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Extant research has analysed the impact of security policies, truces and informal agreements on both the dynamics and traits of organized violence in El Salvador. However, less is understood about variation in the levels of lethal violence across subnational units. This article contributes to filling this gap. Based on a case study of the municipality of Chalatenango, the analysis shows that community organization and translocal dynamics are crucial to explaining violence containment. Local communities have managed to control the levels of lethal violence and deter criminal actors amid a national context characterized by state neglect and chronic violence. Community organization is not territorially bound but extends across transnational networks. Migrants are a source of livelihoods for the local population; they also contribute to providing public goods and participate in local forms of organization. Transnational networks have forged a migration corridor that enables immigration to the United States. In addition, community organization informally contributes to the capacity of the local state to perform its functions, thereby shaping cooperative state - society relations. This analysis sheds new light on the conditions shaping the variation in levels of violence at the subnational level and local governance dynamics.

Sexualisierte Kriegsgewalt ist ein Verbrechen, das vor allem Frauen in zahlreichen Konflikten weltweit erleiden. Besonders die Demokratische Republik Kongo (DRC) ist betroffen, die einst von den Vereinten Nationen (UN) als „rape capital of the world“ bezeichnet wurde. Die DRC hat, wie viele andere UN-Mitgliedstaaten, einen Nationalen Aktionsplan (NAP) erstellt, welcher die Inhalte der Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS Agenda) der UN auf nationaler Ebene umsetzen soll. Dieser Beitrag analysiert, inwiefern die Demokratische Republik Kongo transformative Reparationsstrategien zur Prävention sexualisierter Kriegsgewalt in ihrem NAP implementiert und wie die spezifische Umsetzung im Kontext der Lokalisierung internationaler Normen zu erklären ist. Zunächst wird illustriert, warum transformative Reparationsstrategien als besonders wirksam gelten, sexualisierte Kriegsgewalt nachhaltig zu bekämpfen. Im zweiten Schritt werden mittels einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse nach Philipp Mayring sowohl die Agenda der WPS als auch der NAP der DRC auf das Vorkommen der Strategien untersucht. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse werden einander gegenübergestellt und im dritten Schritt anhand der Lokalisierungstheorie nach Amitav Acharya diskutiert. Im Ergebnis implementiert der NAP der DRC das Konzept transformativer Reparationsstrategien in geringerem Maße als die WPS Agenda, nämlich nur in den zwei Prinzipien Rehabilitierung und Garantien der Nicht-Wiederholung. Die Ursachen liegen in dem Spannungsverhältnis globaler und lokaler Dynamiken, in dem sich die Bekämpfung sexualisierter Kriegsgewalt wiederfindet. Zum einen ermöglicht die WPS Agenda einen hohen Grad an Flexibilität in ihrer Umsetzung, sodass entsprechende Maßnahmen den lokalen Gegebenheiten angepasst werden können. Zum anderen führt dieses Konzept zu einer Einflussnahme verschiedener Akteur*innen sowie zu einer Missachtung wichtiger Elemente auf lokaler Ebene, die ein Hindernis in der Bekämpfung des Verbrechens darstellen. Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is a crime that women in particular experience in numerous conflicts around the world. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), once called the "rape capital of the world" by the United Nations (UN), is particularly affected. The DRC, like many other UN member states, has created a National Action Plan (NAP) that aims to implement the contents of the UN’s Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS Agenda) at the national level. The article analyses the extent to which the DRC implements transformative reparation strategies for the prevention of conflict-related SGBV in its NAP and how the specific implementation can be explained in the light of the localization of international norms. First, the article illustrates why transformative reparation strategies are considered particularly effective in sustainably combating conflict-related SGBV. In a second step, both the WPS agenda and the DRC NAP are examined for the occurrence of the strategies by means of a qualitative content analysis according to Philipp Mayring. The results of the analysis are compared and discussed in the third step using the localization theory according to Amitav Acharya. They show that the NAP of the DRC implements the concept of transformative reparation strategies to a lesser extent than the WPS agenda, namely only in the two principles of rehabilitation and guarantees of non-recurrence. The reasons lie in the tension between global and local dynamics in which the fight against conflict-related SGBV finds itself. On the one hand, the WPS agenda allows a high degree of flexibility in its implementation, so that corresponding measures can be adapted to local conditions. On the other hand, this concept leads to the influence of different actors as well as to a disregard of important elements at the local level, which form an obstacle in combating the crime.

Ecuador has one of the most progressive constitutions in Latin America. It defines the state as plurinational and guarantees collective rights to Indigenous people and even to Nature itself. At the same time, the oil sector has been of strategic importance and “national interest” to both right‐ and left‐wing governments for the last decades, contributing with its rents and revenues to around one‐third of the state coffers. Therefore, the extractivist model remains unchallenged and still promises development—while reproducing systemic inequalities and a “continuum of violence.” In June 2022, the Indigenous movement called for a nationwide strike to draw attention to the socio‐economic crisis following the pandemic. The authorities harshly repressed the mobilization and a racializing media discourse demarcated the “Indigenous” agenda from the needs of “all Ecuadorians,” classifying the protesters as “terrorists” and thus, a threat to the nation. Drawing on ethnographic research, this article discusses the role of extractivism in social mobilization. Exploring the future of social protest in Ecuador in the face of new pressures like climate change and the energy transition, it argues that extractivist patterns will change globally and amplify social discontent and mobilization.

Ausgehend von der sekundären Viktimisierung der NSU-Opfer, die im Zuge der polizeilichen Ermittlungen als Täter identifiziert wurden, beschäftigt sich der Artikel mit den affektiven Dimensionen struktureller Rassismuserfahrung. Durch die Täter-Opfer-Umkehrungen und die fehlende Bereitschaft zu umfassender Aufarbeitung des NSU-Komplexes schalteten sich rassistische Mechanismen in den Prozess der Trauer ein, sodass diese selbst enteignet wurde. Entlang des Verhältnisses von rassistischer Gewalt und migrantisch situiertem Wissen im Kontext des NSU-Komplexes werden die Begriffe des "Außer-Sich"- Seins (Butler), der wake work (Sharpe) sowie der undercommons (Harney/Moten) herangezogen, um nach Konzepten für eine Politik der Trauer zu suchen. This article deals with the affective dimension of the experiences of structural racism based on the secondary victimisation of the NSU victims who were identified as perpetrators in the course of the police investigations. Through the perpetrator-victim reversals, and the lack of willingness to engage in a comprehensive clearance of the NSU complex, the mourning process itself was dispossessed by racist mechanisms. Refering to the relationship between racist violence and migrant-situated knowledge in the context of the NSU complex, the concepts of being-beside-of-oneself (Butler), wake work (Sharpe), and undercommons (Harney/Moten) are used as tools to explore a politics of mourning and dispossession.

