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Debates concerning social learning in the behavioral and the developmental cognitive sciences have largely ignored the literature on social influence in the affective sciences despite having arguably the same object of study. We argue that this is a mistake and that no complete model of social learning can exclude an affective aspect. In addition, we argue that including affect can advance the somewhat stagnant debates concerning the unique characteristics of social learning in humans compared to other animals. We first review the two major bodies of literature in nonhuman animals and human development, highlighting the fact that the former has adopted a behavioral approach while the latter has adopted a cognitive approach, leading to irreconcilable differences. We then introduce a novel framework, affective social learning (ASL), that studies the way we learn about value(s). We show that all three approaches are complementary and focus, respectively, on behavior toward; cognitions concerning; and feelings about objects, events, and people in our environment. All three thus contribute to an affective, behavioral, and cognitive (ABC) story of knowledge transmission: the ABC of social learning. In particular, ASL can provide the backbone of an integrative approach to social learning. We argue that this novel perspective on social learning can allow both evolutionary continuity and ontogenetic development by lowering the cognitive thresholds that appear often too complex for other species and nonverbal infants. Yet, it can also explain some of the major achievements only found in human cultures. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Whether one can label nonhuman primate signals as ‘meaningful’ hinges on what one takes as central features to meaning. If one targets a notion of meaning closely related and comparable to meaning in human words, two features must be identified: firstly, a concrete ascribable meaning to the signal and, secondly, an element of convention or arbitrariness of the signal’s meaning. In their seminal paper published in 1980, Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler demonstrated that vervet monkey alarm calls have concrete, discrete, ascribable meaning. But what about their arbitrariness? Here we will suggest a potential way into the investigation of this second feature: Human individuals are capable of comprehending arbitrary word meaning through learning and teaching processes. The current theory suggests in particular that imitation learning and natural pedagogy-like teaching behavior are necessary. For nonhuman primate signals, there is high doubt that learning processes are involved in the acquisition of novel signals, for instance, during ontogeny, and even higher doubt in the involvement of natural pedagogy. We will tackle the question of why complex imitation learning and natural pedagogy is not necessary for animal signals to be arbitrarily meaningful. We will also argue that the framework of ASL – Affective Social Learning – can help us determine whether simple forms of learning and passive forms of (indirect) teaching hinging on affective states of the teacher are involved, allowing for an arbitrary character of nonhuman signals.

The presence of divergent and independent research traditions in the gestural and vocal domains of primate communication has resulted in major discrepancies in the definition and operationalization of cognitive concepts. However, in recent years, accumulating evidence from behavioural and neurobiological research has shown that both human and non-human primate communication is inherently multimodal. It is therefore timely to integrate the study of gestural and vocal communication. Herein, we review evidence demonstrating that there is no clear difference between primate gestures and vocalizations in the extent to which they show evidence for the presence of key language properties: intentionality, reference, iconicity and turn-taking. We also find high overlap in the neurobiological mechanisms producing primate gestures and vocalizations, as well as in ontogenetic flexibility. These findings confirm that human language had multimodal origins. Nonetheless, we note that in great apes, gestures seem to fulfil a carrying (i.e. predominantly informative) role in close-range communication, whereas the opposite holds for face-to-face interactions of humans. This suggests an evolutionary shift in the carrying role from the gestural to the vocal stream, and we explore this transition in the carrying modality. Finally, we suggest that future studies should focus on the links between complex communication, sociality and cooperative tendency to strengthen the study of language origins.

The concept of functional reference has been used to isolate potentially referential vocal signals in animal communication. However, its relatedness to the phenomenon of reference in human language has recently been brought into question. While some researchers have suggested abandoning the concept of functional reference altogether, others advocate a revision of its definition to include contextual cues that play a role in signal production and perception. Empirical and theoretical work on functional reference has also put much emphasis on how the receiver understands the referential signal. However, reference, as defined in the linguistic literature, is an action of the producer, and therefore, any definition describing reference in non-human animals must also focus on the producer. To successfully determine whether a signal is used to refer, we suggest an approach from the field of pragmatics, taking a closer look at specific situations of signal production, specifically at the factors that influence the production of a signal by an individual. We define the concept of signaller's reference to identify intentional acts of reference produced by a signaller independently of the communicative modality, and illustrate it with a case study of the hoo vocalizations produced by wild chimpanzees during travel. This novel framework introduces an intentional approach to referentiality. It may therefore permit a closer comparison of human and non-human animal referential behaviour and underlying cognitive processes, allowing us to identify what may have emerged solely in the human lineage.