Search

Ecuador has one of the most progressive constitutions in Latin America. It defines the state as plurinational and guarantees collective rights to Indigenous people and even to Nature itself. At the same time, the oil sector has been of strategic importance and “national interest” to both right‐ and left‐wing governments for the last decades, contributing with its rents and revenues to around one‐third of the state coffers. Therefore, the extractivist model remains unchallenged and still promises development—while reproducing systemic inequalities and a “continuum of violence.” In June 2022, the Indigenous movement called for a nationwide strike to draw attention to the socio‐economic crisis following the pandemic. The authorities harshly repressed the mobilization and a racializing media discourse demarcated the “Indigenous” agenda from the needs of “all Ecuadorians,” classifying the protesters as “terrorists” and thus, a threat to the nation. Drawing on ethnographic research, this article discusses the role of extractivism in social mobilization. Exploring the future of social protest in Ecuador in the face of new pressures like climate change and the energy transition, it argues that extractivist patterns will change globally and amplify social discontent and mobilization.

Since 2018, the Daniel Ortega regime has led a systematic campaign of repression against Nicaragua's once-vibrant civil society. Now it is attacking the last sanctuary of dissent: the Catholic Church. The latest arrests of clerics in Nicaragua resulted in international outrage. Pope Francis, who had long remained silent on the situation in Nicaragua, expressed his sincere concerns. The comprehensive attacks against the Church are but another step in Ortega's tightening authoritarian grip on the country. Since 2018, when nationwide street protests erupted, repression has characterised daily life in Nicaragua. The regime's strategies of repression have evolved from indiscriminate violence against all stirrings of protest to more targeted forms of clamping down on dissent. Some 396 state-driven acts of aggression against the Church in Nicaragua have been reported since April 2018. At the time of writing, 11 clerics are under arrest, at least two have been expelled, eight were denied re-entry to the country, and various Church-run media outlets have been shut down. The Catholic Church had been the last space where protest against state repression was still voiced. Ortega's "Christian rebirth" in his 2006 electoral campaign was key to his return to power. The current wave of repression against the Church marks a break with this alliance. The recent wave of repression could backfire, with high costs for the government: in a predominantly Christian society, these attacks on the Church have caused indignation - even within the ruling party's own ranks. The Catholic Church needs to live up to its values and stand up to the Ortega regime. The European Union has imposed sanctions; however, it should pressure international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to end loans to the regime that help stabilise its power. With universities having been closed, the EU should facilitate exiled Nicaraguan students finishing their degrees in Europe.

Der Beitrag wirft die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von musikzentrierten Jugendkulturen und Szenen, Pop- und Rockmusik sowie sozialen (Jugend-)Bewegungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart auf. Popmusik und Rockmusik bildet in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts eine zentrale kulturelle Ausdrucksform in Jugendkulturen und Szenen. Desgleichen gehört jugendliches Protestverhalten zur soziokulturellen Praxis Jugendlicher. Daraus wird die Frage abgeleitet, ob und inwiefern spezifische Musik in musikzentrierten Jugendkulturen und Szenen mit sozialen (Jugend-)Bewegungen zusammengebracht werden kann. Es wird selektiv auf historische Entwicklungen der Popmusik und Rockmusik eingegangen. Mit dieser historischen Perspektive soll hinterfragt werden, ob überhaupt und welche Musik soziale (Jugend-)Bewegungen beeinflusst und geprägt hat, und nach belegbaren Beispielen dafür gesucht werden. Abschließend wird ein Blick auf aktuelle Zusammenhänge geworfen und auf Entwicklungen hinsichtlich rechter musikkultureller Erlebniswelten eingegangen. The article raises the question of the connection between music-orientated youth cultures, pop music and juvenile social movements in the past and present. In the second half of the 20th century, pop music is a central form of cultural expression in youth cultures. Likewise, juvenile social protest behaviour is part of the socio-cultural practice of young people. From this, the question is derived as to whether and to what extent specific music can be brought together in music-orientated youth cultures with juvenile social movements. Historical developments in pop music are dealt with selectively. With the historical perspective, the aim is to question whether and which music has influenced and shaped juvenile social movements at all, and to look for verifiable examples of this. Finally, a look is taken at current connections and developments with regard to right-wing music worlds of experience are discussed.

Bibliographie: Dryndova, Olga: Protestbewegung in Belarus: Frauen an der Front?, Femina Politica – Zeitschrift fur feministische Politikwissenschaft, 1-2021, S. 133-138. https://doi.org/10.3224/feminapolitica.v30i1.16

Leseprobe ----- Zusammenfassung Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit der Protestbewegung gegen die neoliberale kapitalistische Weltordnung, die, inspiriert von den mexikanischen Zapatistas, in der zweiten Halfte der 1990er Jahre entstand. Sie war starker globalisiert und trotz unterschiedlicher Stromungen charakterisiert durch ein pluralitatsaffines und eher anarchistisches Politikverstandnis. Ihr gelang es teilweise, weitere Liberalisierungen des Welthandels zu verhindern und v.a. zahlreiche Reformprozesse in den von ihr kritisierten Institutionen der globalen politischen Okonomie in Gang zu setzen. Aus einer postkolonialen Perspektive wird am Beispiel der Erlassjahrkampagne deutlich, dass trotz einer gestiegenen Sensibilitat gegenuber der Problematik auch sie nicht ganz frei ist von Paternalismus und Dominanz im Nord-Sud Verhaltnis. Schlagworter: globaler Protest, Globalisierungskritik, internationale Finanzinstitutionen, Reform, Internationalismus, Neoliberalismus, Politikverstandnis, postkoloniale Kritik, soziale Bewegungen ----- The Impacts of the Movement against Neoliberal Globalisation. Institutional Reforms, a New Conception of Politics, and Postcolonial Questions Abstract This article discusses the protest movement against the neoliberal capitalist world order which emerged in the second half of the 1990s and was inspired by the Mexican Zapatistas. This movement was considerably globalised and, despite different currents, characterised by a pluralist and anarchist conceptualisation of politics. The article argues that it partly succeeded in preventing further liberalisation of world trade and, above all, that it provoked numerous reforms in the global political economy institutions that were the targets of its critique. However, from a postcolonial perspective, the case of Jubilee 2000 demonstrates that the protest movement against neoliberal globalisation was not entirely free from paternalism and dominance in North-South relations, despite a heightened sensibility towards these phenomena. Keywords: global protest, alterglobalisation, international financial institutions, reform, internationalism, neoliberalism, conception of politics, postcolonial critique, social movements ----- Bibliographie: Ziai, Aram: Auswirkungen der globalisierungskritischen Protestbewegung. Institutionelle Reformen, ein neues Politikverstandnis und postkoloniale Nachfragen, PERIPHERIE – Politik • Okonomie • Kultur, Nr. 161 (1-2021), S. 12-42. https://doi.org/10.3224/peripherie.v41i1.02

