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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) theoretically provides information-theoretic security based on physical laws. However, imperfections in practice lead to the possibility of quantum hacking on the QKD implementation, especially the passive attacks that are difficult to be detected. In this paper, we study experimentally and theoretically the upper limit of a backflash attack, as one of the vital passive attacks, on a fiber-based QKD system. We experimentally demonstrate the backflash attack on a full equipped fiber-based QKD receiver to show its feasibility and limited distinguish ratio of decoding. More importantly, we have developed a simulation model to analyze the maximum distinguish ratio of decoding can be achieved considering the wide-spectrum feature of backflash photons, which indicates that Eve can extract effective key information from 95.7% of the backflash photons. Consequently, the secure key rate of the decoy-state BB84 QKD system under backflash attack is calculated. This work provides a general methodology to comprehensively evaluate the effect of the backflash attack on a QKD system.

The decoy-state method is a prominent approach to enhance the performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that operate with weak coherent laser sources. Due to the limited transmissivity of single photons in optical fiber, current experimental decoy-state QKD setups increase their secret key rate by raising the repetition rate of the transmitter. However, this usually leads to correlations between subsequent optical pulses. This phenomenon leaks information about the encoding settings, including the intensities of the generated signals, which invalidates a basic premise of decoy-state QKD. Here we characterize intensity correlations between the emitted optical pulses in two industrial prototypes of decoy-state BB84 QKD systems and show that they significantly reduce the asymptotic key rate. In contrast to what has been conjectured, we experimentally confirm that the impact of higher-order correlations on the intensity of the generated signals can be much higher than that of nearest-neighbour correlations., Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures, 2 tables

The twin-field class quantum key distribution (TF-class QKD) has experimentally demonstrated the ability to surpass the fundamental rate-distance limit without requiring a quantum repeater, as a revolutional milestone. In TF-class QKD implementation, an optical phase-locked loop (OPLL) structure is commonly employed to generate a reference light with correlated phase, ensuring coherence of optical fields between Alice and Bob. In this configuration, the reference light, typically located in the untrusted station Charlie, solely provides wavelength reference for OPLL and does not participate in quantum-state encoding. However, the reference light may open a door for Eve to enter the source stations that are supposed to be well protected. Here, by identifying vulnerabilities of an acousto-optic modulator (AOM) in the OPLL scheme, we propose and demonstrate a wavelength-switching attack on a TF-class QKD system. This attack involves Eve deliberately manipulating the wavelength of the reference light to increase mean photon number of prepared quantum states, while maintaining stable interference between Alice and Bob as required by TF-class QKD protocols. The maximum observed increase in mean photon number is 8.7%, which has been theoretically proven to compromise the security of a TF-class QKD system. Moreover, we have shown that with well calibration of the modulators, the attack can be eliminated. Through this study, we highlight the importance of system calibration in the practical security in TF-class QKD implementation., Comment: 12 pages, 8 figures

One of the most significant vulnerabilities in the source unit of quantum key distribution (QKD) is the correlation between quantum states after modulation, which shall be characterized and evaluated for its practical security performance. In this work, we propose a methodology to characterize the intensity correlation according to the single-photon detection results in the measurement unit without modifying the configuration of the QKD system. In contrast to the previous research that employs extra classical optical detector to measure the correlation, our method can directly analyse the detection data generated during the raw key exchange, enabling to characterize the feature of correlation in real-time system operation. The basic method is applied to a BB84 QKD system and the characterized correlation decreases the secure key rate shown by the security proof. Furthermore, the method is extended and applied to characterize the correlation from the result of Bell-state measurement, which demonstrates its applicability to a running full-scheme MDI QKD system. This study provides an approach for standard certification of a QKD system.

The intensity correlations due to imperfect modulation during the quantum-state preparation in a measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) system compromise its security performance. Therefore, it is crucial to assess the impact of intensity correlations on the practical security of MDI QKD systems. In this work, we propose a theoretical model that quantitatively analyzes the secure key rate of MDI QKD systems under intensity correlations. Furthermore, we apply the theoretical model to a practical MDI QKD system with measured intensity correlations, which shows that the system struggles to generate keys efficiently under this model. We also explore the boundary conditions of intensity correlations to generate secret keys. This study extends the security analysis of intensity correlations to MDI QKD protocols, providing a methodology to evaluate the practical security of MDI QKD systems.

