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Traditional models of skill learning posit that skilled action unfolds in an automatic manner and that control will prove deleterious to movement and performance proficiency. These perspectives assume that automated processes are characterised by low levels of control and vice versa. By contrast, a number of authors have recently put forward hybrid theories of skilled action which have sought to capture the close integration between fine-grained automatic motor routines and intentional states. Drawing heavily on the work of Bebko et al. (2005) and Christensen et al. (2016), we argue that controlled and automated processes must operate in parallel if skilled performers are to address the wide range of challenges that they are faced with in training and competition. More specifically, we show how skilled performers use controlled processes to update and improve motor execution in training contexts and to stabilise performance under pressurised conditions.

Objectives The present paper elucidates some cognitive mechanisms of expertise in sport that have emerged from recent studies of three topics in psychology: motor imagery; flow and “clutch” states; and the “quiet eye” phenomenon. Design A selective narrative review was conducted of research on the three preceding topics. Special consideration was given to recent studies by European researchers on these topics. Method Following a brief overview of theoretical approaches to sport expertise, the paper examines certain cognitive mechanisms of elite athletic performance that have emerged from recent studies of motor imagery; flow and “clutch” states; and the “quiet eye” phenomenon. In the final section, conclusions are drawn about theoretical progress in understanding the cognitive mechanisms of expertise in sport. Results The mechanisms underlying sport expertise reflect both task-specific and universal cognitive processes (e.g., mental representations). Conclusion Considerable progress has been made in identifying the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise in sport but additional research is required to address certain unresolved issues in this field.

Cognitive sport psychology is concerned with the scientific investigation of “cognitive” processes in sport performers. The classical paradigm in cognitive psychology was shaped significantly by a symposium held on 11 September 1956 at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The concept of the mind as a representational information-processing system revolutionized cognitive psychology for one major reason: it challenged the prevailing behaviourist view that, as mental processes were unobservable, they could not be studied scientifically. Arising from the limitations of the information-processing paradigm, a range of embodiment approaches to the study of cognition emerged in psychology in the early 1990s. Research in cognitive sport psychology is influenced by two main theoretical paradigms – the classical or information-processing approach and a range of embodiment approaches. Evidence to support embodiment theories in psychology has emerged from numerous sources, especially in the field of perception.

Eye tracking technology records the location, duration and sequence of people’s visual fixations when they inspect a given scene. In this way, it elucidates what people pay attention to when they l...

Motor imagery (MI) involves consciously performing an action in our minds without engaging in overt physical movement. Although inhibition is crucial to MI, few studies have explored the nature of ...

Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of research interest in motor imagery (MI; sometimes known as mental practice) or the mental simulation of actions without any concomitant bodily movement. While numerous experimental studies have demonstrated the efficacy of MI in improving skilled performance in fields such as music, sport and medical surgery, few to date have investigated the extent to which MI and motor execution share similar cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, to address this gap, the present studies explored the relationship between the executed and imagined movements of expert pianists. Study 1 explored the effects of movement complexity and force on the time required for nine pianists to actually perform and imagine performing a musical composition. Results revealed that although the durations of participants’ imagined performances were longer than those of executed ones, stage-duration variations during execution were mirrored in the stage-duration variations during MI. In Study 2, seven pianists’ pupil-size measurements (obtained using Tobii eye-tracking glasses) were used to explore changes in cognitive effort between executed and imagined piano performance. Results showed that pupil-size measurements during executed and imagined piano playing were similar. The significance of the findings is discussed and some potential new directions for research are identified.

Empirical evidence demonstrates that performing artists are confronted by a variety of ‘bodily crises’ (e.g., injury, attrition of habits induced by ageing) over the course of their careers (Wainwright, Williams, & Turner, 2005). Such crises may present a serious threat to the embodied subject. Unfortunately, many prominent theories of skill acquisition (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967) appear to evacuate the body from performance by suggesting that any form of conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one's action during motor skill execution) will disrupt habitual behaviour. As a result, few researchers have considered how performers might tackle bodily anomalies. In the current paper, we seek to address this issue by discussing a variety of the ‘crises’ that confront the performing body. We start by discussing a number of disciplinary practices that may contribute to these crises. Next, we argue that habitual movements must be open to ‘acts of creativity’ in order to maintain a productive relationship between the performing body and the environment. Then we consider what this ‘creative action’ might involve and discuss a number of approaches (e.g., mindfulness, somaesthetic awareness) that could maintain and improve one's movement proficiency. Here, our argument draws on Dewey's (1922) pragmatist philosophy and his belief that ‘intelligent habit’ was required to help people to improve their movement functioning. Finally, we consider the implications of our argument for current conceptualisations of ‘habitual’ movement and recommend that researchers explore the adaptive and flexible capacity of the performing body.