Randall Collins: Explosive Conflict - Time-Dynamics of Violence. London: Routledge 2022. 978-1-032-15770-2

This paper examines the effect of conflict on agricultural value added, using the example of the conflict in the Anglophone and Northern regions of Cameroon. The authors examine this relationship using data from FAO (FAOSTAT, 2022) and the World Bank (WDI, 2022) for the period 2000 to 2022. The econometric results show that the conflict variable, whose impact is the purpose of this exercise, has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient indicates that the years of conflict lead to a negative variation in agricultural production of sixteen percentage points, corresponding to a total estimated loss of nearly 4615 billion CFA francs over the eight years of conflict (2014-2022), or an average of 576.9 billion CFA francs per year. If conflict is a fundamental cause of the decline in agricultural value-added in Cameroon, then policies aimed at defusing and preventing conflict and promoting peace are an essential means of agricultural recovery, improving food security, and reducing rural poverty in Cameroon.

Die neue Regierung in Israel steht politisch so weit rechts wie keine andere vor ihr. Der Erfolg der rechtsradikalen Parteien und ihre Beteiligung an der Regierung sind Ergebnisse einer länger anhaltenden Transformation der politischen Landschaft Israels. Kennzeichnend für diese Entwicklung ist die Genese einer rechten Mehrheit, die mit einer Rechtsverschiebung des Mainstreams und der politischen Legitimierung des radikalsten Segments der israelischen Gesellschaft einhergeht. Der gemeinsame Nenner dieser Regierung ist ein antiliberaler Impetus, der auf eine Neuordnung des Staates hinausläuft. Die Regierung beabsichtigt, demokratische Mechanismen, ins­besondere das System von Checks and Balances, den Status des Obersten Gerichtshofs und den der Grundrechte, zu schwächen. Stattdessen sollen majoritäre Prinzipien gestärkt werden, die den Regierungsmehrheiten kaum mehr Schranken auferlegen. Dieser disruptive Ansatz bezieht sich auch auf den Konflikt mit den Palästinensern: Hier wird ein Sieg angestrebt. Die Integration des Westjordanlands in das Rechts­gebiet des Staates Israel soll unumkehrbar gemacht werden. (Autorenreferat)

Seit November 2022 werden in einem Kooperationsprojekt des Instituts für Kriminologie an der Universität Hamburg (UHH) und des German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg im Rahmen des MOTRA Forschungsverbundes alle zwei Monate in Deutschland Stichproben von etwa 2500 Erwachsenen online befragt. Ziel dieser Studie unter dem Titel "Menschen in Deutschland International" (MiDInt) ist es, Reaktionen der Bevölkerung auf international bedeutsmer Geschehnissen zu erfassen und deren Einflüsse auf politische Einstellungen der Menschen in Bezug auf die Situation in Deutschland zu untersuchen. In diesem Spotlight werden zentrale Ergebnisse der ersten Welle dieser Befragungen zur Frage der Wahrnehmung und Bewertung der Proteste und Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Iran und deren Auswirkungen auf Muslimfeindlichkeit in Deutschland vorgestellt. Eine weit überwiegende Mehrheit der Deutschen befürwortet danach, dass die Protestierenden von Deutschland unterstützt und dass wegen der Menschenrechtsverletzungen weitere Sanktionen gegen den Iran verhängt werden. Weiter waren deutliche Ausstrahlungseffekte der Vorgänge im Iran auf das Ausmaß der Muslimfeindlichkeit in Bezug auf Deutschland zu erkennen. Die pauschalisierende Deutung der Entwicklungen im Iran als Beleg einer generellen Menschen- und Frauenrechtsfeindlichkeit des Islam trägt danach ganz erheblich zu einer weiteren Steigerung von muslimfeindlichen Einstellungen in Deutschland bei. Demgegenüber haben Deutungen, welche die Proteste vor allem als Ausdruck einer Bewegung von Muslimen für mehr Frauen- und Freiheitsrechte einordnen, eine reduzierende Wirkung auf das Ausmaß der Muslimfeindlichkeit in Deutschland.

Jenni Brichzin, Henning Laux und Ulf Bohmann: Risiko-Demokratie - Chemnitz zwischen rechtsradikalem Brennpunkt und europäischer Kulturhauptstadt. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag 2022. 978-3-8376-6226-9

Die Forschungsstelle Terrorismus/Extremismus des Bundeskriminalamts führt zusammen mit den kommunalen Spitzenverbänden (DST, DLT, DStGB) im Rahmen von MOTRA ein "Kommunales Monitoring zu Hass, Hetze und Gewalt gegenüber Amtsträgerinnen und Amtsträgern" durch. Es handelt sich hierbei um eine längsschnittlich angelegte bundesweite Befragung aller ehren- und hauptamtlichen (Ober-)Bürgermeister/Bürgermeisterinnen und Landräte/ Landrätinnen, die in einem sechsmonatigen Turnus durchgeführt wird. Die in diesem Spotlight aufgeführten Ergebnisse beruhen auf der Frühjahrsbefragung'22 (Referenzzeitraum: November'21-April'22). Diese zeigen, dass mehr als jede/r dritte befragte (34%) kommunale Amtsperson im angegebenen Halbjahreszeitraum Anfeindungen, Bedrohungen und/oder Übergriffe erlebt hat. Dass das Problem gesellschaftliches und politisches Gehör finden muss - nicht nur auf kommunaler Ebene, zeigt auch die Tatsache, dass 74% aller Befragten weitere Maßnahmen zum Schutz kommunaler Amts- und Mandatstragende für erforderlich halten.

