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Figurative language processing impairments in autism have been widely demonstrated, and have been considered a defining feature of autism. Studies in this area often consider different types of figurative language together, and less attention has been paid to identifying the factors that might contribute to difficulties in processing specific types of figurative language. Here we present a preregistered systematic review and meta-analysis of studies assessing the comprehension of idioms and proverbs in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as compared to typically developing (TD) individuals. Idioms are widely used multi-word figurative expressions, which are understood by using contextual information. Proverbs are a related type of fixed, figurative, formulaic expression in a sentential form, typically linked with wisdom. Idioms and proverbs represent forms of figurative language which are more conventionalized and frequently opaquer than metaphors, pointing to a unique way that they are processed in conversational contexts. Our analysis encompassed a total of 11 studies from 10 papers (involving 235 autistic and 224 TD individuals), which met our inclusion criteria (the ASD and TD groups were matched on both chronological age and intelligence). The analysis of accuracy data revealed a group difference favouring the TD over the ASD group, with a medium effect size, and no indication of a publication bias. Participants’ age was unrelated to the magnitude of group differences, but there was a trend for smaller group differences in the case of participants with higher (verbal) intelligence. We discuss these findings with reference to theories related to the nature of figurative language impairments in autism.

We examined the relationship between metaphor comprehension and verbal analogical reasoning in young adults who were either typically developing (TD) or diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The ASD sample was highly educated and high in verbal ability, and closely matched to a subset of TD participants on age, gender, educational background, and verbal ability. Additional TD participants with a broader range of abilities were also tested. Each participant solved sets of verbal analogies and metaphors in verification formats, allowing measurement of both accuracy and reaction times. Measures of individual differences in vocabulary, verbal working memory, and autistic traits were also obtained. Accuracy for both the verbal analogy and the metaphor task was very similar across the ASD and matched TD groups. However, reaction times on both tasks were longer for the ASD group. Additionally, stronger correlations between verbal analogical reasoning and working memory capacity in the ASD group indicated that processing verbal analogies was more effortful for them. In the case of both groups, accuracy on the metaphor and analogy tasks was correlated. A mediation analysis revealed that after controlling for working memory capacity, the inter-task correlation could be accounted for by the mediating variable of vocabulary knowledge, suggesting that the primary common mechanisms linking the two tasks involve language skills.

Whereas some evidence exists that math anxiety may interfere with math performance fromthe very beginning of primary school, no study to date has attempted to investigate whether mathanxiety may also interfere with early math learning (i.e., the encoding of new math knowledge), andnot only with recalling already mastered contents in test situations. Across two experiments carriedout in two different countries (Study 1: N = 115, conducted in Italy; Study 2: N = 120, conducted inthe UK), we addressed this question by presenting 6-year-old children with two math contents thathad not been covered by their school curriculum before the study. Children were tested immediatelybefore and immediately after the learning phase, and after a one-week delay. Results of longitudinalstructural models revealed that math anxiety was negatively related to initial level of knowledge inthe case of 3 out of 4 math contents. More importantly, math anxiety was also negatively related torate of learning in two out of four tasks (one task in Study 1 and one in Study 2). These studiesprovide the first evidence that math anxiety may reduce the encoding of novel math contents inmemory in very young children, potentially leading to cumulative gaps in math proficiency forchildren with math anxiety from the very beginning of their formal education.