We used a novel meta regression analysis approach to examine the effectiveness of 24psychological skills training and behavioral interventions in sport assessed using single-case 25experimental designs (SCEDs). One hundred and twenty-one papers met the inclusion criteria 26applied to eight database searches and key sport psychology journals. Seventy-one studies 27reported sufficient detail for effect sizes to be calculated for the effects of psychological skills 28training on psychological, behavioral, and performance variables. The unconditional mean 29effect size for weighted (∆ = 2.40) and unweighted (∆ = 2.83 ) models suggested large 30improvements in psychological, behavioral, and performance outcomes associated with 31implementing cognitive-behavioral psychological skills training and behavioral interventions 32with a SCED. However, meta-regression analysis revealed important heterogeneities and 33sources of bias within this literature. First, studies using a group-based approach reported 34lower effect sizes compared to studies using single-case approaches. Second, the single-case 35studies, (over 90 per cent the effect sizes), revealed upwardly biased effect sizes arising from: 36(i) positive publication bias such that studies using lower numbers of baseline observations 37reported larger effects, while studies using larger numbers of baseline observations reported 38smaller – but still substantial – effects; (ii) not adopting a multiple baseline design; and (iii) 39not establishing procedural reliability. We recommend that future researchers using SCED’s 40should consider these methodological issues. 41Keywords: meta regression analysis, psychological skills training, single-case experimental 42designs, procedural reliability, applied sport psychology

Objectives Motor imagery (MI) is a dynamic mental state during which the representation of a given motor movement is rehearsed in working memory without overt motor output. Mental practice (MP; also known as motor imagery practice) is the systematic application of MI for the cognitive rehearsal of a task in the absence of overt physical movements. Although MP is known to enhance skilled performance, debate still exists about the magnitude and moderators of these imagery effects. Against this background, and amid concerns about the “reproducibility crisis” in psychology, it seems timely to revisit, update and extend a key meta-analysis of MP effects published over two decades ago – namely, that of Driskell, Copper, and Moran (1994). To this end, the present paper reports a methodological replication of the Driskell et al’s (1994) meta-analysis of MP effects. Design & method Included are 37 studies on MP effects published between 1995 and 2018. Nine factors were selected to examine the extent to which they moderate the effectiveness of mental practice, providing a window into the conditions under which mental practice is most effectively implemented. Practice Type (Mental or Physical), Expertise, Duration of practice (both program and session), Task Type, and Control Type were retained as factors of interest from the original Driskell et al. (1994) meta-analysis. In order to further explore the nuance of mental practice implementation, we additionally examined the Imagery Type, the Performance Measure used, Activity Type (team versus individual activities) and the Setting of the intervention. Results Following publication bias analyses, our results confirm that overall, MP has a small but significant positive effect on performance (r = 0.131). Moderators of this beneficial effect were MP duration, type of task and type of imagery used. Conclusions We conclude that MP has an enduring positive influence on performance.

Motor imagery (MI; mental simulation of actions) shares certain mental representations and processes with executed movement (ME). This neurocognitive overlap between MI and ME may explain why the systematic use of MI improves skilled performance in numerous domains. Unfortunately, the attentional mechanisms underlying MI remain unresolved. Therefore, the present studies investigated the role of attentional effort (as measured by pupil dilation) in MI. We evaluated the effects of movement complexity and speed on expert pianists' pupil dilation as they physically executed and used MI to perform easy/complex and slow/fast music phrases. Results revealed that easy movements required similar levels of attentional effort during MI and ME. However, during complex movements performed at a fast speed, the correspondence between execution and imagery of movement was disrupted.