The new government in Israel is politically further to the right than any other before it. The success of the radical right parties and their inclusion in the government are the results of a long-term transformation of Israel’s political landscape. One characteristic of this development is the genesis of a right-wing majority, accompanied by a shift to the right of the mainstream, and the political legitimisation of the most radical segment of Israeli society. The common denominator of this government is its anti-liberal impetus, which amounts to a reorganisation of the state. The government intends to weaken democratic mechanisms, especially the system of checks and balances, the status of the Supreme Court, and that of fundamental rights. Instead, majoritarian principles are to be strengthened, placing few limits on government majorities. This disruptive approach also applies to the conflict with the Palestinians. Here, victory is sought: The integration of the West Bank into the legal territory of the state of Israel is to be made irreversible. (author's abstract)

In this article we discuss the comparative impact and significance of Community-Oriented Policing (COP) in Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua). We emphasize in particular the formal role of COP as a means to re-establish trust between the state and community, demonstrate professionalism and to evidence the democratic accountability of the police to the population. Although these formal goals remain the goal of community oriented policing, we demonstrate in this article that there has been an increased emphasis on more kinetic or militarized forms of policing in recent years. Hard handed, heavily armed and interventionist police policies have spread from El Salvador to Guatemala, and more recently Nicaragua. Moves towards more aggressive policing are explained by governments and police forces as a necessary response to the rising threat of gangs and drug cartels and horrifying levels of homicide statistics. However, as we highlight there is also evidence of these changes reflecting undemocratic shifts within national administrations and the repositioning of people within government and national institutions with links to these countries' earlier military governments.The net effect of these changes we argue is to erode the intentions of COP initiatives, and severely reduce levels of trust and accountability between people and the democratic state.

In their attempts to mobilise supporters and justify their actions, violent religious extremists often refer to parts of scripture that legitimize violence against supposed enemies of the faith. Accounts of religious extremism are divided on whether such references to scripture have genuine motivating and mobilising power. We investigate whether references to legitimations of violence in religious scripture can raise support for religious violence by implementing a survey experiment among 8,000 Christian, Muslim and Jewish believers in seven countries across Europe, North America, the Middle East and Africa. We find that priming individuals with isomorphic pro-violence quotes from Bible, Torah or Quran raises attitudinal support for religious violence significantly. Effect sizes are particularly large among those with a fundamentalist conception of their religion. Our results show that religious scripture can be effectively used to mobilise support for violence. The findings thus mark a counterpoint to theoretical arguments that question the causal role of religion and have important implications for de-radicalization policies.

While many studies dealing with the problem of militarised refugees analyse when and how militarised refugees lead to a diffusion of violence, it is unclear what conditions contribute to the avoidance of it. The present paper tackles this issue by linking securitisation theory to research on militarised refugees and war diffusion and thus offers new insights into the conditions of prevention of conflict diffusion. Specifically, it compares the two cases of former Zaire (now DR Congo) and Tanzania. Both countries faced an influx of refugees and refugee militarisation following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the civil war in Burundi in the 1990s, though their outcomes varied in terms of regional war diffusion. The article suggests that while certain security strategies such as closure of borders and the repatriation and expulsion of refugees might be successful in preventing conflict diffusion, they often include a breach of international refugee law when preventing bona fide refugees from entering the country. Hence, communicating and cooperating with peaceful members of the refugee communities and confronting those suspected of being responsible for the violence are necessary steps to deal with this issue.

Original Scientific Paper DOI: https://doi.org/10.37458/ssj.1.1.2 This paper presents an initial assessment of the results of a four-month research project studying Ultras in BiH. This research contributed to the Bosnia & Herzegovina Resilience Initiative (BHRI) Programme (implemented by the International Organization for Migration - United Nations, funded and closely coordinated with the U.S. Agency for International Development -USAID) aiming to reduce the threat of violent extremism in BiH and to counter extremist efforts to deepen or exploit communal tensions.

Leseprobe ----- Abstract When it comes to understanding how peacebuilding affects violence-centred masculinities that emerge during civil wars, the literature on gender and post-conflict reconstruction reveals large gaps. To address this shortcoming, the article analyses the way in which security sector reform (SSR) in Liberia has changed institutional practices of masculinity within the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Liberian National Police (LNP). Based on interviews conducted during field research in Monrovia in 2017 and the analysis of policy documents, the author shows that, indeed, SSR has contributed to a change of violence-centred masculinities in both institutions. Women are now, to some extent, accepted as part of both organisations. Sometimes they are even regarded as crucial for mission success. Institutionally, citizen orientation has replaced the practice to abuse civilians and, in the case of the AFL, there are now procedures in place that allow for a prosecution of sexual violence. The Liberian case shows that for changes to occur, especially disarmament and demobilisation, vetting, and the development and reinforcement of new institutional cultures via training and legislation are essential. ----- Mannlichkeitsreformen? Uber den durch SSR hervorgerufenen Wandel gewaltzentrierter Mannlichkeiten in Liberias Sicherheitssektor Zusammenfassung In Bezug auf die Veranderung von im Burgerkrieg entstandenen gewaltzentrierten Mannlichkeiten durch Friedensbildungsmasnahmen weist die Forschungsliteratur zu Genderfragen und Peacebuilding nach bewaffneten Konflikten grose Leerstellen auf. Um diese Lucke zu schliesen, analysiert dieser Artikel den Einfluss von Sicherheitssektorreformen (SSR) auf den Wandel von institutionellen Mannlichkeitspraktiken in den Liberianischen Streitkraften (AFL) und der Liberianischen Polizei (LNP). Anhand einer Dokumentenanalyse und mit Hilfe von Interviews, die als Teil einer Feldforschung in Monrovia im Jahr 2017 gefuhrt wurden, wird gezeigt, dass SSR tatsachlich zu einem Wandel gewaltzentrierter Mannlichkeiten in beiden Institutionen beigetragen haben. Frauen werden nun, zumindest teilweise, als Mitglieder beider Institutionen akzeptiert und im Falle der LNP sogar als relevant fur den Erfolg von Einsatzen angesehen. Auf institutioneller Ebene hat Burger/-innenorientierung die vormalige Praktik von Menschenrechtsverletzungen an Zivilist/-innen ersetzt, und im Falle der AFL gibt es nun festgelegte Vorgehensweisen, die die Verfolgung von sexualisierter Gewalt erlauben. Der Fall Liberias zeigt, dass insbesondere Entwaffnung und Demobilisierung, Sicherheitsuberprufungen (vetting) sowie die Entwicklung und Verfestigung neuer Organisationskulturen durch Training und entsprechende Gesetze zentral sind, um Wandel hervorzurufen. ----- Bibliographie: Quest, Hendrik: Reforming Masculinity? The SSR-Induced Change of Violence-Centred Masculinities in the Liberian Security Sector, Femina Politica – Zeitschrift fur feministische Politikwissenschaft, 1-2020, S. 39-54. https://doi.org/10.3224/feminapolitica.v29i1.04

South Sudan, which separated from Sudan in 2011 after nearly 40 years of civil war, was embroiled in a new devastating conflict at the end of 2013. This happened when political disputes coupled with preexisting ethnic and political fault lines became brutal. This conflict has mostly targeted civilians and most often, ethnic groups, and warring parties have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The conflict has resulted in a major humanitarian crisis, mass displacement, and mass atrocities against South Sudanese citizens. Notwithstanding, instability in South Sudan has made the country one of the most dangerous countries for humanitarian aid workers in the world, especially as the majority of them have lost their lives during their operation. In view of this, the article seeks to interrogate the main driving forces that triggered the deadly conflict and also the ramifications brought upon the population as well as the country.