Orte und Räume des Protests wandeln sich mit veränderten technologischen Möglichkeiten, und Protestartikulationen finden verschiedene mediale Ausdrucksformen. Zugleich verändern sich die Medienrepertoires von Protestbewegungen und Aktivist*innen. Um nun einen Blick auf die Veränderungen in den Medienrepertoires von Aktivist*innen zu werfen und Entwicklungslinien aufzuzeigen, sind drei Bereiche entscheidend: Erstens ist mit Mediatisierung und Digitalisierung ein Medienwandel verbunden, zweitens verändern sich soziale Bewegungen, Protest und Aktivismus fortwährend und drittens bestimmt der gesellschaftliche Kontext mit über die Praktiken von Protest. So sind es zwar einerseits die durch digitale Medien bereitgestellten Möglichkeiten der Vernetzung und Mobilisierung, die von Protestbewegungen genutzt werden, gleichzeitig sind diese nicht ohne den gesellschaftlichen Kontext denkbar, also Entwicklungen, die etwa unter Globalisierung, Ökonomisierung und Individualisierung gefasst werden. Ziel des Beitrags ist es, einen systematisierenden Blick auf soziale Bewegungen und verschiedene Formen von Aktivismus, mit Schwerpunkt auf feministischen Aktivismus, unter Berücksichtigung der Veränderungen durch digital vernetzte Medien zu werfen. Damit sollen verschiedene Aspekte der Veränderungen in den Protestformen sozialer Bewegungen unter den Bedingungen von Digitalisierungsprozessen aufgezeigt werden.

Drawing on walking interviews with 19 Fridays for Future (FFF) activists in Germany, this study focuses on Greta Thunberg by researching strikers' perception, identification, and online networking practices with the movement’s central figure. With respect to protest mobilization and collective identity formation, this study finds that participants primarily identify with Thunberg via her class standing. While male activists highlight Thunberg's gender as a mobilizing factor, female and non-binary activists often dismiss it, thereby distancing themselves from FFF's feminized public image. Participants believe that Thunberg's disability gives her an "edge" to generate media attention for FFF, calling it an asset to the cause. Although all participants engage with Thunberg via social media, many downplay her leadership role in the movement. Similarly, local organizers actively use Thunberg's posts to build up their own online networks while routinely emphasizing FFF's leaderlessness. The findings thus nuance assumptions about identity-based mobilization, explore the construction of networked leadership, and chart digital organizing practices in a transnational youth climate movement.

Lateinamerika kennt zahlreiche Protestbewegungen seiner indigenen Bevölkerung. Einer der emblematischsten Fälle ist die soziale Bewegung gegen ein Prestige-Projekt der Morales-Regierung: den Bau einer Straße im Indigenen Territorium und Nationalpark Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) im bolivianischen Amazonasgebiet. Mit Blick auf die Perspektiven der heterogenen Protestakteur*innen rekonstruiert der Autor diesen Widerstand in seinen komplexen Erscheinungsformen. Dabei stellt er heraus, wie Problematiken der geschwächten indigenen Selbstverwaltung, sozioökologische Bedrohungen, Defizite des neoextraktiven Entwicklungsmodells und mangelnde Rechtsumsetzung zusammenhängen.

Autocrats worldwide have exploited COVID-19 and corresponding legal measures to curtail civil liberties. However, the health crisis and related socio-economic setbacks have also created needs-induced space, leading to a rise of civil society relief activism and propelling protests against dissatisfactory government responses. Rather than uniformly shrinking, civic space has often been sustained during the pandemic. Civil liberties have further shrunk across the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), non-OECD Europe and the Caucasus, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as 123 countries enforced 254 new legal frameworks related to COVID-19. The majority are executive measures that grant governments sweeping powers, leading to crackdowns on dissidents. Sub-Saharan Africa and non-OECD Europe and the Caucasus enacted the most legal measures, conducive to heightened repression. All five of these world regions saw the emergence of needs-induced space, illustrated by drastic declines in GDP growth, rising poverty, and increasing inequality. Despite (and sometimes because of) government efforts to weaponise COVID-19-related laws to erode civil liberties, protest activities have skyrocketed: demonstrators at more than 9,000 COVID-related protests have voiced their economic grievances and demanded better government responses. Most of these protests occurred in LAC and the Asia-Pacific, followed by MENA. Civil society organisations (CSO) have enhanced their emergency relief, filling gaps left by governments. While carrying out such relief activism seems to have been easier in more democratic countries in LAC and the Asia-Pacific, CSOs have delivered aid and advocated for state provision in autocracies as well. European policymakers should set an example of how to implement democratic laws to contain COVID-19, and they should push back against the autocratic weaponisation of such laws elsewhere. European donor governments and political foundations should seek creative ways to support relief efforts by civil society that simultaneously address economic inequality and democratic governance, thereby enabling the sustenance of civic space.

Seitdem das Fernsehen Politik macht, werden Einwände und Kritik gegen Regierende über den Bildschirm kommuniziert - die Bürger*innen sind in passives Zuschauen gedrängt. Der Aufstieg der sozialen Medien dagegen verspricht neue Möglichkeiten der Teilhabe. Doch wird der öffentliche Raum immer undurchsichtiger, komplexer und schwerer zu fassen: Meinungen und Verhaltensmuster werden zunehmend durch Algorithmen kontrolliert, die globalen Unternehmen unterstehen. Welche Alternativen bleiben angesichts dieser Enteignung? Dissidenz und Hacking? Im Spiegel der forcierten (Zwangs-)Digitalisierung durch die Covid-19-Pandemie widmet sich Néstor García Canclini aus kultur- und politikwissenschaftlicher Perspektive diesem Komplex.

Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der exemplarischen Rekonstruktion eines Wandels von Anerkennungsordnungen kollektiver Gewaltausübung. Dabei wird die These bearbeitet, dass es im Zuge der _GIDA-Bewegung zu einer gesellschaftlichen Öffnung gegenüber Gewalthandeln kommt, die etablierte Aversionsnormen übergeht. Eine besondere Rolle spielen hier Fußballhooligans, deren Gewaltexpertise im Lichte einer bei _GIDA-Demos als wehrlos dargestellten Volksgemeinschaft eine neue Legitimierung erfährt. Wir zeigen, inwiefern stellvertretende politische Gewalt zum Selbstverständnis rechtsextremer Hooliganszenen gehört, um dann nachzuzeichnen, wie dieses Handlungsmodell eines gewalttätigen Stellvertreteraktivismus von einflussreichen Teilen der _GIDA-Bewegung Bestätigung erhält und adaptiert wird. Ankerpunkt für diesen Argumentationsgang ist ein Ereignis, bei dem der Wandel in der Anerkennungsordnung kollektiver und politisierter Gewaltausübung prägnant sichtbar wird., In this paper, we reconstruct changes in the order of accepting collective acts of violence. We elaborate the thesis that the _GIDA-movement introduced a new openness towards acts of violence thereby bypassing established social aversions that a concerned with the public display of violence. Football hooligans play a special role in this process. Their violence expertise receives a new legitimization in the light of the own ethnic community (Volksgemeinschaft) that at _GIDA-demonstrations is described to be defenceless. We show to what extent political deputy violence is part of the very self-conception of the extreme right-wing hooligan scene. That allows us to trace how this action model of deputy activism is acknowledged and adapted by influential parts of the _GIDA-movement. The anchor point of this argumentation is an event that represents concisely the change in the order of accepting collective acts of violence.

Zusammenfassung Die Forderung findet deshalb ein so groses Echo, weil sie nicht das Interesse groserer oder kleinerer Gruppen formuliert, sondern unabweisbar das Interesse aller Menschen. Die Gefahr der Weltzerstorung durch Klimawandel ist greifbar geworden, die Bedrohung ist konkret. Deshalb spricht die Schulerbewegung fur alle und findet Resonanz bei ganz vielen. Sie unterliegt nicht dem haufig notwendigen Ideologie-Verdacht mit der Frage, welches okonomische oder weltanschauliche oder Interesse einer Organisation sich hinter der Behauptung des Allgemeininteresses abspielt. Schlagworter: Klimawandel, Weltgesellschaft, Interessen, Schule ----- Bibliographie : Reinhardt, Sibylle: Fridays For Future – Moral und Politik gehoren zusammen, GWP - Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft. Politik, 2-2019, S. 159-162. https://doi.org/10.3224/gwp.v68i2.01

This article explores the intersections of gender and centre–periphery relations and calls for theoretical and political involvement in gendered struggles against colonial and capitalist forces across different national contexts. The article raises questions about the possibility of resisting inequality and exploitation arising from capitalist expansion and extraction of natural resources in Sweden and Greece, outside of urban contexts. It does so by highlighting women’s role in protest movements in peripheral places and questioning power relations between centre and periphery. The article also argues that making visible women’s struggles and contributions to protest movements brings about vital knowledge for realizing democratic worlds that do not thrive on the destruction of natural resources and the institutionalization of inequalities.

The global pandemic crisis has highlighted the inherent weaknesses of governance in countries of the Maghreb. It has underscored Morocco’s lagging human development and infrastructure amid growing authoritarianism. In Algeria, where the government is struggling with an ongoing legitimacy crisis, the pandemic has exposed the state's weak public services. In Tunisia, the pandemic has emphasised the disarray of the coun­try's political elites and the effects of the protracted transition on state output. Yet, the pandemic crisis has pushed some of these governments to seize opportunities, in­cluding speeding up digitalisation, allowing for citizen engagement, and even seeking some self-sufficiency in terms of medical production. As these countries pursue eco­nomic relief and support to overcome the growing economic impacts from the crisis, European partners have the opportunity to use their leverage to promote policies that reduce inequality, prioritise investment in critical infrastructure, and encourage transparent and responsive citizen-government relations. (author's abstract)

This study argues that scholars and policy-makers need to understand environmental activists better to bridge the gap between growing activism and policy. Conventional wisdom is that environmental activists generally support stronger climate policies. But there is still little understanding about diversity of views within activist groups when it comes to specific policies, and existing studies indicate that their views are not uniform, which can weaken their impact as a group. Activists might unite to demand change, but not necessarily agree on details of the desired change. Exploring the differences within the group, this paper focuses on how to nudge those who already share favorable attitudes towards policies that mitigate climate change. The motivation has been to see, in presence of general support for stronger environmental policies, whether this support could be channeled into more specific policies. We first take on a methodological challenge to construct an index of environmental predisposition. Then drawing from existing social-behavioral scholarship, we analyze results of an experimental survey with select treatments previously reported as promising. In November and December 2019, we collected responses from 119 participants at the Fridays for Future demonstrations in Germany. The results indicate that there are indeed important differences within the group, and nudging effects exist even in this rather strongly predisposed group, with participants assigned to the experimental group showing higher levels of support for the introduction of a carbon tax that is traditionally seen as a difficult policy to gain widespread public support. We find that those who score neither too high nor too low are more likely to respond to nudging. Yet, the effects vary for general outcomes such as policy support, behavioral intentions, and environmental citizenship. Overall, the findings show the value of understanding the heterogeneity of individual views within environmental movements better and directing interventions in large resource systems such as climate to specific issues and target groups for accelerating transformations towards sustainability.

"Das Volk will den Sturz des Regimes!" Unvergessen bleibt der Ruf der Menschen in Ägypten nach Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung, der im Jahr 2011 durch die Straßen Kairos hallte. Auf theoretisch innovative und interdisziplinäre Weise kombiniert der Autor strukturelle, netzwerktheoretische, konstruktivistische und kommunikative Aspekte des Transitionsprozesses zur umfassenden Untersuchung der revolutionären Mobilisierung säkularer Netzwerke sowie der konfliktiven Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Regime und der Muslimbruderschaft. So zeigt er auf, dass Demokratisierung ein widersprüchlicher und schwieriger Prozess ist, an dessen Ende die Re-Autoritarisierung der Politik stehen kann.

Sebastian Haunss, Moritz Sommer (Hrsg.): Fridays for Future - Die Jugend gegen den Klimawandel: Konturen der weltweiten Protestbewegung. Bielefeld: transcript 2020. 978-3-8376-5347-2.+++David Fopp: Gemeinsam für die Zukunft: Fridays for Future und Scientists for Future. Bielefeld: transcript 2021. 978-3-8376-5555-1.

The #MeToo movement has had a profound cultural impact on US society, and notably on US party politics. While many studies have addressed the #MeToo-related controversy arising from the Brett Kavanaugh nomination to Supreme Court Justice in 2018, the relationship between #MeToo and US politics before this event has remained understudied. This article, therefore, addresses this gap by looking at the role of politics at the beginning of the #MeToo movement. Focusing on the first six months of online activity on Twitter (October 2017 – April 2018), over 2 million tweets with the #MeToo hashtag are analyzed to identify the main activity patterns across the dataset and to gain insight on user behavior and participation in the conversation. Results point to the weaponization of #MeToo in the political context from its inception. It is suggested that #MeToo reflects the polarized political climate in the US and that it can be conceptualized as part of the wider “culture wars” (Hunter 1991) that characterize the public debate.

