Search

Humans can integrate social contextual information into decision-making processes to adjust their responses toward inequity. This context dependency emerges when individuals receive more (i.e., advantageous inequity) or less (i.e., disadvantageous inequity) than others. However, it is not clear whether context-dependent processing of advantageous and disadvantageous inequity involves differential neurocognitive mechanisms. Here, we used fMRI to address this question by combining an interactive game that modulates social contexts (e.g., interpersonal guilt) with computational models that enable us to characterize individual weights on inequity aversion. In each round, the participant played a dot estimation task with an anonymous coplayer. The coplayer would receive pain stimulation with 50% probability when either of them responded incorrectly. At the end of each round, the participant completed a variant of dictator game, which determined payoffs for him/herself and the coplayer. Computational modeling demonstrated the context dependency of inequity aversion: when causing pain to the coplayer (i.e., guilt context), participants cared more about the advantageous inequity and became more tolerant of the disadvantageous inequity, compared with other conditions. Consistently, neuroimaging results suggested the two types of inequity were associated with differential neurocognitive substrates. While the context-dependent processing of advantageous inequity was associated with social- and mentalizing-related processes, involving left anterior insula, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the context-dependent processing of disadvantageous inequity was primarily associated with emotion- and conflict-related processes, involving left posterior insula, right amygdala, and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. These results extend our understanding of decision-making processes related to inequity aversion.

In human society, which is organized by social hierarchies, resources are usually allocated unequally and based on social status. In this study, we analyze how being endowed with different social statuses in a math competition affects the perception of fairness during asset allocation in a subsequent Ultimatum Game (UG). Behavioral data showed that when participants were in high status, they were more likely to reject unfair UG offers than in low status. This effect of social status correlated with activity in the right anterior insula (rAI) and with the functional connectivity between the rAI and a region in the anterior middle cingulate cortex, indicating that these two brain regions are crucial for integrating contextual factors and social norms during fairness perception. Additionally, there was an interaction between social status and UG offer fairness in the amygdala and thalamus, implicating the role of these regions in the modulation of social status on fairness perception. These results demonstrate the effect of social status on fairness perception and the potential neural underpinnings for this effect.

Humans are capable of integrating social contextual information into decision-making processes to adjust their attitudes towards inequity. This context-dependency emerges both when individual is better off (i.e. advantageous inequity) and worse off (i.e. disadvantageous inequity) than others. It is not clear however, whether the context-dependent processing of advantageous and disadvantageous inequity rely on dissociable or shared neural mechanisms. Here, by combining an interpersonal interactive game that gave rise to interpersonal guilt and different versions of the dictator games that enabled us to characterize individual weights on aversion to advantageous and disadvantageous inequity, we investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the two forms of inequity aversion in the interpersonal guilt context. In each round, participants played a dot-estimation task with an anonymous co-player. The co-players received pain stimulation with 50% probability when anyone responded incorrectly. At the end of each round, participants completed a dictator game, which determined payoffs of him/herself and the co-player. Both computational model-based and model-free analyses demonstrated that when inflicting pain upon co-players (i.e., the guilt context), participants cared more about advantageous inequity and became less sensitive to disadvantageous inequity, compared with other social contexts. The contextual effects on two forms of inequity aversion are uncorrelated with each other at the behavioral level. Neuroimaging results revealed that the context-dependent representation of inequity aversion exhibited a spatial gradient in activity within the insula, with anterior parts predominantly involved in the aversion to advantageous inequity and posterior parts predominantly involved in the aversion to disadvantageous inequity. The dissociable mechanisms underlying the two forms of inequity aversion are further supported by the involvement of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in advantageous inequity processing, and the involvement of right amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in disadvantageous inequity processing. These results extended our understanding of decision-making processes involving inequity and the social functions of inequity aversion.

Competition is prevalent. People often resort to unethical means to win (e.g., the recent Volkswagen scandal). Not surprisingly, competition is central to the study of economics, psychology, sociology, political science, and more. Although we know much about contestants’ behavior before and during competitions, we know little about contestants’ behavior after the competition has ended. Connecting postcompetition behaviors with preceding competition experience, we find that after a competition is over winners behave more dishonestly than losers in an unrelated subsequent task. Furthermore, the subsequent unethical behavior effect seems to depend on winning, rather than on mere success. Providing insight into the issue is important in gaining understanding of how unethical behavior may cascade from exposure to competitive settings.

