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This paper examines Robert Kilwardby's (ca. 1215-1279) treatment of causal necessity and contingency. In his Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and in his De ortu scientiarum, Kilwardby seems to be particularly concerned with the precarious epistemological status of ethics and physics insofar as these disciplines deal with contingent events. In order to reconcile strictly scientific knowledge with conjectural forms of knowledge, Kilwardby sets the problem of contingency in a genuinely gnoseological rather than metaphysical context, arriving at a highly original account of contingency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the commentary on the "Posterior Analytics" of Greek philosopher Aristotle written in the 13th century by the English scholastic philosopher Robert Grosseteste. Grosseteste's work is seen, in contrast to majority academic opinion, as successful in reconciling Aristotelian epistemology, which sees human knowledge as deriving primarily from sense perception, with the medieval (Augustinian) theory of divine illumination, the view that God intervenes directly in human cognition.

Medieval theories of ethics tended on the whole to regard self-perfection as the goal of human life. However there was profound disagreement, particularly in the late thirteenth century, over how exactly this was to be understood. Intellectualists such as Aquinas famously argued that human perfection lay primarily in coming to know the essence of God in the next life. Voluntarists such as the Franciscan John Peckham, by contrast, argued that ultimate perfection was to be achieved in patria through the act of loving God. The present article argues that Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent defended a different sort of voluntarism with respect to the final destiny of human beings. Rather than claiming that the goal of human life lay in the perfection of the self, they argued instead that ultimate union with God was to be achieved mystically through an act of self-transcendence, which occurred through ecstasy or quasi-deification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the problem of authenticity of medieval philosophy. ft does not consider any particular philosophical ideas of the Middle Ages, but rather questions modern interpretations and modern view of medieval philosophy. ft particularly discusses the definition of philosophy, which today, from the positivist perspective, deprives philosophy of metaphysical topics. Mystical and metaphysical themes by and large permeate medieval philosophy; that's why the credibility of this philosophy is often questioned. However, positivist definitions question many other, undoubted/v confirmed philosophical systems, not limited to the Middle Ages. This paper therefore starts with the widest possible definition of philosophy, that of love of wisdom. Medieval philosophy represents a specific form of philosophizing, although, from the modern perspective, its role boils down to serving religion. However, the history of philosophy confirms that philosophy has never been in any other service but that of the truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]