Dieser Report kartiert den Verlauf von 125 inner­staatlichen Konflikten, die nach 1989 begannen und bis spätestens Dezember 2020 beendet wurden. Der jeweilige Verlauf ergibt sich aus dem Auf und Ab der tödlichen Gewalt über die Gesamt­dauer des Konflikts. Gut jeder zweite Konflikt weist eine einmalige Gewalt­spitze auf, die die durch­schnittliche Todesrate um ein Mehr­faches übertrifft. Fast jeden dritten Konflikt kennzeichnet ein wellen­förmiger Verlauf. Die gewonne­nen Einblicke in Konflikt­verläufe lassen sich für Anstrengungen nutzen, die Konflikte beenden oder eindämmen sollen.

The Juba Peace Agreement of October 2020 has not pacified conflicts in Sudan, and has instead actually created new alliances between armed groups and security forces. After decades of marginalisation, conflict entrepreneurs from the periphery are now shaping Sudan’s national politics and undermining the country’s potential to return to democratic transition. Insecurity in Darfur could escalate and contribute to fur­ther destabilisation of the country. International donors should pressure these con­flict entrepreneurs to relinquish power. They should also prudently promote projects to foster peace in Darfur at the same time. (author's abstract)

Several studies show that political violence justification (PVJ) is associated with unfavourable social and economic characteristics such as poor education, low income, and poverty at the national level. However, the mechanisms by which these factors interact remain unclear. This study aims to find out whether poverty at the country level (contextual poverty) moderates the relationship between individuals’ educational level and household income, and PVJ in the European Union (EU). We perform an analysis using a dataset of 15.347 individuals from twelve EU countries who participated in the European Values Survey, 2017. Logistic regressions models with interaction terms were used to analyze factors related to PVJ. Our findings are twofold. First, we find no evidence of educational level and PVJ's relationship in countries with medium levels of contextual poverty. In contrast, in countries with low levels of contextual poverty, individuals with medium educational level were associated with higher PVJ. Second, individuals living in countries with lower levels of contextual poverty and higher household income were associated with higher PVJ. We conclude that more individuals tend to justify political violence in countries with lower contextual poverty levels - individuals with medium educational level and higher household income. To our knowledge, this is the first study to find evidence that education and socioeconomic status may amplify PVJ in the EU.

Two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, there are signs that sub-Saharan Africa will experience a modest recovery in 2022. Yet at least in the first half of the year, the region will continue to suffer from inadequate provision and administration of vaccines. In addition, violent conflicts and structural weaknesses constitute considerable challenges. We present a selective list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2022. Politics: Last year saw a number of military coups, which may foreshadow future takeovers by armies in Africa. Pivotal elections lie ahead that could trigger the outbreak of violence, for instance in Kenya. Political heavyweight South Africa is in a severe socio-economic crisis that is engendering growing public anger, and the governing African National Congress is experiencing increasingly deepening internal rifts. Violent conflicts: The civil war in Ethiopia puts the state’s integrity at risk and could further undermine stability in the whole Horn of Africa. Jihadism represents a major security threat on the continent that needs to be tackled by African and international actors. A focus should lie on addressing root causes and on preventing crises. Development: It will take years for African countries to rebound from the pandemic’s socio-economic repercussions. Structural problems such as high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth and the effects of climate change are strongly felt in many African countries already. The year 2022 will be crucial for devising the next steps for continental economic integration. International arena: Africa is a sought-after international partner. Several actors including China, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union and its member countries are vying for political and economic influence. This competition will further intensify. African countries getting their full share of COVID-19 vaccines will be important. African and international partners need to expand support for the COVAX initiative and boost public health systems. The approaching EU–African Union summit in February represents an opportunity to step up cooperation to strengthen regional economic integration, democratic development, and the fight against climate change. Based on its coalition agreement, the new German government should be a main driver of this partnership.

South Africa finds itself in a severe internal crisis that has serious implications for its neighbours. As the regional hegemon is turning inwards, it has largely been unable to engage in regional crises in a constructive and meaningful way. As a result, we see a worrying downward trend in Southern Africa, traditionally a haven of stability in Africa. The COVID-19 pandemic has amplified South Africa's social and economic woes. Unemployment has reached an all-time high; more than half of the youth cannot find a job and live in poverty. This has bred public discontent and protest. The governing African National Congress (ANC) is ravaged by internal power struggles between "traditionalists" and the "reformers" around current president Cyril Ramaphosa. While official investigations have exposed deeply ingrained corruption in state-owned companies, the ANC suffered a serious blow in the November 2021 local elections. Being preoccupied with its domestic challenges, the government has largely remained inactive in responding to gross human rights violations in neighbouring Zimbabwe and eSwatini. Additionally, authoritarian Rwanda, not South Africa, has led the regional response to jihadist violence, deploying elite troops to quell the Islamist insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region. The European Union and Germany both have a strong interest in further supporting South Africa and thereby also the broader Southern Africa region: South Africa is one of the world's few democratic regional powers: it can be a core partner in fighting the global climate crisis, and its progressive constitution closely aligns with the new German government's focus on promoting human rights and women's empowerment. Finally, with more than 600 German companies present in South Africa, German business interests would profit from fostering stability in the country and the Southern African region.

Seit 2000 wird am 25. November der Internationale Tag zur Beseitigung der Gewalt gegen Frauen begangen. Er sollte ein Zeichen setzen, "Rechte und Freiheiten im Falle von Gewalt gegen Frauen zu schützen und zu fördern." Die Autorinnen des BICC-Kommentars sehen die Welt von diesem Ziel immer noch weit entfernt. Denn wenn es um empirische Analyse der Zusammenhänge von Gender-Balance, Militarisierung und Gewalt gegen Frauen geht, gibt es ein Riesenproblem: Es fehlen die Daten!