The 20 October 2021 marks the first anniversary of the shooting of unarmed protesters by the Nigerian military. The movement pushing to abolish the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) has proved how social media can make the voices of the weak heard. However, recent developments surrounding social media regulations in the aftermath of the shooting show that the right to freedom of expression is at risk of regression. The EndSARS protest has proven itself to be a milestone people-led movement. It is the first time Nigerians from different classes, ethnic groups, and religions have united behind a cause. It went beyond making demands for the mere disbanding of the SARS squad to insisting on the release of protesters, justice for victims, prosecution of poor police conduct, evaluation and retraining of officers, and an increase in police salary - all organised via social media. What came in the aftermath of the movement served as a driver for the renewed calls for bills to regulate social media. The political elite issued a communiqué that called for the strict monitoring and censorship of social media usage. Recent developments are not unique. A careful analysis of social media regulations shows that the government has remained ambivalent towards freedom of expression - promoting that right while at the same time limiting it. Nigeria has witnessed some progress since it transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999. Nevertheless, it risks regression if draconian bills are introduced that curtail freedom of expression and assembly. The Nigerian government must be willing to review and revise its cyber bills to eliminate ambiguity. It must also include all relevant stakeholders, such as youth, women, and human as well as digital rights experts, in its drafting of cyber bills.

How has the youth climate movement in the US grown since the Climate Strikes began and in what ways did it change as it grew? This article takes advantage of a unique dataset that includes surveys from activists who organized the nationally coordinated climate strikes in the US that began with Fridays for Future in spring 2019. Building on the research on alliance building and strategic coalitions, this article analyzes how the patterns of participation changed over the period of the study. We employ social network analysis to map the affiliation networks among the organizers of these events to assess the coalitions of groups involved and the shifting organizational landscape. Our analysis does not provide evidence that groups spanned the boundaries across movements, nor does it show that identity plays a role in coalition building in this movement. Instead, by mapping out the coalition of organizations within this movement and how connections among them change over time, we see clear evidence that this youth-led movement was reoriented by adult-led organizations. Our article concludes by considering how these findings suggest the future trajectory of the youth climate movement and its role in a ‘new climate politics’ in America.

In December 2015, political leaders celebrated the Paris Agreement as a milestone in the global fight against climate change. Three years later, Greta Thunberg's school strike outside the Swedish parliament inspired thousands of students around the world to protest against their political leaders' inability to adequately respond to climate change. Envisioning livable climate futures for generations to come, the emerging “Fridays for Future” (FFF) movement urges governments to take more radical action on climate change. While FFF has sparked discussions about climate change around the world, the movement's effects on broader societal change remain unclear. We, therefore, explore how FFF has triggered debates beyond the necessity to tackle climate change and offer a framework to reflect upon the broader socio-political implications of the school strikes. We illustrate the contestation between different ideas of social life and political order encapsulated within and attached to FFF by analyzing the movement's self-understanding and the media discourse around these protests in Germany. Although the German government portrays the country as a pioneer in moving an industry-based economy toward decarbonization, the school strikes have quickly emerged and stabilized. We explore if and how the FFF protestors express not only the need for climate action but also call for deeper societal transformation. To do so, our study draws upon a discourse analysis based on news articles, official documents, and speeches, complemented by qualitative interviews with youth representatives and experts involved in the movement to identify competing imaginaries and themes of contestation. We study the tensions between competing student-led visions of the future through the lens of sociotechnical imaginaries, which allows us to illuminate and juxtapose moderate and radical approaches. In conclusion, current school protests are not only about climate action but reflect more fundamental political struggles about competing visions of a future society in times of climate change. Yet, the protestors' strong focus on science-driven politics risks to overshadow these broader societal debates, potentially stabilizing the techno-centric, apolitical and market-driven rationale behind climate action.

In 2019, China commemorated several anniversaries of politically significant events in its recent history: the May Fourth Movement (100 years), the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (70 years), the Tibet Uprising (60 years), the beginning of the reform and opening policy (40 years), and the massacre on Tiananmen Square (30 years). How China officially commemorates these events - or does not - weighs heavily on the country’s domestic and foreign policy. The state-constructed interpretations of his­tory as a claim to power are directed not only at Chinese society, but also at foreign partners interacting with China, especially governments and companies. The conceal­ment of problematic events from the past is alarming, not least because it in­creases the danger that historical mistakes will be repeated. (author's abstract)

Die Konflikte um das Großprojekt "Stuttgart 21" verdeutlichen exemplarisch, wie Protestbewegungen das postdemokratische Zusammenspiel von Staat und Wirtschaft herausfordern. Bürgerbeteiligung und Kostentransparenz sind seither nahezu obligatorisch, dabei hat die Bewegung gegen "S21" ihr eigentliches Ziel, das Bahn- und Immobilienprojekt zu stoppen, verfehlt, trotz scheinbar positiver Ausgangslage. Anhand von Schlüsselereignissen im Konflikt um das Großprojekt rekonstruiert die Autorin die Dynamiken und Diskurse dieser sozialen Bewegung. Diese Untersuchung stellt in ihrer Art eine Neuheit in der Protest- und Bewegungsforschung dar und ist gleichzeitig ein Lehrstück für andere soziale Bewegungen. A teaching play for protest research: key events and dynamics of the social movement against "S21".

Ao longo do ano de 2020, a COVID-19 se tornou um fator dominante na política e mídia alemãs. As primeiras percepções dos representantes do governo declaradas em janeiro de 2020, de que o novo vírus seria de importância mínima, foram rapidamente substituídas por uma série de medidas para proteger a população do que foi então oficialmente declarado uma pandemia. No final de fevereiro de 2020, o Ministro da Saúde alemão Jens Spahn e o Ministro do Interior Horst Seehofer formaram o primeiro grupo de gerenciamento da crise para tratar dos desafios que estavam por vir. Quando medidas oficiais começaram a restringir direitos civis e forçaram as empresas a fechar temporariamente, movimentos de protesto apareceram em diferentes partes do país. Mobilizada através de campanhas online e canais de mídias sociais, parte da população da classe média alemã formou grupos de protesto e viajou pelo país para participar de um crescente número de eventos de protesto. Em agosto de 2020, a capital alemã, Berlim, se tornou o palco de manifestações políticas organizadas por grupos regionais e relativamente desconhecidos de indivíduos com agendas políticas diversas. Aglomerações de até 40.000 cidadãos de diferentes origens ocorreram, nas quais os participantes se articulavam criticamente com relação às medidas políticas e legais tomadas pelo governo para tratar da crise causada pela COVID-19. O objetivo deste artigo é oferecer um panorama inicial desse movimento de protestos estabelecido recentemente que, em poucos meses, se desenvolveu de grupos regionais de protestos da classe média para um caso de monitoramento da agência de segurança doméstica alemã.