What exactly is “concentration”, and how is it related to the broader psychological construct of attention? what theories and metaphors best help us to understand attentional processes? why do skilled performers “lose” their concentration? what are the building blocks of effective concentration? how is attention related to situational awareness and visual-perceptual skills? The chapter presents answers for these questions using the principles and findings of cognitive psychology – a discipline that studies how the mind works in acquiring, storing and using knowledge. In psychology, the term “attention” refers to a cognitive system that facilitates the selection of some stimuli for further processing while inhibiting that of other stimuli. In sport and performance psychology, considerable research has been conducted on how experts and novices use their perceptual system to guide their attention. In psychology, “pupillometry” is the objective measurement of mental effort though task-evoked changes in the diameter of the pupil of the eye during cognitive processing.

We are constantly bombarded by information. Therefore, during every waking moment of our lives, we face decisions about which stimuli to prioritize and which ones to ignore. To complicate matters, the information that clamors for our attention includes not only events that occur in the world around us but also experiences that originate in the subjective domain of our own thoughts and feelings. The end result is that our minds can consciously attend to only a fraction of the rich kaleidoscope of information and experiences available to us from our senses, thoughts, memories, and imagination. Attentional processes such as “concentration,” or the ability to focus on the task at hand while ignoring distractions, are crucial for success in sport and other domains of skilled performance. To illustrate, Venus Williams, one of the greatest tennis players of all time, proclaimed that “for the players it is complete and pure focus. You don’t see anything or hear anything except the ball and what’s going on in your head.” For psychological scientists, concentration resembles a mental spotlight (like the head-mounted torch that miners and divers wear in dark environments) that illuminates targets located either in the external world around us or in the internal world of our subjective experiences. A major advantage of this spotlight metaphor is that it shows us that concentration is never “lost”—although it can be diverted to targets (whether in the external world or inside our heads) that are irrelevant to the task at hand. Research on attentional processes in sport and performance has been conducted in cognitive psychology (the study of how the mind works), cognitive sport psychology (the study of mental processes in athletes), and cognitive neuroscience (the study of how brain systems give rise to mental processes). From this research, advances have been made both in measuring attentional processes and in understanding their significance in sport and performance settings. For example, pupillometry, or the study of changes in pupil diameter as a function of cognitive processing, has been used as an objective index of attentional effort among skilled performers such as musicians and equestrian athletes. Next, research suggests that a heightened state of concentration (i.e., total absorption in the task at hand) is crucial to the genesis of “flow” states (i.e., rare and elusive moments when everything seems to come together for the performer) and optimal performance in athletes. More recently, studies have shown that brief mindfulness intervention programs, where people are trained to attend non-judgmentally to their own thoughts, feelings, and sensations, offer promise in the quest to enhance attentional skills in elite athletes. By contrast, anxiety has been shown to divert skilled performers’ attention to task-irrelevant information—sometimes triggering “choking” behavior or the sudden and significant deterioration of skilled performance. Finally, concentration strategies such as “trigger words” (i.e., the use of short, vivid, and positively phrased verbal reminders such as “this ball now”) are known to improve athletes’ ability to focus on a specific target or to execute skilled actions successfully.

A number of influential theories of skill acquisition posit that the performing body is an absent presence during “habitualized” action. The current article counters this claim by drawing on a wide range of empirical and phenomenological evidence to argue that the body is never forgotten during skilled movement. We draw on Colombetti’s (2011) taxonomy of the bodily self to show how skilled performers may experience either a reflective or prereflective mode of bodily awareness depending on the foci of attention adopted during online skill execution. We argue that it is the dynamic interplay of these latter forms of bodily awareness that facilitates optimal performance and allows skilled performers to confront the challenges (e.g., injury, performance slumps) that are a ubiquitous feature of competitive environments.

