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Crosby, Monin, and Richardson (2008) found that hearing an offensive remark caused subjects ( N = 25) to look longer at a potentially offended person, but only if that person could hear the remark. On the basis of this result, they argued that people use social referencing to assess the offensiveness. However, in a direct replication in the Reproducibility Project: Psychology, the result for Crosby et al.’s key effect was not significant. In the current project, we tested whether the size of the social-referencing effect might be increased by a peer-reviewed and preregistered protocol manipulation in which some participants were given context to understand why the remark was potentially offensive. Three labs in Europe and the United States ( N = 283) took part. The protocol manipulation did not affect the size of the social-referencing effect. However, we did replicate the original effect reported by Crosby et al., albeit with a much smaller effect size. We discuss these results in the context of ongoing debates about how replication attempts should treat statistical power and contextual sensitivity.

Background In criminal investigations, uncooperative witnesses might deny knowing a perpetrator, the location of a murder scene or knowledge of a weapon. We sought to identify markers of recognition in eye fixations and confidence judgments whilst participants told the truth and lied about recognising faces (Experiment 1) and scenes and objects (Experiment 2) that varied in familiarity. To detect recognition we calculated effect size differences in markers of recognition between familiar and unfamiliar items that varied in familiarity (personally familiar, newly learned). Results In Experiment 1, recognition of personally familiar faces was reliably detected across multiple fixation markers (e.g. fewer fixations, fewer interest areas viewed, fewer return fixations) during honest and concealed recognition. In Experiment 2, recognition of personally familiar non-face items (scenes and objects) was detected solely by fewer fixations during honest and concealed recognition; differences in other fixation measures were not consistent. In both experiments, fewer fixations exposed concealed recognition of newly learned faces, scenes and objects, but the same pattern was not observed during honest recognition. Confidence ratings were higher for recognition of personally familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces. Conclusions Robust memories of personally familiar faces were detected in patterns of fixations and confidence ratings, irrespective of task demands required to conceal recognition. Crucially, we demonstrate that newly learned faces should not be used as a proxy for real-world familiarity, and that conclusions should not be generalised across different types of familiarity or stimulus class.

Background Criminal associates such as terrorist members are likely to deny knowing members of their network when questioned by police. Eye tracking research suggests that lies about familiar faces can be detected by distinct markers of recognition (e.g. fewer fixations and longer fixation durations) across multiple eye fixation parameters. However, the effect of explicit eye movement strategies to concealed recognition on such markers has not been examined. Our aim was to assess the impact of fixed-sequence eye movement strategies (across the forehead, ears, eyes, nose, mouth and chin) on markers of familiar face recognition. Participants were assigned to one of two groups: a standard guilty group who were simply instructed to conceal knowledge but with no specific instructions on how to do so; and a countermeasures group who were instructed to look at every familiar and unfamiliar face in the same way by executing a consistent sequence of fixations. Results In the standard guilty group, lies about recognition of familiar faces showed longer average fixation durations, a lower proportion of fixations to the inner face regions, and proportionately more viewing of the eyes than honest responses to genuinely unknown faces. In the countermeasures condition, familiar face recognition was detected by longer fixations durations, fewer fixations to the inner regions of the face, and fewer interest areas of the face viewed. Longer fixation durations were a consistent marker of recognition across both conditions for most participants; differences were detectable from the first fixation. Conclusion The results suggest that individuals can exert a degree of executive control over fixation patterns but that: the eyes are particularly attention-grabbing for familiar faces; the more viewers look around the face, the more they give themselves away; and attempts to deploy the same fixation patterns to familiar and unfamiliar faces were unsuccessful. The results suggest that the best strategy for concealing recognition might be to keep the eyes fixated in the centre of the screen but, even then, recognition is apparent in longer fixation durations. We discuss potential optimal conditions for detecting concealed knowledge of faces. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.1186/s41235-019-0169-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

In forensic investigations, suspects sometimes conceal recognition of a familiar person to protect co-conspirators or hide knowledge of a victim. The current experiment sought to determine whether eye fixations could be used to identify memory of known persons when lying about recognition of faces. Participants’ eye movements were monitored whilst they lied and told the truth about recognition of faces that varied in familiarity (newly learned, famous celebrities, personally known). Memory detection by eye movements during recognition of personally familiar and famous celebrity faces was negligibly affected by lying, thereby demonstrating that detection of memory during lies is influenced by the prior learning of the face. By contrast, eye movements did not reveal lies robustly for newly learned faces. These findings support the use of eye movements as markers of memory during concealed recognition but also suggest caution when familiarity is only a consequence of one brief exposure.