The development of fault-tolerant quantum processors relies on the ability to control noise. A particularly insidious form of noise is temporally correlated or non-Markovian noise. By combining randomized benchmarking with supervised machine learning algorithms, we develop a method to learn the details of temporally correlated noise. In particular, we can learn the time-independent evolution operator of system plus bath and this leads to (i) the ability to characterize the degree of non-Markovianity of the dynamics and (ii) the ability to predict the dynamics of the system even beyond the times we have used to train our model. We exemplify this by implementing our method on a superconducting quantum processor. Our experimental results show a drastic change between the Markovian and non-Markovian regimes for the learning accuracies., Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures

A commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) system needs to be formally certified to enable its wide deployment. The certification should include the system's robustness against known implementation loopholes and attacks that exploit them. Here we ready a fiber-optic QKD system for this procedure. The system has a prepare-and-measure scheme with decoy-state BB84 protocol, polarisation encoding, qubit source rate of 312.5 MHz, and is manufactured by QRate. We detail its hardware and post-processing. We analyse the hardware for known implementation loopholes, search for possible new loopholes, and discuss countermeasures. We then amend the system design to address the highest-risk loopholes identified. We also work out technical requirements on the certification lab and outline its possible structure., Comment: 34 pages, 11 figures, 2 tables. Minor improvements after peer review. Accepted to Phys. Rev. Appl

Variational quantum algorithms (VQAs) combining the advantages of parameterized quantum circuits and classical optimizers, promise practical quantum applications in the Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum era. The performance of VQAs heavily depends on the optimization method. Compared with gradient-free and ordinary gradient descent methods, the quantum natural gradient (QNG), which mirrors the geometric structure of the parameter space, can achieve faster convergence and avoid local minima more easily, thereby reducing the cost of circuit executions. We utilized a fully programmable photonic chip to experimentally estimate the QNG in photonics for the first time. We obtained the dissociation curve of the He-H$^+$ cation and achieved chemical accuracy, verifying the outperformance of QNG optimization on a photonic device. Our work opens up a vista of utilizing QNG in photonics to implement practical near-term quantum applications.

Quantum Generative Adversarial Networks (QGANs), an intersection of quantum computing and machine learning, have attracted widespread attention due to their potential advantages over classical analogs. However, in the current era of Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) computing, it is essential to investigate whether QGANs can perform learning tasks on near-term quantum devices usually affected by noise and even defects. In this Letter, using a programmable silicon quantum photonic chip, we experimentally demonstrate the QGAN model in photonics for the first time, and investigate the effects of noise and defects on its performance. Our results show that QGANs can generate high-quality quantum data with a fidelity higher than 90\%, even under conditions where up to half of the generator's phase shifters are damaged, or all of the generator and discriminator's phase shifters are subjected to phase noise up to 0.04$\pi$. Our work sheds light on the feasibility of implementing QGANs on NISQ-era quantum hardware.

We propose a high-rate scheme for discretely-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution (DM CVQKD) using quantum machine learning technologies, which divides the whole CVQKD system into three parts, i.e., the initialization part that is used for training and estimating quantum classifier, the prediction part that is used for generating highly correlated raw keys, and the data-postprocessing part that generates the final secret key string shared by Alice and Bob. To this end, a low-complexity quantum k-nearest neighbor (QkNN) classifier is designed for predicting the lossy discretely-modulated coherent states (DMCSs) at Bob's side. The performance of the proposed QkNN-based CVQKD especially in terms of machine learning metrics and complexity is analyzed, and its theoretical security is proved by using semi-definite program (SDP) method. Numerical simulation shows that the secret key rate of our proposed scheme is explicitly superior to the existing DM CVQKD protocols, and it can be further enhanced with the increase of modulation variance., Comment: 18 pages, 17 figures

Attacks that control single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution using tailored bright illumination are capable of eavesdropping the secret key. Here we report an automated testbench that checks the detector's vulnerabilities against these attacks. We illustrate its performance by testing a free-running detector that includes a rudimentary countermeasure measuring an average photocurrent. While our testbench automatically finds the detector to be controllable in a continuous-blinding regime, the countermeasure registers photocurrent significantly exceeding that in a quantum regime, thus revealing the attack. We then perform manually a pulsed blinding attack, which controls the detector intermittently. This attack is missed by the countermeasure in a wide range of blinding pulse durations and powers, still allowing to eavesdrop the key. We make recommendations for improvement of both the testbench and countermeasure., Comment: 11 pages, 11 figures. Revised after referee reports from EPJ Quantum Technol

