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The purpose of this article is to expose a basic flaw at the root of perennialism as a method for studying mysticism—its distinction between ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ components of mysticism and religion. Rather than being distinct, the specific ‘exoteric’ doctrines of a given mystic’s tradition penetrate the mystics’ knowledge-claims. Thus, the ‘esoteric’ dimension in a mystical tradition is permeated by that mystical tradition’s ‘exoteric’ doctrines, not by the transcultural and ahistorical perennial spine that perennialists postulate. Contrary to what the perennialists suggest, there is no one underlying esoteric set of beliefs embedded in all traditional religions that all mystics share. Rather, in the different religious traditions of the world, there are genuinely different mysticisms with different beliefs, practices, values, and goals. Thus, the perennialist approach distorts the history of mysticism. It is better seen as a theology of religions than as an alleged discernment of timeless truths presented throughout the history of mysticism.

This study wants to provide insight into the importance of thinking Seyyed Hossein Nasr in the Islamic world. The rise of various thoughts that deviate from the teachings of Islam made Seyyed Hossein Nasr moved to make breakthroughs in reforms that denied in the Islamic world. One response that challenges the thought of Seyyed Hossein Nasr is the flow of Western development that overrides the spiritual aspect. Seyyed Hossein Nasr is due to the opposition to the Islamic religion which is felt to be very struggling with Islamic civilization going forward. The main weapon of Seyyed Hossein Nasr to counter this Western discussion is the use of the philosophy of perennialism or what is often referred to as Pernenis Religion.

Religious pluralism is growing in significance because of increasing religious diversity and increasing religious conflicts, which cause unrest in contemporary society. Muslim perennialists represent one of many groups advocating for the common goals of religious pluralism and the reaffirmation of perennial wisdom, which lies at the heart of all primordial religious traditions. The purpose of the study is to explore the principles of religious pluralism advocated by Muslim perennialist philosophers. Using the discourse analysis methodology, this study analyzed the theological validity of the Muslim perennialist perspective for articulating interfaith dialogue and co-existence in multicultural societies. By conducting this critical analysis, the study concludes that the principles of religious pluralism advocated by Muslim perennialists are the means of bringing interfaith peaceful co-existence to society.

This paper explains the perennialist doctrines of Helena Blavatsky (1831–1891), the main theorist of Theosophy, a form of occultism whose heirs include New Age and contemporary Pagan spirituality. The analysis is restricted to her first major work, Isis Unveiled (1877). In that treatise, Blavatsky argued that a single Pagan tradition lay at the basis of all historical religions and that this ancient wisdom had been corrupted by the Catholic and Protestant churches to gain power over the blind masses. Providing a fine-grained understanding of such influential heterodox perspectives of the nineteenth century, the article contributes to a historicization of religious universalism and other ideas that have become popular in modern and post-modern times, such as the claim that a perennial “mysticism” lies at the heart of all “true spirituality,” the idea that “spirituality” is something different from “religion,” and the theory that monotheism is an inherently intolerant form of religion whereas mystical, Pagan, or polytheistic spiritualities are inherently peaceful.

The rush of Western civilization, headed by Christianity, caused a considerable identity crisis in the 19th century Joseon dynasty. The founder of Donghak 東學, Suun Choe Je-u 水雲 崔濟愚, sought a way out of the crisis through religion. Suun contended that the religions of both east and west are grounded in the same Way of Heaven, and that it can be ascertained through an experience of mystical union induced by chanting a 21-character incantation. He also emphasized the importance of practicing this Way of Heaven in real life. According to him, the Western invasion is an act of selfishness, and goes against the Heavenly Way. The Heavenly Way is considered a foundation that enables communication and coexistence in a religiously diverse society. Despite the fact that his belief in the universality of the Heavenly Way is based on a personal experience&mdash, which is problematic to all mysticisms&mdash, Donghak provided a powerful discourse to deal with a variety of challenges of his time. In this age of religious pluralism, Suun&rsquo, s universalism is significant in exploring the intellectual and spiritual foundation of the modern pluralistic thoughts of Korea.

