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Attribute-framing bias reflects people's tendency to evaluate positively framed objects more favorably than the same objects framed negatively. Most theoretical accounts of this bias emphasized the role of positive- and negative-framing valence in the message, disregarding the quantitative information that typically accompanies it. To examine the role of both framing valence and detailed quantitative information in attribute-framing bias, we applied the distinction between gist and verbatim representations, as proposed by fuzzy-trace theory. We hypothesized that gist representations retain the framing valence used in the scenario, consequently eliciting biased positive or negative evaluations, whereas verbatim representations retain detailed quantitative information that allows for fine-tuning of the evaluations reflective of the magnitude of the target attribute. In 2 experiments, we compared precise presentations of different magnitudes using percentages and pie charts with vague presentations using verbal descriptions. A substantial attribute-framing bias was found for both the precise and vague presentation conditions, consistent with the hypothesis that the framing bias is driven by coarse and imprecise gist representation. Critically, however, the findings reveal higher correlations between evaluations and the magnitude of the target attribute in the precise presentation conditions (percentages and pie charts) compared with the vague verbal presentation. This finding suggests a process of fine-tuning of the evaluations when a detailed verbatim representation of the quantitative information is available. We discuss the findings in view of the distinction between gist and verbatim representations and propose future research to examine similar cognitive mechanisms accounting for biases in judgment and decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Attribute-framing bias (AFB) refers to addressees' bias in evaluating positively framed objects (80% success) more favorably than negatively framed ones (20% failure), although they are logically equivalent. The novelty of the current study is in examining conditions in which AFB occurs or does not occur. Typically, AFB is examined for favorable outcomes (e.g., 80% success / 20% failure); the current study extended the examination to unfavorable outcomes (e.g., 80% failure / 20% success). According to fuzzy-trace theory, information is encoded both as a detailed verbatim representation and as a fuzzy gist representation, and AFB is elicited by the vague gist representations that maintain either the positive or the negative valence of the message. The current study offers a novel insight into the relationship between gist and verbatim representations in AFB by examining how it is moderated by the favorability of the outcomes. In three experiments, we focused on the perceived reliability of news items. As fake news has become an issue of major concern, some news media publish truthfulness evaluations; however, the framing of such evaluations may bias the perceived reliability of news. Hence, we examined to what extent the favorability of the outcomes moderated AFB in perceived news reliability. The results showed that attribute framing biased the perceived reliability of news when truthfulness outcomes were favorable (80% true / 20% fake) but not when outcomes were unfavorable (20% true / 80% fake). We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings to the understanding of AFB and their practical implications concerning the perceived reliability of news. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Attribute-framing bias (AFB) refers to bias in evaluating positively framed objects more favourably than the same objects framed negatively. In most AFB studies, framing is manipulated by contrasting the positive and negative outcomes, using the corresponding positive (success) or negative (failure) labels as descriptors. This study examined the unique contributions of the outcomes of the scenario and the labels describing these outcomes by manipulating them orthogonally. In three experiments, framing scenarios were presented to participants with either positive outcomes rendered with positive (65% passed) or negative (65% didn’t fail) descriptors, or negative outcomes rendered with positive (35% didn’t pass) or negative (35% failed) descriptors. All experiments revealed a strong effect for the outcome with a weaker effect for the descriptor valence, suggesting that outcomes have a stronger influence on AFB than do descriptors. We discuss the results within a theoretical framework that maps the outcome effects onto attention mechanisms and descriptor effects onto association-activation mechanisms.

Previous research has found that negative-valence appeals relating to the self (Don't be a cheater) are more effective at reducing unethical behaviour than appeals relating to behaviour (Don't cheat). We aimed to replicate these findings and examine whether positive-valence appeals relating to the self (Be an honest person) and to behaviour (Answer honestly) could have a similar effect. We ran five experiments with Israeli and U.S. samples, using social interaction and anonymous settings, and different methodologies: Die roll, coin-flip and number choice. A meta-analysis of the five experiments revealed a small effect of the self-appeals relative to the behaviour-appeals. These findings provide additional support for the theoretical explanation offered in terms of the role of the self in regulating unethical behaviour. However, the effect sizes found in our experiments were smaller than the ones previously reported. We discuss the merit in using self-appeals to reduce unethical behaviour, the possible advantage of positive-valence self-appeals, and the possible moderating role of the setting in which the behaviour takes place: Social interaction versus anonymous settings.

Presentation of epidemiological information about the absolute number of suicides has been used occasionally to increase awareness of the suicide phenomenon. This study investigated the effectiveness of absolute quantitative messages versus relative messages. An example of relative messages would be comparing the number of suicide deaths with the number of deaths by car accidents. Participants were randomly presented with absolute or relative messages regarding suicide. They were then requested to indicate the degree of severity they attributed to the suicide phenomenon, being the level to which they view the phenomenon as sufficiently important to mandate national intervention and resource allocation. Relative messages proved more effective than absolute ones in yielding greater perceived severity of suicide. Increasing public and policymakers’ awareness of the suicide phenomenon could be aided by presenting information in relative terms.

