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The digital world encodes our lives with incriminating clues. How you travel, live, love, and shop are tracked through growing surveillance technologies. Police have recognized this reality and are actively exploiting new surveillance tools for investigative purposes. The Fourth Amendment--the constitutional protection meant to limit police search powers--has not kept up with the privacy and security threats of these new digital technologies. Current doctrine has remained stymied by legal tests asking all the wrong questions about "reasonable expectations of privacy" and "trespass" searches. While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "digital is different," it has not yet provided a coherent theory to protect individuals from growing digital surveillance. This Article offers an alternative Fourth Amendment theory based on the harm of rummaging--a principle that can trace its lineage from the Founding debates around General Warrants and the Writs of Assistance to the Supreme Court's most recent cases on cell phone location data. Fear of government agents rummaging into private homes and papers motivated the passage of the Fourth Amendment and has remained a doctrinally coherent throughline recurring in Fourth Amendment cases. This Article develops the "rummaging test" as a new way to see the harms of government collection of digital evidence. The Article excavates rummaging as an original justification for the Fourth Amendment and then demonstrates how the digital rummaging concept perfectly responds to the harms of government surveillance in the digital age. The rummaging test recognizes that the arbitrary, overbroad, invasive, exposing collection of personal data reflects the same harms that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment in the first instance. The Article seeks to refocus attention on the government's power to rummage through personal data by examining legal challenges around smart-home data and long-term pole cameras. The hope is to move the longstanding background principle against rummaging to the foreground of Fourth Amendment analysis and thereby answer some of the hardest questions facing courts confronting challenges to digital surveillance., TABLE OF CONTENTS I. RUMMAGING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT A. The Role of Rummaging in Fourth Amendment History 1. The English Background 2. The American Colonial Experience 3. Boyd v. [...]

I. THE STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SIX A. Government personnel B. Preliminary to or in connection with a proceeding C. Particularized need II. AMERICAN PRIVACY LAW [...]

I. INTRODUCTION The August 2009 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Directives on border searches of electronic devices and electronic media add additional guidelines to existing DHS policies; (1) however, officials [...], An analysis of the Department of Homeland Security's 2009 Directives on Border Searches of Electronic Media reveals the difficulty in striking a balance between protecting government interests in protecting the borders and preserving travelers' privacy interests. The 2009 Directives take some steps towards reaching this balance. They do not, however, adequately protect travelers' privacy interests, especially when taking into account the vast amount of personal information that electronic devices now carry. I make three suggestions to better strike this delicate balance: (1) Border officials should be required to have at least some reasonable suspicion before searching an electronic device; (2) Congress should require the DHS to conduct annual studies of their border searches, report their findings to Congress, and annually issue updated and concrete directives; and (3) Congress should require airlines to better inform travelers of the broad authority that border officials have in searching electronic devices.

INTRODUCTION I. THE FACTS OF PHYSICAL SPACE AND THE FACTS OF THE INTERNET A. The Inside/Outside Distinction 1. Outside and inside in physical investigations 2. Outside and inside in Internet [...], This Article offers a general framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet. It assumes that courts will seek a technology-neutral translation of Fourth Amendment principles from physical space to cyberspace, and it considers what new distinctions in the online setting can reflect the function of Fourth Amendment protections designed for the physical world It reaches two major conclusions. First, the traditional physical distinction between inside and outside should be replaced with the online distinction between content and noncontent information. Second, courts should require a search warrant that is particularized to individuals rather than Internet accounts to collect the contents of protected Internet communications. These two principles point the way to a technology-neutral translation of the Fourth Amendment from physical space to cyberspace.

Introduction Here is the scenario. You are an in-house counsel or a retained litigator that represents a large company in the United States. The client, though, like so many companies, [...], Globalization has "shifted into warp speed." (2) Individuals and businesses now collaborate and compete at a breakneck pace and information has become the new global currency. The ease with which electronic information is now created, moved, and stored, however, places profound stress on the existing international discovery system. This paper calls for the recognition of a practical solution to the issue of litigation discovery and cross-border data transfer between the United States, the European Union, and elsewhere. Finally, this paper also calls for a re-writing of the Hague Evidence Convention. It is time for a modern, global and effective solution.

ABSTRACT Translating Fourth Amendment rules designed to regulate searches and seizures of physical property into rules that regulate digital investigations raises numerous questions. This Note seeks to address one narrow [...]

This paper explores some of the special issues that may arise when U.S. litigation requires the discovery of electronic documents in Europe. The first section discusses European law with respect [...]