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Your search keyword '"two-dimensional heterogeneity"' showing total 4 results
Start Over Descriptor "two-dimensional heterogeneity" Topic public goods
4 results on '"two-dimensional heterogeneity"'

1. Distortionary taxation and the free-rider problem.

Author

Bierbrauer, Felix

Subjects
TAXATION, FREE-rider problem, PUBLIC goods, ECONOMIC models, WILLINGNESS to pay, SOCIOECONOMICS
Abstract

This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule which takes into account that a distortionary Ramsey-tax system is used to finance public-goods provision. Individuals have private information about their public-goods preferences. Moreover, individuals differ in their productive abilities. The incidence of taxation in the Ramsey model implies that more productive individuals have a lower willingness to pay for public goods than less productive individuals. They are therefore tempted to understate their valuation of public goods and less productive individuals are inclined to exaggerate theirs. The paper characterizes an optimal rule for taxation and public-goods provision that eliminates these biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2012
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2. Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision

Author

Bierbrauer, F. and Sahm, M.

Subjects
ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Finanzpolitik, Öffentliches Gut, optimal taxation, two-dimensional heterogeneity, D71, D82, Asymmetrische Information, D72, Optimale Besteuerung, asymmetric information, Wahlverhalten, ddc:330, H41, Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie, Allokationseffizienz, Theorie, Public goods
Abstract

We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.

Published
2008

3. Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule

Author

Felix Bierbrauer and Marco Sahm

Subjects
Mechanism design, Public economics, media_common.quotation_subject, jel:D71, jel:D82, jel:D72, jel:H41, Public good, information aggregation, informative voting, public goods, two-dimensional heterogeneity, Microeconomics, Incentive, information aggregation, informative voting, public goods, two-dimensional heterogeneity, Information aggregation, Voting, Economics, Valuation (finance), media_common
Abstract

We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the optimal utilitarian provision rule. The relevant incentive constraints for information aggregation ensure that individuals be-have as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level of public good provision. It is shown that the use of information by an optimal provision rule is inversely related to the polarization of preferences which results from the properties of the skill distribution.

Published
2006

4. Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule

Author

Bierbrauer, Felix and Sahm, Marco

Subjects
public goods, Öffentliches Gut, Trittbrettfahrerverhalten, two-dimensional heterogeneity, informative voting, D71, D82, D72, information aggregation, information aggregation, informative voting, public goods, two-dimensional heterogeneity, ddc:330, Informationsverhalten, H41, Theorie
Abstract

We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the optimal utilitarian provision rule. The relevant incentive constraints for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level of public good provision. It is shown that the use of information by an optimal provision rule is inversely related to the polarization of preferences which results from the properties of the skill distribution.

Published
2006

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