What to expect from the political fallout of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic? Three lessons learned from the Great Recession hit Europe in 2008.

Warum treffen sich soziale Bewegungen? Dieser Frage geht der Autor am Beispiel der transnationalen Bewegungskonferenz des Weltsozialforums nach. Mithilfe einer interaktionssoziologischen Perspektive zeigt er auf, welche Eigenleistungen die Sozialform der (physischen) Interaktion für das Zustandekommen und den Erfolg der Treffen sozialer Bewegungen erbringt. Hierzu analysiert er, wie eine fragile Interaktionsordnung konstruiert, Verstehen ermöglicht und Zusammenhalt geschaffen wird - und dadurch Alternativen lebbar werden. Dabei wird deutlich, dass es nicht nur bei sozialen Bewegungen einen Eigenwert hat, sich leibhaftig zu treffen, anstatt über technische Medien zu kommunizieren. Social movements and their (transnational) meetings - on the intrinsic and added value of face-to-face interaction.

Post-peace accord Colombia is full of paradoxes. Progress in political participation, in inclusion, and heightened social mobilisation are unfolding against a backdrop of persistent violence and insecurity. While the end of the war with the FARC-Ep has enabled relevant democratic advances, the lack of implementation regarding the peace accord as well as the current government's policies raise serious concerns about the prospects for peace and democracy. The peace agreement between the state and FARC-Ep guerrillas has been a contested subject in Colombian politics. Although the transition has been far from smooth, it has enabled opportunities for peacebuilding and shifted the public debate towards issues such as inequality and corruption. Amid this transitional context, President Iván Duque's government has not managed to develop a political project according to the post-accord scenario. Unable to either please the most radical factions of his right-wing party, Democratic Centre, or to build a government in line with the demands of the Colombian citizenry, Duque's approval rating has plummeted to just 23 per cent. Social discontent manifested on the streets in the form of mass demonstrations at the end of 2019. While the demands made point to long-standing problems, the shortcomings of the current government have led to discontent being channelled through the figure of Duque specifically. A salient trait of the protests is the participation of the urban, middle class, and youth. Meanwhile, violence has not come to a halt. A reconfiguration of non-state armed actors and the emergence of further violence are taking place in different localities against the backdrop of the structural factors that the peace process never resolved. The Colombian government has also failed to protect the lives of social leaders and former FARC-Ep combatants. The response of the government to citizens' demands raises serious concerns about both the governance capabilities of President Duque and the repercussions thereof for the already undermined credibility of the Colombian state and its democratic institutions. Complicating matters, the half-hearted implementation of the peace agreement and the persistence of violence suggest a grim outlook. In the face of all this, it is crucial to support the efforts of actors committed to peacebuilding endeavours.

Die Proteste in Chile, die im Oktober 2019 einsetzten, haben unter anderem eine Verfassungs­initiative nach sich gezogen, die Bürgerinnen und Bürger schon lange gefor­dert hatten. Nun haben sich auch Regierungs- und Oppositionsparteien darauf geeinigt. Sie soll mit einer Volksabstimmung darüber beginnen, ob eine neue Ver­fassung ge­wünscht wird und welches Kollektivorgan sie aus­arbeiten soll. Seit dem 26. Februar befindet sich Chile offiziell im Wahlkampf für dieses Referendum. Wegen der Covid-19-Pan­demie wurde es vom 26. April auf den 25. Oktober verschoben. Die gegebenenfalls abzuhaltende Wahl des verfassunggebenden Organs soll nun erst am 11. April 2021 stattfinden. Zwar ist noch ungewiss, inwiefern eine neue Verfassung dazu bei­tragen wird, die soziale, politische und institutionelle Krise zu bewältigen. Dennoch glaubt die große Mehrheit der Bevölkerung, dass sie unabdingbarer Grund­stein für einen notwendigen neuen Gesellschaftsvertrag ist. (Autorenreferat)

Over the last decade, self-organized refugee protests in Europe have increased. One strand of activism in Europe, noborder, involves a transnational network of people who are heterogeneous with regards to legal status, race, or individual history of migration, but who share decolonial, anti-capitalist ideals that criticize the nation-state. Noborder activists embrace prefigurative strategies, which means enacting political ideals in their everyday life. This is why this article asks: How do noborder activists try to meet their political ideals in their everyday practices, and what effects do these intentions entail? Noborder practices take place at the intersection of self-organization as a reference to migrants' legal status or identity, on the one hand, and self-organization as anti-hierarchical forms of anarchist-autonomous organization, on the other. On the basis of empirical findings of a multi-sited ethnography in Germany and Greece, this article conceptualizes that noborder creates a unique space for activists to meet in which people try to work productively through conflicts they see as being produced by a global system of inequalities. This demanding endeavor involves social pressure to self-reflect and to transform interpersonal relationships. Broader society could learn from such experiences to build more inclusive, heterogeneous communities.

