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In all of these examples of genocides, it becomes gradually clear that they are based on scapegoating, on identity needs, on group affiliation, on propaganda, and of course on political and economic grounds. However, those individuals who permit themselves to become co-opted into genocidal acts are those who, in the majority of cases, have felt deep hostility either derived from a childhood experience of being brutally treated, and/or later in life based upon jealousy and envy of some subgroup that the mainstream or those in power find it easy to attack. Thus, genocides can be classified generally into two distinct categories. The first example of a typical genocide is, of course, driven by a so-called madman. Hitler and Stalin are examples. The second type of genocide arises not necessarily with a definite God-head figure leading the way, but rather by committee of “severals”—out of the pervasive tone of the overall society and culture of a particular nation in which a defined subgroup has been designated to be deserving first of ostracism and later of punishment.

In the discussion of evil presented throughout Part 1 of this volume, it becomes evident that “evil” has been considered both as “intent” as well as “action.” Yet, as “intention,” however dastardly its content, such intent still needs to be materialized into action in order for it to be considered as behavior. This sort of behavior is defined as abhorrent, malevolent, vicious, sinful, immoral, iniquitous, and bad—or plainly evil. Therefore, evil is largely identified through the actual behavior of individuals and groups. Apparently, and philosophically speaking, we are what we do, not necessarily what we think.

The human personality relationship with a belief in God is a bifurcated one. On the one hand we find most people who rely on their faith in God as a truth and not as assumption, and on the other hand there are those who rely only on what they consider tangible reality without any belief in a supernatural existence of God whatsoever. Of course there are many in-between shades of faith and/or belief in God, but for all intents and purposes we will consider these two.

Sigmund Freud in his exegesis on religion (1959/1907, 1961/1927) focused mostly on what he considered to be the illusion responsible for religious belief, especially the belief in a super/supra-natural God. He theorized that belief in God was a first step in a general attempt to manage the unfeeling nature of nature, or as Paul Bloom (2005) puts it, “the terrors of nature.” In a specific way, Freud pointed to man’s fate of ultimate death as a particularly onerous contemplation, and posited that religious faith was conceived by man to approach this harsh truth. In essence he saw it as a compensatory balm for this particular anticipatory (and unfair) existential suffering of human-kind.

With the disappearance of the tail in the evolutionary process along with the gradual appearance of greater cortical development, the thinking brain became also an ontological one. That is, Homo sapien of course retained its animal concern with survival but added to its existential awareness, that of an expectation and tension about death. And from this knowledge and expectation of the certainty of one’s ultimate demise was born what became known as “ontological anxiety,” defined as an existential concern regarding one’s “being” (Kellerman, 2009a)—a concept philosophically discussed by Kierkegaard and also psychologically elaborated by Rollo May (1950, 1983).