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The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831-863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.’s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831-863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former’s methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N = 993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT’s generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Belief bias is the tendency for prior beliefs to influence people's deductive reasoning in two ways: through the application of a simple belief-heuristic (response bias) and through the application of more effortful reasoning for unbelievable conclusions (accuracy effect or motivated reasoning). Previous research indicates that cognitive ability is the primary determinant of the effect of beliefs on accuracy. In the current study, we show that the mere tendency to engage analytic reasoning (analytic cognitive style) is responsible for the effect of cognitive ability on motivated reasoning. The implications of this finding for our understanding of the impact of individual differences on belief bias are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on modular approach based on human reasoning psychology. Topics discussed include overview on model based on heuristic-belief facts, analysis on logical approach, for defining human reasoning aspects and evaluation of both the models. It also states on, practicing of human model based on "heuristic" and "logical" aspects, for researching on reasoning ability.

Models based on signal detection theory (SDT) have occupied a prominent role in domains such as perception, categorization, and memory. Recent work by Dube et al. (2010) suggests that the framework may also offer important insights in the domain of deductive reasoning. Belief bias in reasoning has traditionally been examined using indices based on raw endorsement rates--indices that critics have claimed are highly problematic. We discuss a new set of SDT indices fit for the investigation belief bias and apply them to new data examining the effect of perceptual disfluency on belief bias in syllogisms. In contrast to the traditional approach, the SDT indices do not violate important statistical assumptions, resulting in a decreased Type 1 error rate. Based on analyses using these novel indices we demonstrate that perceptual disfluency leads to decreased reasoning accuracy, contrary to predictions. Disfluency also appears to eliminate the typical link found between cognitive ability and the effect of beliefs on accuracy. Finally, replicating previous work, we demonstrate that cognitive ability leads to an increase in reasoning accuracy and a decrease in the response bias component of belief bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Base-rate neglect refers to the tendency for people to underweight base-rate probabilities in favor of diagnostic information. It is commonly held that base-rate neglect occurs because effortful (Type 2) reasoning is required to process base-rate information, whereas diagnostic information is accessible to fast, intuitive (Type 1) processing (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). To test this account, we instructed participants to respond to base-rate problems on the basis of "beliefs" or "statistics," both in free time (Experiments 1 and 3) and under a time limit (Experiment 2). Participants were given problems with salient stereotypes (e.g., "Jake lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb") that either conflicted or coincided with base-rate probabilities (e.g., "Jake was randomly selected from a sample of 5 doctors and 995 nurses for conflict; 995 doctors and 5 nurses for nonconflict"). If utilizing base-rates requires Type 2 processing, they should not interfere with the processing of the presumably faster belief-based judgments, whereas belief-based judgments should always interfere with statistics judgments. However, base-rates interfered with belief judgments to the same extent as the stereotypes interfered with statistical judgments, as indexed by increased response time and decreased confidence for conflict problems relative to nonconflict. These data suggest that baserates, while typically underweighted or neglected, do not require Type 2 processing and may, in fact, be accessible to Type 1 processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people evaluate conclusions, they are often influenced by prior beliefs. Prevalent theories claim that belief bias affects the quality of syllogistic reasoning. However, recent work by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) has suggested that belief bias may be a simple response bias. In Experiment 1, receiver operating characteristic analysis revealed that believability affected accuracy for complex but not for simple syllogisms. In Experiment 2, the effect of believability on accuracy disappeared when judgments were made under time pressure and with participants low in cognitive capacity. The observed effects on reasoning accuracy indicate that beliefs influence more than response bias when conditions are conducive to the use of certain reasoning strategies. The findings also underscore the need to consider individual differences in reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the importance of integrating several neuroscientific methods within a single study to advance the investigations of the reasoning brain. The said methods include functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and event-related potentials (ERP). Details on how these methods can be applied are also given.

The author reflects on a study that utilized signal detection theory (SDT) approach to causal conditional reasoning, and mentions that SDT model is often unable to provide an informative characterization of data in, as it fails to separate argument strength and response bias. The authors further opine that reliance on receiver operating characteristics (ROC) shape in the study, to justify a separation between affirmation and denial problems, is unnecessary and misguided.

According to dual-process accounts of thinking, belief-based responses on reasoning tasks are generated as default but can be intervened upon in favor of logical responding, given sufficient time, effort, or cognitive resource. In this article, we present the results of 5 experiments in which participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Contrary to the predictions arising from these accounts, the logical status of the presented conclusion had a greater impact on judgments concerning its believability than did the believability of the conclusion on judgments about whether it followed logically. This finding was observed when instructional set was presented as a between-participants factor (Experiment 1), when instruction was indicated prior to problem presentation by a cue (Experiment 2), and when the cue appeared simultaneously with conclusion presentation (Experiments 3 and 4). The finding also extended to a range of simple and more complex argument forms (Experiment 5). In these latter experiments, belief-based judgments took significantly longer than those made under logical instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for default interventionist accounts of belief bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]