Beim Beobachten derzeitiger Protestbewegungen in der Postkolonie, besonders solchen von Studierenden, die die Ungleichheit auf dem Campus und in Gesellschaften allgemein thematisieren, lässt sich die Rolle der Kunst bei der Sichtbarmachung der verknüpften Formen des Kolonialismus und des Kapitalismus nicht übersehen. Diese Repräsentationen verleihen nicht nur abstrakten Ideen Sichtbarkeit, sie beinhalten zudem auch symbolische Repertoires, um Regime der Kolonialität anzugehen. Indem sie Erinnerungen an Kolonialisierung, Sklaverei und die Ausbeutung billiger Arbeitskräfte wachrufen, machen sie die kolonialen Ursprünge der heutigen sozialen Beziehungen sichtbar. Der Artikel reflektiert den Einsatz der Erinnerung anhand von poetischen und visuellen Praktiken, die 2015 Teil der Bewegungen #RhodesMustFall und #FeesMustFall an der Universität Kapstadt waren. Der Artikel argumentiert, dass heutige Erinnerungspraktiken ähnlich wie in früheren Beispielen von Kunst und Gedichten der Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung ein neues kollektives Narrativ zu erschaffen versuchen – in diesem Fall ein alternatives Erinnern der Transition der 90er Jahre. Allerdings verdeutlicht in diesen Darstellungen die Erinnerung der Kolonialisierung die täglichen Schwierigkeiten, eine Identität auszubilden und Handlungsfähigkeit auszuüben; sie sensibilisieren für die Anstregungen, die beim Ausbilden neuer Identitäten auf den Ruinen der alten unternommen werden müssen., When observing contemporary protest movements in the post-colony, particularly those led by students and addressing issues of equality on campuses and in societies at large, one cannot circumvent the role of art in making visible the interlinking forms of colonialism and capitalism. Not only do artistic representations lend particular visibility to abstract ideas, but they also provide symbolic repertoires for tackling regimes of coloniality. They often do so by evoking memories of colonisation, slavery and the exploitation of cheap labour, revealing the colonial roots of social relations today. Focusing on the poetic and visual practices that were part of the #Rhodes Must Fall and #Fees Must Fall movements at the University of Cape Town during 2015, this article reflects on the uses of memory in such projects. Similarly to the earlier anti-apartheid examples of art and poetry, the paper argues that contemporary memory practices aim to create a new collective narrative - in this case, an alternative memory of the 1990s transition. However, in these performances, the memory of colonisation elucidates the present-day difficulties of forming an identity and exercising agency; it cautions one of the efforts to be invested into forging new collective identities on the ruins of the old.

Traditionally marginalized groups now have more access to new and unconventional means to participate in politics, transforming the media ecologies of existing political environments. Contemporary feminist scholarship has centered on how women use new media technologies to serve political agendas. However, this literature focuses predominately on women in the West, while women in developing countries, or Asia more generally, have been largely excluded from analysis. This article aims to fill in this gap by examining Thai women’s online activities during the 2013/2014 Bangkok political protests. Specifically, we ask how the rise of social and digital media has altered what it means to participate politically in the context of Thai women’s present-day political experience. To answer this question we looked at how women resorted to various digital and social media to discuss women’s rights and political issues, including Yingluck Shinawatra’s political leadership as Thailand’s first female prime minister (2011-2014). Moving beyond traditional notions of participation, we argue that there is a need to recognize the emerging dynamics of women’s online engagement in the political landscape of Thailand. In the context of a totalitarian state, speaking out against the ruling authority online embodies an additional layer of citizen resistance, a feature of digital life that is often taken for granted in Western democracies., Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, Vol 9 No 2 (2016): New Media

Durante los 20 años posteriores a la transición democrática de 1989-1990, la política chilena se caracterizó por formas estables de representación política basada en partidos, niveles relativamente bajos de movilización social y un consenso tecnocrático en torno a un modelo de desarrollo neoliberal que generó rápidos y sostenidos, aunque altamente desiguales, patrones de crecimiento económico. Esta matriz sociopolítica fue desafiada, sin embargo, cuando cientos de miles de estudiantes y sus partidarios salieron a las calles para protestar contra las desigualdades educativas, mientras que un número menor de manifestantes se movilizó alrededor de una plétora de otras reivindicaciones laborales, ambientales y de derechos indígenas. Esta ola de protesta social se produjo en un contexto de creciente desvinculación de los ciudadanos chilenos de los partidos tradicionales y de las instituciones representativas, y perforó el aura de inevitabilidad y consenso que rodeaba el modelo económico del país. La oleada de protesta popular significó el fin de una era política pos-transición en Chile y el amanecer de una nueva época definida por la repolitización de las desigualdades sociales y económicas, incluyendo debates vigorosos sobre los pilares sociales del modelo neoliberal y el alcance de los derechos sociales de ciudadanía. El caso chileno arroja nueva luz sobre los procesos por los que las desigualdades llegan a politizarse o despolitizarse en diferentes contextos estructurales, institucionales e ideacionales., For 20 years following the 1989-1990 democratic transition, Chilean politics was characterized by stable forms of party-based political representation, relatively low levels of social mobilization, and a technocratic consensus around a neoliberal development model that generated rapid and sustained, albeit highly unequal, patterns of economic growth. This sociopolitical matrix was challenged, however, when hundreds of thousands of students and their supporters took to the streets to protest against educational inequalities, while smaller numbers of protestors mobilized around a plethora of other labor, environmental, and indigenous rights claims. This wave of social protest occurred in a context of growing detachment of Chilean citizens from traditional parties and representative institutions, and it punctured the aura of inevitability and consensus that surrounded the country's economic model. The groundswell of popular protest signified the end of a posttransition political era in Chile and the dawning of a new one defined by the repoliticization of social and economic inequalities, including vigorous debates about the social pillars of the neoliberal model and the reach of social citizenship rights. The Chilean case sheds new light on the processes by which inequalities come to be politicized or depoliticized in different structural, institutional, and ideational contexts.

Taking the different case studies of the book together, one general observation stands out: Key agents of socioeconomic contention, including movements by organized labor and the unemployed that were important in the run-up to the uprisings and that saw their political opportunities open up in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions, have since been effectively marginalized as political actors. The concluding chapter reflects on the causes of this weakness of socioeconomic contention by identifying comparative insights that emerge from the contributions to this volume and by situating them in the context of broader comparative and theoretical debates on the relationship between social movements and political change. More specifically, the chapter first discusses Egypt’s and Tunisia’s post-revolutionary trajectories from a comparative perspective. Second, it discusses these comparative findings in the light of experiences in Latin America. Third, drawing again on comparative scholarship on Latin America, the chapter offers a theoretical interpretation of some of the main dynamics observed in Egypt and Tunisia based on the notion of a popular-sector incorporation crisis. Fourth and finally, the chapter concludes with general implications and an outlook.

Social networks have been resorted to as effective platforms for social mobility in many parts of the world. This mobility occurs when social media users exploit their interpersonal relationships, especially their ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973). Social networks enable their users to be producers of information, rather than mere consumers, and to be socially and politically well-informed. They have come to function as the alternative media serving citizens rather than governments’ agendas. The paper investigates whether or not social networks are used for social and political mobility in Morocco. Practically, the boycott campaign 2018 in Morocco is considered to uncover the new services these networks are offering. All these issues are investigated in this paper through administering a survey questionnaire to a Moroccan population. A quantitative and a qualitative analysis of 112 questionnaires show that the majority of the participants not only follow social and political content on social media but also share, post, and re-tweet content. The paper indicates that social media are useful platforms for political and social mobility since they are risk-free, costless, and accessible by everybody. The participants do not deny the outstanding roles that social networks play in organizing campaigns as forms of social mobility, yet they do not consider social media a prerequisite for making such events a success because the world has been witnessing successful mass street protests wherein no use of social media platforms has been mentioned.