Adolescent boys are characterised by increased risk-taking behavior, including a relatively high propensity to develop problem gambling habits. The association between gambling and sensitivity to immediately available rewards is well-established, suggesting that gamblers are less influenced by potential future consequences than non-gamblers. Nevertheless, existing studies have considered present- and future-orientation as two ends of the same continuum, and have not investigated the possibility that present and future perspectives might make independent contributions to gambling behavior. In the current study, we adopted Zimbardo's multidimensional approach, which discriminates between not only present and future perspectives, but also between a hedonistic and fatalistic present-orientation (in addition to positive and negative orientations towards the past). The participants were 223 male adolescents (mean age = 16.7 years). We investigated the effects of time perspectives on gambling frequency and gambling problem severity, after taking into account the effects of age, sensation seeking, and gambling-related cognitive distortions. Gambling frequency was significantly predicted by the present fatalistic perspective, and problem gambling was significantly (negatively) related to the future perspective. The present hedonistic and past negative perspectives were also significantly related to both gambling frequency and gambling problems, although they did not explain additional variance in gambling behavior when the effects of the other factors were controlled. Overall, these results offer a fresh perspective on the role of time perspectives in gambling behavior, with potential implications for understanding the origins of gambling problems and the development of novel interventions.

Postural control is an adaptive process that can be affected by many aspects of human behavior, including emotional contexts. The main emotional contexts that affect postural control are postural threat and passive viewing of aversive or threatening images, both of which produce a reduction in postural sway. The aim of the present study was to assess whether similar stress-related changes in postural sway can be observed using stress induced by social evaluative threat (SET) while perform-ing arithmetic tasks. Twelve young adults performed an arithmetic and a postural control task separately, concurrently, and concurrently with added time pressure in the arithmetic task. In the final condition, participants were given negative feedback about their performance in the arithmetic task and performed it again while being observed (SET condition). Results showed that stress increased linearly with task demand. Postural sway and reaction times were not affected by the first two conditions; however, when time pressure was introduced, reaction times became faster and sway amplitude increased. Finally, introduc-tion of SET caused the predicted reduction in postural sway and an increase in reaction times relative to the time pressure condition. Our results suggest that stress induced using a combination of arithmetic tasks and social evaluative threat leads to systematic changes in postural control. The paradigm developed in the present study would be very useful in assessing interactions between cognition, stress, and postural control in the context of postural instability and falls in older adults.

Probabilistic reasoning skills are important in various contexts. The aim of the present study was to develop a new instrument (the Probabilistic Reasoning Scale – PRS) to accurately measure low levels of probabilistic reasoning ability in order to identify people with difficulties in this domain. Item response theory was applied to construct the scale, and to investigate differential item functioning (i.e., whether the items were invariant) across genders, educational levels, and languages. Additionally, we tested the validity of the scale by investigating the relationships between the PRS and several other measures. The results revealed that the items had a low level of difficulty. Nonetheless, the discriminative measures showed that the items can discriminate between individuals with different trait levels, and the test information function showed that the scale accurately assesses low levels of probabilistic reasoning ability. Additionally, through investigating differential item functioning, the measurement equivalence of the scale at the item level was confirmed for gender, educational status, and language (i.e., Italian and English). Concerning validity, the results showed the expected correlations with numerical skills, math-related attitudes, statistics achievement, IQ, reasoning skills, and risky choices both in the Italian and British samples. In conclusion, the PRS is an ideal instrument for identifying individuals who struggle with basic probabilistic reasoning, and who could be targeted by specific interventions. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Background. Numeracy skills are important for medical decision making as lower numeracy is associated with misinterpreting statistical health risks. Math anxiety, characterized by negative emotions about numerical tasks, and lower subjective numeracy (i.e., self-assessments of numerical competence) are also associated with poor risk comprehension. Objective. To explore independent and mediated associations of math anxiety, numerical ability, and subjective numeracy with risk comprehension and to ascertain whether their associations are specific to the health domain. Methods. Objective numeracy was measured with a 14-item test. Math anxiety and subjective numeracy were assessed with self-report scales. Risk comprehension was measured with a 12-item test. In experiment 1, risk comprehension items were limited to scenarios in the health domain. In experiment 2, participants were randomly assigned to receive numerically equivalent risk comprehension items in either a health or nonhealth domain. Results. Linear regression analyses revealed that individuals with higher objective numeracy were more likely to respond correctly to the risk comprehension items, as were individuals with higher subjective numeracy. Higher math anxiety was associated with a lower likelihood of correct responding when controlling for objective numeracy but not when controlling for subjective numeracy. Mediation analyses indicated that math anxiety may undermine risk comprehension in 3 ways, including through 1) objective numeracy, 2) subjective numeracy, and 3) objective and subjective numeracy in serial, with subjective numeracy mediating the association between objective numeracy and risk comprehension. Findings did not differ by domain. Conclusions. Math anxiety, objective numeracy, and subjective numeracy are associated with risk comprehension through unique pathways. Education initiatives for improving health risk comprehension may be most effective if jointly aimed at tackling numerical ability as well as negative emotions and self-evaluations related to numeracy.

