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Discussions of political issues may influence people’s opinions. Is there any systematic ff in opinions between those who discuss frequently and those who do not? We measured the association between self-reported discussion frequency and the probability of holding the more liberal opinion on moral issues, using data from the General Social Survey (81 issues, n = 4,395) and the American National Election Studies (27 issues, n = 17,653). This association looked different among liberals and among conservatives. Having more frequent discussions is associated with a higher probability of holding more liberal opinions among liberals, while there is little association between discussion frequency and opinions among conservatives. These findings can be explained by the moral argument theory, which is an account of the long-term liberalization of public opinion on moral issues as an outcome of repeated discussions. The key assumption of this theory is that opinions that are justified by the kinds of arguments that only conservatives accept have a disadvantage compared to opinions that are justified by the kinds of arguments that everyone accepts. Consistent with this theory, we find that the e􀀀ect of discussion frequency is stronger formoral opinions that have a bigger argument advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a recent theory, public opinion on moral issues will trend toward opinions that are justified by generally acceptable kinds of arguments. Both in the United States and the United Kingdom, generally acceptable kinds of arguments include concerns about harm, violence, fairness, and liberty. The theory therefore predicts that these countries will exhibit similar opinion trends on moral issues. We test this prediction using polling data on 98 issues in the United States and 108 issues in the United Kingdom, with an overlap of 27 issues on which opinions have been polled in both countries. We find that moral opinion trends are well predicted by the applicability of generally acceptable kinds of arguments and that there is a remarkable similarity between opinion trends in the two countries. These findings lend support to the theory that generally acceptable kinds of arguments play a key role in driving opinion dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1990s, the Russian public held overwhelmingly favorable attitudes toward the United States; in recent years, attitudes toward the United States have been overwhelmingly unfavorable. Analysts often trace this dramatic change to (1) the emergence of Russian-American conflicts such as those in former Yugoslavia and (2) Russian leaders' attempts to escape blame for their country's failures by attributing them to a powerful external enemy. We point to another major factor of Russian anti-Americanism that preceded the international conflicts and the government-led anti-American propaganda: (3) disillusionment, or an emotional and ideological dissatisfaction with the outcome of pro-Western reforms that started among the liberal elites and then spread among the general public. Using data from the New Russian Barometer surveys, we analyze the dynamics of attitudes toward the United States from 1993 to 2009. We find that mass disappointment in the perestroika outcomes preceded the spread of anti-Americanism in Russia and that anti-American sentiment was stronger and occurred earlier among the elite than among the mass public. Furthermore, those (especially better-educated) people who express disappointment with the outcomes of pro-Western reforms prove significantly more anti-American. Our findings illustrate a general ideological phenomenon that may explain the growth of anti-Americanism in unsuccessful democracies worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]