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The war is ready to emerge in Ukraine. We have the full information coming from the Western offi cials, specially the American ones, pronounced by State Secretary Anthony Blinken in the Security Council1 or by the President in front of the European leaders. America has chosen to use all the instruments for deterring Russia to move to war and has even sacrifi ce valuable intelligence in order to show that every move is well known. So that it wasn’t a surprise that Friday, on 18 February, we had the announcement that Putin decided the invasion and Sunday evening that orders of action have been delivered to the Russian units, once the BelarusRussia huge snap exercise has been prolonged due to evolutions in Donbas2 . It is interesting to see that the information war has begun as well as the war for narratives, credibility, legitimacy, hearts and minds of the worldʼs citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 ignited propaganda efforts from the U.S. executive branch of government and the U.S. media, as the country tried to position itself towards the war not just in the eyes of its citizens but of the entire world as part of its geopolitical power position. A comparative quantitative and qualitative analysis of official U.S. communications and U.S. partisan media coverage in the first week of the invasion aims to uncover how the U.S. government set the agenda and framed the events, and to what extent the media copied or diverged from this agenda-setting and framing. The results suggest a narrow focus and distinct framing on the part of the U.S. government, partly taken over by partisan media. The latter also touched on other topics that fit media logic and provided some counter-frames in line with their ideological positions, yet overall confirmed the dominant framing of the war as unjust, unprovoked and premeditated, as Putin's choice, and the position of the U.S. as the leader of the free world and defender of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of KUL Journal of Legal Studies / Studia Prawnicze KUL is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lubin / Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawla II and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Jurídica de la Universidad Autonóma de Madrid is the property of Dykinson SL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Socioloski Pregled is the property of Srpsko Sociolosko Drustvo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Russia's decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 was seemingly driven by an unprecedented willingness to accept risks for the Russian regime, state, and society. Developing a generalizable framework, this article analyzes the development of Russian risk acceptance in offensive war initiation. Drawing on policy documents, speeches, expert literature, and various interviews with Russian, Ukrainian, and Western policymakers, the article finds that risk acceptance has continuously risen since the mid-2000s, although the 2022 invasion still evinces some risk aversion. These results are robust when accounting for miscalculation and caution against attributing the 2022 invasion solely to short-term and leader-centric factors. They also provide cues for understanding the crisis behavior of Russia and other major powers, corroborate prospect theory models on cognitive biases in elite decision-making, and indicate the need to revise the theoretical assumption that risk acceptance is an empirically rare and drastic aberration from a risk-neutral or risk-averse normality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: In late 2021, Western intelligence services began issuing warnings about Moscow's readiness to invade Ukraine, although Russian elites, including Putin, denied the claim. But to the dismay of observers and the concern of Western nations, he ordered an invasion in February 2022. At first, this action was supposed to be a short and decisive operation with the aim of overthrowing the Zelenskyi government. But the field calculations were wrong and Moscow admitted that every war has its own path and does not necessarily follow the pre-planned path and the plan of the military commanders. The 2022 Russian war on Ukraine sparked different and even contradictory analyses. Some believe that because of NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's desire to join this security alliance, the Kremlin is opposed to any option except war. Other scholars believe that Putin attacked Ukraine because of Moscow's strong desire to be recognized and respected as a "great power" or because of elements of Russia's strategic culture. Other studies have focused on Putin's personal characteristics and ambitions as the main source of the attack. This article examines the role of Putin's perceptions and miscalculations in relation to the issue of war. Research Question: The key question of the study is: How have Putin's misperceptions affected his policy towards Kyiv? There are also a few minor questions, such as: How Putin understands the international position of Russia and its relations with other countries, and how he perceives the intentions of other great powers. Research Hypothesis: This study hypothesizes that Putin's misperceptions of Russia's military might, Ukraine's will and power to resist, his misperception of Ukraine's intentions and his misunderstanding of the reactions of third parties critically contributed to and precipitated his decision to go to war. Methodology (and theoretical framework if there are): To determine the main variables of the research, a conceptual framework, based on the findings of some key scholars of the psychology of International Politics, namely Jack Levy and Martin White, has been adopted. According to the conceptual framework, 3 main categories of misperceptions play an important role in leading countries to war: 1) Misperception of oneself and enemy's military capabilities; 2) Misperception on the enemy's intentions and the degree of its animosity, and 3) Misperception on the intentions and reactions of the third parties. The second tier of the conceptual framework includes two key elements of Russian strategic culture, "fear" and "arrogance" which according to Martin White, are the main elements of a war. All of these factors could pave the way for a costly and all-out war. To investigate the role of these factors in the 2022 war in Ukraine, the research