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The view of globalization taken in this chapter is that it is but a subset of the immense number of structural adjustments that the world is undergoing as a result of the evolution of a related group of new technologies usually referred to as information and communications technologies (ICT). Since the ICT revolution is causing many structural adjustments, including globalization, and since the rethinking of the role of governments is to a great extent driven by all of these structural changes, it is often hard to know what is due to globalization and what is due to other aspects of the adjustments wrought by the ICT revolution. So, the scope of this chapter is the nature of the ICT revolution, the deep structural adjustments that it is inducing, including globalization, and the rethinking of the place of the government in the economy—one major driving force of which is globalization. Sect. 2 of the chapter looks at technological and structural change in general and ends with globalization in particular, and Sect. 3 deals with what economists have traditionally regarded as the functions of the nation state. Sect. 4 develops the chapter's main theme,i.e., how technological change and globalization are altering views about the place of government in the economy and, in the process, leading to a new clash of ideologies.

State-sponsored gambling is now widespread in both Canada and the United States. The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of gambling as a revenue-raising instrument for government. We begin by outlining key principles, and then demonstrate how a realistic appraisal of the economic and employment effects of expansion can be achieved. Next, we evaluate gambling as a source of revenue and jobs. A discussion of cost issues and a brief treatment of First Nations' gambling follows. Recommendations complete the paper.

This paper is a summary of the Legal Factum submitted by the Canadian Labor Congress to the Supreme Court of Canada. It intends to demonstrate the irrelevance of the Anti-Inflationnary Act of October 1975. Three main questions are dealt with. First, was there an economic crisis in October 1975? Analysing various sets of data, the paper concludes that, by no stretch of imagination, could October 1975 be called an economic crisis. Second, was there a policy crisis in the sense that traditional methods had been tried and failed? It establishes here that no serious attempt had been made to contain inflation by traditional fiscal and monetary tools by October 1975. Third, what results can be expected from income policies? This part gives a summary of the voluminous evidence for the U.K. and the U.S., and concludes that the evidence of other incomes policies is that their effects on slowing the rate of inflation are small and often transitory.

The first subject is policy co-ordination. I have always been a skeptic about the value of co-ordinating macro policies internationally. I feel that policy co-ordination is one of the world's myths and that in practice, it will turn out to have all the disadvantages of fine tuning times seven. Economic theorists now hold the view that as Devereux and Wilson's paper indicates in simple static models there are small gains to co-ordination, while in more 'realistic' models, the co-operative solution of co-ordinated policies may be worse than the nonco-operative solution. One point which I think is critical in the present theorizing is that if different countries have different models, policy co-ordination is no longer necessarily beneficial. I would add two other considerations. First, realistic models should have stochastic properties that are only partially known. We must remember what Milton Friedman said loud and clear: there are long and variable lags in monetary policy. Ex post, we can usually explain why this lag was long, while that lag was short, but in advance lags are hard to predict. In a world where our policies operate with long, variable, and unpredictable lags, and where each country has different models of what is going on, policy co-ordination is certainly not an obvious benefit.

Part I argues that empirical evidence shows controls have little permanent effect on the price level. Part II argues that there are forces at work that may lead to a future repetition of the present experiment with controls. Part III uses UK experience and analyses the long-term harm done by repeated applications of controls. The harm takes such forms as: increasing both industrial concentration and the power of trade unions, changing social attitudes, politicizing economic relations, and leaving behind a heritage of specific controls - such as rent controls - that remain when the general controls are terminated. Dans la premiere partie nous soutenons que les resultats d'dtudes empiriques montrent que les politiques des revenus et des prix n'ont que des effets permanents tres faibles sur le niveau des prix. Dans la deuxieme partie nous montrons que des forces sont creces qui peuvent amenerdans le futur une rdpetition de l'essai actuel de contrrle. La troisieme partie utilise l'experience du Royaume-Uni et analyse les mdfaits a long term rdsultant d'applications repetdes de ces politiques de contrrle. Le dommage prend des formes telles que: l'augmentation du degre de concentration industrielle et du pouvoir des syndicats, le changement des attitudes sociales, la politisation des relations dconomiques, et l'heritage de politiques de contrrle particulieres, telles que le contrrle des loyers, qui subsistent apres la suppression des politiques de contrrle generales.

he Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada is a landmark in the evolution of Canadian economic policy. The Commission started its work in the depths of a serious recession with an unwieldy mandate and thirteen Commissioners drawn from varied backgrounds. During the nearly three years of its existence, the Commission held wide-ranging public hearings and the staff did considerable research aimed at synthesizing the state of existing knowledge relating to its mandate in economics, political science, and law. An interim report, published in April 1984, lacked focus on possible solutions and created confusion about the Commission's view of the nature of, and reasons for, Canada's economic predicament. The final Report, however, is a remarkable document. Forceful recommendations for far-reaching changes in the conduct of Canadian economic policy replace earlier lack of focus and confusion. Together, the recommendations provide a signpost signaling a volte face in the way Canadians should look at their economy; singly or in groups, they present a shopping basket of proposals for change. We see three important themes that underlie the Commission's economic policy analysis and that give unity to its recommendations: Canada is a small open economy operating in an increasingly turbulent and uncertain international environment; its preeminence as a producer of natural resources has declined