Der Aufstieg von Fridays for Future wurde durch eine quasi-symbiotische Beziehung zu den Massenmedien begünstigt. Die Bewegung hat bisherige Herausforderungen gut gemeistert, wird aber voraussichtlich mit mehr interner wie externer Kritik rechnen müssen.

Die tiefe politische Krise, die Frankreich mit der Bewegung der Gelbwesten durchlebt, gefährdet Macrons Strategie. Unter der Flagge des Progressivismus setzt sich Frankreichs Präsident für eine Reformagenda in der Innen- wie auch Europapolitik ein. Mehr denn je braucht er den Erfolg in der EU, um in Frankreich als handlungsfähig wahrgenommen zu werden. Umgekehrt hängt seine Autorität als Ideengeber und Anführer des proeuropäischen Lagers stark von seiner Glaubwürdigkeit im eigenen Land ab.

Die guten Nachrichten vom Horn von Afrika scheinen nicht enden zu wollen. Erst übernimmt mit Abiy Ahmed ein junger Reformer die Führung in Äthiopien, ein Jahr später wird Sudans Diktator Omar al-Bashir nach dreißig Jahren Herrschaft gestürzt. Ausgerechnet das sudanesische Militär hatte nach Monaten ziviler und friedlicher Proteste den Machthaber aus dem Amt gedrängt. Knapp vier Monate später steht eine Regierung aus Zivilisten und Militärs, die von Abdalla Hamdok angeführt wird, einem Ökonomen mit jahrzehntelanger Erfahrung bei den Vereinten Nationen. Ob sich der Übergang weiterhin positiv entwickelt, wird von der Bereitschaft des Sicherheitsappa­rats abhängen, die Macht an eine zivile Führung zu übergeben. Entscheidend für die Stabilisierung und die wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit des Landes wird aber auch sein, ob und in welchem Ausmaß externe Akteure den sudanesischen Transforma­tionsprozess unterstützen. (Autorenreferat)

Anfang Mai soll in Ägypten ein Referendum über eine Verfassungsänderung abgehalten werden, die Präsident Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi nach dem Ende seiner laufenden Amtszeit ein Weiterregieren ermöglichen würde. Angesichts massiver Repression scheint die Zustimmung gewiss. Damit wäre die Machtkonsolidierung des Sisi-Regimes, das aus dem Militärputsch vom Juli 2013 hervorgegangen ist, weitgehend abgeschlossen. Doch wie wird sich dieses Regime in Zukunft entwickeln? Denkbare Szenarien sind eine erfolgreiche Entwicklungsdiktatur, jahrzehntelange politische und wirtschaft­liche Stagnation wie unter Mubarak oder ein baldiges Scheitern. Während eine Ent­wicklungsdiktatur mangels Reformbereitschaft unrealistisch ist, sind die beiden an­deren Szenarien für Deutschland und seine europäischen Partner mit großen Risiken verbunden. Sie sollten daher künftig die Vergabe neuer Budgethilfen an eine Verbes­serung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte knüpfen, auf humanitäre Krisenprävention im Sinne des "Do-No-Harm"-Ansatzes setzen und die Kontakte mit Vertretern der ägyp­tischen Opposition auch im Ausland ausbauen. (Autorenreferat)

Der Ende 2016 ausgehandelte Friedensvertrag zwischen der kolumbianischen Regierung und der ältesten lateinamerikanischen Guerilla Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) beendete einen mehr als 50 Jahre anhaltenden bewaffneten Konflikt und wurde international gefeiert. Doch mit der Unterzeichnung dieses Friedensschlusses sind die Probleme nicht gelöst, der Aufbau eines stabilen und dauerhaften Friedens ist in vielerlei Hinsicht noch unsicher. Trotz weitgehend erfolgreicher Demobilisierung und der Waffenabgabe der FARC-EP sowie einer allgemeinen Reduktion der Gewalt stieg die Anzahl der Morde an "sozialen Anführerinnen und Anführern" seit 2016 kontinuierlich an und erreichte 2018 einen nie zuvor dokumentierten Höchststand. Vor diesem Hintergrund sucht der vorliegende Report nach den Ursachen und Bedingungen, die diesem jüngsten Anstieg der Gewalt zugrunde liegen.

A referendum on a constitutional amendment is to be held in Egypt at the beginning of May, which would enable President Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi to continue governing after the end of his current term. In the face of massive repression, approval seems certain. This would largely complete the power consolidation of the Sisi-regime, which emerged from the military coup of July 2013. But how will this regime develop in the future? Possible scenarios are a successful development dictatorship, decades of political and economic stagnation, as under Hosni Mubarak, or imminent failure. While a develop­ment dictatorship is unrealistic due to a lack of willingness to reform, the other two scenarios entail major risks for Germany and its European partners. In the future, they should therefore link new budgetary assistance to improvements in human and civil rights, focus on humanitarian crisis prevention in line with the "do no harm" approach, and expand contacts with representatives of the Egyptian opposition outside of Egypt. (Autorenreferat)

Im August 1999 wurde Wladimir Putin vom damaligen Präsidenten Boris Jelzin zum Premierminister ernannt und zu dessen Nachfolger designiert. Zu Anfang der dritten Dekade an der Macht sieht sich Präsident Putin im Jahr 2019 mit einer ganzen Reihe innenpolitischer Herausforderungen konfrontiert, die sich aus einer Kombination von struktureller Reformunfähigkeit, gestiegenen gesellschaftlichen Forderungen nach Wandel, Veränderungen im Medienkonsum weg vom Fernsehen hin zu Internetressourcen und sozialen Medien sowie der Unsicherheit innerhalb der Elite über das Nachfolgeproblem 2024 ergeben. Um die Machtsicherung des "kollektiven Putins" zu gewährleisten, gilt es aus Sicht des Kremls schon jetzt, proaktiv den großen Wahlzyklus mit den Dumawahlen 2021 und den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2024 wasserdicht zu machen. Zentraler Baustein hierfür ist die Verfassungsmehrheit von "Einiges Russland" (ER) in der nächsten Duma 2021.

