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While language impairment is the defining symptom of aphasia, the co-occurrence of non-language cognitive deficits and their importance in predicting rehabilitation and recovery outcomes is well documented. Despite this, people with aphasia (PWA) are rarely tested on assessments of higher order cognitive functions, making it difficult for studies to associate these functions with a consistent lesion correlate. Contrary to classic models of speech and language, cumulative evidence shows that Broca’s area and surrounding regions in the left inferior frontal cortex (LIFC) are involved in, but not specific to, speech production – suggesting that these regions may be involved in higher-level cognitive functions that support language production. A better understanding of language processing in the context of other domain general cognitive functions is essential for improving aphasia treatments.This study aimed to explore the brain-behaviour relationships between tests of individual cognitive skill and language abilities in people with post-stroke aphasia, with a focus on language production deficits and their associated lesion correlates. We predicted our analysis would reveal a latent (non-language specific) cognitive component, that would be driven by damage to LIFC.We analysed the behavioural and neural correlates of an extensive battery of language and non-language cognitive tests in a sample of thirty-six adults with long-term speech production deficits from post-stroke aphasia. All participants were anomic, with relatively intact speech comprehension and no apraxia of speech. The behavioural variables were analysed using Principal Component Analysis and their neural correlates were estimated using Voxel-Based Correlational Morphology. A significant number of anomic adults showed impaired performance on tests of non-language specific cognitive function. The variance underlying behavioural performance was best captured by four orthogonal components, two higher-order cognitive components (executive functions and verbal working memory) and two linguistic processing components (phonology and semantics). Brain-behaviour relationships revealed separable neural correlates for each component in line with previous studies and an executive functions correlate in the left inferior frontal cortex (LIFC).Our findings suggest that in adults with chronic post-stroke language production deficits (anomia), higher-level cognitive functions explain more of the variance in language function than classical models of the condition imply. Additionally, lesions to the LIFC, including Broca’s area, were associated with executive (dys)function, independent of language abilities, suggesting that lesions to this area are associated with non-language specific higher-level cognitive functions that support speech production. These findings support contemporary models of speech production that place language processing within the context of domain-general perception, action and conceptual knowledge.

The central and autonomic nervous systems can be defined by their anatomical, functional and neurochemical characteristics, but neither functions in isolation. For example, fundamental components of autonomically mediated homeostatic processes are afferent interoceptive signals reporting the internal state of the body and efferent signals acting on interoceptive feedback assimilated by the brain. Recent predictive coding (interoceptive inference) models formulate interoception in terms of embodied predictive processes that support emotion and selfhood. We propose interoception may serve as a way to investigate holistic nervous system function and dysfunction in disorders of brain, body and behaviour. We appeal to predictive coding and (active) interoceptive inference, to describe the homeostatic functions of the central and autonomic nervous systems. We do so by (i) reviewing the active inference formulation of interoceptive and autonomic function, (ii) survey clinical applications of this formulation and (iii) describe how it offers an integrative approach to human physiology; particularly, interactions between the central and peripheral nervous systems in health and disease.

Contains fulltext : 175110.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Research suggests that perception and imagination engage neuronal representations in the same visual areas. However, the underlying mechanisms that differentiate sensory perception from imagination remain unclear. Here, we examine the directed coupling (effective connectivity) between fronto-parietal and visual areas during perception and imagery. We found an increase in bottom-up coupling during perception relative to baseline and an increase in top-down coupling during both perception and imagery, with a much stronger increase during imagery. Modulation of the coupling from frontal to early visual areas was common to both perception and imagery. Furthermore, we show that the experienced vividness during imagery was selectively associated with increases in top-down connectivity to early visual cortex. These results highlight the importance of top-down processing in internally as well as externally driven visual experience. 9 p.