Classical theories of skill acquisition propose that automatization (i.e., performance requires progressively less attention as experience is acquired) is a defining characteristic of expertise in a variety of domains (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967 ). Automaticity is believed to enhance smooth and efficient skill execution by allowing performers to focus on strategic elements of performance rather than on the mechanical details that govern task implementation ( Williams & Ford, 2008 ). By contrast, conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one's action during motor execution) has been found to disrupt skilled movement and performance proficiency (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001 ). On the basis of this evidence, researchers have tended to extol the virtues of automaticity. However, few researchers have considered the wide range of empirical evidence which indicates that highly automated behaviors can, on occasion, lead to a series of errors that may prove deleterious to skilled performance. Therefore, the purpose of the current paper is to highlight the perils, rather than the virtues, of automaticity. We draw on Reason's (1990) classification scheme of everyday errors to show how an overreliance on automated procedures may lead to 3 specific performance errors (i.e., mistakes, slips, and lapses) in a variety of skill domains (e.g., sport, dance, music). We conclude by arguing that skilled performance requires the dynamic interplay of automatic processing and conscious processing in order to avoid performance errors and to meet the contextually contingent demands that characterize competitive environments in a range of skill domains.

Understanding the neurological changes that take place as expertise develops is a central topic in both cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Here, we argue that video games, despite previous misconceptions, are an excellent model environment from which one can examine the development of neurocognitive expertise. Of particular relevance we argue is the area of esports, which encompass video/computer games played within the medium of cyberspace competitively and increasingly professionally. The massive scale of participation, controlled environments, structured skill ratings, pervasive social nature, and large repositories of data, together make esports potentially a very fruitful area for scientific research to increase our understanding of a new era of cognitive athletes. This chapter reviews the progress and prospects for esports research with a particular focus on the effects of gaming on neurocognition. We also outline some exciting new avenues and techniques from which we hope to further elucidate the benefits of esports on the brain.

Motor imagery has been central to adzvances in sport performance and rehabilitation. Neuroscience has provided techniques for measurement which have aided our understanding, conceptualization and theorizing. Challenges remain in the appropriate measurement of motor imagery. Motor imagery continues to provide an impetus for new findings relating to our emotional network, embodied cognition, inhibitory processes and action representation. New directions are proposed which include exploring the physical setting and conditions in which imagery occurs and investigating if short term impairments to the motor system detract from motor imagery ability and the potential application of motor imagery for recovery.

Objectives: There has been considerable inconsistency and confusion in the definition of elite/expert athletes in sport psychology research, which has implications for studies conducted in this area and for the field as a whole. This study aimed to: (i) critically evaluate the ways in which recent research in sport psychology has defined elite/expert athletes; (ii) explore the rationale for using such athletes; and (iii) evaluate the conclusions that research in this field draws about the nature of expertise. Design: Conventional systematic review principles were employed to conduct a rigorous search and synthesise findings. Methods: A comprehensive literature search of SPORTDiscus, PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES and Academic Search Complete was completed in September, 2013 which yielded 91 empirical studies published between 2010 and 2013. The primarily qualitative findings were analysed thematically. Results: Eight ways of defining elite/expert athletes were identified, ranging from Olympic champions to regional level competitors and those with as little as two years of experience in their sport. Three types of rationale were evident in these studies (i.e., 'necessity', 'exploratory' and 'superior'); while findings also indicated that some elite athletes are psychologically idiosyncratic and perhaps even dysfunctional in their behaviour. Finally, only 19 of the 91 included studies provided conclusions about the nature of expertise in sport. Conclusions: This study suggests that the definitions of elite athletes vary on a continuum of validity, and the findings are translated into a taxonomy for classifying expert samples in sport psychology research in future. Recommendations are provided for researchers in this area. Author has checked copyright

Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) influential phenomenological analysis of skill acquisition proposes that expert performance is guided by non-cognitive responses which are fast, effortless and apparently intuitive in nature. Although this model has been criticised (e.g., by Breivik Journal of Philosophy of Sport, 34, 116–134 2007, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 40, 85–106 2013; Eriksen 2010; Montero Inquiry: An interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 53, 105–122 2010; Montero and Evans 2011) for over-emphasising the role that intuition plays in facilitating skilled performance, it does recognise that on occasions (e.g., when performance goes awry for some reason) a form of ‘detached deliberative rationality’ may be used by experts to improve their performance. However, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) see no role for calculative problem solving or deliberation (i.e., drawing on rules or mental representations) when performance is going well. In the current paper, we draw on empirical evidence, insights from athletes, and phenomenological description to argue that ‘continuous improvement’ (i.e., the phenomenon whereby certain skilled performers appear to be capable of increasing their proficiency even though they are already experts; Toner and Moran 2014) among experts is mediated by cognitive (or executive) control in three distinct sporting situations (i.e., in training, during pre-performance routines, and while engaged in on-line skill execution). We conclude by arguing that Sutton et al. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42, 78–103 (2011) ‘applying intelligence to the reflexes’ (AIR) approach may help to elucidate the process by which expert performers achieve continuous improvement through analytical/mindful behaviour during training and competition.