Traditionally, experiments on social learning (in both humans and nonhumans) involve dyads, with an experimenter or experimenter-trained conspecific serving as the demonstrator and the participant as the observer. But social learning in nature often involves multiple potential models, and the models themselves were once learners. We discuss our studies of social learning by adult humans in interactive group settings in the absence of formal demonstrations by experimenters, which tracked transmission over multiple learner generations. In these experiments, we found evidence for cumulative learning over generations. This has allowed us to manipulate learning conditions in order to test hypotheses regarding the necessary conditions for cumulative culture. We also report results from a further experiment using similar methods, which compared conditions of varying cohort size. Participants were given the task to build a paper airplane to fly as far as possible. Contrary to expectations, there was no advantage for larger cohort sizes, in terms of the cumulative effects observed.

The rapid appearance (over evolutionary time) of the cognitive skills and complex inventions of modern humans has been attributed to “cumulative cultural evolution” (CCE), the accumulation of knowledge and skills over generations. To date, researchers have only been able to speculate about the reasons for the apparent absence of this phenomenon in nonhumans, and it has not been possible to test hypotheses regarding the mechanisms underlying it. Here, we show that it is possible to demonstrate CCE under laboratory conditions by simulating generational succession through the repeated removal and replacement of human participants within experimental groups. We created “microsocieties” in which participants were instructed to complete simple tasks using everyday materials. In one of our procedures, participants were instructed to build a paper aeroplane which flew as far as possible, and in the other, they were instructed to construct a tower of spaghetti which was as tall as possible. We show that, in both cases, information accumulates within the groups such that later generations produce designs which are more successful than earlier ones. These methods offer researchers a window to understanding CCE, allowing for experimental manipulation and hypothesis testing.

Theoretical work predicts that individuals should strategically increase their reliance on social learning when individual learning would be costly or risky, or when the payoffs for individually-learned behaviors are uncertain. Using a method known to elicit cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory, we investigated the degree of within-group similarity, and between-group variation, in design choices made by participants under conditions of varying uncertainty about the likely effectiveness of those designs. Participants were required to build a tower from spaghetti and modeling clay, their goal being to build the tower as high as possible. In one condition, towers were measured immediately on completion, and therefore participants were able to judge the success of their design during building. In the other condition, participants’ towers were measured five minutes after completion, following a deliberate attempt to test the tower’s stability, making it harder for participants to judge whether an innovative solution was liable to result in a good score on the final measurement. Cultural peculiarity (i.e. the extent to which a design could be identified as belonging to a particular chain) was stronger in the delayed measure condition, indicating that participants were placing greater reliance on social learning. Furthermore in this condition there was only very weak evidence of successive improvement in performance over learner generations, whereas in the immediate measure condition there was a clear effect of steadily increasing scores on the goal measurement. Increasing the risk associated with learning for oneself may favor the development of arbitrary traditions.

Eyewitnesses to a filmed event were interviewed twice using a Cognitive Interview to examine the effects of variations in delay between the repeated interviews (immediately & 2 days; immediately & 7 days; 7 & 9 days) and the identity of the interviewers (same or different across the two repeated interviews). Hypermnesia (an increase in total amount of information recalled in the repeated interview) occurred without any decrease in the overall accuracy. Reminiscence (the recall of new information in the repeated interview) was also found in all conditions but was least apparent in the longest delay condition, and came with little cost to the overall accuracy of information gathered. The number of errors, increased across the interviews, but the relative accuracy of participants’ responses was unaffected. However, when accuracy was calculated based on all unique details provided across both interviews and compared to the accuracy of recall in just the first interview it was found to be slightly lower. The identity of the interviewer (whether the same or different across interviews) had no effects on the number of correct details. There was an increase in recall of new details with little cost to the overall accuracy of information gathered. Importantly, these results suggest that witnesses are unlikely to report everything they remember during a single Cognitive Interview, however exhaustive, and a second opportunity to recall information about the events in question may provide investigators with additional information.