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The article discusses the regulatory design of the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) and its significance in the evolution of EU competition law. The DMA is seen as a major step in the evolution of competition law, adopting strong regulatory structures based on experience gained from competition law enforcement in digital markets. The article outlines the roles of various actors involved in rule and policy formation, such as the Digital Markets Advisory Committee and the high-level group of digital regulators. It also discusses the enforcement of the DMA, involving the Commission, gatekeepers, national authorities, and European and national courts. The article concludes by highlighting the importance of the tri-annual review of the Act and its potential impact on competition law enforcement. [Extracted from the article]

This article discusses recent policy changes and legislative developments that have expanded the jurisdiction of the European Commission and national competition authorities. These changes have created uncertainty for businesses regarding whether their transactions will need to be reviewed. The article also highlights a significant development in the assessment of conglomerate mergers, particularly in the digital sector. The European Commission recently prohibited a conglomerate merger between Booking Holdings and eTraveli, based on an ecosystem theory of harm. This departure from previous guidelines and the lack of a clear economic and legal framework for such theories of harm raises concerns about predictability and legal certainty in merger control. The article emphasizes the need for a balanced approach that addresses the challenges of digital markets while providing a just and predictable framework for businesses. [Extracted from the article]

Stricter competition regulation in digital markets is a growing trend in the Global North, with the Digital Markets Act in Europe being the poster child of a more interventionist approach. In this article we do not focus on the debate surrounding these European efforts (which has meritorious arguments on both sides in our view), but instead examine similar developments elsewhere in the world, namely in South Africa, India, China, and Brazil. With reference to recent enforcement activities in these countries (such as industry investigations, greater scrutiny of mergers and of individual firm conduct, and in some cases ex ante regulations targeted at specific categories of firms), we provide our views on the potential adverse consequences of seeking to replicate the European approach in instances where digital markets may be less mature. In particular, while it is generally understood that heavy-handed regulation can stifle innovation and chill competition, we argue that such risks are more acute in countries outside of Europe (and North America), which thus warrants more cautious regulation methods. This is especially the case where the policy objectives deviate from the traditional one of protecting competition rather than competitors, since such an approach runs the risk of promoting short term gains at the expense of long-term benefits, which may ultimately harm the very stakeholders that such regulation is designed to advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses how the European Commission can achieve the goal of effectively implementing the Digital Markets Act. Based on legal and economic reasoning, we highlight the important role of the gatekeeper's compliance report, and discuss how to incentivize gatekeepers to write useful reports. In addition, we develop recommendations regarding the internal organization of the Commission, the prioritization of cases, and how to effectively use the concurrent enforcement powers of the Digital Markets Act and Article 102 of the TFEU. We illustrate the principles we develop using four different EU antitrust cases. Furthermore, we discuss coordination between the Commission and National Competition Authorities and the need to already develop an independent evaluation process for the Digital Markets Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines the recent experiences of South Africa’s competition authorities in engaging with competition matters in the country’s digital markets. Specifically, the authors examine engagements by the Competition Commission South Africa (CCSA), the Competition Tribunal of South Africa, and the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) with three regulatory elements: (1) mergers, examined through the MIH and WeBuyCars and Google and Fitbit cases; (2) abuse of dominance, examined through the GovChat v Facebook case; and (3) cartel conduct, examined through the Competition Commission v Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Limited & Others case. In reviewing the decisions made in these cases, the authors highlight regulatory considerations that are coming to the fore in response to competition matters in digital markets.