Unauthorized light injection has always been a vital threat to the practical security of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system. An optical power limiter (OPL) based on the thermo-optical defocusing effect has been proposed and implemented, limiting the injected hacking light. As a hardware countermeasure, the performance of the OPL under various light-injection attacks shall be tested to clarify the security boundary before being widely deployed. To investigate the OPL's security boundary in quantum cryptography, we comprehensively test and analyse the behavior of OPL under continuous-wave (c.w.) light-injection attacks and pulse illumination attacks with pulses' repetition rate at $0.5$-$\hertz$, $40$-$\mega\hertz$, and $1$-$\giga\hertz$. The testing results illuminate the security boundary of the OPL, which allows one to properly employ the OPL in the use cases. The methodology of testing and analysis proposed here is applicable to other power-limitation components in a QKD system., Comment: 15 pages, 14 figures

With photonics, the quantum computational advantage has been demonstrated on the task of boson sampling. Next, developing quantum-enhanced approaches for practical problems becomes one of the top priorities for photonic systems. Quantum walks are powerful kernels for developing new and useful quantum algorithms. Here we realize large-scale quantum walks using a fully programmable photonic quantum computing system. The system integrates a silicon quantum photonic chip, enabling the simulation of quantum walk dynamics on graphs with up to 400 vertices and possessing full programmability over quantum walk parameters, including the particle property, initial state, graph structure, and evolution time. In the 400-dimensional Hilbert space, the average fidelity of random entangled quantum states after the whole on-chip circuit evolution reaches as high as 94.29$\pm$1.28$\%$. With the system, we demonstrated exponentially faster hitting and quadratically faster mixing performance of quantum walks over classical random walks, achieving more than two orders of magnitude of enhancement in the experimental hitting efficiency and almost half of the reduction in the experimental evolution time for mixing. We utilize the system to implement a series of quantum applications, including measuring the centrality of scale-free networks, searching targets on Erd\"{o}s-R\'{e}nyi networks, distinguishing non-isomorphic graph pairs, and simulating the topological phase of higher-order topological insulators. Our work shows one feasible path for quantum photonics to address applications of practical interests in the near future.

To achieve secure quantum key distribution, all imperfections in the source unit must be incorporated in a security proof and measured in the lab. Here we perform a proof-of-principle demonstration of the experimental techniques for characterising the source phase and intensity fluctuation in commercial quantum key distribution systems. When we apply the measured phase fluctuation intervals to the security proof that takes into account fluctuations in the state preparation, it predicts a key distribution distance of over 100 km of fiber. The measured intensity fluctuation intervals are however so large that the proof predicts zero key, indicating a source improvement may be needed. Our characterisation methods pave the way for a future certification standard., Comment: 14 pages, 12 figures

Implementation of high-speed quantum key distribution~(QKD) has become one of the major focus in the field, which produces high key-generation rate for applications. To achieve high-speed QKD, tailored techniques are developed and employed to quickly generate and detect quantum states. However, these techniques may introduce unique loopholes to compromise the security of QKD systems. In this paper, we investigate the loopholes of self-differencing~(SD) avalanche photodiode~(APD) detector, typically used for high-speed detection in a QKD system, and demonstrate experimental testing of SD APD detector under strong pulse illumination attack. This attack presents blinding stability and helps an eavesdropper to learn the secret key without introducing extra QBER. Based on this testing, we propose a set of criteria for protecting SD APD detectors from the strong pulse illumination attack.

A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit. The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laser-damage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks. Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source. This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line. We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiber-optic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser., Comment: Abstract, Fig.5 and discussion section modified. Various minor corrections, including clarification and explanation about the experimental setup stability and its graphical representation; testing procedure; configuration of QKD systems with circulators; heating of isolators; testing results of circulators' port couples. New references added in the bibliography. 13 pages, 6 figures, 2 tables

We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In a simple experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending a larger number of photons at a longer wavelength. In another experiment, we show that the detector can be blinded by bright continuous-wave light and then, a controlled response simulating single-photon detection can be produced by applying a bright light pulse. We model an intercept-and-resend attack on a quantum key distribution system that exploits the latter vulnerability and, under certain assumptions, succeeds to steal the key., Comment: Replacing incorrectly uploaded previous versions. 6 page, 5 figures

Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a commonly used method is to patch the loopholes in the existing QKD systems. However, in this work, we show an adversary's capability of exploiting the imperfection of the patch itself to bypass the patch. Specifically, we experimentally demonstrate that, in the detector under test, the patch of photocurrent monitor against the detector blinding attack can be defeated by the pulse illumination attack proposed in this paper. We also analyze the secret key rate under the pulse illumination attack, which theoretically confirmed that Eve can conduct the attack to learn the secret key. This work indicates the importance of inspecting the security loopholes in a detection unit to further understand their impacts on a QKD system. The method of pulse illumination attack can be a general testing item in the security evaluation standard of QKD., Comment: 11 pages, 11 figures, 1 table

The unremitting pursuit for quantum advantages gives rise to the discovery of a quantum-enhanced randomness processing named quantum Bernoulli factory (QBF). This quantum enhanced process can show its priority over the corresponding classical process through readily available experimental resources, thus in the near term it may be capable of accelerating the applications of classical Bernoulli factories, such as the widely used sampling algorithms. In this work, we provide the framework analysis of the QBF. We thoroughly analyze the quantum state evolution in this process, discovering the field structure of the constructible quantum states. Our framework analysis shows that naturally, the previous works can be described as specific instances of this framework. Then, as a proof of principle, we experimentally demonstrate this framework via an entangled two-photon source along with a reconfigurable photonic logic, and show the advantages of the QBF over the classical model through a classically infeasible instance. These results may stimulate the discovery of advantages of the quantum randomness processing in a wider range of tasks, as well as its potential applications., Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures

Quantum state tomography is a key process in most quantum experiments. In this work, we employ quantum machine learning for state tomography. Given an unknown quantum state, it can be learned by maximizing the fidelity between the output of a variational quantum circuit and this state. The number of parameters of the variational quantum circuit grows linearly with the number of qubits and the circuit depth, so that only polynomial measurements are required, even for highly-entangled states. After that, a subsequent classical circuit simulator is used to transform the information of the target quantum state from the variational quantum circuit into a familiar format. We demonstrate our method by performing numerical simulations for the tomography of the ground state of a one-dimensional quantum spin chain, using a variational quantum circuit simulator. Our method is suitable for near-term quantum computing platforms, and could be used for relatively large-scale quantum state tomography for experimentally relevant quantum states., Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures

We experimentally demonstrate optical control of negative-feedback avalanche diode (NFAD) detectors using bright light. We deterministically generate fake single-photon detections with a better timing precision than normal operation. This could potentially open a security loophole in quantum cryptography systems. We then show how monitoring the photocurrent through the avalanche photodiode can be used to reveal the detector is being blinded.

Although quantum communication systems are being deployed on a global scale, their realistic security certification is not yet available. Here we present a security evaluation and improvement protocol for complete quantum communication systems. The protocol subdivides a system by defining seven system implementation sub-layers based on a hierarchical order of information flow; then it categorises the known system implementation imperfections by hardness of protection and practical risk. Next, an initial analysis report lists all potential loopholes in its quantum-optical part. It is followed by interactions with the system manufacturer, testing and patching most loopholes, and re-assessing their status. Our protocol has been applied on multiple commercial quantum key distribution systems to improve their security. A detailed description of our methodology is presented with the example of a subcarrier-wave system. Our protocol is a step towards future security evaluation and security certification standards., Comment: Improved readability and minor updates, Published in Scientific Reports volume 11, Article number: 5110 (2021), 17 pages, 3 figures, 3 tables

Boson sampling is a promising candidate for quantum supremacy. It requires to sample from a complicated distribution, and is trusted to be intractable on classical computers. Among the various classical sampling methods, the Markov chain Monte Carlo method is an important approach to the simulation and validation of boson sampling. This method however suffers from the severe sample loss issue caused by the autocorrelation of the sample sequence. Addressing this, we propose the sample caching Markov chain Monte Carlo method that eliminates the correlations among the samples, and prevents the sample loss at the meantime, allowing more efficient simulation of boson sampling. Moreover, our method can be used as a general sampling framework that can benefit a wide range of sampling tasks, and is particularly suitable for applications where a large number of samples are taken., Comment: 5 pages, 4 figures

Here, we investigate the security of the practical one-way CVQKD and CV-MDI-QKD systems under laser seeding attack. In particular, Eve can inject a suitable light into the laser diodes of the light source modules in the two kinds of practical CVQKD systems, which results in the increased intensity of the generated optical signal. The parameter estimation under the attack shows that the secret key rates of these two schemes may be overestimated, which opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack on these systems. To close this loophole, we propose a real-time monitoring scheme to precisely evaluate the secret key rates of these schemes. The analysis results indicate the implementation of the proposed monitoring scheme can effectively resist this potential attack., Comment: 9 pages,7 figures

Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be pre-calibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can be broken with a high-power laser attack. We have tested four fiber-optic attenuator types used in quantum key distribution systems, and found that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states and may allow an eavesdropper to compromise the key., Comment: 12 pages, 12 figures

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure., Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures

Recent advances on quantum computing hardware have pushed quantum computing to the verge of quantum supremacy. Random quantum circuits are outstanding candidates to demonstrate quantum supremacy, which could be implemented on a quantum device that supports nearest-neighbour gate operations on a two-dimensional configuration. Here we show that using the Projected Entangled-Pair States algorithm, a tool to study two-dimensional strongly interacting many-body quantum systems, we can realize an effective general-purpose simulator of quantum algorithms. This technique allows to quantify precisely the memory usage and the time requirements of random quantum circuits, thus showing the frontier of quantum supremacy. With this approach we can compute the full wave-function of the system, from which single amplitudes can be sampled with unit fidelity. Applying this general quantum circuit simulator we measured amplitudes for a $7\times 7$ lattice of qubits with depth $1+40+1$ and double-precision numbers in 31 minutes using less than $93$ TB memory on the Tianhe-2 supercomputer., Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures, 1 table

In a practical CVQKD system, the optical attenuator can adjust the Gaussian-modulated coherent states and the local oscillator signal to an optimal value for guaranteeing the security of the system and optimizing the performance of the system. However, the performance of the optical attenuator may deteriorate due to the intentional and unintentional damage of the device. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD system with reduced optical attenuation. We find that the secret key rate of the system may be overestimated based on the investigation of parameter estimation under the effects of reduced optical attenuation. This opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack in a practical CVQKD system. To close this loophole, we add an optical fuse at Alice's output port and design a scheme to monitor the level of optical attenuation in real time, which can make the secret key rate of the system evaluated precisely. The analysis shows that these countermeasures can effectively resist this potential attack., Comment: 9 pages, 8 figures

Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the laws of quantum physics allows the secure distribution of secret keys over an insecure channel. Unfortunately, imperfect implementations of QKD compromise its information-theoretical security. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is a promising approach to remove all side channels from the measurement unit, which is regarded as the "Achilles' heel" of QKD. An essential assumption in MDI-QKD is however that the sources are trusted. Here we experimentally demonstrate that a practical source based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser seeding attack, in which light injected from the communication line into the laser results in an increase of the intensities of the prepared states. The unnoticed increase of intensity may compromise the security of QKD, as we show theoretically for the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols. Our theoretical security analysis is general and can be applied to any vulnerability that increases the intensity of the emitted pulses. Moreover, a laser seeding attack might be launched as well against decoy-state based quantum cryptographic protocols beyond QKD., Comment: 14 pages, 7 figures

The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air's varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve's attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbulence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver, or using beam wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eve's attack., Comment: 10 pages, 5 figures

This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letter's conclusions., Comment: 2 pages

Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications., Comment: 13 pages, 8 figures

The decoy state protocol has been considered to be one of the most important methods to protect the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a weak coherent source. Here we test two experimental approaches to generating the decoy states with different intensities: modulation of the pump current of a semiconductor laser diode, and external modulation by an optical intensity modulator. The former approach shows a side-channel in the time domain that allows an attacker to distinguish s signal state from a decoy state, breaking a basic assumption in the protocol. We model a photon-number-splitting attack based on our experimental data, and show that it compromises the system's security. Then, based on the work of K. Tamaki et al. [New J. Phys. 18, 065008 (2016)], we obtain two analytical formulas to estimate the yield and the error rate of single-photon pulses when the signal and decoy states are distinguishable. The distinguishability reduces the secure key rate below that of a perfect decoy-state protocol. To mitigate this reduction, we propose to calibrate the transmittance of the receiver (Bob's) unit. We apply our method to three QKD systems and estimate their secure key rates., Comment: 14 pages, 7 figures

Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (ddiQKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side-channels, a major security loophole in QKD implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of ddiQKD is not based on post-selected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that ddiQKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit device's imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in ddiQKD., Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures, 1 table

In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique's random-detector-efficiency countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack, but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of this countermeasure containing a security proof [C. C. W. Lim et al., IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, 21, 6601305 (2015)]. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack, because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice., Comment: 12 pages, 12 figures