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Author Contact Information: Mirsad Serdarevic, Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Psychology Psychology Program Coordinator International University of Sarajevo Tel.: 061-036-716 mirsad.serdarevic@gmail.com Abstract The purpose of this article is to illustrate limitations of Dr. Thomas S. Szasz's absolutist approach in critiquing psychiatry, psychotherapy, and the concept of mental illness most famously expressed in The Myth of Mental Illness (Szasz, 1961). This article illustrates that Szasz mistook scientific proof for absolute truth. First, a comparison of scientific proof to its superior relation, mathematical proof, illustrates its theoretical short-comings. Szasz relies, sometimes subtly, sometimes quite overtly, but always selectively on "real science" to present psychiatry and the mental health fields as imposters in the field of medicine or health, while neglecting to see or discuss limitations of "science" in general and medicine in particular. Secondly, a summary of evidence supporting psychotherapy's effectiveness will be presented, the discussion of which was either consciously or unconsciously omitted in Szasz's (1978; 1988) The Myth of Psychotherapy. Third, summary of Pennington's (2002) integration of both biological and psychological basis of psychopathology through cognitive neuroscientific theoretical framework is presented as it reasonably addresses Szasz's confusion about and critique of mental illness and the mind-body problem.

In psychiatry, the criteria by which the need for psychiatric attention is evaluated are often the object of disagreements, thus bringing to the fore debates regarding the validity of the concept of mental illness. Whereas anti-psychiatrists, such as Szasz (1961), argue against the prevention of suicide, Freud (1915) describes a case of melancholia that would justify psychiatric intervention in suicidal individuals. In this article, I examine these arguments and argue that Freud's account of melancholia puts Szasz's position into question. Na psiquiatria os critérios pelos quais a necessidade de atenção médica psiquiátrica é avaliada são passíveis de discordância permitindo que se mantenha o grande debate acerca da validade do conceito de doença mental. Enquanto anti-psiquiatras como por exemplo Szasz (1961) argumenta contra a prevenção de suicídio, Freud (1915) oferece uma leitura da melancolia que justifica intervenção psiquiátrica em indivíduos suicidas. Nesse artigo, eu examino esses argumentos e argumento que a leitura da melancolia sugerida por Freud questiona efetivamente a crítica feita por Szasz. En psiquiatría los criterios por los cuales la necesidad de atención médica psiquiátrica es evaluada son pasibles de discordancia permitiendo que se mantenga el gran debate acerca de la validad del concepto de enfermedad mental. El tiempo que anti-psiquiatras, como por ejemplo Szasz (1961), argumentan contra la prevención del suicidio, Freud (1915) ofrece una lectura de la melancolía que justifica la intervención psiquiátrica en individuos suicidas. En este artículo examino esos argumentos y argumento que la lectura de la melancolía sugerida por Freud cuestiona efectivamente la crítica hecha por Szasz. Dans la psychiatrie, les critères d'après lesquels la nécessité d'attention médicale psychiatrique est évaluée font objet de désaccord, tout en permettant que se maintienne le grand débat concernant la validité du concept de maladie mentale. Si des anti-psychiatres, comme par exemple Szasz (1961), font valoir contre la prévention du suicide, Freud (1915), par contre, offre une lecture de la mélancolie qui justifie de l'intervention psychiatrique envers les suicidaires. Dans cet article, j'examine ces raisonnements tout en argumentant que la lecture de la mélancolie suggérée par Freud interroge efficacement la critique proposée par Szasz.

Does the reference to a mental realm in using the notion of mental disorder lead to a dilemma that consists in either implying a Cartesian account of the mind-body relation or in the need to give up a notion of mental disorder in its own right? Many psychiatrists seem to believe that denying substance dualism requires a purely neurophysiological stance for explaining mental disorder. However, this conviction is based on a limited awareness of the philosophical debate on the mind-body problem. This article discusses the reasonableness of the concept of mental disorder in relation to reductionist and eliminativist strategies in the philosophy of mind. It is concluded that we need a psychological level of explanation that cannot be reduced to neurophysiological findings in order to make sense of mental disorder.