The increasing dominance of a small number of 'big tech' companies, across a range of critical online markets, has led to growing calls for regulation to promote more competition, and to ensure that market power is not exploited unfairly. New regulatory regimes to this end are now under development in a variety of jurisdictions. While the new German and EU regulatory regimes are the most advanced, there are detailed proposals under discussion in the UK, US, and China, while in South Korea new regulations have been introduced in relation to the specific area of app stores. This article discusses several questions arising in this context. What problem is pro-competition digital platform regulation trying to solve? Why regulation and not competition law? What are the design challenges involved in developing such regulation? What are the risks arising from diverging regulatory approaches to these global issues and how much these risks be mitigated? And what role can trade policy play? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the digital economy, its treatment under competition, and the need for potential regulation. The aim of this article is to answer the question, of how a legal framework looks like that, on the one hand, prevents possible undesirable developments and undesirable side effects of digitization, while not unduly preventing opportunities and suppressing positive effects. The analysis requires an examination of the proper legal framework as well as the unique characteristics of the digital economy that this legal framework must take into account. As a result, in the first part of the paper, the particular features of the digital economy are worked out in the context of existing competition legislation. Based on this, the second part investigates the need for regulation. From the scientific methods, we have used the analytical and descriptive methods to analyze the current situation. By the comparative method, we introduce different views on legal regulation. The presented topic has not been thoroughly examined in the literature on the subject thus far, giving the chance to identify avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the impact of proposed regulations in the European Union (EU) on the global digital economy and efforts to advance similar regulations in the US. The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) will enter into force on 1 November 2022 and will be one of the most important pieces of legislation to regulate so-called ‘Big Tech’ platforms in any jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the US Congress is also considering legislation that would address many of the same issues as the DMA. However, it remains to be seen whether the current versions of one or more of the pending bills – or some variation thereof – will ultimately be signed into law. Until such time as new US legislation relating to the operation of digital platforms is enacted, the unilateral conduct of businesses in the US will continue to be governed by existing US antitrust law. But, with the specter of the DMA looming on the horizon, US companies are faced with the prospect of potentially needing to reimagine their business strategy in other jurisdictions to comply with a law that runs contrary to their current business operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The comparative capitalism literature examined how institutions vary on a national or societal level and how these differences affect multinational companies' strategies. Yet, little attention has been devoted to cross-national or regional differences in the governance of competition, especially in the context of digitalization of markets. The article seeks to fill this gap by looking at the case of Google. It traces the process of the stark US–EU disagreement over Google's abuse of dominant position in digital markets, which resulted in one of the largest fines in the EU history. It is argued that the variation in the response to the company's market and nonmarket strategies are traced back to differences between Ordoliberal and Chicago School ideas, which are embedded in the 'competition regimes' of European and US capitalist models. The article concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for varieties of capitalism frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a broad consensus that the EU has great sources of power but little agreement on how and when this power is actively leveraged to shape global market regulation. Scholars have noted a widespread fragmentation and called for studies that cover multiple cases and account for how contextual factors influence strategic aims. This article responds to these calls by conceptualizing 'regime vetting' as a technique used by the European Union to reach beyond its borders in various sectors. By coining this term, the article enables exploration of a form of active and de-centred power projection that leverages the EU's main sources of power. The article also offers a typology of four different types of regime vetting and propositions on how internal and external contextual factors systematically shape the strategic uses of regime vetting, thereby contributing to the theoretical discussion on how 'context matters' in shaping EU external action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital platforms elude legal and regulatory frameworks traditionally used to address market power, speech and disinformation issues. One of the dominant policy responses to addressing these issues involves reforming competition policy to better manage digital platform markets. This case study examines how stakeholders, including tech giants, their competitors, regulators and advocacy groups, deploy competition policy to address platform power in a series of 2019–20 US congressional hearings on the subject, with implications for the wider global debate. The article traces the politics underlying these debates, which manifests in variations in stakeholders' definitions of platform power and their proposed solutions, reflecting tensions over the role of the state in managing markets and in addressing non-economic concerns associated with digital platforms. The article concludes with a consideration of what this politics implies for policy interventions aimed at addressing platform power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital markets are increasingly described as the 'railroads' of the 21st century. Extending that metaphor, some commentators argue we should revive stale railroad-era economic regulations and adapt them to the digital age. This enthusiasm appears to be buoyed by both a sudden nostalgia for railroad and airline regulations once administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and an equally sudden amnesia of the enormous harm those regulations caused to consumers. ICC and CAB regulations are indeed an apt metaphor, as they illustrate perfectly how sectoral regulations sold to the public as simple, clear, and cheap can go awry. Ultimately, a bipartisan consensus emerged to disband those agencies and deregulate those industries. After deregulation, prices fell, output expanded, and firms innovated. Proposals to regulate Big Tech today in a similar fashion forget these important lessons. We should know better than to do the same thing again today and expect a different result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antitrust enforcement and competition policy in the digital economy is high on the agenda of authorities and policymakers. The distinctive features of digital markets and the strategic role played by large platforms apparently require a rethinking of the antitrust regime. Several reform proposals point to the need to integrate the antitrust toolkit with ex ante measures since there is a risk that ex post enforcement would be too slow to successfully keep markets competitive and contestable. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the invoked regulatory approach reflects the distinctive structural features of digital markets or whether it is just an enforcement short-cut. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]