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Literature highlights the distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking as a prominent cognitive style distinction, leading to the proposal of various theories within the framework of the dual process model. However, it remains unclear whether individuals differ in their thinking styles along a single dimension, from intuitive to analytic, or if other dimensions are at play. Moreover, the presence of numerous thinking stylemeasures, employing different terminology but conceptually overlapping, leads to confusion. To address these complexities, Newton et al. suggested the idea that individuals vary across multiple dimensions of intuitive-analytic thinking styles and distinguished thinking styles between 4 distinct types: Actively open-minded thinking, close-minded thinking, preference for effortful thinking, and preference for intuitive thinking. They proposed a new measure for this 4-factor disposition, The 4-Component Thinking Styles Questionnaire (4-CTSQ), to comprehensively capture the psychological outcomes related to thinking styles; however, no independent test exists. In the current pre-registered studies, we test the validity of 4-CTSQ for the first time beyond the original study and examine the association of the proposed measure with various factors, including morality, conspiracy beliefs, paranormal and religious beliefs, vaccine hesitancy, and ideology in an underrepresented culture, Türkiye. We found that the correlated 4-factor model of 4-CTSQ is an appropriate measure to capture individual differences based on cognitive style. The results endorse the notion that cognitive style differences are characterized by distinct structures rather than being confined to two ends of a single continuum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012, two independent groups simultaneously demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God. However, there is now some mixed evidence on both the effectiveness of manipulations used in these studies and the effect of mindset manipulation on belief in God. Thus, this proposal attempted to replicate one of those experiments (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012) for the first time in a high-powered experiment using an under-represented population (Turkey). In line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, a negative correlation between reflectiveness and religious belief emerged, at least in one of the experimental conditions. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, the results revealed no effect of the cognitive style manipulation on religious belief. Although a self-report measure (Faith in Intuition) provided evidence that the manipulation worked as intended, it did not influence actual performance (Cognitive Reflection Test), suggesting a demand effect problem. Overall, the results failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample, despite generally following the predicted patterns, and suggest that using stronger manipulation techniques are warranted in future studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dual-process model of the mind predicts that religious belief will be stronger for intuitive decisions, whereas reflective thinking will lead to religious disbelief (i.e., the intuitive religious belief hypothesis). While early research found intuition to promote and reflection to weaken belief in God, more recent attempts found no evidence for the intuitive religious belief hypothesis. Many of the previous studies are underpowered to detect small effects, and it is not clear whether the cognitive process manipulations used in these failed attempts worked as intended. We investigated the influence of intuitive and reflective thought on belief in God in two large-scale preregistered experiments (N = 1,602), using well-established cognitive manipulations (i.e., time-pressure with incentives for compliance) and alternative elicitation methods (between and withinsubject designs). Against our initial hypothesis based on the literature, the experiments provide first suggestive then confirmatory evidence for the reflective religious belief hypothesis. Exploratory examination of the data suggests that reflection increases doubts about beliefs held regarding God's existence. Reflective doubt exists primarily among non-believers, resulting in an overall increase in belief in God when deciding reflectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]