This article studies the reception of the Bhagavad Gita within circles of Perennial Philosophy scholars and examines how the Gita is interpreted to the extent that it influenced their thoughts. Within the Hindu tradition, the Gita is often read from a dualist and/or non-dualist perspective in the context of observing religious teachings and practices. In the hands of Perennial Philosophy scholars, the Gita is read from a different angle. Through a critical examination of the original works of the Perennialists, this article shows that the majority of the Perennial traditionalists read the Gita from a dualist background but that, eventually, they were convinced that the Gita&rsquo, s paradigm is essentially non-dualist. In turn, this non-dualist paradigm of the Gita influences and transforms their ontological thought, from the dualist to the non-dualist view of the reality. Meanwhile, the non-traditionalist group of Perennial Philosophy scholars are not interested in this ontological discussion. They are more concerned with the question of how the Gita provides certain ways of attaining human liberation and salvation. Interestingly, both traditionalist and non-traditionalist camps are influenced by the Gita, at the same time, inserting an external understanding and interpretation into the Gita.

In Island (1962), Aldous Huxley presents a utopian community in which theinhabitants aim to become "fully human beings" by realizing their "potentialities."I demonstrate how Huxley's notion of the "human potentialities" havebeen misrepresented, both by scholars and by the founders of the Esalen Institute.Huxley's focus on human potentialities arose from a shift in his thinkingfrom the other-worldly mysticism of The Perennial Philosophy (1945) to thelife-affirming traditions of Tantra, Zen and Mahayana Buddhism. In Island,the population attempt to realize their human potentialities and engage in anexperiential spirituality that celebrates the body and nature as sacred throughthe use of the moksha-medicine and the practice of maithuna. I argue thatwhereas Tantric adepts practised maithuna as a means to acquire supernormalpowers (siddhis), in Island the Palanese version of maithuna is quite differentand is used to valorize samsara and the acquisition of human potentialities.

Traditionalism involves the concept of a perennial philosophy, a central truth,underlying all major religions. Though little has been written about SwedishTraditionalism, consideration of the ideologies of figures such as Ivan Aguéli,Kurt Almqvist, and Tage Lindbom provides important insights into the developmentof this concept and its political connotations. Here, the influence offoundational Traditionalists René Guénon and Frithjof Schuon, Christianity,Sufism, and radical conservatism on the ideas of Aguéli, Almqvist, and Lindbomare explored.

Alister Hardy was one of the pioneers of the scientific study of spiritual experiences (SE); however, his work and insights have not received the attention they deserve. This paper, based on an in-depth analysis of Hardy’s own writings, presents his main methodological and epistemological contributions for advancing the investigation of SE. Hardy’s main epistemological propositions were as follows: the transcendent as the core of spirituality and SE as a major source of R/S beliefs; a nondogmatic approach, acknowledging that Darwinian evolution does not imply materialism and that mind is not reducible to matter; and a call for studies of psychic experiences and considering an expanded naturalism, including the “para-physical”, that could lead to a perennial philosophy and a natural theology. His methods focused on phenomenological classification and the development of a natural history of SE based on studies with proper ecological validity on the experimental and the experiential, mixing large surveys of the general population with in-depth qualitative studies of the most prominent cases. In addition, it would be worth investigating developments of SE throughout a person’s life. Bringing back Hardy’s contributions will foster a better understanding of the history of the scientific study of SE and provide key insights for moving it forward.

The purpose of this essay is to illustrate a difficulty which may arise in the attempt to simultaneously identify with more than one religious tradition. Drawing upon the philosophical insights of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas, I demonstrate how some of the most cardinal themes in one faith or theological perspective may set itself against the central notions of another. Along the way, Kierkegaard, the perennial philosophy, process theology, and even Frank Herbert’s science fiction classic Dune are woven into the discussion.