Motor simulation theory (MST; Jeannerod, 2001) purports to explain how various action-related cognitive states relate to actual motor execution. Specifically, it proposes that motor imagery (MI; imagining an action without executing the movements involved) shares certain mental representations and mechanisms with action execution, and hence, activates similar neural pathways to those elicited during the latter process. Furthermore, MST postulates that MI works by rehearsing neural motor systems off-line via a hypothetical simulation process. In this paper, we review evidence cited in support of MST and evaluate its efficacy in understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying MI. In doing so, we delineate the precise postulates of simulation theory and clarify relevant terminology. Based on our cognitive-level analysis, we argue firstly that the psychological mechanisms underlying MI are poorly understood and require additional conceptual and empirical analysis. In addition, we identify a number of potentially fruitful lines of inquiry for future investigators of MST and MI.

Sport science is a relatively recent domain of research born from the interactions of different disciplines related to sport. According to the European College of sport science ( http://sport-science.org ): "scientific excellence in sport science is based on disciplinary competence embedded in the understanding that its essence lies in its multi- and interdisciplinary character". In this respect, the scientific domain of neuroscience has been developed within such a framework. Influenced by the apparent homogeneity of this scientific domain, the present paper reviews three important research topics in sport from a neuroscientific perspective. These topics concern the relationship between mind and motor action, the effects of cognition on motor performance, and the study of certain mental states (such as the "flow" effect, see below) and motor control issues to understand, for example, the neural substrates of the vertical squat jump. Based on the few extensive examples shown in this review, we argue that by adopting an interdisciplinary paradigm, sport science can emulate neuroscience in becoming a mono-discipline.

“Flow” is a highly coveted yet elusive state of mind that is characterized by complete absorption in the task at hand as well as by enhanced skilled performance. Unfortunately, because most measures of this construct have been developed in physical activity and sport settings, little is known about the applicability of flow scales to the experiences of performers in other domains such as music. To fill this gap in the research literature, the present study had two objectives. First, we investigated the psychometric adequacy of the Dispositional Flow Scale–2 (DFS-2) for a large sample ( n = 205) of musicians. In addition, we examined the experience of flow among amateur and elite music students. Results indicated that the DFS-2 is a generally reliable and factorially-sound measure of flow and that flow states are experienced quite frequently by music students. Nevertheless, the results also raise questions about the validity of certain subscales of this test (e.g., merging of action and awareness, loss of self-consciousness). The theoretical and practical significance of these findings is discussed and suggestions are provided for future research on flow.

One of the most remarkable capacities of the mind is its ability to simulate sensations, actions, and other types of experience. A mental simulation process that has attracted recent attention from cognitive neuroscientists and sport psychologists is motor imagery or the mental rehearsal of actions without engaging in the actual physical movements involved. Research on motor imagery is important in psychology because it provides an empirical window on consciousness and movement planning, rectifies a relative neglect of non-visual types of mental imagery, and has practical implications for skill learning and skilled performance in special populations (e.g., athletes, surgeons). Unfortunately, contemporary research on motor imagery is hampered by a variety of semantic, conceptual, and methodological issues that prevent cross-fertilization of ideas between cognitive neuroscience and sport psychology. In this paper, we review these issues, suggest how they can be resolved, and sketch some potentially fruitful new directions for inter-disciplinary research in motor imagery.