Social norms provide a set of expectations regarding context-specific appropriate behavior that aids in navigating social environments ([Bicchieri, 2006][1]). Classic studies have demonstrated that people tend to conform to these norms even at the cost of their own interest ([Fehr and Fischbacher

Altruistic behavior, i.e., promoting the welfare of others at a cost to oneself, is subserved by the integration of various social, affective, and economic factors represented in extensive brain regions. However, it is unclear how different regions interact to process/integrate information regarding the helper's interest and recipient's need when deciding whether to behave altruistically. Here we combined an interactive game with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to characterize the neural network underlying the processing/integration of self-interest and other-need. At the behavioral level, high self-risk decreased helping behavior and high other-need increased helping behavior. At the neural level, activity in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) were positively associated with self-risk levels, and activity in right inferior parietal lobe (rIPL) and rDLPFC were negatively associated with other-need levels. Dynamic causal modeling further suggested that both MPFC and rIPL were extrinsically connected to rDLPFC; high self-risk enhanced the effective connectivity from MPFC to rDLPFC, and the modulatory effect of other-need on the connectivity from rIPL to rDLPFC positively correlated with the modulatory effect of other-need on individuals’ helping rate. Two tDCS experiments provided causal evidence that rDLPFC affects both self-interest and other-need concerns, and rIPL selectively affects the other-need concerns. These findings suggest a crucial role of the MPFC-IPL-DLPFC network during altruistic decision-making, with rDLPFC as a central node for integrating and modulating motives regarding self-interest and other-need.

Social hierarchy exists in almost all social species and affects everything from resource allocation to the development of intelligence. Previous studies showed that status within a social hierarchy influences the perceived fairness of income allocation. However, the effect of one’s social status on economic decisions is far from clear, as are the neural processes underlying these decisions. In this study, we dynamically manipulated participants’ social status and analyzed their behavior as recipients in the ultimatum game, during which event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed that acceptance rates for offers increased with the fairness level of offers. Importantly, participants were less likely to accept unfair offers when they were endowed with high status than with low status. In addition, cues indicating low status elicited a more positive P2 than cues indicating high status in an earlier time window (170 – 240 ms), and cues indicating high status elicited a more negative N400 than did cues indicating low status in a later time window (350 – 520 ms). During the actual reception of offers, the late positivity potential (LPP, 400 – 700 ms) for unfair offers was more positive in the high status condition than in the low status condition, suggesting a decreased arousal for unfair offers during low status. These findings suggest a strong role of social status in modulating individual behavioral and neural responses to fairness.

This study aimed to validate a Chinese's adaption of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire for children (CERQ-Ck). This self-report instrument evaluates nine cognitive emotion regulation strategies that can be used by children after experiencing a negative life event. The CERQ-Ck was evaluated in a sample of 1403 elementary students between the ages of 9 and 11 by using cluster sampling. All the item-correlation coefficients for CERQ-Ck were above 0.30. The internal consistencies of the nine factors suggested moderate reliability (0.66 to 0.73). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that the current version had the same structure as the original instrument (Tucker-Lewis index = 0.912, comparative fit index = 0.922, root mean square error of approximation = 0.032, standardized root mean square residual = 0.044). A second-order factor and a third-order factor structure were also found. Test-retest correlations (0.53 to 0.70, ps < 0.01) over a period of 1 month, which ranged from acceptable to moderately strong were obtained from a random and stratified subsample of elementary students (N = 76). In addition, we analyzed convergent validity in relation to CERQ-Ck and the Chinese version of the Children's Depression Inventory model dimensions with a subsample of 1083 elementary students. Multiple-group CFA confirmed the measurement invariance for both the male and female groups (ΔCFI < 0.01, ΔRMSEA < 0.015). Overall, results indicate that CERQ-Ck has similar psychometric properties to the original instrument as well as with adequate reliability and validity to investigate the nine cognitive emotion regulation strategies during late childhood developmental periods.