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Background: Tinkering, an ad hoc approach to solving a problem, involves manipulating objects to characterize and build knowledge about a particular system in an exploratory way, often with the goal of getting some product/idea to produce desired behavior. Tinkering contrasts more deliberate activity toward understanding how a phenomenon works. Purpose: Some researchers have argued that tinkering is an unproductive engineering design practice because it does not always lead to progress in design and/or conceptual learning while others have argued for tinkering as a productive design practice. We speak to this disagreement regarding the productivity of tinkering for novice designers by closely analyzing tinkering episodes. Design/Method: We present a microgenetic account of two tinkering episodes to contribute to a more refined understanding of what tinkering is. The research setting is in a summer camp for high school girls using a design-based Arduino component. Results: Our analyses demonstrate that tinkering is neither universally productive nor unproductive in engineering design; we show that tinkering can help participants make progress toward some instructional goals such as supporting the engagement of students in some engineering design practices. We also show that tinkering can hinder progress toward other goals such as developing a robust solution to a design problem. Conclusions: We argue for a more nuanced understanding of productivity (of tinkering and other design practices), which is local and defined with respect to specific goals and actors.

Professional problem-solving practice in physics and engineering relies on mathematical sense making--reasoning that leverages coherence between formal mathematics and conceptual understanding. A key question for physics education is how well current instructional approaches develop students' mathematical sense making. We introduce an assessment paradigm that operationalizes a typically unmeasured dimension of mathematical sense making: use of calculations on qualitative problems and use of conceptual arguments on quantitative problems. Three assessment items embodying this calculation-concept crossover assessment paradigm illustrate how mathematical sense making can positively benefit students' problem solving, leading to more efficient, insightful, and accurate solutions. These three assessment items were used to evaluate the efficacy of an instructional approach focused on developing students' mathematical sense making skills. In a quasi-experimental study, three parallel lecture sections of first-semester, introductory physics were compared: two mathematical sense making sections, one with an experienced instructor and one with a novice instructor, and a traditionally taught section, as a control group. Compared to the control group, mathematical sense making groups used calculation-concept crossover approaches more often and gave more correct answers on the crossover assessment items, but they did not give more correct answers to associated standard problems. In addition, although students' postcourse epistemological views on problem-solving coherence were associated with their crossover use, they did not fully account for the differences in crossover approach use between the mathematical sense making and control groups. These results demonstrate a new assessment paradigm for detecting a typically unmeasured dimension of mathematical sense making and provide evidence that a targeted instructional approach can enhance engagement with mathematical sense making in introductory physics.

Problem solving in groups can be rich with tension for students. This tension may arise from conflicting approaches (conceptual and/or epistemological) and/or from conflict emerging in the social relations among group members. Drawing on video records of undergraduate students working collaboratively, we use three cases to illustrate the multifaceted ways in which conflict arises--combining conceptual, epistemological, and socioemotional dynamics--and a specific way of managing the tension that can emerge from the multifaceted conflict, "taking an escape hatch." An escape hatch is a set of discourse moves through which participants close the conversational topic, thereby relieving tension, but before a conceptual resolution is achieved. We describe how epistemological twists and turns can be recruited as a means of managing the strong emotions experienced by the students, showing the coupling of emotion and epistemology in students' conceptual sense making during group work. We help to provide the groundwork necessary for instructors to notice, understand, and respond to one way in which conceptual--epistemological--social--emotional aspects of interaction are coupled in the emergence of tension, rather than narrowly targeting instructional moves based on only conceptual or epistemological considerations. Instead, instructors should often respond to--and help students become aware of--the emotional component of peer interactions and its entanglement with the "cold cognitive" conceptual and epistemological components.

Evidence from psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience suggests that cognition and emotions are coupled. Education researchers have also documented correlations between emotions (such as joy, anxiety, fear, curiosity, boredom) and academic performance. Nonetheless, most research on students' reasoning and conceptual change within the learning sciences and physics and science education research has not attended to the role of learners' emotions in describing or modeling the fine timescale dynamics of their conceptual reasoning. The few studies that integrate emotions into models of learners' cognition have mostly done so at a coarse grain size. In this study, toward the long-term goal of incorporating emotions into models of in-the-moment cognitive dynamics, we present a case study of Judy, an undergraduate electrical engineering and physics major. We show that shifts in the intensity of a fine-grained aspect of Judy's emotions, her annoyance at conceptual homework problems, co-occur with shifts in her epistemological stance toward differentiating knowledge about and the practical utility of real circuits and idealized circuit models. We then argue for the plausibility of a cognitive model in which Judy's emotions and epistemological stances mutually affect each other. We end with discussions on how models of learners' cognition that incorporate their emotions are generative for instructional purposes and research on learning.