An object presented positively is often judged more favourably than the same object described negatively even when the descriptions are logically equivalent. This difference, termed the attribute‐f...

Background:Global suicide rates among older adults are very high. Public attitudes towards older adults’ suicide may affect older adults upon their contemplating such an act. Previous research has demonstrated that message framing affects persons’ judgments and decision making. Thus, message framing may have particular significance in the context of attitudes towards end-of-life phenomena, such as physician-aided suicide. This study examined the possible role of ageism in moderating the effect of message framing on attitudes towards older adults’ suicide.Methods:Two studies examined the association between ageism and attitudes towards older adults’ suicide. Study 1 assessed both variables by self-administered questionnaires; Study 2 further examined these variables, incorporating participants’ responses to a suicide-related vignette, and evaluating the possible effect of message framing, using a between-participants design.Results:High-ageism participants expressed greater acceptance for older adults’ suicide, whereas low-ageism participants expressed a less permissive approach to it (Study 1). In addition, ageism moderated the effect of message framing on attitudes towards older adults’ suicide: High-ageism participants revealed a more permissive attitude towards older adults’ suicide when the issue was presented in positive terms of not prolonging life, relative to a negative presentation of ending life; a similar effect was not found for low-ageism participants (Study 2).Conclusions:The moderating effect of ageism on attitudes towards older adults’ suicide has both theoretical and practical implications. We discuss these implications with respect to suicide prevention among older adults, and suggest future research.

Summary Objects and events are often evaluated more favourably when presented in a positive frame than when presented in the complementary negative framing. Recent studies show that this attribute-framing bias can be moderated when both positive and negative frames are represented in the message. Most attribute-framing studies used written messages, although important messages are often conveyed auditorily. Unlike written messages, recipients cannot reread auditory messages and have to rely on their memory when evaluating them; consequently, the moderating effect of mixed representation may depend on memory constraints. The current study compared the framing bias in single-attribute versus mixed-attribute representations in written and auditory messages. In both written and auditory messages, single-attribute representation yielded substantial framing bias whereas mixed-attribute representation moderated the bias. The results are discussed in terms of the role of memory and attention in the attribute-framing bias. Theoretical and practical implications are considered, and future research is suggested. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Previous research has found that objective numeracy moderates framing effects: People who are less numerate were found to be more susceptible to goal-framing and attribute-framing effects than people who are highly numerate. This study examined the possibility that subjective numeracy likewise moderates attribute framing in contexts where participants are presented with percentages of success or failure. The results show that compared with highly numerate participants, less numerate participants were more susceptible to the effect of attribute framing. Interestingly, this moderating effect was revealed only when using objective numeracy measures, and not when subjective numeracy measures were used. Future research is suggested to replicate these findings, to establish the generalizability of numeracy as a moderator of other cognitive biases, and to examine several possible theoretical explanations for the differential moderation of attribute-framing bias.

PurposeConsumers frequently find themselves having to choose between various product brands that differ in price and quality. The purpose of this paper is to examine several possible factors that may affect this choice: message framing of the choice as either gain or loss of money or quality, consumer involvement, and consumers’ perceived monetary and quality gains.Design/methodology/approachIn all, 837 participants from Portugal, Turkey, and Israel were randomly assigned to a positively or negatively framed message regarding the quality or price of two alternative brands of sunscreen lotion.FindingsAs expected, highly involved consumers show a higher preference for the better and more expensive product than less involved consumers, while perceived monetary or quality gains mediates this relation. Challenging previous findings, negative framing of loss avoidance affects perceived gains and brand choice more than positive framing only for less involved participants, rather than for highly involved ones.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough the results were replicated in three different countries, future research of message framing context on other products is needed, as well as research in the context of goal framing.Practical implicationsIf indeed future research would replicate the higher effectiveness of positive framing among highly involved consumers, retailers should consider that in planning their product promotion strategy.Originality/valueThis study challenges the current literature regarding the effect of message framing on message and the moderating role of involvement.

Research showed that given the opportunity, people behave dishonestly only to the degree that will allow them to maintain a positive self-concept. These experiments did not include the probability of getting caught cheating, although in everyday life, this risk always exists. If it is shown that people behave more honestly when faced with an explicit risk of getting caught, the ecological validity of these experiments may be at risk. This study showed that explicit risk, framed as the probability of getting caught or as the complementary probability of not getting caught, did not reduce participants’ dishonest behavior relative to no risk. These findings support the ecological validity of previous research on unethical behavior.

Construal level theory predicts that people will judge immoral events more harshly when these are presented in a way that elicits a higher construal level, relative to a lower construal level. Previous research supported this prediction using an Israeli sample but not a U.S. sample. This article compared Israeli and U.S. samples with respect to the interactive effect of utility and construal level on unethical behavioral intentions. We found that construal level did not affect unethical behavioral intentions in either the U.S. samples for low-utility level or the Israeli samples for low- and high-utility levels. In contrast, construal level affected unethical behavioral intentions in the U.S. sample for high-utility level: unethical behavioral intentions were higher in the low-construal level compared to the high-construal level. We discuss these findings and suggest additional factors that challenge arguments concerning the direct effect of construal level on unethical behavior.