method of qualitative content analysis has been used. Directed qualitative content analysis, unlike conventional inductive approaches, is a comparative research approach. In this method, the researcher uses the existing theory and literature to determine the key concepts and variables. Based on those concepts and variables, the researcher begins to collect, code, decode and analyze the data. In the current study, according to the variables of the conceptual framework, the author has directly and indirectly pointed out Putin's views in this field in order to extract his possible misconceptions about Ukraine crisis. In collecting information related to Putin's words, the writer has referred to the interviews and documents published by the Russian Foreign Ministry. To strengthen the reliability of the research, the findings of the existing literature have also been examined. The collected data has been coded, decoded and analyzed in the conceptual framework. Results and Discussion: Cognitive and psychological factors have played a significant role in creating the ground for the war in Ukraine. There is some evidence that highlights the role of the misperceived Russian elites, mainly Putin, in the war against Kyiv. These misconceptions are: 1) Misunderstanding of Ukraine's own and military capabilities, a) overestimating Moscow's military capabilities and b) underestimating Ukraine's military capabilities 2) Misperception on the intentions of Kyiv; including a) Overestimating the animosity and evil intentions of Ukraine, and b) Underestimating the enemy's will and courage to resist and 3) Misunderstanding of EU and US response to ongoing events, mainly underestimating their harsh and long-term response. These misconceptions, combined with two key elements of Russian strategic culture, fear and arrogance, led Russia to escalate the crisis into an all-out war. These findings contribute to the literature by articulating a meaningful conceptual framework. Combining cognitive factors with elements of Russian strategic culture can be useful for explaining some fascinating and illusory issues of Russian foreign policy. Conclusion: Russia invaded Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Geopolitical, geo-economics, geo-strategic and even geo-cultural factors played a role in pushing Moscow on the path to war. These factors had taken roots for a long time and didn't appear suddenly. The findings of this paper help to explain why Putin chose the war path despite previous restraints. Elements of Russia's strategic culture highlighted Moscow's perceived threats and called for an immediate response. In the process of orchestrating a credible and decisive response to threats, elements of this misperception helped significantly to convince Putin that the time had come for a military strike. The role of these misconceptions in the form, tactics, and objectives of the initial mobilization of Russian forces is quite clear. In short, Putin and other military elites' misperceptions, along with fear and arrogance, paved the way for his war in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To choose an effective strategy to stop Putin and Russia's aggressive ambitions in Ukraine and in wider Eastern Europe, Western political and military leaders need to understand his modus operandi and strategic logic. This article focuses on the benefits of game theory in explaining the behavior of the warring parties in Ukraine. It argues that, from an initial "mad man" or a game of chicken strategy chosen by Putin, he has been forced to gradually shift toward a less promising dollar auction model. If the mad man strategy was meant to deter opposing powers from testing Putin's limits, now the dominant game has locked Putin into a self-driven game with ever higher bids and complications for any exit. For an effective response from the West, the key elements are the Ukrainian will to fight but also the brinkmanship of the West in choosing the right moment to force the Kremlin out of the game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has made iterative changes to its National Security Strategy (NSS) to bolster its position in the world. The initial intent of the NSS was to provide aspirational foreign policy goals and ambitions the Kremlin could work towards. In 2021, President Putin viewed Russia to be in a position to change the Kremlin's status in the world and decided to take action. In addition to publishing the 2021 NSS, President Putin also penned a personal history essay about Russia and Ukraine. President Putin's article provides the Kremlin with a narrative to garner popular domestic support and superficial justification for Russia's actions against Ukraine. The ultimate goal of the NSS is to reestablish the Cold War world order. President Putin is using Ukraine as a means to reassert Russia's position in the world while at the same time attempting to discredit the Euro-Atlantic rules-based order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the aims of Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. Since the Kremlin has stated several different reasons for its invasion, there have also been several different interpretations over what Putin's real war objectives are and whether his decision making was rational or not. By revealing inconsistency in Russia's declared goals and actions as well as analyzing the shift in Putin's political discourse of nationalism, this article argues that his goal is not to stop NATO's expansion or "protect the Russians from genocide" in eastern Ukraine, but to oust the Zelensky regime and to put Ukraine under Russia's control. Thus, even though Russia has changed its strategy to the "liberation" of Donbas so far, it is likely that Russia will prolong the war to reorganize the troops and to seize the entire Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia has already used the issue of linguistic and nationality rights of the Russian minority in Ukraine as a pretext in 2014, when it invaded Crimea and supported the breakaway regions of eastern Ukraine. Russian President Putin’s speech immediately prior to the launch of the war against Ukraine also emphasises the language issue. This paper looks at the possible link between linguistic (human) rights and their violation and security policy. Using the example of the linguistic rights of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia, it examines whether Ukrainian language policy in recent years can be interpreted as a violation of linguistic rights, and also seeks to answer the question of whether there can be a balance between the guarantee of linguistic rights of minorities and security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Visual Review is the property of Eagora Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This research note explores the place of Nazism and historical genocide in early-twentieth century Ukraine and the ways in which the evaluation of these historical processes inform current Ukrainian politics. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 was preceded by two speeches by Russia's President Vladimir Putin, in which he promised to 'denazify' Ukraine. He further stated that genocide was being committed against the (predominantly Russian-speaking) people of eastern Ukraine, something which his forces were to bring to an immediate halt. The speeches drew on a number of historical parallels – mainly from Ukraine's Nazi occupation during the Second World War – in an attempt to justify the decision to occupy Ukraine. The language of 'Ukrainian Nazism and genocide' became a staple of Russian state media in the weeks following the start of operations, and have permeated everyday life in Russia. In 'the West', meanwhile, the use of these terms was met with outrage and misunderstanding, and they were largely considered to be baseless and deliberately inflammatory. By offering a brief overview of the place fascism and genocide held in Ukraine during the Second World War, this research note explores how Ukraine's turbulent history is being deliberately misconstrued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States extended security assurances to Ukraine in December 1994 in an agreement that became known as the Budapest Memorandum. This agreement was part of a package of arrangements whereby Ukraine transferred the Soviet-made nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS). Russia's violations of the Budapest Memorandum, notably its annexation of Crimea, could have far-reaching implications for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament because of the questions that Russia's behaviour has raised about the reliability of major-power security assurances for NNWS parties to the NPT. Doubts about the reliability of such assurances could create incentives to initiate, retain or accelerate national nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, because the Budapest Memorandum included restatements of UN Charter provisions and principles articulated in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Russia's disregard for the Budapest Memorandum has raised fundamental questions about the future of international order. The Russians have demonstrated that, despite economic sanctions and international condemnation, they are prepared to disregard longstanding legal and political norms, including those expressed in the Budapest Memorandum, in pursuit of strategic and economic advantages and the fulfilment of national identity goals. Unless Russia reverses its dangerous course, the fate of the Budapest Memorandum may in retrospect stand out as a landmark in the breakdown of international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ukrainian crisis has focused attention on the European Union and NATO. Brussels and Moscow have become powerful symbols of two different ways of politics and life. But the European defense structures built so laboriously over the past two decades have proved irrelevant. Meeting the new threat from the East requires a joint effort by Europeans and Americans—in large measure through NATO. Yet, Ukraine is not a full member of the Alliance, hence is not covered by the Article 5 security assurance. President Putin is intent on increasing Russian power in the world—by creating a Eurasian economic association that will rival the EU, by forming with the EU a pan-European security system to replace NATO, and ultimately by challenging and transforming the U.S.-centered international order. Europe, NATO, and geopolitics are back. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the period before the 2007–2008 elections, there was much talk from the regime about the danger of a ‘coloured revolution’ in Russia. The article considers whether the fear of revolution was genuine or artificially created to discredit opposition and strengthen support for the regime. It seems that tensions inside the regime and the unexpected occurrence of the previous coloured revolutions led to real fears of revolution in Russia, although this was in fact unlikely. Russian policy towards the West and the rival election programmes are examined to investigate whether the regime was creating an ‘enemy image’ of the West. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the politics and government of Russia and Eurasia, particularly focusing on the state of Russia in light of the re-election of Russian president Vladimir Putin. It addresses social unrest in Russia as the result of perceived government corruption and inequality. It also comments on political controversy in Ukraine with the election of president Viktor Yanukovych and political opposition on the South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

The colour revolutions, and especially the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, are widely perceived as major international setbacks to Putin's Russia. The Ukrainian events alarmed Russian elites, who feared the possibility of a local colour revolution during the 2007–2008 electoral cycle. To thwart the perceived colour revolution threat, Russian authorities adopted strategies that combined a political, administrative and intellectual assault on the opposition and Western ideas of democracy promotion. An integral part of this assault was, first, an attempt to create a mass youth movement, Nashi, as a counterweight to the various youth movements that were the driving forces behind the colour revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Second, it was an attempt to delegitimize the idea of liberal democracy itself, labelling it subversive and alien to the Russian national character. We argue that Russian reactions to the ‘colour revolution threat’ provide important insights into what an authoritarian regime, such as that in Russia, perceives as the most threatening aspects of democratizing activities by domestic and international actors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]