Summary Learning from visual representations is enhanced when learners appropriately integrate corresponding visual and verbal information. This study examined the effects of two methods of promoting integration, color coding and labeling, on learning about probabilistic reasoning from a table and text. Undergraduate students (N = 98) were randomly assigned to learn about probabilistic reasoning from one of 4 computer-based lessons generated from a 2 (color coding/no color coding) by 2 (labeling/no labeling) between-subjects design. Learners added the labels or color coding at their own pace by clicking buttons in a computer-based lesson. Participants' eye movements were recorded while viewing the lesson. Labeling was beneficial for learning, but color coding was not. In addition, labeling, but not color coding, increased attention to important information in the table and time with the lesson. Both labeling and color coding increased looks between the text and corresponding information in the table. The findings provide support for the multimedia principle, and they suggest that providing labeling enhances learning about probabilistic reasoning from text and tables. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Impairments related to figurative language understanding have been considered to be one of the diagnostic and defining features of autism. Metaphor comprehension and production in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as compared to typically developing (TD) individuals have been investigated for around thirty years, generally showing an overall advantage for TD groups. We present a preregistered systematic review and meta-analysis including a total of 15 studies that fulfilled our set of inclusion criteria (notably, ASD and TD groups matched in chronological age and verbal- or full-scale IQ). Along with accuracy, we also analyzed group differences in reaction time in the studies that reported them. The results revealed a medium-to-large group difference favoring TD over ASD groups based on accuracy measures, as well as a similar overall advantage for TD groups based on reaction times. There was reliable heterogeneity in effect sizes for group differences in accuracy, which was mostly explained by the effect of verbal intelligence, with differences in metaphor processing being smaller for participants with better verbal skills. Some of the variation in effect sizes may also be attributed to differences in types of metaphor processing tasks. We also evaluated the quality of the studies included in the meta-analysis, and the evidence relating to the potential presence of publication bias.

This study investigated whether different types of ordering skills were related to mathematics achievement in children (n = 100) in middle childhood, after the effects of age, socio-economic status, IQ, and processing speed were taken into account. The relations between ordering skills and magnitude processing were also investigated, as well as the possibility that some of the shared variance between math and reading is explained by ordering abilities. The ordering tasks included the ordering of familiar numerical and non-numerical sequences, a parental report of children’s everyday ordering skills, and an order working memory task. Three magnitude processing tasks (symbolic and non-symbolic comparison and number line estimation), were also administered, as well as measures of inhibition and spatial working memory. From this set of measures, number ordering, order working memory and number line estimation emerged as the most important predictors of mathematics skills. We found that number ordering mediated the effect of both symbolic and non-symbolic comparison skills on mathematics, further confirming that this task captures some essential skills related to mathematics. Additionally, order working memory mediated the effect of both number comparison and reading skills on math. Finally, whereas non-symbolic comparison and number line estimation are considered important indicators of magnitude processing skills, there was no relationship between these abilities, but there was a correlation between each of these abilities and reading skills, with number line estimation also mediating the effect of reading skills on math. These novel findings could contribute to a better understanding of the basic processes underlying math ability, and why math and reading are strongly related in typical populations and in children with learning difficulties.