ObjectiveTo test the hypothesis that poststroke fatigue, a chronic, pathologic fatigue condition, is driven by altered effort perception.MethodsFifty-eight nondepressed, mildly impaired stroke survivors with varying severity of fatigue completed the study. Self-reported fatigue (trait and state), perceived effort (PE; explicit and implicit), and motor performance were measured in a handgrip task. Trait fatigue was measured with the Fatigue Severity Scale-7 and Neurologic Fatigue Index. State fatigue was measured with a visual analog scale (VAS). Length of hold at target force, overshoot above target force, and force variability in handgrip task were measures of motor performance. PE was measured with a VAS (explicit PE) and line length estimation, a novel implicit measure of PE.ResultsRegression analysis showed that 11.6% of variance in trait fatigue was explained by implicit PE (R = 0.34; p = 0.012). Greater fatigue was related to longer length of hold at target force (R = 0.421, p < 0.001). A backward regression showed that length of hold explained explicit PE in the 20% force condition (R = 0.306, p = 0.021) and length of hold and overshoot above target force explained explicit PE in the 40% (R = 0.399, p = 0.014 and 0.004) force condition. In the 60% force condition, greater explicit PE was explained by higher force variability (R = 0.315, p = 0.017). None of the correlations were significant for state fatigue.ConclusionTrait fatigue, but not state fatigue, correlating with measures of PE and motor performance, may suggest that altered perception may lead to high fatigue mediated by changes in motor performance. This finding furthers our mechanistic understanding of poststroke fatigue.

Contains fulltext : 157745.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) In daily life, complex events are perceived in a causal manner, suggesting that the brain relies on predictive processes to model them. Within predictive coding theory, oscillatory beta-band activity has been linked to top-down predictive signals and gamma-band activity to bottom-up prediction errors. However, neurocognitive evidence for predictive coding outside lower-level sensory areas is scarce. We used magnetoencephalography to investigate neural activity during probability-dependent action perception in three areas pivotal for causal inference, superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, using bowling action animations. Within this network, Granger-causal connectivity in the beta-band was found to be strongest for backward top-down connections and gamma for feed-forward bottom-up connections. Moreover, beta-band power in TPJ increased parametrically with the predictability of the action kinematics-outcome sequences. Conversely, gamma-band power in TPJ and MPFC increased with prediction error. These findings suggest that the brain utilizes predictive-coding-like computations for higher-order cognition such as perception of causal events. 8 p.

Contains fulltext : 143441.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Recent accounts of understanding goal-directed action underline the importance of a hierarchical predictive architecture. However, the neural implementation of such an architecture remains elusive. In the present study, we used functional neuroimaging to quantify brain activity associated with predicting physical movements, as they were modulated by conceptual-expectations regarding the purpose of the object involved in the action. Participants observed object-related actions preceded by a cue that generated both conceptual goal expectations and movement goal predictions. In 2 tasks, observers judged whether conceptual or movement goals matched or mismatched the cue. At the conceptual level, expected goals specifically recruited the posterior cingulate cortex, irrespectively of the task and the perceived movement goal. At the movement level, neural activation of the parieto-frontal circuit, including inferior frontal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobe, reflected unpredicted movement goals. Crucially, this movement prediction error was only present when the purpose of the involved object was expected. These findings provide neural evidence that prior conceptual expectations influence processing of physical movement goals and thereby support the hierarchical predictive account of action processing. 8 p.

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether “what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth” (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

Item does not contain fulltext Observing the movements of another person influences the observer's intention to execute similar movements. However, little is known about how action intentions formed prior to movement planning influence this effect. In the experiment reported here, we manipulated the congruency of movement intentions and action intentions in a pair of jointly acting individuals (i.e., a participant paired with a confederate coactor) and investigated how congruency influenced performance. Overall, participants initiated actions faster when they had the same action intention as the coactor (i.e., when participants and the coactor were pursuing the same conceptual goal). Participants' responses were also faster when their and the coactor's movement intentions were directed to the same spatial location, but only when participants had the same action intention as the coactor. These findings suggest that observers use the same representation to implement their own action intentions that they use to infer other people's action intentions and also that a dynamic, multitiered intentional mechanism is involved in the processing of other people's actions. 6 p.