This special gender issue brings to the fore a renewed focus on the importance of feminist intersectional analyses in understanding violence and (in)security in the everyday. It does so through the examination of several cases across the globe. The first set of articles examines how gender is understood in the context of police reform initiatives in post-conflict contexts, where despite political peace agreements, many forms of violence and insecurity continue in the everyday. The second set of articles focuses on gender in populist movement, and particularly foregrounds an intersectional lens. The intersections of race, religion, class, caste, geographies and gender raise important questions when analyzing populist projects, including how the rise of populism may indicate a growing dissonance between the domestic and international, and how this is relevant to understanding the changing nature of violence and (in)security in this changing global era. Taken together, the two sets of articles give a rich account of the significance of incorporating a more complex understanding of gender in gaining better insight into contemporary societal processes.

Religion has become increasingly contentious in recent years. Faith-based discrimination, hostility and violence seem to have increased worldwide. But how can faith lead to conflict? In this article, we test the impact of two important dimensions of religion that have been neglected in previous research: the belief in ‘one true religion’ and perceptions of threats by other religious groups. Putting these two potential drivers to the test, we conducted a representative survey experiment with 972 respondents in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Results show that one of the tested dimensions, perceptions of threats by others, increases the support to use violence to defend one’s own group. This is particularly the case for religiously intolerant respondents with characteristics such as pre-existing threat perceptions, unfavorable views on intermarriage, or belief in the superiority of their own faith. In contrast, we find relatively weak evidence that the prime of ‘one true religion’ increases the readiness to use violence. Our findings have important implications for policy: We conclude that appeals by leaders to threats by others and intolerance toward other faiths can contribute to more conflict. Political and religious leaders should refrain from capitalizing on such notions and should promote tolerance towards other faiths instead.

This paper presents the results of the first-ever representative survey on the demographic and attitudinal legacies of the Armenian genocide. The data, collected in 2018, maps the varied geographical origins of the citizens of contemporary Armenia and traces their links to the genocide. Around half of contemporary Armenians descend from refugees of the genocide, while about a third had family members killed. The data also inform debates on how violence transforms societies. Respondents who lost family members during the genocide show elevated levels of ethnocentrism, and lower levels of prosocial behaviour. However, rather than victimization being associated with militarism and hawkishness, the same individuals tend to be less supportive of military solutions. Even though the genocide took place more than a century ago, its demographic and attitudinal legacies remain clearly visible in contemporary Armenia.

Das Juba-Friedensabkommen von Oktober 2020 hat nicht zu einer Befriedung der sudanesischen Konflikte geführt. Stattdessen hat es vor allem neue Allianzen zwi­schen bewaffneten Gruppen und Sicherheitskräften geschaffen. Nach ihrer jahr­zehntelangen Marginalisierung prägen nun Gewaltunternehmer aus der Peripherie die nationale Politik Sudans und unterminieren eine mögliche Rückkehr zu einem demokratischen Übergangsprozess. Die Unsicherheit in Darfur könnte eskalieren und zu einer weiteren Destabilisierung des Landes beitragen. Internationale Geber sollten einerseits Druck auf diese Gewaltunternehmer ausüben, damit sie die Macht abgeben, und andererseits umsichtig Friedensprojekte in Darfur fördern. (Autorenreferat)

Merging survey data from the Colombian AmericasBarometer 2018 with the number of violent incidents and peace initiatives that have taken place in the respondents’ respective departments of residence, this analysis attempts to improve understanding of social and contextual factors that inform individuals’ attitudes in post-conflict societies. For this purpose, I develop a theoretical framework by reviewing previous research on the effects of violence, the relationship between violence and peace activism, and how these factors may contribute to a sense of agency and readiness to reconcile with former perpetrators on the part of civilians. Subsequently, I conduct a statistical interaction analysis to test if and how the prevalence of violence and peace protests inform reconciliation attitudes regarding former fighters of the two biggest guerrilla groups FARC and ELN. Contrasting the common narrative of helpless and revengeful victimised communities, the present data suggests that the more violence per population of a department, the higher its prevalence of initiatives for positive peace. Furthermore, while readiness to reconcile cannot be predicted by prevalence of violence alone, combining it with peace protests has a positive effect on attitudes regarding reconciliation with both guerrilla groups. Even though this impact is rather moderate and only applies for some types of peace initiatives and the dichotomy "any peace protest vs none", the findings illustrate that contextual factors and civilian agency cannot be neglected in our understanding of civilian perspectives and political behaviour in post-conflict scenarios.

Shortly after COVID-19 was classified as a pandemic in March 2020, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called on violent actors to initiate ceasefires so that energy could be focused on fighting the pandemic. Resonance was low, however - violence even increased in several countries around the globe. Overall, patterns of violence since the spread of COVID-19 have varied significantly over time, between and within Global South regions, and in terms of the most dominant violent actors. The nexus of the external shock of COVID-19 and armed violence is multifaceted and its manifestation highly context-specific. Comparing pre-pandemic patterns of violence with those exhibited in 2020 and 2021 allows us to disentangle pandemic-related from other drivers of violence. Changes in violence dynamics vary across time and space. While the number and frequency of violent events increased in sub-Saharan Africa after the onset of COVID-19, Latin America and the Caribbean along with the Middle East and North Africa experienced decreases. State and non-state violent actors were affected differently, and changes in their activities were not always linked to the pandemic per se. The main consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on violence relate to the worsening of structural drivers of violent conflict, such as increasing inequalities and the marginalisation of large segments of the population. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation should focus on policies that reduce inequality and improve the provision of public goods, especially access to food, healthcare, and education. Additionally, "building back better" must include improving political and socio-economic opportunities for women, youth, and ethnic minorities.

This article presents a methodological proposal for formulating a Human Security Index (HSI), including information from institutional sources and the inhabitants' perception of security. The developed methodology uses quantitative methods to evaluate HS (Human Security) in small municipalities with large rural areas affected by the confluence of different social and economic problems. Given the security conditions in the area, it was impossible to use a random sampling mechanism. Therefore, the data collected have a sample size that cannot be considered significant enough to make inferences using a frequentist statistics approach. The method to construct the index is illustrated using Miranda's data, a Colombian municipality exposed to decades of armed conflict. With the answers given by 55 interviewees to questions related to the armed conflict such as presence-absence reminders and retained values of violent events, a proposal of 36 indices was made, and two of them were selected for the study, following some statistical criteria. In the construction of one of these selected indices, we used information from binary variables and, for the other index, we used information from count data. The values obtained by both indices for the municipality of Miranda were, respectively, 46.4 and 35.8. According to HS experts, both values can be considered moderate levels in the perception of insecurity by residents of the municipality.

