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Does stepping back to evaluate a situation from a distanced perspective lead us to be selfish or fair? This question has been of philosophical interest for centuries, and, more recently, the focus of extensive empirical inquiry. Yet, extant research reveals a puzzle: some studies suggest that adopting a distanced perspective will produce more rationally self-interested behavior, whereas others suggest that it will produce more impartial behavior. Here we adjudicate between these perspectives by testing the effects of adopting a third-person perspective on decision making in a task that pits rational self-interest against impartiality: the dictator game. Aggregating across three experiments (N = 774), participants who used third-person (i.e., distanced) vs. first-person (i.e., immersed) self-talk during the dictator game kept more money for themselves. We discuss these results in light of prior research showing that psychological distance can promote cooperation and fairmindedness and how the effect of psychological distance on moral decision-making may be sensitive to social context., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Previous research suggests that people show increased self-referential processing when they provide criticism to others, and that this self-referential processing can have negative effects on interpersonal perceptions and behavior. The current research hypothesized that adopting a self-distanced perspective (i.e. thinking about a situation from a non-first person point of view), as compared with a typical self-immersed perspective (i.e. thinking about a situation from a first-person point of view), would reduce self-referential processing during the provision of criticism, and in turn improve interpersonal perceptions and behavior. We tested this hypothesis in an interracial context since research suggests that self-referential processing plays a role in damaging interracial relations. White participants prepared for mentorship from a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective. They then conveyed negative and positive evaluations to a Black mentee while electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. Source analysis revealed that priming a self-distanced (vs self-immersed) perspective predicted decreased activity in regions linked to self-referential processing (medial prefrontal cortex; MPFC) when providing negative evaluations. This decreased MPFC activity during negative evaluations, in turn, predicted verbal feedback that was perceived to be more positive, warm and helpful. Results suggest that self-distancing can improve interpersonal perceptions and behavior by decreasing self-referential processing during the provision of criticism., (© The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Placebo treatments can strongly affect clinical outcomes, but research on how they shape other life experiences and emotional well-being is in its infancy. We used fMRI in humans to examine placebo effects on a particularly impactful life experience, social pain elicited by a recent romantic rejection. We compared these effects with placebo effects on physical (heat) pain, which are thought to depend on pathways connecting prefrontal cortex and periaqueductal gray (PAG). Placebo treatment, compared with control, reduced both social and physical pain, and increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) in both modalities. Placebo further altered the relationship between affect and both dlPFC and PAG activity during social pain, and effects on behavior were mediated by a pathway connecting dlPFC to the PAG, building on recent work implicating opioidergic PAG activity in the regulation of social pain. These findings suggest that placebo treatments reduce emotional distress by altering affective representations in frontal-brainstem systems. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Placebo effects are improvements due to expectations and the socio-medical context in which treatment takes place. Whereas they have been extensively studied in the context of somatic conditions such as pain, much less is known of how treatment expectations shape the emotional experience of other important stressors and life events. Here, we use brain imaging to show that placebo treatment reduces the painful feelings associated with a recent romantic rejection by recruiting a prefrontal-brainstem network and by shifting the relationship between brain activity and affect. Our findings suggest that this brain network may be important for nonspecific treatment effects across a wide range of therapeutic approaches and mental health conditions., (Copyright © 2017 the authors 0270-6474/17/373621-11$15.00/0.)

Current theories suggest that physical pain and social rejection share common neural mechanisms, largely by virtue of overlapping functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity. Here we challenge this notion by identifying distinct multivariate fMRI patterns unique to pain and rejection. Sixty participants experience painful heat and warmth and view photos of ex-partners and friends on separate trials. FMRI pattern classifiers discriminate pain and rejection from their respective control conditions in out-of-sample individuals with 92% and 80% accuracy. The rejection classifier performs at chance on pain, and vice versa. Pain- and rejection-related representations are uncorrelated within regions thought to encode pain affect (for example, dorsal anterior cingulate) and show distinct functional connectivity with other regions in a separate resting-state data set (N = 91). These findings demonstrate that separate representations underlie pain and rejection despite common fMRI activity at the gross anatomical level. Rather than co-opting pain circuitry, rejection involves distinct affective representations in humans.