This study tested the hypothesis that individuals with dyscalculia have an order processing deficit. The ordering measures included both numerical and non-numerical ordering tasks, and ordering of both familiar and novel sequences was assessed. Magnitude processing/estimation tasks, and measures of inhibition skills were also administered. The participants were 20 children with developmental dyscalculia, and 20 children without maths difficulties. The two groups were closely matched on age, gender, socio-economic status, educational experiences, IQ and reading ability. The findings revealed differences between the groups in both ordering and magnitude processing skills. Nevertheless, diagnostic status was best predicted by order processing abilities.

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a short measure of a person's ability to resist intuitive response tendencies and to produce a normatively correct response, which is based on effortful reasoning. Although the CRT is a very popular measure, its psychometric properties have not been extensively investigated. A major limitation of the CRT is the difficulty of the items, which can lead to floor effects in populations other than highly educated adults. The present study aimed at investigating the psychometric properties of the CRT applying item response theory analyses (a two-parameter logistic model) and at developing a new version of the scale (the CRT-long), which is appropriate for participants with both lower and higher levels of cognitive reflection. The results demonstrated the good psychometric properties of the original, as well as the new scale. The validity of the new scale was also assessed by measuring correlations with various indicators of intelligence, numeracy, reasoning and decision-making skills, and thinking dispositions. Moreover, we present evidence for the suitability of the new scale to be used with developmental samples. Finally, by comparing the performance of adolescents and young adults on the CRT and CRT-long, we report the first investigation into the development of cognitive reflection. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 18-item Need for Cognition Scale (NFC-18) is the most commonly used tool to measure the need for cognition. The aim of this study was to explore the possibility of developing an abbreviated version of the scale, applying the item response theory (IRTirt). Item response theory analyses suggested the exclusion of eight items that did not perform well in measuring the latent trait. The resulting 10-item scale (NFC-10), which included highly discriminative items, covered the same range of the measured trait as the original scale and showed high measurement precision along various levels of the trait. Additionally, since IRT analyses can only confirm the accuracy of the short scale in measuring the underlying construct, we sought to replicate the nomological net of the NFC-18 using the shortened version of the scale. The results showed that the NFC-10 reflects an adequate operationalization of the construct, in line with the longer version. In particular, as expected, the NFC-10 showed moderate relations with various measures of cognitive skills and self-report measures of cognitive styles, confidence, and anxiety. These findings confirm that we have obtained a much shorter version of the NFC that maintains excellent reliability and validity.

Time attitudes (TA) are evaluative feelings toward the past, present and future. Given the role of TA in psychological and behavioural outcomes, the aim of this study was to analyze the adequacy of the Adolescent Time Inventory-Time Attitudes (ATI-TA; Mello & Worrell, 2007) scale among adolescents and young adults in Italy. The scale was administered to 638 students in order to test its psychometric properties and validity. These analyses confirmed the adequacy of the six-factor model and the reliability of the subscales. Additionally, the measurement invariance of the scale across genders and age groups (between adolescents up to the age of 18, and young adults above 18) was demonstrated. Specifically, gender invariance reached the level of equivalence of error variances/covariances, and the same level was partially reached for invariance across age groups. Evidence of the validity of the scale was also provided by obtaining significant correlations between the subscales, and self-esteem and strategic learning. Taken together, these results support the suitability of the ATI-TA to be used for research and clinical purposes.

Ordinality is a fundamental feature of numbers and recent studies have highlighted the role that number ordering abilities play in mathematical development (e.g., Lyons et al., 2014), as well as mature mathematical performance (e.g., Lyons & Beilock, 2011). The current study tested the novel hypothesis that non-numerical ordering ability, as measured by the ordering of familiar sequences of events, also plays an important role in maths development. Ninety children were tested in their first school year and eighty-seven were followed up at the end of their second school year, to test the hypothesis that ordinal processing, including the ordering of non-numerical materials, would be related to their maths skills both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. The results confirmed this hypothesis. Ordinal processing measures were significantly related to maths both cross-sectionally and longitudinally, and children’s non-numerical ordering ability in their first year of school (as measured by order judgments for everyday events and the parents’ report of their child’s everyday ordering ability) was the strongest longitudinal predictor of maths one year later, when compared to several measures that are traditionally considered to be important predictors of early maths development. Children’s everyday ordering ability, as reported by parents, also significantly predicted growth in formal maths ability between Year 1 and Year 2, although this was not the case for the event ordering task. The present study provides strong evidence that domain-general ordering abilities play an important role in the development of children’s maths skills at the beginning of formal education.