The purpose of this study was to provide an ecologically valid account of the experiences of ‘admitted dopers’. In-depth interviews were conducted with five elite athletes from the sports of road cycling, mountain biking and weightlifting. The athletes had either tested positive for banned substances or had admitted to prior drug use after their retirement from competitive sport. Thematic analysis was used to extract meaning from the interview data. Individual psychological factors and contextual influences on the athletes' doping decisions were identified. The conflicting responses of these athletes make the identification of a psychological profile of athletes most at-risk for doping difficult, but morality was consistently cited as an important consideration. The culture of the athletes' team or training group and ‘critical incidents’ during the athletes' careers were often influential in precipitating drug use. Doping deterrents were also discussed, of which guilt and shame were predominant. The athle...

Researchers have suggested that skill performance deteriorates when people try to exert conscious control over automatic actions. Unfortunately, little is known about the effects of different types of conscious processing on skilled performance by expert athletes. We conducted two experiments to address this issue. Experiment 1 investigated the influence of a specific form of conscious control (making technical adjustments to a stroke) on the putting skills of expert golfers. The expert golfers maintained putting proficiency (i.e. number of putts holed) when making technical adjustments. However, this form of conscious processing altered the timing and consistency of golfers' putting strokes. Experiment 2 compared the influence of technical adjustments and conscious monitoring (paying attention to the execution of the stroke) on expert golfers' putting skills. Technical adjustments had no disruptive influence on expert golfers' putting proficiency but did reduce the consistency of their strokes. However, conscious monitoring was found to impair putting proficiency. The implications of the work for theory and future work are discussed.

Problem There has been a recent upsurge of research interest in cognitive sport psychology or the scientific study of mental processes (e.g., mental imagery) in athletes. Despite this interest, an important question has been neglected. Specifically, is research on cognitive processes in athletes influential outside sport psychology, in the “parent” field of cognitive psychology or in the newer discipline of cognitive neuroscience? Objectives The purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical significance of research on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes from the perspective of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Method Following analysis of recent paradigm shifts in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, a narrative review is provided of key studies on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes. Results and conclusions This paper shows that cognitive sport psychology has contributed significantly to theoretical understanding of certain mental processes studied in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It also shows that neuroscientific research on motor imagery can benefit from increased collaboration with cognitive sport psychology. Overall, I conclude that the domain of sport offers cognitive researchers a rich and dynamic natural laboratory in which to study how the mind works.

This study investigated the factors perceived by 191 international athletes to have either facilitated or inhibited their development and success. Using Carlson’s (1993) framework as a reference point, the athlete’s ‘microsystem’ (i.e., supportive roles, activities and interpersonal relationships) was the site of the strongest positive factors in the eyes of these elite performers. These microsystem factors included family, friends and coaches. Consistent with Carlson’s ecological perspective, the personal attributes of the athletes were perceived to be central to maximizing their talent and responding to their environment and circumstances. A key implication of these findings is that if success is to be achieved, athletes require strong personal motivation and a supportive microsystem, particularly in the early and middle stages of development. As the athlete progresses, the need for wider, system-based support becomes apparent so that the sporting, financial and personal challenges associated w...

A new perspective on mental control is proposed that conceptually links conscious and automatic processes through a complementary postconscious activity that is rooted in the cognitive mechanism of priming. It is argued that the alterable structure of underlying mental representations connects these processes to produce a level of intentional regulation that would normally prove beneficial but in a few rare cases could prove detrimental. This hypothetical process is reflected in our empirical knowledge of mental control and related phenomena such as prospective memory. The new perspective maintains the traditional models' structure of conscious and automatic processing but, in an effort to expand our knowledge in the field, it redefines the relationship between these two processes so that it fits into a more accountable theoretical framework.

Creatine is a nutritional supplement that is commonly, if controversially, used as an ergogenic aid in sport. The aim of the present study was to examine the prevalence, use and knowledge of this substance among a sample of elite Gaelic football, rugby, and soccer players in Ireland. 460 male athletes completed an anonymous self-report questionnaire that examined their use and knowledge of creatine. Overall, 18.9% of the sample (n = 87) had not heard of creatine, 56.7% (n = 261) reported that they had heard of it but had never used it, a further 16.3% (n = 75) had used creatine in the past but were no longer doing so and 5.2% (n = 24) were currently using it. Further analysis showed some differences in patterns of use among those who had heard of creatine. In general, although there were more users at adult level than at school level, there was no difference in percentage of users across sport types. However, when school and adult players were examined separately, there were significantly more users in rugby at the adult level. The data indicate a higher awareness of this substance among adult rugby players than among players of other sports tested in the sample.