Are people wiser when reflecting on other people's problems compared with their own? If so, does self-distancing eliminate this asymmetry in wise reasoning? In three experiments (N = 693), participants displayed wiser reasoning (i.e., recognizing the limits of their knowledge and the importance of compromise and future change, considering other people's perspectives) about another person's problems compared with their own. Across Studies 2 and 3, instructing individuals to self-distance (rather than self-immerse) eliminated this asymmetry. Study 3 demonstrated that each of these effects was comparable for younger (20-40 years) and older (60-80 years) adults. Thus, contrary to the adage "with age comes wisdom," our findings suggest that there are no age differences in wise reasoning about personal conflicts, and that the effects of self-distancing generalize across age cohorts. These findings highlight the role that self-distancing plays in allowing people to overcome a pervasive asymmetry that characterizes wise reasoning., (© The Author(s) 2014.)

Although recent experimental work indicates that self-distancing facilitates adaptive self-reflection, it remains unclear (a) whether spontaneous self-distancing leads to similar adaptive outcomes, (b) how spontaneous self-distancing relates to avoidance, and (c) how this strategy impacts interpersonal behavior. Three studies examined these issues demonstrating that the more participants spontaneously self-distanced while reflecting on negative memories, the less emotional (Studies 1-3) and cardiovascular (Study 2) reactivity they displayed in the short term. Spontaneous self-distancing was also associated with lower emotional reactivity and intrusive ideation over time (Study 1). The negative association between spontaneous self-distancing and emotional reactivity was mediated by how participants construed their experience (i.e., less recounting relative to reconstruing) rather than avoidance (Studies 1-2). In addition, spontaneous self-distancing was associated with more problem-solving behavior and less reciprocation of negativity during conflicts among couples in ongoing relationships (Study 3). Although spontaneous self-distancing was empirically related to trait rumination, it explained unique variance in predicting key outcomes., (2010 APA, all rights reserved)

Background During the fall of 2014, the threat of an Ebola outbreak gripped the United States (Poll, 8-12 October 2014; see Harvard School of Public Health & SSRS, 2014), creating a unique opportunity to advance basic knowledge concerning how emotion regulation works in consequential contexts and translate existing research in this area to inform public health and policy. Method We addressed these issues by examining whether third-person self-talk, a simple technique that promotes emotion regulation, could nudge people into reasoning about Ebola more rationally. In all, 1,257 people from across the United States were asked to write about their feelings about Ebola using their name or I (i.e. third-person self-talk vs. first-person self-talk) as concerns about Ebola swelled (24 October 2014-26 October 2014). Results Third-person self-talk led participants who scored high on Ebola worry at baseline to generate more fact-based reasons not to worry about Ebola, which predicted reductions in their Ebola worry and risk perception. These findings held when controlling for several theoretically relevant covariates, highlighting their robustness. Conclusion These results demonstrate how a simple linguistic technique can enhance rational thinking and quell worry about a pressing public health threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although analyzing negative experiences leads to physical and mental health benefits among healthy populations, when people with depression engage in this process on their own they often ruminate and feel worse. Here we examine whether it is possible for adults with depression to analyze their feelings adaptively if they adopt a self-distanced perspective. We examined this issue by randomly assigning depressed and nondepressed adults to analyze their feelings surrounding a depressing life experience from either a self-distanced or a self-immersed perspective and then examined the implications of these manipulations for depressotypic thought accessibility, negative affect, implicit and explicit avoidance, and thought content. Four key results emerged. First, all participants were capable of self-distancing while analyzing their feelings. Second, participants who analyzed their feelings from a self-distanced perspective showed lower levels of depressotypic thought accessibility and negative affect compared to their self-immersed counterparts. Third, analyzing negative feelings from a self-distanced perspective led to an adaptive shift in the way people construed their experience--they recounted the emotionally arousing details of their experience less and reconstrued them in ways that promoted insight and closure. It did not promote avoidance. Finally, self-distancing did not influence negative affect or depressotypic thought accessibility among nondepressed participants. These findings suggest that whether depressed adults' attempts to analyze negative feelings lead to adaptive or maladaptive consequences may depend critically on whether they do so from a self-immersed or a self-distanced perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although recent findings indicate that people can reflect either adaptively or maladaptively over negative experiences, extant research has not examined how culture influences this process. We compared the self-reflective practices of Russians (members of an interdependent culture characterized by a tendency to brood) and Americans (members of an independent culture in which self-reflection has been studied extensively). We predicted that self-reflection would be associated with less-detrimental outcomes among Russians because they self-distance more when analyzing their feelings than Americans do. Findings from two studies supported these predictions. In Study 1, self-reflection was associated with fewer depressive symptoms among Russians than among Americans. In Study 2, Russians displayed less distress and a more adaptive pattern of construals than Americans after reflecting over a recent negative event. In addition, they self-distanced more than Americans while analyzing their feelings, and self-distancing mediated the cultural differences in self-reflection. These findings demonstrate how culture shapes the way people reflect over negative experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: Recent findings indicate that a critical factor determining whether people’s attempts to adaptively analyze negative experiences succeed or fail is the type of self-perspective (self-immersed vs. self-distanced) they adopt while analyzing negative feelings. The present research examined whether these findings generalize to individuals displaying high levels of depression symptoms who are particularly vulnerable to rumination. Findings revealed that the effectiveness of self-distancing for attenuating emotional reactivity increased linearly with depression symptoms. Moreover, mediation analysis revealed that participants tendency to recount vs. reconstrue their experience accounted for the regulatory effects of self-distancing on emotional reactivity regardless of depression symptoms. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

