1. Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to Be Selfish
- Author
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Özgür Evren, Stefania Minardi, Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH), Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and HEC Paris Research Paper Series
- Subjects
jel:D81 ,Ricardian Equivalence ,Warm-Glow ,media_common.quotation_subject ,jel:D64 ,Altruism ,Freedom of Choice ,GeneralLiterature_MISCELLANEOUS ,Microeconomics ,Voting ,Economics ,Altruism, Warm-Glow, Freedom of Choice, Philanthropy, Charitable Giving, Public Goods ,JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D64 - Altruism • Philanthropy ,Public Goods ,Preference (economics) ,Axiom ,Voter Turnout ,media_common ,Freedom of choice ,jel:D11 ,JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ,Public good ,Crowding out ,Motivation Crowding Out ,Philanthropy ,Prosocial behavior ,[SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration ,JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory - Abstract
Warm-glow refers to other-serving behavior that is valuable for the actor per se, apart from its social implications. We provide axiomatic foundations for warm-glow by viewing it as a form of preference for larger choice sets driven by one's desire for freedom to act selfishly. Specifically, an individual who experiences warm-glow values the availability of selfish options even if she plans to act unselfishly. Our theory accommodates the empirical findings on motivation crowding out and provides clear-cut predictions for empirically distinguishing between warm-glow and other motivations for prosocial behavior, a task of obvious importance for policy. The choice behavior implied by our theory subsumes Riker and Ordeshook (1968) on voting and Andreoni (1989, 1990) on the provision of public goods.
- Published
- 2013