This study examined performance on transitive inference problems in children with developmental dyscalculia (DD), typically developing controls matched on IQ, working memory and reading skills, and in children with outstanding mathematical abilities. Whereas mainstream approaches currently consider DD as a domain-specific deficit, we hypothesized that the development of mathematical skills is closely related to the development of logical abilities, a domain-general skill. In particular, we expected a close link between mathematical skills and the ability to reason independently of one's beliefs. Our results showed that this was indeed the case, with children with DD performing more poorly than controls, and high maths ability children showing outstanding skills in logical reasoning about belief-laden problems. Nevertheless, all groups performed poorly on structurally equivalent problems with belief-neutral content. This is in line with suggestions that abstract reasoning skills (i.e. the ability to reason about content without real-life referents) develops later than the ability to reason about belief-inconsistent fantasy content.A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90DWY3O4xx8.

The conjunction fallacy is a violation of a very basic rule of probability. Interestingly, although committing the fallacy seems irrational, adults are no less susceptible to the fallacy than young children. In Experiment 1, by employing tasks where the conjunctive response option involved two non-representative items, we found a large reduction in fallacy rates as compared to traditional conjunction fallacy problems. Nevertheless, fallacy rates remained relatively high in both adolescents and adults, although adults showed more consistency in their normative responses. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that children’s relatively good performance on the task was not the consequence of their missing knowledge of social stereotypes. Additionally, children were more strongly affected by explicitly presented frequency information than adults. Indeed, adults only took frequency information into account when frequencies were made relevant by a training in probabilistic reasoning. Overall, the results suggest that whereas the potential for normative reasoning increases with development, this potential is often overshadowed by a pervasive tendency in adolescence and adulthood to rely on contextual information, knowledge, and beliefs, even when conflicting information is available. By contrast, children are more strongly influenced by explicitly presented information than relevant knowledge cued by the tasks., This research, and the writing of this paper, was partially supported by a UK Economic and Social Research Council post-doctoral fellowship [PTA-026-27-2989] to KM.

The fact that adults exhibit a defective truth table when evaluating “If p then q” conditional statement and judge ¬p cases as irrelevant for the truth value of the conditional has been considered as one of the main evidence against the mental model theory and in favour of Evans' (2007) suppositional account of conditional. If judgements of irrelevance result from some heuristic process, as the suppositional theory assumes, they should be rapid. By contrast, if they result from a demanding and time consuming fleshing out process, as our mental model theory assumes, “irrelevant” responses should be the slowest. In the present study, we analyse the time course of responses in a truth table task as a function of their nature and the interpretation of the conditional adopted by the participants. As our mental model theory predicts, “irrelevant” responses are the slowest, and response times are a direct function of the number of models each type of response involves.

Item Response Theory (IRT) models were applied to investigate the psychometric properties of the Arthur and Day's Advanced Progressive Matrices-Short Form (APM-SF; 1994) [Arthur and Day (1994). Development of a short form for the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices test. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 54, 395–403] in order to test if the scale is a reliable and valid tool to assess general fluid ability in a short time frame. The APM-SF was administered to 2264 high-school and university students. Once attested the one-factor structure of the scale, unidimensional IRT analyses for dichotomous data were applied to investigate the increases in item difficulty levels, Test Information Function, and Differential Item Functioning across age, gender, and country (comparing Italian and British respondents). Additionally, validity measures were reported. Findings attest that the Arthur and Day's APM-SF is a sound instrument for assessing fluid ability within a short time frame.