Perennial Philosophy (Philosophy Perennis) is the most monumental work of Seyyed Hossein Nasr's thought, and with that thought he succeeded in bringing together the religion of Islam, philosophy and Science which he said would remain forever. As a universal religion Islam is a continuation of the religions that have been revealed to the apostles, starting Adam a.s. arrived at the Prophet Muhammad. the whole religion is called al-Islam, which in essence is a total surrender to God. Even so according to Nasr, even though Islam and western religions and traditions have equality in several respects, Muslims must not take Western values and views for granted. There must be cech and balance, there must be criticism and auto criticism regarding Western ontology, especially dealing with modern science. The importance of criticizing the basis of modern science ontology, according to Nasr, is because ontology is the most fundamental part of the development of science. Keyword : Religion, Philosophy Perennis, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr

Perennial philosophy holds that there is something hidden in all transcendent matters that does not belong to a particular period of history and to a particular geographical location. Rather, it exists at all times and is transferred from one period to another as a tradition. Therefore, the term tradition in Perennial philosophy is the same as the sacred intellect that lies in the institution of all these transcendent affairs. Among the thinkers who sought to discover the foundations of Perennial philosophy were Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Titus Burckhardt. Perennial philosophy and traditionalist views have always formed the main and deep theories of these two thinkers. It can also be argued that the traditionalist view of the world has influenced all of Nasr and Burckhardt’s scientific theories. What has been studied in this article is the study and analysis of the views and opinions of Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Titus Burckhardt about Perennial philosophy, and the purpose of this research is to extract the basics of Perennial philosophy based on the views of these two thinkers among their works.

This study attempts to critically explore Transpersonal Psychology views on the nature of spiritual experience. The exponents of this kind of psychology claimed their concept as an integration between science and religion as well as it was can be universally accepted by all religions. Since this study reveals religious issues especially religious experience that in Islam is often said to be a sufi experience, then the approach of this study is sufism. From this study we found that the Transpersonal Psychology view is really problematic both epistemologically and theologically. Epistemologically, their assumptions are a priory i.e. they are not purely and intensely resulted by scientific research, but based on the premise of perennial philosophy which recognizes the transcendent unity of religions. Theologically, their assumptions lead to the refutation of religious doctrine. It yields a contemplative spiritual practice that ignores religious teaching. As a result, the spiritual knowledge is more subjective i.e. based on human ego, which finally leads to spiritual narcissism. It is really different from the sufis, which base their spirituality on religion, and subjectively affirm their experience to syariah. Psychologically, the sufi who has reached a spiritual state, his soul was in an existential consciousness on the level of faqr, that is a feeling of indebtedness to Allah. It causes the totality of servitude to Allah, not narcissism.

This paper examines Seyyed Hossein Nasr's thoughts on Islam and perennial philosophy in dealing with the problems of modern humans. The purpose of this article is to explain the plight of modern humans and to explain how to overcome this problem through a study of the thoughts of a contemporary Muslim figure, namely Seyyed Hossein Nasr. In Nasr's perspective, perennial philosophy is a philosophy of eternity which is also interpreted as traditional wisdom. This thought about Nasr's perennial philosophy emerged as a critical reaction to what he saw as a crisis in modern humans. Modern civilization in the West which also flourished in the Islamic world, according to Nasr, has failed to achieve its goals because it has caused a variety of existentialism and spiritual crises experienced by modern humans. Through perennial philosophy, Nasr explained that to deal with the problems currently faced by modern humans is to get closer to God through Sufism as has been done by ancient scholars.

This article is intended to scrutinize Seyyed Hosssein Nasr’s thought about the negative dimensions of modernity and put it into the problems of the world where the idea of materialism ends due to greed of modern people. Nasr’s aim is actually to save humanity from destructive elements of modernity due to the idea of materialism, although the traditional-ism project that he proposed has still looked for a momentum within human consciousness and that is not to neglect the sacred matter in under-standing their world. In a reflection of his traditionalism, Nasr presupposes the creation of a progressive world presented with self-awareness to the existence of the Absolute and the Infallible. Nasr believes that modern people could live with their idea of perennial philosophy that connects everything in this world into the realm of the sacred. Benefits of modernity, according to Nasr, will be tarnished if people deny every sacred matter.