*Behavioral Sciences Department, Ruppin Academic Center, Emek Hefer 40250, Israel. eyalg@ruppin.ac.il**School of Education, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905, IsraelThis research demonstrates the effect of framing on applicants’reactions to two personnelselection methods: undergraduate grade point average and personnel interview scores.Presenting a selection situation framed positively (to accept applicants) caused applicantsto rate bothselectionmethods morefavorablyrelative to presentingthemwithanidenticalselection situation framed negatively (to reject the remaining applicants). Framing affectedreactions that emphasized distributive justice aspects of the selection situation andprocedural justice aspects. The results are consistent with Prospect theory and withFairness Heuristic theory. The paper offers a theoretical explanation for the effect offraming on applicants’reactions to personnel selection methods, discusses the implicationsof this effect, and suggests directions for future research.

This paper integrates recent meta-analytical findings regarding group differences in joband educational-related criteria and cognitive ability measures used as predictors in personnel selection and selection to higher education institutions. The findings suggest that cognitive ability measures reveal much higher group differences than the corresponding between-group differences in job- and educational-related criteria. One possible explanation for these differential gaps is that cognitive ability measures are objective and standardized while the typical measures used as job- and-educational related criteria are non-standardized subjective evaluations of job performance and academic achievement. While these findings are consistent with unbiased prediction or over-prediction for lower scoring groups, they imply that selection is biased against them. Implications and future research are discussed.

Two experiments examined the effect of framing on attitudes toward an affirmative-action program of preferential treatment. Participants' attitudes were consistently more favorable toward the affirmative-action program presented in a positive frame—preferring a target group's applicant over a majority group's applicant—than when the very same program was presented in a negative frame—rejecting the majority group's applicant in favor of the target group's applicant. Similar effects were evident for 3 target groups in the context of higher education selection and personnel selection. Two theoretical explanations for the effect of framing on attitudes toward affirmative-action programs are suggested. The implications of this effect are discussed, and the challenges facing future research of this phenomenon are outlined.

Objective: The interpersonal theory of suicide posits that perceived burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness are two causal interactive suicidal risk factors. The aim of this study was to examine whether therapists are affected by these factors upon assessing patients' suicide risk. Method: Using an experimental design, 388 mental health professionals were presented with a text vignette describing a hypothetical patient with either high or low perceived burdensomeness and with either high or low thwarted belongingness. Results: The findings revealed that both factors affected therapists' risk assessment of psychache, suicidal ideation, suicide attempt and resilience. Conclusions: The study results highlight the interpersonal theory as an important theory for understanding the factors upon which therapists and mental health professionals rely when assessing suicide risk.

Empirical examination of the relation between prediction bias and selection bias has been hampered by the lack of a valid definition of selection bias. In this article, we show that such a definition is possible in the special case of fixed-n selection, where the only reason for rejecting otherwise acceptable applicants is that their number exceeds the number of available places. Using the proposed definition, the empirical relation between prediction bias and selection bias with respect to prominent social groups is examined. The results indicate that although the 2 biases are related, the relation is not isomorphic: First, it is mediated by the selection ratio; second, for most selection ratios, its strength is only moderate. Thus, both the direction and the magnitude of prediction bias may be misleading as a basis for determining the corresponding direction and magnitude of selection bias. In particular, lack of prediction bias does not entail lack of selection bias. Hence, examination of selection bia...

People ascribe “euthanasia” different values and view it differently. This study hypothesized that a different framing of objectively the same euthanasia situations would affect people’s attitudes toward it. Indeed, “positive” framing of euthanasia as not prolonging life resulted in more support for both passive and active euthanasia relative to “negative” framing of the objectively same situations as ending life. Two experiments replicated this pattern using either continuous measures of attitude or dichotomous measures of choice. The article offers two theoretical explanations for the effect of message framing on attitudes toward euthanasia, discusses implications of this effect, and suggests future research.

Attitudes of public groups towards behavioral policy interventions (or nudges) can be important for both the policy makers who design and deploy nudges, and to researchers who try to understand when and why some nudges are supported while others are not. Until now, research on public attitudes towards nudges has focused on either state- or country-level comparisons, or on correlations with individual-level traits, and has neglected to study how different social groups (such as minorities) might view nudges. Using a large and representative sample, we tested the attitudes of two distinct minority groups in Israel (Israeli Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews), and discovered that nudges that operated against a minority group’s held social norms, promoting a more general societal goal not aligned with the group’s norms, were often less supported by minorities. Contrary to expectations, these differences could not be explained by differences in trust in the government applying these nudges. We discuss implications for public policy and for the research and applications of behavioral interventions.