to the perceived power relations in Chinese PRH provision on the ground. It also develops an analytical framework based on Billis by complementing it with Social Network Analysis to measure the power relations. Such a framework will allow the comparison of different governance systems across time and different jurisdictions within and beyond China. This study shows the structures and mechanisms for non-governmental actors to play a role, which they do not have in the 'government' period, in the governance of PRH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors comment on the level and type of security available to households living in rented housing. They say the level of security offered to them is under-theorized and under-researched in contrast the level and nature of security for home owners. Security is a multi-layered concept with different dimensions ranging from aspects of financial security to psycho-social security.

In an attempt to promote efficiency and consumer choice, many governments in Europe have in recent years required social housing organisations to be more market-orientated and competitive. Competition, however, is being discussed and implemented without any detailed examination of what is meant by the term 'competition' outside a conventional 'market', as is the case in social housing. It is not clear what exactly is meant by competition and this paper therefore focuses on the question of how competition can be operationalised and how it can be measured in practice. This paper concentrates on social housing in England and the Netherlands: two countries where competition in social housing is an issue. These two countries also have different social housing models. For both countries, we build on an evaluative framework based on the economic concepts of rivalry, risk and choice and then analyse the data to establish whether competition can be measured in a convincing way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Urban renewal in the Netherlands has become a matter of ‘networking’. Housing associations, Dutch social landlords, became financially independent in the 1990s and have a responsibility in urban renewal. It is a joint responsibility in which local authority, social landlord and tenants are dependent on each other. This situation is rather new and needs some getting used to, as the two case studies show. The paper concludes that taking account of the complexity of networks could improve the chances of gaining support for problem definitions and solutions. This would result in agreement about goals and win–win package deals for actors, and ultimately in ‘more’ progress in urban renewal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social rental housing has once again captured a strong position on the Dutch political agenda. This has happened especially since the European Commission sent a letter to the Dutch government indicating that the Dutch social rental sector was not considered EU-proof from the viewpoint of the European Union's competition policy. The letter coincided with criticisms from Dutch politicians that housing associations had not been performing well enough for some time, given their abundant resources. However, in an international context, the Dutch social rental sector is often regarded as a good system for providing affordable housing to those who need it, without the sector being marginalized and stigmatized. Jim Kemeny has classified this market as one in which the social rental sector in due course competes with the private rental sector on equal or almost equal terms as a unitary rental market. The starting point of this paper is whether the achievement of a unitary rental sector is threatened by the EU's competition policy. It will also discuss two other possible threats to the future of the Dutch unitary rental market: the threat to take surplus capital away from housing associations and have government decide on what to invest; and the attractiveness of home-ownership to households. We conclude that the character of the Dutch unitary rental sector is indeed under threat, although mostly by stealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Housing allowances aim to make rental housing affordable for the recipients. Whether affordability for tenants is achieved in an economically efficient way is the question that is discussed in this essay. Three aspects of efficiency are focused on: disincentives to work, over-consumption of housing and horizontal inefficiency. These topics are tackled through a discussion that focuses mainly on the principles, but also on some of the outcomes, of the means-tested housing allowance systems in six Western countries: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and Sweden. Conclusions concern the apparent unimportance of the poverty trap or the unemployment trap specifically for rental housing, the concept of notional rent used to tackle over-consumption, and the frequent existence of some form of horizontal inefficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]