In his recent book Reinventing the Sacred, renowned biologist and systems theorist Stuart Kauffman offers an avenue for the revival of the sacred and for reconciling sacredness with a robust scientific outlook. According to Kauffman, God is a human cultural invention, and he urges us to reinvent the sacred as the ceaseless creativity in nature. I argue that Kauffman's proposal suffers from a major shortcoming, namely, being at odds with the nature, and content, of authentic experiences of the sacred, experiences which point invariably in the direction of a reality which transcends human imagination and capacity for cultural innovation. Correspondingly, I point in the direction of an alternative approach to the revival of the sacred rooted in what I call the path of direct spiritual awareness. I argue that, while being in better accord with the phenomenology of religious experience, this realist alternative to Kauffman's constructivism also avoids the unpleasant symptoms which often accompany traditional theism, namely, dogmatism, irrationalism, and incompatibility with a scientifically minded metaphysics.

One of the CARDINAL debates in the German Enlightenment in general and in the German Early Enlightenment in particular concerned the origins of knowledge. It was a continuation of a sixteenth-centuiy discussion which affected eveiy aspect of the intellectual world-theology, philosophy, history, philology, scientific and political thought-often transcending dogmatic barriers between disciplines and calling for a wider, universal perspective. It gave rise to different constructions of the transmission and transformation of knowledge that was described as "true" and "untainted" and that was methodically distinguished from "distorted" or "deviant'" knowledge.I want to highlight two interrelated aspects of this complex debate in Germany. First, theology retained considerable authority in Germany during the first half of the eighteenth century despite the growth of radical thought, and shaped the search for the source of authentic knowledge by setting it within the framework of sacred history. The German idea of a "perennial philosophy" {philosophia perennis)-a term Leibniz borrowed from August Steucho1-promoted a model of the transmission of authentic theological knowledge. This emphasis gave rise to various problems concerning the identification of perennial knowledge in nontheological systems of thought such as Greek philosophy. Second, although "theological," the German intellectual world was far from being theologically homogenous. Almost all Protestant sects make use of "perennial" arguments as proof of their authenticity, even when condemning others as heretics. This language dominated not only the polemical and apologetic debates within German Protestantism but also the often one-sided intrareligious debate with the "other," be it with a pagan, Jew, or Muslim.These two aspects were factors in the discussions of Jewish (or Hebrew) religion. Jews were the most significant "other" in German Protestantism, not only because they were physically present but also because they served as a mirror image upon which Protestantism constructed its own identity. The fact that the consideration of ancient Judaism and its esoteric knowledge, the Kabbalah, stood at the heart of the philosophia perennis debate since the sixteenth centuiy only intensified the tension. For side by side with Protestant controversies concerning the vaunted antiquity and authenticity of kabbalistic wisdom, there were internecine criticisms and concerns over the Christian preoccupation with these materials.2 Christian Kabbalah-already an established terminus in the seventeenth centuiy3-was often depicted as having a dangerous affinity for Judaism, an intrareligious accusation that in turn affected the image of Judaism itself.In the following pages I wish to present three different considerations of Hebrew religion in general and Kabbalah in particular, written during the German Early Enlightenment: Johann Benedikt Carpzov's Introduction to Jewish Theology (1687), Johann Franz Buddeus's Introduction to the History of the Philosophy of the Hebrews (1701), and Jacob Friedrich Reimmann's Introduction to Theology in General and to Jewish Theology in Particular (1717). I choose to deal with these essays not only in light of their significance for discussions throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but also because they share an interest in histoiy-Carpzov's perspective on the degeneration of true knowledge, Buddeus in the framework of the "Histoiy of Philosophy," and Reimmann through the prism of historia literaria-combining the historical narrative with the theological/philosophical one. In examining these essays I will focus on three main points: how each defines theology; the depiction of Jewish thought in light of that definition; and the understanding of Kabbalah in light of the two preceding points. I will examine the attempt in each essay to reconcile the discourse of "perennial philosophy" with Christianity through the discussion on Judaism, either by denouncing Kabbalah as a source deprived of authenticity, thus condemning the use of Christian Kabbalah, or by employing the perennial philosophy concept in a wider view of universal histoiy. …