Reasoning about problems with empirically false content can be hard, as the inferences that people draw are heavily influenced by their background knowledge. However, presenting empirically false premises in a fantasy context helps children and adolescents to disregard their beliefs, and to reason on the basis of the premises. The aim of the present experiments was to see if high-functioning adolescents with autism are able to utilize fantasy context to the same extent as typically developing adolescents when they reason about empirically false premises. The results indicate that problems with engaging in pretence in autism persist into adolescence, and this hinders the ability of autistic individuals to disregard their beliefs when empirical knowledge is irrelevant.

Background. The equiprobability bias is a tendency for individuals to think of probabilistic events as 'equiprobable' by nature, and to judge outcomes that occur with different probabilities as equally likely. The equiprobability bias has been repeatedly found to be related to formal education in statistics, and it is claimed to be based on a misunderstanding of the concept of randomness. Aims. The aim of the present study was to examine whether experimenting with random generators would decrease the equiprobability bias. Sample. The participants were 108 psychology students whose performance was measured either immediately after taking part in a training session ( n= 55), or without doing any training exercises ( n= 53). Method. The training session consisted of four activities. These included generating random sequences of events, and learning about the law of large numbers. Subsequently, the participants were tested on a series of equiprobability problems, and a number of other problems with similar structure and content. Results. The results indicated that the training successfully decreased the equiprobability bias. However, this effect was moderated by participants' cognitive ability (i.e., higher ability participants benefitted from the training more than participants with lower cognitive ability). Finally, the training session had the unexpected side effect of increasing students' susceptibility to the representativeness heuristic. Conclusions. Experimenting with random generators has a positive effect on students' general understanding of probability, but the same time it might increase their susceptibility to certain biases (especially, to the representativeness heuristic). These findings have important implications for using training methods to improve probabilistic reasoning performance.

A major challenge for Dual Process Theories of reasoning is to predict the circumstances under which intuitive answers reached on the basis of Type 1 processing are kept or discarded in favour of analytic, Type 2 processing (Thompson 2009). We propose that a key determinant of the probability that Type 2 processes intervene is the affective response that accompanies Type 1 processing. This affective response arises from the fluency with which the initial answer is produced, such that fluently produced answers give rise to a strong feeling of rightness. This feeling of rightness, in turn, determines the extent and probability with which Type 2 processes will be engaged. Because many of the intuitions produced by Type 1 processes are fluent, it is common for them to be accompanied by a strong sense of rightness. However, because fluency is poorly calibrated to objective difficulty, confidently held intuitions may form the basis of poor quality decisions.

When people evaluate syllogisms, their judgments of validity are often biased by the believability of the conclusions of the problems. Thus, it has been suggested that syllogistic reasoning performance is based on an interplay between a conscious and effortful evaluation of logicality and an intuitive appreciation of the believability of the conclusions (e.g., Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994). However, logic effects in syllogistic reasoning emerge even when participants are unlikely to carry out a full logical analysis of the problems (e.g., Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). There is also evidence that people can implicitly detect the conflict between their beliefs and the validity of the problems, even if they are unable to consciously produce a logical response (e.g., De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010). In 4 experiments we demonstrate that people intuitively detect the logicality of syllogisms, and this effect emerges independently of participants' conscious mindset and their cognitive capacity. This logic effect is also unrelated to the superficial structure of the problems. Additionally, we provide evidence that the logicality of the syllogisms is detected through slight changes in participants' affective states. In fact, subliminal affective priming had an effect on participants' subjective evaluations of the problems. Finally, when participants misattributed their emotional reactions to background music, this significantly reduced the logic effect.