Sie sind heterogen, stellen widersprüchliche Forderungen, geben keine Ruhe: die Gelb­westen in Frankreich. Seit November 2018 demonstrieren sie für mehr Kaufkraft und mehr Demokratie. Nach finanziellen Zugeständnissen spielt Präsident Emmanuel Macron auf Zeit. Er hat eine "große nationale Debatte" initiiert, in deren Rahmen alle Bürgerinnen und Bürger aufgerufen sind, Stellung zu politischen Zukunftsfragen zu beziehen. Diese Debatte dürfte ihm dazu verhelfen, die Wahl zum Europäischen Par­la­ment (EP) im Mai zu gewinnen und die Spaltung der Gelbwesten voranzutreiben. Um weitere Proteste abzuwenden, die das Land paralysieren, die Regie­rung delegitimieren und seine Präsidentschaft scheitern lassen können, muss Macron seine Reformagenda besser vermitteln. Das bloße Spiel auf Zeit wird Frankreich für den Präsidenten eben­so wenig reformier- und regierbar machen wie für seine Vorgänger. (Autorenreferat)

France's yellow vests (gilets jaunes) are heterogeneous, make contradictory demands, and refuse to give up. Since November 2018 they have been demonstrating for more purchasing power and greater democracy. Having made financial concessions, Presi­dent Emmanuel Macron is now playing for time. He has initiated a "grand national debate", in which all citizens were called on to voice their opinions concerning future political issues. This debate is likely to help him win the European Parliament (EP) elections in May and facilitate splintering the yellow vests. To avert further protests that could paralyse the country, delegitimise his government and ensure that his presidency fails, Macron needs to improve the way he communicates his reform agenda. Merely playing for time will not make France reformable and governable for this president, any more than it did for his predecessors. (author's abstract)

There seems to be no end to the good news coming from the Horn of Africa. First, the Nobel peace prize for Ethiopia’s young reformer Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Octo­ber and then, in April, Sudan’s dictator Omar al-Bashir was overthrown after thirty years of rule. After months of civil and peaceful protests, it was actually the Sudanese military that finally forced the ruler out of office. Then, less than four months later, military leaders and civilians led by Abdalla Hamdok, an economist with decades of experience at the United Nations, managed to form a government. Whether the tran­sition continues to develop positively will depend on the willingness of the security apparatus to transfer power to civilian leaders. However, in stabilising the country and improving its economic performance much will depend on whether and to what extent external actors support Sudan’s transformation process. (author's abstract)

In Hongkong droht die chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee den Demonstrierenden mit "Konsequenzen"; in Venezuela unterstützt die Armee die Repression der Proteste gegen Präsident Maduro; in Algerien schlagen sich die Streitkräfte des Landes auf die Seite der protestierenden Massen gegen Präsident Bouteflika und im Sudan stürzt das Militär den langjährigen Machthaber al-Bashir nach Massenprotesten. Diese Fälle spiegeln historische Erfahrungen: Das Militär entscheidet in vielen Fällen über den Ausgang von Massenprotesten und handelt vor allem im eigenen Interesse. Die jüngsten Protestbewegungen in Algerien, Sudan, Venezuela und Hongkong sind keine Einzelfälle, sondern stehen in einer langen Reihe von Massenprotesten in Diktaturen. Während die Gründe für das Auftreten und den Erfolg von Massenprotesten vielfältig sind, entscheidet letztendlich das Militär über ihren Ausgang. Wenn Polizei und Geheimdienste nicht mehr in der Lage sind, die Demonstrationen einzugrenzen, hängt das Überleben des Regimes von der Bereitschaft der Streitkräfte ab, die Proteste durch massive Gewaltanwendung zu beenden. Die aktuellen Fälle wie auch der historische Vergleich zeigen, dass sich Militärs in solchen "Diktatorenendspielen" nicht immer dazu entscheiden, als willfährige Büttel des Regimes zu agieren. Oft leiten sie auch den Sturz des Diktators ein, indem sie sich auf die Seite der Protestierenden schlagen oder sich selbst an die Macht putschen. Dabei folgen Militärs vor allem eigenen Interessen; externe Akteure haben nur begrenzte Einflussmöglichkeiten, das Verhalten der Streitkräfte zu beeinflussen. Wenn Diktatoren durch langanhaltende Massenproteste herausgefordert werden, entscheidet letztlich häufig das Militär über die Zukunft des Regimes und der Protestbewegung. Die Interessen der Militärführung und ihre Handlungsoptionen machen somit oft den Unterschied zwischen blutiger Niederschlagung der Proteste, dem Sieg der Demonstrierenden oder einem militärischen Staatsstreich. Interne wie externe Akteure sollten sich daher vor allem um friedliche Konfliktbeilegung und einen Interessenausgleich zwischen Militär und Protestierenden bemühen.

The election of a socialist and pro-Russian candidate in December 2016 as president of Moldova marked a new turn in Moldovan politics. This election contrasts with the pro-Western attitudes of the previous government. Governing instability in Moldova and changing international orientations of many prominent political actors, as emphasized by this article, are partly due to political alternative victories of parties supported by different social groups. Focusing on young people activism, this article underlines the differentiation between the political success of pro-Western parties, made possible by the street protests of April 2009, and the political failure of December 2016. The findings of this research may add a new explanation to Moldova's permanent instability. The factor we emphasize here is the change in political values, attitudes and actions due to profound generational transformations. Since democracy is a life- long learning process, a continuous updating, changing of beliefs and action strategies responding to the varying political environment, different generations rely not only on different past experiences, but on different adapting capacities, on different meanings given to rights and freedoms, social standards and economic conditions.

Rule is commonly conceptualized with reference to the compliance it invokes. In this article, we propose a conception of rule via the practice of resistance instead. In contrast to liberal approaches, we stress the possibility of illegitimate rule, and, as opposed to critical approaches, the possibility of legitimate authority. In the international realm, forms of rule and the changes they undergo can thus be reconstructed in terms of the resistance they provoke. To this end, we distinguish between two types of resistance—opposition and dissidence—in order to demonstrate how resistance and rule imply each other. We draw on two case studies of resistance in and to international institutions to illustrate the relationship between rule and resistance and close with a discussion of the normative implications of such a conceptualization.

This article presents results from a study of online presence in activist milieus associated with the radical left in Sweden discussed from a perspective of non-participation. With the aim to further the understanding of digital non-participation as communicative strategy in activism, it builds upon empirical findings and argues that the online practices and use of social media, as could be observed in milieus associated with the radical left, indicates active non-participation and that this, in turn, is related to the ambition to claim autonomy. The article draws from existing scholarship on critical perspectives on protest movements and social media as well as empirical examples of online content published by radical leftist groups. Furthermore, it analyses how these activities could be understood in terms of active and passive non-participation, abstention or adaptation to social media affordances, as well as implosion of the social in digital media. The findings suggest that much of the activities in the material could be described as active non-participation and that this media practice relates to ideological positioning and values in the milieu. © 2016 by the author