Mathematical sense-making--looking for coherence between the structure of the mathematical formalism and causal or functional relations in the world--is a core component of physics expertise. Some physics education research studies have explored what mathematical sense-making looks like at the introductory physics level, while some historians and "science studies" have explored how expert physicists engage in it. What is largely missing, with a few exceptions, is theoretical and empirical work at the intermediate level--upper division physics students--especially when they are learning difficult new mathematical formalism. In this paper, we present analysis of a segment of video-recorded discussion between two students grappling with a quantum mechanics question to illustrate what mathematical sense-making can look like in quantum mechanics. We claim that mathematical sense-making is possible and productive for learning and problem solving in quantum mechanics. Mathematical sense-making in quantum mechanics is continuous in many ways with mathematical sense-making in introductory physics. However, in the context of quantum mechanics, the connections between formalism, intuitive conceptual schema, and the physical world become more compound (nested) and indirect. We illustrate these similarities and differences in part by proposing a new symbolic form, "eigenvector eigenvalue," which is composed of multiple primitive symbolic forms.

Much research in engineering and physics education has focused on improving students' problem-solving skills. This research has led to the development of step-by-step problem-solving strategies and grading rubrics to assess a student's expertise in solving problems using these strategies. These rubrics value "communication" between the student's qualitative description of the physical situation and the student's formal mathematical descriptions (usually equations) at two points: when initially setting up the equations, and when evaluating the final mathematical answer for meaning and plausibility. We argue that (i) neither the rubrics nor the associated problem-solving strategies explicitly value this kind of communication "during" mathematical manipulations of the chosen equations, and (ii) such communication is an aspect of problem-solving expertise. To make this argument, we present a case study of two students, Alex and Pat, solving the same kinematics problem in clinical interviews. We argue that Pat's solution, which connects manipulation of equations to their physical interpretation, is more expert-like than Alex's solution, which uses equations more algorithmically. We then show that the types of problem-solving rubrics currently available do not discriminate between these two types of solutions. We conclude that problem-solving rubrics should be revised or repurposed to more accurately assess problem-solving expertise. (Contains 2 tables, 1 figure and 4 footnotes.)

Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students' difficulties with mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology. Students' beliefs about knowledge and learning can hinder the activation and integration of productive knowledge they have. Such explanations, however, risk falling into a "deficit trap"--substituting a concepts/skills deficit with an epistemological one. Our interview-based case study of a freshman engineering major, "Jim," explains his difficulty solving a physics problem (on hydrostatic pressure) in terms of his epistemology, but avoids a deficit trap by modeling the dynamics of his epistemological stabilities and shifts in terms of fine-grained cognitive elements that include the seeds of epistemological expertise. Specifically, during a problem-solving episode in the interview, Jim reaches and sticks with an incorrect answer that violates common sense. We show that Jim has all the mathematical skills and physics knowledge he would need to resolve the contradiction. We argue that his difficulty doing so stems in part from his epistemological views that (i) physics equations are much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning, and (ii) physics equations do not express meaning that tractably connects to common sense. For these reasons, he does not view reconciling between common sense and formalism as either necessary or plausible to accomplish. But Jim's in-the-moment shift to a more sophisticated epistemological stance highlights the seeds of epistemological expertise that were present all along: he does see common sense as connected to formalism (though not always tractably so), and in some circumstances, this connection is both salient and valued. (Contains 1 figure, 1 table, and 3 notes.)

Abstract: Problem solving in groups can be rich with tension for students. This tension may arise from conflicting approaches (conceptual and/or epistemological) and/or from conflict emerging in the social relations among group members. Drawing on video records of undergraduate students working collaboratively, we use three cases to illustrate the multifaceted ways in which conflict arises—combining conceptual, epistemological, and socioemotional dynamics—and a specific way of managing the tension that can emerge from the multifaceted conflict, “taking an escape hatch.” An escape hatch is a set of discourse moves through which participants close the conversational topic, thereby relieving tension, but before a conceptual resolution is achieved. We describe how epistemological twists and turns can be recruited as a means of managing the strong emotions experienced by the students, showing the coupling of emotion and epistemology in students’ conceptual sense making during group work. We help to provide the groundwork necessary for instructors to notice, understand, and respond to one way in which conceptual–epistemological–social–emotional aspects of interaction are coupled in the emergence of tension, rather than narrowly targeting instructional moves based on only conceptual or epistemological considerations. Instead, instructors should often respond to—and help students become aware of—the emotional component of peer interactions and its entanglement with the “cold cognitive” conceptual and epistemological components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Current conceptions of quantitative problem-solving expertise in physics incorporate conceptual reasoning in two ways: for selecting relevant equations (before manipulating them) and for checking whether a given quantitative solution is reasonable (after manipulating the equations). We make the case that problem-solving expertise should include opportunistically blending of conceptual and formal mathematical reasoning even while manipulating equations. We present analysis of interviews with two students, Alex and Pat. Interviewed students were asked to explain a particular equation and solve a problem using that equation. Alex used and described the equation as a computational tool. By contrast, Pat found a shortcut to solve the problem. His shortcut blended mathematical operations with conceptual reasoning about physical processes, reflecting a view-expressed earlier in his explanation of the equation-that equations can express an overarching conceptual meaning. Using case studies of Alex and Pat, we argue that this opportunistic blending of conceptual and formal mathematical reasoning (i) is a part of problem-solving expertise, (ii) can be described in terms of cognitive elements called symbolic forms (Sherin, 2001), and (iii) is a feasible instructional target. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]