The seminal work of Kazdin (1982) and Barlow and Hersen (1984) into single-case research has prompted many repeated calls for sport psychologists to adopt these methods into their research and prac...

One of our most remarkable mental capacities is the ability to use our imagination voluntarily to mimic or simulate sensations, actions, and other experiences. For example, we can “see” things in our mind’s eye, “hear” sounds in our mind’s ear, and imagine motor experiences like running away from, or perhaps “freezing” in the face of, danger. Since the early 1900s (1), researchers have investigated “mental imagery” or the multimodal cognitive simulation process by which we represent perceptual information in our minds in the absence of sensory input (2). Although visual imagery has attracted most research attention to date (3), there has been an upsurge of interest in cognitive neuroscience and sport psychology in non-visual simulation processes such as “motor imagery” (MI) - or the mental rehearsal of actions without engaging in the physical movements involved (4). This trend is attributable mainly to the discovery of close parallels between the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying imagination and motor control. Specifically, inspired by Jeannerod’s (5–7) simulation theory of action representation, researchers have discovered that MI recruits similar neural pathways and mechanisms to those involved in actual movements. For example, Hetu et al. (8) showed that the neural network of MI includes several cortical regions known to underlie actual motor execution. Building on this apparent functional equivalence between imagined and executed actions, the present article explores the implications of research on MI for increased understanding of three clinical conditions – post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), personality disorder, and social anxiety disorder (SAD). Before we begin, however, some background information on imagery processes in psychopathology is required. Arising from Kosslyn’s proposition that mental imagery plays “a special role in representing emotionally charged material” [(9), p. 405; see also Ref. (10)], researchers have examined the role of imagery processes in the onset, maintenance, and treatment of various psychological disorders (11–13). A consistent finding is that negative, vivid, and distressing involuntary (“intrusive”) imagery is a “transdiagnostic” feature of depression (14), SAD (15), PTSD (16), and obsessive-compulsive disorder [OCD; (17)]. For example, Weslau and Steil (14) reported that more than one in three depressed people suffer from involuntary negative mental imagery. Furthermore, people’s capacity to use imagery prospectively is significantly impaired in certain clinical disorders. Thus, Morina et al. (18) discovered that depressed patients were less capable of imagining positive future outcomes than were non-depressed controls. Imagery processes also help in the treatment of psychopathology. Indeed, Holmes et al. (19) evaluated the therapeutic value of “imagery rescripting” [where distressing images are modified to change their associated thoughts, feelings, and behavior; (20)] in the treatment of PTSD. Clearly, imagery research represents “a new and important arena” [Pearson et al. (13), p. 3] for clinical psychology. Despite increased awareness of imagery processes in psychopathology, there is at least one significant gap in research in this field. Specifically, little is known about the role of MI in clinical disorders. Curiously, despite the multimodal nature of imagery (21), clinical researchers have tended to focus mainly on its visual component. Thus, Weslau and Steil (14) proclaimed that in imagery, although “other sensory components such as smells, sounds, or haptic sensations … may be present … the visual aspect is the necessary and sufficient condition” (our italics, p. 274). This proposition may be challenged, however, by evidence that mildly to moderately depressed patients experience proportionately more somatic (39.6%) than visual (27.2%) imagery (17). More importantly, MI processes may help to elucidate the mechanisms underlying clinical conditions with distinctive motor components. For example, Chen et al. (22) discovered that depressed patients have difficulties in the mental rotation of hand stimuli. These imagery deficits reflect “an underlying slowing down of motor preparation, which may contribute to psychomotor retardation” (p. 341). Let us now consider three specific disorders in which MI processes are potentially significant - PTSD, personality disorders, and SAD.