Der Konflikt zwischen der Türkei und der kurdischen Bevölkerung hat eine lange und verwobene Geschichte. Um die gegenwärtigen Spannungen und die Konsequenzen der staatlichen Politik verstehen zu können, ist ein Blick in die Vergangenheit unumgänglich. Der Autor nimmt sich dieses Komplexes an und analysiert vor dem Hintergrund der historischen Entwicklungen die autoritäre und gewaltsame Durchsetzung von Nationalstaatlichkeit in der Türkei. Auf dieser Grundlage formuliert er darüber hinaus Empfehlungen für eine politische Bildung, die einen Beitrag zur Anerkennung von Pluralität und Diversität sowie zu einem gesellschaftlichen Friedensprozess liefern kann.

South Asia is one of the most unstable and volatile regions of the world and stands second least peaceful region out of nine regions that were evaluated by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The ranking of the peacefulness of most of the South Asian countries is also rather low. In a developing country like India, the economic cost of violence at 5 percent of its GDP is too high. The causes of internal conflicts can be attributed to factors like ineffectiveness of the governance systems, sub-nationalism, deprivations, discrimination, social injustice, ethnic, sectarian, and religious polarisation, socio-economic exclusion, identity crisis, and competition for fast depleting crucial resources. These conflicts manifest in the form of insurgencies, terrorism, low-intensity armed conflicts, civil wars, and related political violence. There is a definite relationship between terrorism and internal armed conflicts, as both generally follow near similar contours. The terrorists have tried to destroy the very idea of India - democratic, secular, growth-oriented economy, excellence in IT and industry. Almost all elements of national power have a role - direct or indirect - on matters of national security, to suppress internal armed conflicts, and finally to resolve them. The legitimate aspirations and grievances of the people must be identified region-wise and addressed with a sense of urgency. The Government needs to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy (CNSS), to give a definite direction to the role of each element of national power in the short and long term, and minimize its economic cost of violence.

The media play an essential role of informing and mobilising voters as well as facilitating a two-way communication process between citizens and those vying for electoral offices during elections. This allows citizens to get information on various issues from the contenders, which largely informs their electoral decisions. In most less democratic societies however, this media function is increasingly becoming difficult to fulfil due to challenges journalists encounter during electoral processes. Using Uganda’s last general elections in 2016 as a case study, this article discusses the safety of journalists during elections basing on findings from a bigger study on the media coverage of the 2016 elections, supplemented by in-depth interviews with 10 journalists who covered the elections. In addition, the analysis makes reference to the 2016 Uganda Press Freedom Index. Findings of this research show that journalists face more safety and security risks during elections particularly perpetuated by state security agencies. Compared to previous elections, the 2016 elections also recorded the highest number of victims who were female journalists. This article highlights key challenges journalists face during elections, which include: state harassment and intimidation, arrest of those considered critical to the state, and denial of access to important information. Due to concerns of their own safety, journalists have responded to the insecure work environment by engaging in self-censorship, thereby giving biased or limited information to the public. The article identifies gaps that media development agencies can help to close if the media are to play their rightful role in a democratic society, especially during the electoral process.

Rampant forms of violence increasingly take place not only in troubled areas but also in centers and metropoles. Such violence is no longer simply confined to local concerns or historical ruptures, but emerges instead in relation to modalities of power. The movement of people and expanding networks of actors and capital enables the notion of violence to transgress boundaries set by institutions, geography, state, and power. In some conditions, rather than sealing off the emergence of violence, the transition to democracy has opened the door for engineered violent confrontations to manifest out of cleavages that have been tempered by previous authoritarian rule. ASEAS 12(2) addresses violence in selected cases and on different scales. The contributions discuss how violence is practiced, how it (re)produces structures, and how it may eventually transform into non-violence. Violence is not simply an outcome of tensions but is a mechanism that actors and organizations deploy to stabilize their struggles, which eventually makes peacebuilding or democratic projects volatile. The articles in this issue feature police violence in the Philippines; intimate partner violence against women in Vietnam; Islamist online/offline mobilization strategies in Indonesia; the role of traditional actors in reconciliation processes in Timor-Leste; and gender security in the context of conflict management in Thailand’s Deep South.

This article describes the complexity of applying human security through the notion of gender equality in southern Thailand where violent conflict has been prevalent for nearly half a century in a Malay-Muslim-dominated society. It explores how the concepts of gender and security have been interpreted in Malay-Muslim leaders’ outlooks. To define security more broadly, the article surveys the various notions of peacebuilding dealing with comprehensive human security and any security threat, thus not limited to state of war or physical violence only. In the prolonged armed violence and conflict, like that faced in Thailand’s Deep South, women’s security and their role in peacebuilding emerge as pertinent concerns. The discontinuities within the narratives of women and security highlight a divergence connected to personal-political imaginations of conflict whereby subtle variations in violent conflict can be seen as the products of different policy prescriptions, local cultural norms, and the project outcomes of women groups supported by governmental organizations and national and international donors. Thus, in order to reflect upon how contemporary security notions are framed, gendered security per- ceptions ought to be considered as they signify the exercise of peacebuilding programs in the local context. Persistent advocacy of gender equality is about cultural change, which eventually becomes a modality for non-violent society., Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, Vol 12 No 2 (2019): Violence in Southeast Asia

Do ethnic riots affect prosocial behavior? A common view among scholars of ethnic violence is that riots increase cooperation within the warring groups, while cooperation across groups is reduced. We revisit this hypothesis by studying the aftermath of the 2010 Osh riot in Kyrgyzstan, which saw Kyrgyz from outside the city kill over 400 Uzbeks. We implement a representative survey, which includes unobtrusive experimental measures of prosocial behavior. Our causal identification strategy exploits variation in the distance of neighborhoods to armored military vehicles, which were instrumental in orchestrating the riot. We find that victimized neighborhoods show substantially lower levels of prosocial behavior. Importantly, we demonstrate that the reduction is similarly stark both within and across groups. Using qualitative interviews, we parse out two mechanisms that help explain the surprising reduction in ingroup prosociality: Victimized Uzbeks felt abandoned by their coethnics, and variation in victimization created a feeling of suspicion.

Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der exemplarischen Rekonstruktion eines Wandels von Anerkennungsordnungen kollektiver Gewaltausübung. Dabei wird die These bearbeitet, dass es im Zuge der _GIDA-Bewegung zu einer gesellschaftlichen Öffnung gegenüber Gewalthandeln kommt, die etablierte Aversionsnormen übergeht. Eine besondere Rolle spielen hier Fußballhooligans, deren Gewaltexpertise im Lichte einer bei _GIDA-Demos als wehrlos dargestellten Volksgemeinschaft eine neue Legitimierung erfährt. Wir zeigen, inwiefern stellvertretende politische Gewalt zum Selbstverständnis rechtsextremer Hooliganszenen gehört, um dann nachzuzeichnen, wie dieses Handlungsmodell eines gewalttätigen Stellvertreteraktivismus von einflussreichen Teilen der _GIDA-Bewegung Bestätigung erhält und adaptiert wird. Ankerpunkt für diesen Argumentationsgang ist ein Ereignis, bei dem der Wandel in der Anerkennungsordnung kollektiver und politisierter Gewaltausübung prägnant sichtbar wird., In this paper, we reconstruct changes in the order of accepting collective acts of violence. We elaborate the thesis that the _GIDA-movement introduced a new openness towards acts of violence thereby bypassing established social aversions that a concerned with the public display of violence. Football hooligans play a special role in this process. Their violence expertise receives a new legitimization in the light of the own ethnic community (Volksgemeinschaft) that at _GIDA-demonstrations is described to be defenceless. We show to what extent political deputy violence is part of the very self-conception of the extreme right-wing hooligan scene. That allows us to trace how this action model of deputy activism is acknowledged and adapted by influential parts of the _GIDA-movement. The anchor point of this argumentation is an event that represents concisely the change in the order of accepting collective acts of violence.

How do financial remittances influence electoral participation in violent democracies? Previous work has focused on the ‘substitution effect’; if recipients depend on remittances for welfare rather than the state, they become disengaged from formal political processes and less likely to vote in elections. However, while remittances can be used to substitute for state provision of welfare goods, they cannot fully substitute for public security. In this paper, we posit that the ability of governments to contain crime and violence conditions the effect of remittances on electoral participation. Specifically, we argue that high levels of crime can negate the substitution effect and make remittance recipients more likely to vote. Using municipality-level data from Mexico and individual-level data from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, we find that both the receipt of remittances and crime exposure significantly reduce individuals’ propensity to vote and that aggregate remittances and crime rates are correlated with lower turnout. Remittances can, however, negate the turnout-suppressing effects of crime, and crime can negate the turnout-suppressing effects of remittances. Our results suggest a need to account for government provision of both substitutable and non-substitutable goods when investigating the effects of remittances on political participation. published

Latin American governments frequently emphasise the democratic and peaceful order in the region. These claims are based on two developments: First, except for Cuba, the region has experienced processes of democratisation since the early 1980s. Second, since the 1990s, a series of long-lasting civil wars have ended with negotiated settlements and without a relapse into war. Based on such a superficial analysis, Latin America can be perceived as a successful example of the liberal peacebuilding model. However, although Latin America has democratised and ended wars, it is still the most violent region in the world. This article argues that democratisation and peacebuilding focussed rather on formal changes than on dealing with the structural problems reproducing different manifestations of violence. A focus on the interaction between both processes provides evidence for the possibilities as well as the limitations of change.

Während liberalen Demokratietheorien Gewalt als das Andere von Demokratie gilt, haben post- und dekoloniale Theorien den Nachweis erbracht, dass Gewalt ein grundlegendes Element moderner Ordnungen und liberaler Demokratien ist. Von einem weiten Verständnis von Demokratie ausgehend, das diese auch als Lebensform und Subjektivierungsweise versteht, erörtert der Text erstens die Frage, auf welchen gewaltvollen diskursiven Voraussetzungen die Konstitution des Subjekts in der liberalen Demokratie beruht. Es wird dargelegt, wie die Figur des autonomen, souveränen Individuums auf der gewaltvollen "Kolonialität von Macht" (Quijano 2000) beruht, das ein demokratisches Verständnis von Politik letztlich verunmöglicht. Aus intersektionaler Perspektive wird gezeigt, wie sich in der gewaltvollen Konstitution des demokratischen Subjekts Rassismus, Kolonialismus, Geschlechter- und Sexualitätsverhältnisse miteinander verschränken. Zweitens werden die Erkenntnisse zur Verwobenheit der ‚Kolonialität der Gewalt‘ und Demokratie in Dialog mit Ansätzen radikaler Demokratietheorie gebracht. Hier wird erörtert, wie die radikaldemokratische Kritik mittels post- und dekolonialer Perspektive rekonzeptualisiert werden muss, wenn sie auch die gewaltvollen Fundamente liberaler moderner Demokratie radikal kritisieren will. Daran anschließend wird drittens dargelegt, dass die gegenwärtige Krise der Demokratie aus der hier entwickelten Perspektive eine durchweg systemische ist. Die aktuelle Krise der Demokratie wird als Verdichtung des in der liberal-kolonialen Konstruktion des demokratischen Subjekts angelegten undemokratischen Subtextes ausgewiesen. Den Schluss des Textes bilden Überlegungen zu Wegen der Dekolonisierung von Demokratie. While liberal theories of democracy view violence as the opposite of democracy, post- and decolonial theories argue that violence is a fundamental element of liberal democracies. Based on a broad notion of democracy, which approaches democracy also as a form of life and a mode of subjectivation, the article unmasks first the violent discursive presuppositions of the subject of liberal democracy. I argue that the figure of the autonomous, sovereign individual is based on the violent "coloniality of power" (Quijano 2000) that ultimately makes democratic politics impossible. From an intersectional perspective, I further argue how racist, colonial, gendered and sexual relations of power are intertwined in the violent constitution of the democratic subject. Second, these insights of the 'coloniality of violence' as foundation of liberal democracies are brought to a dialogue with radical democratic theory. Third, I argue that the current crisis of democracy is a systemic one deriving from the 'coloniality of violence' inherent in liberal democracies and its political subjects. The article concludes by offering preliminary reflections on ways of decolonizing democracy.