At first glance the religious philosophy of Mohandas K. Gandhi appears to be a ver­ sion of the perennial philosophy, the main proponent of which was Aldous Huxley. In his book The Perennial Philosophy, Huxley proposed that at the core of the world’s religions is an undifferentiated Godhead, variously named ātman-brahman in Hin­ duism, the dharmakāya in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the nameless dao in Daosim, the en sof in Jewish mysticism, and the bloss nit in Meister Eckhardt’s medieval German. The individual gods of these religious traditions are mere appearances erupting from a divine ground of being. In essence, Huxley anointed the mystics of world history as the true priests and prophets of the world’s religions. In his book The Fifth Dimension, John Hick reaffirms the perennial philosophy with his statement that the Chris­ tian mystics discovered something similar to ātman or the Buddha­nature at the center of their being. 4 With regard to the issue of religious pluralism and the current preference for equal respect for all religions, it is clear that Huxley’s view carries with it a definite bias for Hinduism, Buddhism, and Daoism. Of the major Asian religious texts ex­ cerpted in The Perennial Philosophy, Confucian, Sikh, and Shinto writings are con­ spicuous by their absence, although Huxley could have excerpted passages referring to nirankar, the Sikh equivalent of nirguṇa brahman. For many centuries there have been many Hindu teachers, epitomized in Ronald Eyre’s film The Long Search as the pandit who declares that “everyone is a Hindu.” More subtle but just as religiously imperialistic is Karl Rahner’s concept of the “anonymous Christian,” which one writer describes as “non­Christians who end up in heaven” after having “received the grace of Christ without their realising it.” 5 In this article I will reevaluate Gandhi’s position on religious pluralism in light of recent work on the subject. In the first section I will expand on David R. Griffin’s critique of Hick’s theory of religious pluralism. Griffin contends that Hick’s view

I urge philosophers of religion to investigate far more vigorously than they have until now the acceptability of varied components of the world religions and their epistemological underpinnings. By evaluating “acceptability” I mean evaluation of: truth, morality, spiritual efficacy and human flourishing, in fact any value religious devotees might think significant to their religious lives. Secondly, I urge that philosophers of religion give more attention to what scholars have called the “esoteric” level of world religions, including components of strong ineffability, weak ineffability, and an alleged perennial philosophy. All this should involve a cooperative effort between analytic, comparative, and feminist philosophy of religion.

The paper continues the model I began in a previous issue of Sophia. It is argued that the predominance of purely ascending or ‘top down’ forms of spirituality which stemmed largely from the axial period and have been carried forward into modern, transpersonal theories of evolutionary spirituality is a mistake and that there exists a lost or largely ignored form of spirituality—which I name somatic—which was the predominant domain of early Neolithic and Palaeolithic experience. Aspects of what I call somatic mystical experiences have certainly been acknowledged at times to a limited degree, though they have rarely been fully explored, and have usually been considered as basic to other kinds of mystical experience, rather than fully developed forms in their own right. This article offers a fuller exploration and places such states more accurately within a detailed developmental framework than has previously been the case. Other issues relating to the horizon model across the two papers are also expanded.

Perennial philosophy, has developed into a perspective in religious studies, in order to find a point to unite religions, which leads to the belief in religious pluralism. In Islam they took the justification of the Sufis such as Muhyi al-din Ibn 'Arabi, Jalal al-din al-Rumi and' Abd al-Karim al-Jilli . A ccording to them, these figures had talked about the point which could unite the religions. Therefore, this paper will explore the readings made by perennialists to find the point , which will reveal the validity of claims referred to the Sufis. In the end , it was known that many perennialists distorted the reading of Sufism texts so that they became in line with their beliefs. Whereas in reality, the Sufis did not initiate these beliefs at all, they even believed that only the Sharia of Islam was right and there was no way to Allah except through the path carried by the Prophet Muhammad.

Critics have pointed out that the content and sequence of mystical development reported by different traditions do not seem very congruous with the contention that there is a universal path of mystical development. I propose a model of mystical development that is more subtle than traditional ‘invariant hierarchical’ models, and which explains how the apparently differing accounts of mystical development between traditions and thinkers can be reconciled with each other in a more convincing fashion, and brought together under one umbrella. The model preserves both the objective core of perennialism and the culturally subjective element of mystical ‘specialization’ that is undeniably evidenced in the mystical literature, and which hierarchical and invariant ‘universalist’ accounts struggle to integrate.