How can people adaptively analyze and “work through” negative feelings without ruminating? This paper will briefly review findings from an integrative program of research, which suggests that a critical factor determining whether people's attempts to adaptively reason about negative experiences succeed or fail is the type of self-perspective they adopt. That is, whether people analyze their feelings from a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective. The implications of shifting self-perspectives for subjective experience, autonomic nervous system reactivity, and neural activity are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Wimalaweera and Moulds [Wimalaweera, S. W., & Moulds, M. L. (2008). Processing memories of anger-eliciting events: the effect of asking ‘why’ from a distance. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 402–409] reported a failure to replicate previous findings demonstrating the effectiveness of analyzing anger-related experiences from a self-distanced perspective for reducing negative affect in the short-term (Ayduk, O., & Kross, E. (2008). [Enhancing the pace of recovery: self-distanced-analysis of negative experiences reduces blood pressure reactivity. Psychological Science, 9(3), 229–231; Kross, E., Ayduk, O., & Mischel, W. (2005). When asking “why” does not hurt. Psychological Science, 16, 709–715.] and facilitating adaptive emotional processing over time [Kross, E., & Ayduk, O. (2008). Facilitating adaptive emotional analysis: distinguishing distanced-analysis of depressive experiences from immersed-analysis and distraction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin]. A reanalysis of their data that takes into account effect sizes and participants'' scores on the avoidance subscale of the Impact of Events Scale, which were not reported in the original write-up, contradict this and a number of other conclusions reported in their article. In this article, we review the key findings that emerged from this reanalysis. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Two studies examined the psychological processes that facilitate adaptive emotional analysis. In Study 1, participants recalled a depression experience and then analyzed their feelings from either a self-immersed (immersed-analysis) or self-distanced (distanced-analysis) perspective. Participants in the distanced-analysis group focused less on recounting their experience and more on reconstruing it, which in turn led to lower levels of depressed affect. Furthermore, comparisons to a distraction group indicated that distanced-analysis was as effective as distraction in reducing depressed affect relative to the immersed-analysis group. Study 2 replicated these findings and showed that both 1 day and 7 days after the experimental manipulations, participants in the distanced-analysis group remained buffered against depressed affect and reported experiencing fewer recurring thoughts about their depression experience over time compared to both the immersed-analysis and distraction groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Converging evidence indicates that distanced self-talk (i.e., using one's own name and other non-first person pronouns to refer to the self) promotes self-control and wise reasoning. However, no research has examined how this process affects how people conceptualize the self. We addressed this issue across two experiments. In Study 1, participants who were randomly assigned to describe themselves using their own name (vs. I) used more abstract descriptors and talked less about their social identities. Study 2 directly replicated these effects in a high-powered pre-registered experiment. It also demonstrated that using one's name to think about the self led to greater shifts in self-concept than those associated with thinking about other people (i.e., a "socially distant" target). Together, these finding demonstrate how subtle shifts in language that promote psychological distance influence the way people cognitively represent the self. They also highlight the need for future research to distinguish between self- and social distance. • Results demonstrate how distanced self-talk influences people's self-concept. • Distanced self-talk increased accessibility of abstract features of self-concept. • Distanced self-talk decreased accessibility of social identities. • Self-distanced descriptions of self were more abstract than those of others. • Self-distanced descriptions of self had fewer social identities than those of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research indicates that psychological distance facilitates emotion regulation. Here, we propose that the ability to transcend one's immersed perspective may be hidden in plain sight, within the very structure of language. We review evidence regarding two linguistic mechanisms, distanced self-talk and generic "you," that promote emotion regulation by allowing speakers to shift from an immersed to a more distanced perspective through the words they use to reflect on the self (e.g., shifting from "I" to their own name or other non-first-person-singular pronouns). We conclude by suggesting that these linguistic shifts occur relatively seamlessly and thus may provide a less effortful route to emotion regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]