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The article focuses on the lesson that was learned during the term of former U.S. President George W. Bush. One of the lessons under his administration that was taught is about the significance of the topic on executive power which emphasizes on its concepts as well as the law itself. Replica of presidential powers is the independency and challenging vision of the power, and the more adjustments and cooperative model of power between the President and federal government. As a result, it is appealing to consider the lesson of the Bush Administration to be that unilateral in attempts to expand executive power, yet, it is important not to indulge this tale because it might diminish the capacities of the public and other government institutions to check against abuses in the future.

Much current debate about presidential power revolves around the phrase “inherent power.” This phrase has a loose signification, but disputes often involve the question of whether presidential power is subject to limitation by Congress. This essay identifies four different constitutional constructions that might lead to such unchecked presidential power. The essay also assesses each of these four constructions from the standpoint of the Constitution's structure, concluding in each case that the assertion of unchecked power is inconsistent with constitutional structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Executive power in the Constitution was left ambiguous and underdefined. Commentators have questioned presidential claims of inherent executive and war powers. Have the president and his subordinates obeyed the Constitution and adhered to the letter and spirit of the law? Have legal commentators and courts properly construed constitutional clauses, especially those dealing with war powers? I start with the idea that the Constitution is a power base for government officials and that construing the Constitution is a political act. As political scientists, we can observe presidents and their counsel substitute novel interpretations of presidential prerogatives when they claim the president has inherent war powers and related diplomatic and national security powers that override statute law or bypass the constitutional prerogatives of Congress, and we can analyze the conditions under which their substitution of executive prerogative power will succeed or fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors suggest that when political power is broadly examined, U.S. presidents and their parties have less power in the previously recognized. It is inferred that the president's formal powers under the Constitution are far narrow to justify the plug that surrounds presidential elections. Moreover, it is argued that elections convey even less power to presidents and their parties.

U.S. presidents have expanded executive power in times of war and emergency, sometimes aggressively so. This article builds on Burnham’s application of punctuated equilibria theory to suggest that the combination of President George W. Bush’s presidentialist doctrine, the external shock of the 9/11 atrocities and the president’s “war” on terror has consolidated a new, constitutional equilibrium between the president and the Congress. While some members of Congress contest the new order, the Congress collectively has acquiesced in its own marginalization. The article surveys a wide range of executive power assertions and legislative retreats AND argues that power assertions and consolidations generally draw on historical precedent and operate nonincrementally within a punctuated pattern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the role of executive power in the U.S. policy towards international terrorism. The Congress passed an Authorization for the Use of Military Force that authorized the president to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the U.S. Detainees from the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba are tried under military commissions, which operate under authority of the executive branch with limited judicial oversight, have the power to impose punishments of life imprisonment or death upon the detainees. However, there have been many criticisms with regards to the treatment of the prisoners and that the executive power has overridden various legislation and limits of executive power under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The author discusses the expansion of the limits of executive power as exemplified in the "Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer" Supreme Court ruling. Justice Robert Jackson's opinion laid out an analysis of executive power in comparison to exercises of congressional power.

Comments on the move of the U.S. Congress in October 2002 to pass a resolution authorizing the president of the U.S. to launch military strikes in Iraq. Implication of the White House's demand to redefine the president's implied power under the U.S. Constitution to repel sudden attacks; Power of the U.S. Congress under the Constitution to decide regarding the threat posed by Iraq.

The article reports that the U.S. Congress and the newspapers continue to be concerned with proposals to amend congressional power to control executive agreements governing agreements with other nations. The U.S. President, as the Constitution now stands, has power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. All treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land, while in contrast acts of U.S. Congress are supreme only if made in pursuance of the Constitution.