This article considers the “perennial” appeal of Ramana Maharshi, the twentieth-century Hindu saint from South India (1879–1950). While not as well-known in the West as either Ramakrishna or Ramana's contemporary, Sri Aurobindo, Ramana's life and teaching have evoked a surprisingly strong positive reaction from Indians and Westerners alike. The reason for this, first of all, is to be located in the perennial philosophy which his life and teaching implicate, and the use made of that philosophy by neo-Hindu apologists or Western scholars and spiritual figures interested in “mysticism” across cultures or interfaith dialogue. Second, the appeal of Ramana can also be located in the compelling attraction of holiness, a phenomenon which raises the fundamental question of what it means to be human. In the case of Ramana, the compelling example of human “being” provokes inquiry into the depth dimension of human existence, where, in the non-dualistic tradition which he represents, one discovers divinity.

This article is a response to D. A. Helminiak's (2001) “Treating Spiritual Issues in Secular Psychotherapy” from the perspective of K. Wilber's integral psychology. The article consists of 3 sections: (a) a selective summary of integral psychology, including the perennial philosophy, 10 levels of development, lines of development, temporary states, types of orientations, the self, and the 4 quadrants; (b) various conceptual issues; and (c) usefulness to mental health practitioners (MHPs). Although D. A. Helminiak's endeavor to formulate a clear and functional definition of spirituality is commended, his claim of novelty is shown to be unwarranted. It is argued that K. Wilber's integral model is more comprehensive, clear, coherent, and helpful to MHPs.

One effect of 9/11 has been that Muslim voices, which until then had beenmostly ignored, are increasingly reaching a wider audience of other Muslimsand non-Muslims. In Europe and North America, this has meant that selfidentified“progressive” Muslim scholars who emphasize social justice, aswell as “traditional” Muslims who emphasize Islam’s spiritual or esotericdimension, have been contributing in a much more vocal manner to the contemporaryinterpretation of what it means to be Muslim. Since most of theleading figures presented herein are Sufi Muslims of a particular strand ofesoteric Islam, this book helps fill an important lacuna concerning the developmentof the traditionalist position – a position that has been voiced bysuch Muslim scholars as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Martin Lings.Sedgwick promotes the book as a biography of René Guénon (1886-1951) and an intellectual history of the traditionalist movement that heinaugurated in the early twentieth century. Guénon’s movement combineselements of perennial philosophy, which holds that certain perennial problemsrecur in humanity’s philosophical concerns, and that this perennialwisdom is now only found in the traditional forms of the world religions ...

n an earlier essay I proposed the paradoxical theses that the main religio-philosophical alternative in the West to Judaism and Christianity has always been the perennial philosophy in its various forms, and that Christianity (and less so Judaism) has always been an amalgam or synthesis of the ideal types, biblical religion and the perennial philosophy.' An example of the former is the concept delineated by the biblical theology movement of the 1940s and 1950s.2 By the latter I mean the religio-philosophical world view exemplified by Neoplatonism and Vedanta, and by the philosophical foundation of Gnosticism, Rosicrucianism, and Theosophy, and propounded by such authors as Ren6 Gu6non, Frithjof Schuon, S. H. Nasr, and Huston Smith. The distinction between these ideal types is closely related to that which interpreters of religion often make between what Weber called the emissary and exemplary types,3 or Berger the confrontation and interiority types.4

