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In its judgment in Consorzio Italian Management, the Court of Justice has gone some way to solving the riddle that since the beginning of European integration has remained one of the most important and widely discussed doctrines of EU law: one that concerns the obligation of national courts of last instance to refer questions of interpretation of EU law for a preliminary ruling to the Court. The doctrine in question concerns exceptions to this obligation, solidified four decades ago in the landmark CILFIT ruling. More specifically, one exception to the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference is found in situations where the meaning of a provision of EU law is clear beyond reasonable doubt. This contribution discusses whether and how the Court’s ruling in Consorzio Italian Management adjusts and recalibrates this particular exception, which despite the name it was usually referred to – ‘acte clair’ – still remains unclear. To explain what, if anything, changes after Consorzio Italian Management, the discussion will go back to the origins of the doctrine of ‘acte clair’, initially pronounced in CILFIT.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2020 5(2), 825-849 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Research design and literature overview. - III. Legal explanations. - III.1. A stricter application of Cilfit by the Supreme Court. - III.2. The Court of Appeal: a de facto court of final appeal applying Cilfit. - IV. A generational change in knowledge and mentality. - V. Increased (EU law) litigations and requests to refer. - VI. No negative feedback loops: general satisfaction with Court of Justice answers. - VI.1. General satisfaction and inspiration. - VI.2. Very few deficient Court of Justice judgments: exceptions proving the rule. - VII. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) Ireland has always had a mixed relationship with the EU. It is one of the few EU Member States in which the people rejected EU constitutional changes. Until the EU enlargement of 2004, Ireland had the lowest rate of preliminary references to the Court of Justice across all EU Member States. The latter has changed in recent years. Irish courts have been at the forefront with important references in sensitive areas (Court of Justice: judgment of 27 November 2012, case C-370/12, Pringle; case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland [GC]; judgment of 6 October 2015, case C-362/14, Schrems [GC]; judgment of 25 July 2018, case C-216/18 PPU, Celmer [GC]). While only 44 cases where referred in its first 30 years of membership (1973-2003), 45 references were made in the six years between 2013-2018. This Article explains this marked change from what seems an island mentality to enthusiastic engagement with the Court of Justice. Why have Irish courts become more active interlocutors of the Court of Justice? What are their motives to refer (or not)? This question is studied on the basis of a legal-empirical research consisting of interviews with Irish judges and a systematic analysis of all decisions (not) to refer since 2013. This Article attributes the increase in references to the arrival of new judges with more knowledge about EU law and a more positive attitude towards referring. Other factors are the previous positive experiences with the Court of Justice that have stimulated (other) judges to refer. Legal considerations also played a role. Not only the Supreme Court, but also the High Court and the Court of Appeal have rather faithfully applied Cilfit (Court of Justice, judgment of 6 October 1982, case 283/81, v. Ministero della Sanità).

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2020 5(2), 745-754 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Evolving legal questions surrounding Art. 267 TFEU. - III. Stocktaking: the procedure under pressure? - IV. Contributing to the academic debate. - V. Overview of the Special Section. - V.1. Factors and motives to refer. - V.2. Quality of Court of Justice answers and dialogue. - V.3. Implementation of Court of Justice judgments. | (Abstract) The most important procedure of EU law is the preliminary ruling procedure. Academic scrutiny by way of a Special Section is pertinent for three reasons. Firstly, there are still many out-standing legal and practical questions with respect to Art. 267 TFEU as illustrated by the continuous flow of new judgments of the Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. Secondly, there are growing allegations that (some) national court judges are dissatisfied with the procedure, their interaction with the Court of Justice and the resulting answers. Thirdly, there has been little (empirical) research into the effective functioning of the procedure and its application by national courts. The Articles of this Special Section examine - often in an empirical way on the basis of interviews or questionnaires - why national courts refer (or not), what they think of their interaction with the Court of Justice and whether and how they implement the answers of the Court of Justice.