In two experiments, we tested some of the central claims of the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory. Experiment 1 showed that the systemizing quotient (SQ) was unrelated to performance on a mathematics test, although it was correlated with statistics-related attitudes, self-efficacy, and anxiety. In Experiment 2, systemizing skills, and gender differences in these skills, were more strongly related to spatial thinking styles than to SQ. In fact, when we partialled the effect of spatial thinking styles, SQ was no longer related to systemizing skills. Additionally, there was no relationship between the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and the SQ, or skills and interest in mathematics and mechanical reasoning. We discuss the implications of our findings for the E-S theory, and for understanding the autistic cognitive profile.

In three experiments we explored developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning, taking into account the effects of cognitive capacity, thinking styles, and instructions. Normative responding increased with grade levels and cognitive capacity in all experiments, and it showed a negative relationship with superstitious thinking. The effect of instructions (in Experiments 2 and 3) was moderated by level of education and cognitive capacity. Specifically, only higher-grade students with higher cognitive capacity benefited from instructions to reason on the basis of logic. The implications of these findings for research on the development of probabilistic reasoning are also discussed.

The conjunction fallacy has been cited as a classic example of the automatic contextualisation of problems. In two experiments we compared the performance of autistic and typically developing adolescents on a set of conjunction fallacy tasks. Participants with autism were less susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that the difference between the groups did not result from increased sensitivity to the conjunction rule, or from impaired processing of social materials amongst the autistic participants. Although adolescents with autism showed less bias in their reasoning they were not more logical than the control group in a normative sense. The findings are discussed in the light of accounts which emphasise differences in contextual processing between typical and autistic populations.

Recent studies (e.g. Dawson et al., 2007) have reported that autistic people perform in the normal range on the Raven Progressive Matrices test, a formal reasoning test that requires integration of relations as well as the ability to infer rules and form high-level abstractions. Here we compared autistic and typically developing children, matched on age, IQ, and verbal and non-verbal working memory, using both the Raven test and pictorial tests of analogical reasoning. Whereas the Raven test requires only formal analogical reasoning, the other analogy tests require use of real-world knowledge, as well as inhibition of salient distractors. We found that autistic children performed as well as controls on all these tests of reasoning with relations. Our findings indicate that the basic ability to reason systematically with relations, for both abstract and thematic materials, is intact in autism.

In three studies we looked at two typical misconceptions of probability: the representativeness heuristic, and the equiprobability bias. The literature on statistics education predicts that some typical errors and biases (e.g., the equiprobability bias) increase with education, whereas others decrease. This is in contrast with reasoning theorists’ prediction who propose that education reduces misconceptions in general. They also predict that students with higher cognitive ability and higher need for cognition are less susceptible to biases. In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that the equiprobability bias increased with statistics education, and it was negatively correlated with students’ cognitive abilities. The representativeness heuristic was mostly unaffected by education, and it was also unrelated to cognitive abilities. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through an instruction manipulation (by asking participants to think logically vs. rely on their intuitions) that the reason for these differences was that these biases originated in different cognitive processes.

Given that the ability to manage numbers is essential in a modern society, mathematics anxiety – which has been demonstrated to have unfortunate consequences in terms of mastery of math – has become a subject of increasing interest, and the need to accurately measure it has arisen. One of the widely employed scales to measure math anxiety is the Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale (AMAS) (Hopko, Mahadevan, Bare & Hunt, 2003). The first aim of the present paper was to confirm the factor structure of the AMAS when administered to Italian high school and college students, and to test the invariance of the scale across educational levels. Additionally, we assessed the reliability and validity of the Italian version of the scale. Finally, we tested the invariance of the AMAS across genders. The overall findings provide evidence for the validity and reliability of the AMAS when administered to Italian students.