Looking through humanity's experience of history one finds, in a varietyof ways, a tendency to go beyond time. This was true in premodemman and is equally prevalent in the postmodern view of human spirituality,even though postmodemism as an entity has failed to recognize the needand logic of such an idea. In response, contemporary religious thinkers,philosophers, and spiritualists have argued for the revival of "tradition,"religious values, and spirituality. Some of the main proponents of this "traditionistschool" (p. 53) are Huston Smith, Frithjof Schuon, Gai Eaton,Titus Burckhardt, Martin Lings, and, of course, Seyyed Hossein Nasr.Nasr has written on several topics within the field of Islamics as wellas other related disciplines. However, the major portion of his writingshave been permeated with such themes as scientia sacra, perennial philosophy,and the revival of spiritual traditions. These are indicative of hisconcern for and commitment to the cause of the revival of tradition. In thewords of Jane Smith, he is the "defender of the sacred."His works on Islam, especially on Sufism, the philosophy of religion,Shi'ite thought, and various topics in world religions are too innumerableto be accounted for here. But Nasr's relevance extends far beyond theareas of Islamic studies and comparative religion, for he writes for thespecialist and for the wider public and appeals to those who are interestednot only in religion and spirituality as such but also in their interrelationto philosophy, science, social science, policy making, art, and youthissues. Above all, Nasr provides material for those who simply seek tounderstand life's deeper mysteries. It has been rightly pointed out thatNasr has beenone of the leading figures in ... the "neo-traditionist" movementin modem Islam and has contributed enormously to the enrichmentof ideas earlier propounded by Rene Guenon. [Further] hisdefense of the "whole and integral tradition of Islam" separateshim from other contemporary Shi'ite Muslim thinkers and bringshim closer to the mainstream of Islamic thought ...

Bertrand Russel au debut du siecle, Huston Smith et Steven Katz aujourd'hui se demandent si la philosophie perpetuelle peut convenablement servir de support empirique a notre connaissance du contenu phenomenologique des experiences mystiques. Bien que les trois philosophes rejettent tous la notion meme d'un tel support, chacun developpe son argumentation selon des itineraires tres differents. L'analyse de ces trois theses fait l'objet du present article

INTRODUCTION In the previous chapter I introduced intense experiences and located them in a phenomenological map of RSEs as a subset of ultimacy experiences. I begin in this introduction by stating the intensity hypothesis – a suite of interconnected phenomenological, neurological, evolutionary, philosophical, and theological claims – and will devote this chapter to expounding and supporting it. Definition Intense experiences involve strong and broad neural activation, corresponding to existential potency and wide awareness, involving both strength of feeling and interconnectedness of ideas, memories, and emotions in such a way as to engage a person with ultimate existential and spiritual concerns and leverage significant personal change and social effects. This is intensity not in the neurologist's narrow sense of strong activation only, but in the common usage that expresses amazement at meaningfulness. Intense experiences are particularly useful for my purposes because their distinctive characteristics open a pathway to a species-wide understanding of the nature, functions, and value of RSEs , an understanding that encompasses their evolutionary origins, their cognitive structure, their emotional texture, their neurological embedding, their bodily and social effects, and their existential and cultural importance. Affiliation with other terms Intensity is not the only factor that matters for RSEs, by any means. My own research has made that quite clear, both in phenomenological and neurological terms. Under a variety of names, however, the experiential characteristics I am collecting under the banner of “intensity” have been central in the phenomenology of religion, construed as the beating heart of many diverse and powerful RSEs, as well as potent aesthetic experiences and transformative experiences of creativity that have no recognizable religious connection but here are called spiritual.

This paper presents research findings on the meaning of the miḥrāb from the metaphysical, cosmological, anthropological and psychological perspectives of the Muslim intellectual heritage. The aim is to broaden the scholarly approach to the miḥrāb as a key symbol of the Muslim heritage and thereby to facilitate a more holistic understanding of its meaning in the history of the world’s art and architecture. This paper applies the findings of new research, the articulation of key questions concerning the miḥrāb in history, architecture and art, and philological and theological considerations of its place in Muslim heritage. These conclusions are then examined in light of the perennial philosophy typical of modern studies of traditional intellectuality, both specifically Muslim and in general. The structure of the study is hierarchical, from general anthropo-theological premises to specific kinds of symbolic forms. Miḥrābs from the Bosnian tradition are considered as the initial pragmatic material and the final illustrative material for the conclusions drawn.

On September 8, 1907, Pope Pius X issued an encyclical entitled Pascendi dominici gregis, condemning — and perhaps inventing — Catholic “Modernism.” The encyclical gave a name to a wide variety of “errors.” The scholars implicated were concerned with the freedom to pursue historical study of the Bible and take seriously those implications for theology. They argued for philosophical alternatives to neo-Scholasticism and were critical of authoritarian uses of the papacy. Neo-Scholasticism presumes that a perennial philosophy exists, as defined by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. It assumes that the world is basically static, not dynamic or developing: that historical changes do not affect the essential nature of persons or institutions and therefore should have little influence in the evolution of doctrine. Theological manuals of the time organized and disseminated conclusions rather than promoting inquiry. They maintained that natural knowledge came from unaided natural reason, and that supernatural knowledge was known when God decided to reveal it.1 The implications of this encyclical were consider-able, for it brought about a renewed stress on the study of Scholastic philosophy, accompanied by a screening of students and teachers in seminaries and the supervision (one might say policing) of priests.