Motor imagery, or the mental rehearsal of actions in the absence of physical movement, is an increasingly popular construct in fields such as neuroscience, cognitive psychology and sport psychology. Unfortunately, few models of motor imagery have been postulated to date. Nevertheless, based on the hypothesis of functional equivalence between imagery, perception and motor execution, Holmes and Collins in 2001 developed the PETTLEP model of motor imagery in an effort to provide evidence-based guidelines for imagery practice in sport psychology. Given recent advances in theoretical understanding of functional equivalence, however, it is important to provide a contemporary critical reflection on motor imagery research conducted using this model. The present article addresses this objective. We begin by explaining the background to the development of the PETTLEP model. Next, we evaluate key issues and findings in PETTLEP-inspired research. Finally, we offer suggestions for, and new directions in, research in this field. Author has checked copyright kpw13/5/13

This study investigated the relationship of controllability of mental imagery with canoe-slalom performance. Controllability of mental imagery was assessed by an objective test of mental rotation, the Mental Rotations Test. This test was administered to both elite ( n = 19) and intermediate ( n = 12) athletes. Predictive validity of the controllability test was supported by a significant correlation between test scores and race rank order for the elite canoeing group ( rs = 0.42, p29 = 0.98, p>.05). Researchers should attempt to evaluate vividness of imagery, controllability of imagery, and accuracy of reference to understand more fully the nature of athletes' imagery.

For over a century, psychologists have investigated the mental processes of expert performers - people who display exceptional knowledge and/or skills in specific fields of human achievement. Since the 1960s, expertise researchers have made considerable progress in understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie such exceptional performance. Whereas the first modern studies of expertise were conducted in relatively formal knowledge domains such as chess, more recent investigations have explored elite performance in dynamic perceptual-motor activities such as sport. Unfortunately, although these studies have led to the identification of certain domain-free generalizations about expert-novice differences, they shed little light on an important issue: namely, experts’ metacognitive activities or their insights into, and regulation of, their own mental processes. In an effort to rectify this oversight, the present paper argues that metacognitive processes and inferences play an important if neglected role in expertise. In particular, we suggest that metacognition (including such processes as ‘meta-attention’, ‘meta-imagery’ and ‘meta-memory’, as well as social aspects of this construct) provides a window on the genesis of expert performance. Following a critique of the standard empirical approach to expertise, we explore some research on ‘metacognition’ and ‘metacognitive inference’ among experts in sport. After that, we provide a brief evaluation of the relationship between psychological skills training and metacognition and comment on the measurement of metacognitive processes. Finally, we summarize our conclusions and outline some potentially new directions for research on metacognition in action.

A key postulate of traditional theories of motor skill-learning (e.g., Fitts and Posner, 1967; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) is that expert performance is largely automatic in nature and tends to deteriorate when the performer 'reinvests' in, or attempts to exert conscious control over, proceduralized movements (Masters and Maxwell, 2008). This postulate is challenged, however, by recent empirical evidence (e.g., Nyberg, in press; Geeves et al., 2014) which shows that conscious cognitive activity plays a key role in facilitating further improvement amongst expert sports performers and musicians – people who have already achieved elite status (Toner and Moran, in press). This evidence suggests that expert performers in motor domains (e.g., sport, music) can strategically deploy conscious attention to alternate between different modes of bodily awareness (reflective and pre-reflective) during performance. Extrapolating from this phenomenon, the current paper considers how a novel theoretical approach (adapted from Sutton et al., 2011) could help researchers to elucidate some of the cognitive mechanisms mediating continuous improvement amongst expert performers. Author has checked copyright

According to the theory of working memory, the “phonological loop” is a slave system that stores a limited number of sounds for a short period of time. The question of how this system works for deaf people reading a logographic script, kanji, was investigated. We measured the memory span of a sample of Japanese hearing and deaf participants. Hearing subjects were tested in Japanese and deaf subjects in sign language. Memory span was assessed in control and articulatory suppression conditions. In the control condition, subjects were required to recall various item sequences as quickly and accurately as possible. In the articulatory suppression condition, the hearing subjects articulated the phrase no-no, and the deaf subjects expressed a pseudosign, while viewing the stimuli. Results showed that the memory span of the deaf for Japanese kanji was similar to that of their hearing peers. This finding conflicts with previous research which suggested that for users of English, the deaf display consistently shorter memory spans than do their hearing counterparts. In addition, we discovered that in contrast to their hearing colleagues, the deaf Japanese subjects were relatively immune to expected articulatory suppression effects. This finding raises the possibility that working memory coding processes are not universal.