A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative process. The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. Participants were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments. Participants were not asked to reason but instead rated the sentences for liking (Experiment 1) and physical brightness (Experiments 2-3). Sentences that followed logically from preceding sentences were judged to be more likable and brighter. Two other factors thought to be linked to implicit processing-sentence believability and facial expression-had similar effects on liking and brightness ratings. The authors conclude that sensitivity to logical structure was implicit, occurring potentially automatically and outside of awareness. They discuss the results within a fluency misattribution framework and make reference to the literature on discourse comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record

The present study tested the hypothesis that adolescents growing up in Children's Homes differ from adolescents growing up in a family environment in how they think about their past, present and future, in the way they make decisions about future events and rewards, and in their levels of empathy and perspective taking. The participants were 40 adolescents from Children's Homes in Budapest, Hungary, and 40 age- and gender-matched controls. Group differences were found in participants' past and present time perspectives, and girls from Children's Homes showed reduced consistency in their plans for the future. Additionally, gender differences emerged in empathy, perspective taking, and in participants' present and future time perspectives. We discuss the implications of our findings for interventions to improve the future prospects of adolescents in Children's Homes.

Many people have a fragmented knowledge and understanding of the rules of mathematics and probability. As a consequence, they struggle with selecting the appropriate strategies to solve problems, and they often rely on intuitive solutions instead of normative rules. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some typical intuitive strategies that people might apply when they solve mathematical or probability problems. Then the chapter describes the notions of primary and secondary intuitions, and gives an overview of the factors that might affect the selection of a particular intuitive strategy (such as certain individual differences variables and task characteristics). Finally, the chapter discusses the implications of these findings for researchers and educators.

BackgroundWhen asked to solve mathematical problems, some people experience anxiety and threat, which can lead to impaired mathematical performance (Curr Dir Psychol Sci 11:181–185, 2002). The present studies investigated the link between mathematical anxiety and performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT; J Econ Perspect 19:25–42, 2005). The CRT is a measure of a person’s ability to resist intuitive response tendencies, and it correlates strongly with important real-life outcomes, such as time preferences, risk-taking, and rational thinking. MethodsIn Experiments 1 and 2 the relationships between maths anxiety, mathematical knowledge/mathematical achievement, test anxiety and cognitive reflection were analysed using mediation analyses. Experiment 3 included a manipulation of working memory load. The effects of anxiety and working memory load were analysed using ANOVAs. ResultsOur experiments with university students (Experiments 1 and 3) and secondary school students (Experiment 2) demonstrated that mathematical anxiety was a significant predictor of cognitive reflection, even after controlling for the effects of general mathematical knowledge (in Experiment 1), school mathematical achievement (in Experiment 2) and test anxiety (in Experiments 1–3). Furthermore, Experiment 3 showed that mathematical anxiety and burdening working memory resources with a secondary task had similar effects on cognitive reflection. ConclusionsGiven earlier findings that showed a close link between cognitive reflection, unbiased decisions and rationality, our results suggest that mathematical anxiety might be negatively related to individuals’ ability to make advantageous choices and good decisions.

When people are looking for a solution to a problem or they have to decide between choice options, they often rely on simplifying heuristics rather than on formal logic or rule-based argumentation. Moreover, the use of heuristics is just as common in real-life settings as in psychology laboratories, and it pervades all aspects of life. For example, when reading a piece of text, people judge the writer to be more intelligent if the text is easier to process (Oppenheimer, 2006), rhyming versions of aphorisms seem to be truer than non-rhyming aphorisms with the same meaning (McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000), and arguments are judged to be stronger if they correspond to the reader’s beliefs (Stanovich & West, 2008). Heuristics do not only influence our judgements, but also affect the ways in which we try to tackle problems. For example, children in a classroom might choose the operations to solve a mathematical word problem based on the title of the chapter that the problem appears in (Van Dooren, De Bock, Evers, & Verschaffel, 2009).

We examined the relationship between cognitive capacity and heuristic responding on four types of reasoning and decision-making tasks. A total of 84 children, between 5 years 2 months and 11 years 7 months of age, participated in the study. There was a marked increase in heuristic responding with age that was related to increases in cognitive capacity. These findings are inconsistent with the predominant dual-process accounts of reasoning and decision making as applied to development. We offer an alternative explanation of the findings, considering them in the context of recent claims concerning the role of working memory in contextualized reasoning.