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The aim of this paper is to make explicit an explanatory strategy that lies at the core of Robert Brandom's A Spirit of Trust. This strategy consists, according to our reading, in treating the epistemological opposition between appearances and reality --and other related conceptual oppositions-- as an internal, normative and historical distinction. We will show how Brandom employs the procedure of recollections to make this strategy work: by situating different representations in a sequence of historical development, recollections allow us to understand the distinction between appearances and reality as the distinction between how things are for us and how they ought to be for us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Visual illusions have been a popular topic of study for a long time, but in recent years, a number of authors have questioned the coherence of this notion. This article deals in depth with ways in which illusions have been, could be, and should be defined and with various criticisms and different conceptions of the notion of illusions. After a review of definitions of illusions in the relevant literature, a more comprehensive but also more restrictive framework is presented, involving both veridicality and illusoriness, and is illustrated using two variants of a 2 × 2 scheme for the presentation of illusions. Many different aspects of illusions are discussed. A set of criteria for illusionhood is listed. Criticisms of the notion of illusions are presented, commented upon, and responded to. Conceptions of illusions differing from the one advocated here are discussed. Throughout the paper, novel variations of illusions are shown, and problems with accounts of some well-known illusions are noted. Examples of strong context effects which are not considered to be illusions are presented. It is concluded that the notion of visual illusions, suitably reformulated, is still viable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is misguided-at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require-and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion (i.e., that S doesn't know that p) without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the difference between appearance and reality. The author believes that common sense is non-existent when it comes to reality and discusses how the human mind was divided between a good part and a bad part. The author further describes imagination as the ability to come up useful novelties. The views of several philosophers regarding reality like Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and Immanuel Kant are also discussed.

According to what I will call the "appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind," conscious mental states are identical to how they subjectively appear or present themselves to us in our experience of them. The doctrine has had a number of supporters but to date has not received from its proponents the comprehensive and systematic treatment that might be expected. In this paper I outline the key features of the appearance-is-reality doctrine along with the case for thinking that doctrine to be true. I also defend the doctrine from some objections. Finally, I spell out the important metaphysical and epistemological implications of the appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are objects in convex passenger-side mirrors "closer than they appear"? If one adapts to inverting goggles, does the world go back to looking the way it was before, or does the world look approximately the same throughout the course of adaptation, only losing its normative sense of wrongness? The answers to these empirical, introspective questions might help cast light on the classic philosophical debate about the degree of resemblance between our visual experience of reality and things as they are in themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper interprets phenomenology as a mode of inquiry that addresses fundamental questions of first philosophy, beyond the limitation of the practice by its leading theorists to the study of mere appearances. I draw on Adorno's critique of phenomenology to show that it has typically functioned as a mode of first philosophy, but I part with Adorno to argue that it ought to be practiced as such, to address consciously a sceptical worry about the gap between appearance and reality that Husserl modestly claimed to have bracketed. Noting Husserl's and Adorno's shared worries about the project of first philosophy, to know the world beyond appearances, I draw on Nietzsche to argue phenomenology ought nonetheless to address real matters of concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Williamson has a strikingly economical way of showing how justified true belief can fail to constitute knowledge: he models a class of Gettier cases by means of two simple constraints. His constraints can be shown to rely on some unstated assumptions about the relationship between reality and appearance. These assumptions are epistemologically non-trivial but can be defended as plausible idealizations of our actual predicament, in part because they align well with empirical work on the metacognitive dimension of experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief (in the relevant sense) are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens. The models also exhibit an epistemic asymmetry between good and bad cases that sceptics seem to ignore or deny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plato believes that the sensible reality is apparent, not real. In fact, the author states that the problem of knowledge is not established in Theaetetus and Sophist but from the basis of knowledge itself: the being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to show up the philosophical dimension of Velázquez painting in relationship with Ortega y Gasset's work, and to clarify the influence that the sevillian painter excerted in his philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued that contrary to appearances, Berkeleyan Idealism lacks anti-sceptical force. The problem stems from the way in which the idealist draws the appearance/reality distinction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing primarily on the Mòzǐ and Xúnzǐ, the article proposes an account of how knowledge and error are understood in classical Chinese epistemology and applies it to explain the absence of a skeptical argument from illusion in early Chinese thought. Arguments from illusion are associated with a representational conception of mind and knowledge, which allows the possibility of a comprehensive or persistent gap between appearance and reality. By contrast, early Chinese thinkers understand mind and knowledge primarily in terms of competence or ability, not representation. Cognitive error amounts to a form of incompetence. Error is not explained as a failure to accurately represent the mind-independent reality due to misleading or illusory appearances. Instead, it can be explained metaphorically by appeal to part-whole relations: cognitive error typically occurs when agents incompetently respond to only part of their situation, rather than the whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the introduction of the skepticism, abductivism and the explanatory gap. Different versions of Cartesianism; Sections on appearance and reality, and objectivity and subjectivity; Solution to the problem of Cartesian skepticism.

The programmatic series of studies provides a thoughtful extension of the development of the appearance-reality distinction and perspective-taking skills. The starting point of this research is the well-documented finding that preschool children have considerable difficulty dealing with the fact that objects can lend themselves to multiple representations. Conscious regulation allows the use of the skills and knowledge in the service of testing other theories and constructing other knowledge. This account provides important information about cognitive development in general, allows the integration of a number of different literatures and phenomena and leads to a set of testable hypotheses that can usefully guide further research.

This article is a discussion of seven studies, published in the January 01, 1986, issue of the periodical "Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development," that extends the research that the authors have reported, concerning children's developing ability to distinguish appearance from reality in visual tasks and with real objects. The authors hypothesize that, in order for young children to distinguish appearance from reality in the types of tasks used, they must develop a dual coding ability. School-aged children and adolescents develop the additional ability to explain and demonstrate their knowledge to someone else.

7 studies of the acquisition of knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction suggest the following course of development. Many 3-year-olds seem to possess little or no understanding of the distinction. They fail the simplest Appearance-Reality (AR) tasks and are unresponsive to efforts to teach them the distinction. Skill in solving simple AR tasks is highly correlated with skill in solving simple perceptual Perspective-taking (PT) tasks; this suggests the hypothesis that the ability to represent the selfsame stimulus in two different, seemingly incompatible ways may underlie both skills. Children of 6-7 years have acquired both skills but nevertheless find it very difficult to reflect on and talk about such appearance-reality concepts as "looks like," "really and truly," and "looks different from the way it really and truly is." In contrast, children of 11-12 years, and to an even greater degree college students, possess a substantial body of rich, readily accessible, and explicit knowledge in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political structural theory and its implications in the relation between appearance and reality in politics. It presents an analysis regarding the self-interpretation of a particular working class constituency and offers various hypothetical revisions in it. It identifies those preliminary interpretation such as the ideology of sacrifice and revisions including the liberal, utopian, and structural moments. It also examines the reason why the ideology of sacrifice prevails and how it affects some aspects of social and political life and explores various implications of self-interpretation.

The article examines the distinction between appearance and reality in the literature originating from the imagination. According to the author, French novelist Alain Robbe-Grillet is correct in his account of the nature of the traditional novel. He adds that for that enterprise hangs upon the distinction between appearance and reality which is itself the cornerstone of the metaphysical imagination. The fate of this distinction between appearance and reality is also embedded in the history of modern philosophy.