There is tension between the study of Buddhism and Christianity, and Buddhist-Christian studies. It reflects the same tension that exists between religious studies and theology. Yet both endeavors are intertwined, and there is room in the academy for both. Since the day when I first stumbled into Masao Abe's course on Zen Buddhism, I have found Buddhist-Christian studies to be an intensely interesting arena of academic inquiry, in that it opens a space to dive deep into questions about what it means to be human on the most profound level. Whereas discourses in Christian theology and treatises on mystical practice had once left me bleary eyed, when studied in the context of dialogue the language and the symbols came alive, invoking all kinds of larger questions about the viability of an easy perennial philosophy, about the relationship of religious language and religious experience, and about the inner dynamics of the spiritual path. Teaching on Buddhist-Christian encounter, I have found the same effect of intellectual awakening prompted in my students as the vantage point of comparison and dialogue opens vistas onto limitless questions concerning selfhood and ultimacy that otherwise might remain hidden in the assumed. For both myself and my students, the comparative perspective afforded by dialogue has enabled us to look at the close and familiar in new ways-a cherished goal of any academic enterprise. Given all this, it had simply never occurred to me that there might be any tension between the field of Buddhist-Christian dialogue and the academic study of religion. There is tension, of course. After reflection it seems to me that the tension between interreligious dialogue and the academic study of religion is rooted in the conflict between normative and descriptive approaches to the study of religion, that is, in the conflict between theological studies and religious studies that characterizes the academy today. The study of religion today stands on shaky ground, especially in our public universities, mainly because of misunderstanding or ignorance about the methods and purposes of the field. As religion scholars seek to circle the wagon train in defense of the discipline, theological approaches to the study of religion are often seen as a liability, tainting the study of religion with the suspicion of confessional and evangelical interests. Security for the discipline is sought on the high ground of disinterested objectivity, so that we are seeing an ongoing shift in the practice of religious studies from a Buddhist-Christian Studies 18 (1998). ? by University of Hawai'i Press. All rights reserved. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.136 on Thu, 19 May 2016 06:02:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Since the late nineteenth century, studies of mysticism have presented us with two contrasting conclusions. The first is that mystics all over the world report basically the same experience, and the second is that there are great differences among the reports, and possibly among the experiences. On the positive side there are such works as Huxley's The Perennial Philosophy, with its claim that all mystics say that all beings are manifestations of a Divine Ground, that men learn of this by direct intuition, that men have two natures, one phenomenal and one eternal, and that identification with his eternal nature is the purpose of man. Walter Stace supports this view, in a modified way, with his observation that, while each mystic seems to advance a peculiar explanation of his experience, their statements collectively exhibit strong similarities. Mystics commonly report a consciousness of unity, carrying with it feelings of objectivity, blessedness, and holiness. They describe their experience in paradoxical language, and say that ultimately it is ineffable. These twentieth-century observations are repetitions of those of William James, so that this basic point has become a cliché, and, as R. C. Zaehner says, ‘We have been told ad nauseum that mysticism is the highest expression of religion and that it appears in all ages and in all places in a more or less identical form, often in a religious milieu that would seem to be the reverse of propitious.’

Three points are discussed: first, that limits of technological fixes are revealed by current economic, social, and environmental problems; second, that these problems cannot be solved by a technological fix but require alternative forms of activity and being; third, that realizing these limits makes possible the re-emergence of the sacred. Two attitudes toward technology, nature, and the sacred are described: Technocrats desacralize nature and strive to shape it technologically for human ends alone; pernetarians resacralize nature and develop a perennial philosophy (synthesized from elements of different spiritual disciplines) allied with an enlarged, artful science, so as to design activities compatible with nature.