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Studies on attentional selection typically use unpredictable and meaningless stimuli, such as simple shapes and oriented lines. The assumption is that using these stimuli minimizes effects due to learning or prior knowledge, such that the task performance indexes a "pure" measure of the underlying cognitive ability. However, prior knowledge of the test stimuli and related stimuli acquired before or during the task impacts performance in meaningful ways. This mini review focuses on prior knowledge of object associations, because it is an important, yet often ignored, aspect of attentional selection. We first briefly review recent studies demonstrating that how objects are selected during visual search depends on the participant's prior experience with other objects associated with the target. These effects appear with both task-relevant and task-irrelevant knowledge. We then review how existing object associations may influence subsequent learning of new information, which is both a driver and a consequence of selection processes. These insights highlight the importance of one aspect of prior knowledge for attentional selection and information acquisition. We briefly discuss how this work with young adults may inform other age groups throughout the lifespan, as learners gradually increase their prior knowledge. Importantly, these insights have implications for developing more accurate measurements of cognitive abilities.

A pervasive bias in the subjective concept of randomness is that people often expect random sequences to exhibit more alternations than produced by genuine random processes. What is less known is the stability of this bias. Here, we examine two important aspects of the over-alternation bias: first, whether this bias is present in stimuli that vary across feature dimensions, sensory modalities, presentation modes and probing methods, and, second, how consistent the bias is across these stimulus variations. In Experiment 1, participants adjusted sequences until they looked maximally random. The sequences were presented as temporal streams of colors, shapes, auditory tones or tiled as spatial matrices. In Experiment 2, participants produced random matrices by adjusting the color of each cell. We replicated the findings using a within-subjects design in Experiment 3. We found that participants judged and produced over-alternating stimuli as the most random. Importantly, this bias was consistent across presentation modes (temporal vs spatial), feature dimensions (color vs shape), sensory modalities (visual vs auditory), speed (fast vs slow), stimulus size (small vs large matrices) and probing methods (adjusting the generating process vs individual bits). Overall, the results suggest that the subjective concept of randomness is highly stable across stimulus variations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most real-world judgments and decisions require the consideration of multiple types of evidence. For example, judging the severity of environmental damage, medical illness, or negative economic trends often involves tracking and integrating evidence from multiple sources (i.e. different natural disasters, physical symptoms, or financial indicators). We hypothesized that the requirement to track and integrate across distinct types of evidence would affect severity judgments of multifaceted problems, compared to simpler problems. To test this, we used scenarios depicting crop damage. Each scenario involved either two event types (i.e. mold damage and insect damage), or one event type. Participants judged the quality of the crop following each scenario. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjective judgments were attenuated if the scenario depicted multiple event types, relative to scenarios depicting single event types. This was evident as a shallower slope of subjective severity ratings, as a function of objectively quantifiable severity, for scenarios with multiple event types. In Experiment 3, we asked whether alternation between event types might contribute to this attenuation. Each scenario contained two event types, and the sequence of events either alternated frequently between types or was organized into two sequential groups. Subjective judgments were attenuated for scenarios with frequently alternating sequences. The results demonstrate that alternation between distinct event types attenuates subjective judgments of severity. This suggests that a requirement to integrate evidence across multiple sources places extra demands on the cognitive system, which reduces the perceived evidence strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study we aim to examine how the implicit learning of statistical regularities of successive stimuli affects the ability to exert cognitive control. In three experiments, sequences of flanker stimuli were segregated into pairs, with the second stimulus contingent on the first. Response times were reliably faster for the second stimulus if its congruence tended to match the congruence of the preceding stimulus, even though most participants were not explicitly aware of the statistical regularities (Experiment 1). In contrast, performance was not enhanced if the congruence of the second stimuli tended to mismatch the congruence of the first stimulus (Experiment 2). The lack of improvement appears to result from a failure of learning mismatch contingencies (Experiment 3). The results suggest that implicit learning of inter-stimulus relationships can facilitate cognitive control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The poor are universally stigmatized. The stigma of poverty includes being perceived as incompetent and feeling shunned and disrespected. It can lead to cognitive distancing, diminish cognitive performance, and cause the poor to forego beneficial programs. In the present research, we examined how self-affirmation can mitigate the stigma of poverty through randomized field experiments involving low-income individuals at an inner-city soup kitchen. Because of low literacy levels, we used an oral rather than written affirmation procedure, in which participants verbally described a personal experience that made them feel successful or proud. Compared with nonaffirmed participants, affirmed individuals exhibited better executive control, higher fluid intelligence, and a greater willingness to avail themselves of benefits programs. The effects were not driven by elevated positive mood, and the same intervention did not affect the performance of wealthy participants. The findings suggest that self-affirmation can improve the cognitive performance and decisions of the poor, and it may have important policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: In standard treatments of probability, is defined as the ratio of to , provided that . This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of arise in the mind via implicit calculation of . We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted by . Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that arises from the ratio fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The poor often behave in less capable ways, which can further perpetuate poverty. We hypothesize that poverty directly impedes cognitive function and present two studies that test this hypothesis. First, we experimentally induced thoughts about finances and found that this reduces cognitive performance among poor but not in well-off participants. Second, we examined the cognitive function of farmers over the planting cycle. We found that the same farmer shows diminished cognitive performance before harvest, when poor, as compared with after harvest, when rich. This cannot be explained by differences in time available, nutrition, or work effort. Nor can it be explained with stress: Although farmers do show more stress before harvest, that does not account for diminished cognitive performance. Instead, it appears that poverty itself reduces cognitive capacity. We suggest that this is because poverty-related concerns consume mental resources, leaving less for other tasks. These data provide a previously unexamined perspective and help explain a spectrum of behaviors among the poor. We discuss some implications for poverty policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]