Highlights • Own mental states depend on inferred interoceptive states. • Understanding another’s mental states (ToM) also entails interoceptive predictions. • Multimodal expectations at deep hierarchical levels contribute to ToM., Inferring the intentions and beliefs of another is an ability that is fundamental for social and affiliative interactions. A substantial amount of empirical evidence suggests that making sense of another’s intentional and belief states (i.e. theory of mind) relies on exteroceptive (e.g. visual and auditory) and proprioceptive (i.e. motor) signals. Yet, despite its pivotal role in the guidance of behaviour, the role of the observer’s interoceptive (visceral) processing in understanding another’s internal states remains unexplored. Predicting and keeping track of interoceptive bodily states – which inform intentions and beliefs that guide behaviour – is one of the fundamental purposes of the human brain. In this paper, we will focus on the role of interoceptive predictions, prescribed by the free energy principle, in making sense of internal states that cause another’s behaviour. We will discuss how multimodal expectations induced at deep (high) hierarchical levels – that necessarily entail interoceptive predictions – contribute to inference about others that is at the heart of theory of mind.

Contains fulltext : 102589.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) The ideomotor theory of voluntary behavior assumes that the selection and control of a concrete goal-directed movement depends on imagining its direct perceptual consequences. However, this perception-guided assumption neglects the fact that behavioral control entails a hierarchical mechanism wherein conceptual expectations – action goals – can modulate lower level perceptuo-motor representations. In this paper, we focus on the hierarchical nature of voluntary behavior by distinguishing between perceptual representations of images that relate to attainment of concrete movement goals and conceptual representations of ideas that pertain to attainment of action goals. We review the dominant ideomotor principle of the direct perceptuo-motor relation and examine its limitation in the light of the proposed hierarchical view of voluntary behavior. Finally, we offer a revision of the ideomotor principle that allows extension of its explanatory domain from perception-guided movement to conceptual, idea-guided action. 5 p.

Contains fulltext : 90541.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Humans are faster to perform a given action following observation of that same action. Converging evidence suggests that the human mirror neuron system (MNS) plays an important role in this phenomenon. However, the specificity of the neural mechanisms governing this effect remain controversial. Specialist theories of imitation suggest that biological cues are maximally capable of eliciting imitative facilitation. Generalist models, on the other hand, posit a broader role for the MNS in linking visual stimuli with appropriate responses. In the present study, we investigated the validity of these two theoretical approaches by disrupting the left and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) during the preparation of congruent (imitative) and incongruent (complementary) actions cued by either biological (hand) or non-biological (static dot) stimuli. Delivery of TMS over IFG abolished imitative response facilitation. Critically, this effect was identical whether actions were cued by biological or non-biological stimuli. This finding argues against theories of imitation in which biological stimuli are treated preferentially and stresses the notion of the IFG as a vital center of general perception–action coupling in the human brain. 7 p.

It is commonly held that a shared mechanism underlies both the control of our own bodily movements as well as the recognition of the movements of other individuals (Friston et al., 2011; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010; Wolpert et al., 2003). The discovery of mirror neurons has bolstered the popularity of perceptuo-motor accounts that explain action recognition as a direct mapping of the perceived consequences of others’ movements to the perceiver’s movement representations (e.g., Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). Subsequent neuroimaging investigations have repeatedly associated activity in the human parieto-frontal “mirror neuron system (MNS)”, or more neutrally labeled “action observation network (AON)”, with processing of own and others’ observed movements (Van Overwalle, 2009). Yet, a large controversy still exists over the neural instantiation of action processing in the perceivers’ brains (Csibra, 2008; Hickok, 2009). Many multitiered accounts of action control are gaining momentum (Cooper and Shallice, 2006; Grafton and Hamilton, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007). Nevertheless, an exact description of the functional relationships and dependencies between different tiers, as well as their neural bases remain unclear (Uithol et al., 2012). Here, we briefly introduce a conceptuo-perceptual inference framework motivated by Bayesian inference models (e.g., Kording and Wolpert, 2006), which integrates the conceptual and perceptuo-motor levels of behavioral control. We also consider implications of the framework for the controversy regarding the role of the MNS/AON in recognition of others’ everyday observed behavior. We assume that conceptuo-perceptual action inference entails a conceptual level that relates to processing of relationships between objects in the world and a perceptuomotor level that encodes relationships between a particular