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The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition. The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet, contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"-a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological, and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

By sharing their world, humans and other animals sustain each other. Their world gets determined over time as generations of animals act in it. Current approaches to psychological science, by contrast, start from the assumption that the world is already determined before an animal's activity. These approaches seem more concerned with uncertainty about the world than with the practical indeterminacies of the world humans and nonhuman animals experience. As human activity is making life increasingly hard for other animals, this preoccupation becomes difficult to accept. This article introduces an ecological approach to psychology to develop a view that centralizes the indeterminacies of a shared world. Specifically, it develops an open-ended notion of "affordances," the possibilities for action offered by the environment. Affordances are processes in which (a) the material world invites individual animals to participate, while (b) participation concurrently continues the material world in a particular way. From this point of view, species codetermine the world together. Several empirical and methodological implications of this view on affordances are explored. The article ends with an explanation of how an ecological perspective brings responsibility for the shared world to the heart of psychological science.

Video games that aim to improve myoelectric control (myogames) are gaining popularity and are often part of the rehabilitation process following an upper limb amputation. However, direct evidence for their effect on prosthetic skill is limited. This study aimed to determine whether and how myogaming improves EMG control and whether performance improvements transfer to a prosthesis-simulator task. Able-bodied right-handed participants (N = 28) were randomly assigned to 1 of 2 groups. The intervention group was trained to control a video game (Breakout-EMG) using the myosignals of wrist flexors and extensors. Controls played a regular Mario computer game. Both groups trained 20 minutes a day for 4 consecutive days. Before and after training, two tests were conducted: one level of the Breakout-EMG game, and grasping objects with a prosthesis-simulator. Results showed a larger increase of in-game accuracy for the Breakout-EMG group than for controls. The Breakout-EMG group moreover showed increased adaptation of the EMG signal to the game. No differences were found in using a prosthesis-simulator. This study demonstrated that myogames lead to task-specific myocontrol skills. Transfer to a prosthesis task is therefore far from easy. We discuss several implications for future myogame designs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we aim to strengthen the emerging radical, non-representational, approaches to cognitive science by defusing the worries radical enactivists have with the use of information in the ecological approaches – namely the worry that information carries content. We show that Gibson’s later use of the concept is meant to allow for a content-less notion of information, but that the language surrounding information in ecological psychology has subsequently slipped into a more cognitivistic vocabulary. We argue that by considering ecological information not to be information about , but information for affordances, the notion of information can be fruitfully applied without invoking notions of content. Gibson’s later notion of information for perception, stresses the insight that in ecological theory there is no information in content, but only in use. It is suggested that radical cognition should embrace this notion of information without content, as doing so can help to situate the enactivist’s “basic mind” into large and complex scales of coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]