The 20 October 2021 marks the first anniversary of the shooting of unarmed protesters by the Nigerian military. The movement pushing to abolish the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) has proved how social media can make the voices of the weak heard. However, recent developments surrounding social media regulations in the aftermath of the shooting show that the right to freedom of expression is at risk of regression. The EndSARS protest has proven itself to be a milestone people-led movement. It is the first time Nigerians from different classes, ethnic groups, and religions have united behind a cause. It went beyond making demands for the mere disbanding of the SARS squad to insisting on the release of protesters, justice for victims, prosecution of poor police conduct, evaluation and retraining of officers, and an increase in police salary - all organised via social media. What came in the aftermath of the movement served as a driver for the renewed calls for bills to regulate social media. The political elite issued a communiqué that called for the strict monitoring and censorship of social media usage. Recent developments are not unique. A careful analysis of social media regulations shows that the government has remained ambivalent towards freedom of expression - promoting that right while at the same time limiting it. Nigeria has witnessed some progress since it transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999. Nevertheless, it risks regression if draconian bills are introduced that curtail freedom of expression and assembly. The Nigerian government must be willing to review and revise its cyber bills to eliminate ambiguity. It must also include all relevant stakeholders, such as youth, women, and human as well as digital rights experts, in its drafting of cyber bills.

Contrary to popular discourse, the threats emanating from the internal security issues pose serious security threats to the Indian state and its people. Faced with numerous internal security challenges, the Indian experience of dealing with them has been a mixed experience. Arguably, no other country has ever faced such multiple internal security threats, in various forms and intensity than the Indian state. While the threat perception emanating from the internal security challenges has de-escalated over the last few years, they refuse to die down. Considering the immediacy of the issue, this paper critically engages with the contemporary internal security challenges that the Indian state encounters. In doing so the paper reflects upon the very process through which each of these internal security threats operates and highlights the nature and the intensity of threat perception. Through providing a conceptual framework, the paper also evaluates the state's responses to the internal security issues. The paper limits its scope to four major internal security issues in India: The Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), the violent conflicts in the Northeastern states, Separatism and terrorism in Jammu, and Kashmir (J&K), and communal violence and religious radicalization.

How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As “tried and tested” agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a “fall-back option”, which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.

The killing of political opponents is an established practice in the Philippines, to which several dozen office­holders fall victim each year and which undermines democracy. In this report, Peter Kreuzer presents a detailed data set on this type of violence and answers the questions why the practice is so wide­spread and why it hardly ever provokes public debate. The analysis focuses on the peace covenant, a central means of symbolic politics to contain violence, but one that uninten­tionally naturalizes it.

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag untersucht in einer Langsschnittanalyse die Entwicklung der Ereignisse, die aus Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit (GMF) und Rechtsextremismus heraus motiviert sind. Grundlage hierfur ist die Dokumentation von chronik.LE, in der Gewalt- und Propaganda-Aktionen organisierter und nichtorganisierter Neonazis und rechter Akteur*innen sowie Vorfalle von Rassismus, Antisemitismus und Sexismus in der Stadt Leipzig und den Landkreisen Leipzig und Nordsachsen dokumentiert sind. Dabei werden drei Perspektiven herausgearbeitet: eine diachrone, eine inhaltliche und eine geografische. Die inhaltliche Auswertung wird mittels Topic Modeling umgesetzt. Dadurch werden verschiedene Akteur*innen, Veranderungen der Ausdrucksformen einzelner Diskriminierungsformen und der Aktionen rechter und rechtsextremer Akteur*innen sowie darauf aufbauend geografische Schwerpunkte aufgezeigt. Der Beitrag ist ein Beispiel dafur, wie umfangreiche Dokumentensammlungen mittels computergestutzten Analyseverfahren ausgewertet werden und damit Methoden der Digital Humanities zur Rechtsextremismusforschung beitragen konnen. Schlusselbegriffe: Digital Humanities, Topic Modeling, Text Mining, Rechtsextremismus, GMF, Sachsen ----- Summary Since 2008 chronik.LE is documenting violence and propaganda actions of organized and non-organized neo-Nazis and right-wing actors as well as incidents of racism, anti-Semitism and sexism in the city of Leipzig and the districts of Leipzig and Northern Saxony. Based on this documentation, this paper examines three perspectives on the development of incidents motivated by group-focused enmity and right-wing extremism: temporal, content-related and geographical. In order to evaluate the content-related development, the documents are analysed by topic modeling. This reveals various actors, changes in the expression of different forms of discrimination and in the actions of right-wing actors, as well as geographical focuses. Overall, the paper is an example of how large document collections can be evaluated by means of computational analysis. Keywords: digital humanities, topic modeling, text mining, right-wing extremism, groupfocused enmity, saxony ----- Bibliographie: Mayer, Elena: Analyse von Rechtsextremismus und Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit: Text Mining der Dokumentation von chronik.LE 2008–2019, ZRex – Zeitschrift fur Rechtsextremismusforschung, 1-2021, S. 42-59. https://doi.org/10.3224/zrex.v1i1.04 ----- Open-Access-Lizenz: Dieser Beitrag ist ab dem 25.06.2021 im Open Access unter der Creative-Commons-Lizenz CC BY 4.0 (Namensnennung 4.0 International) verfugbar. Weitere Informationen zur Lizenz und den Nutzungsbedingungen finden Sie hier .

Nach einem jahrzehntelangen Bürgerkrieg erlangt die Republik Südsudan am 9. Juli 2011 ihre Unabhängigkeit. Doch trotz aller Bemühungen um einen friedlichen Staatsaufbau nimmt die erste Dekade der Eigenstaatlichkeit einen gewaltsamen Verlauf: Im Dezember 2013 schlittert der Südsudan in einen blutig geführten Bürgerkrieg, der sich nicht als einheitlicher Konflikt mit klar definierbaren Parteien, sondern zu einem Amalgam komplex verschachtelter Konfliktlandschaften entwickelt. In analytischen Vignetten, die verschiedene Regionen sowie die nationale und internationale Dimension des Bürgerkrieges untersuchen, gibt Jan Pospisil einen Einblick in die südsudanesische Konfliktrealität.

The gender-based violence in recent times has become an integral part of the on-going Boko Haram Insurgency in North-East Nigeria. Since the full-scale declaration of combat between the Nigerian state and the insurgent group, the asymmetrical tactics of the group have been evolving, based on its capabilities. The recent spike in the targeted raid and attack on female schools, markets, and female institutions purposely for abduction and kidnapping of women and girls indicated this assertion. Due to the depletion of its fighters and loss of territories, there is a surge in mass deployment of ‘women and young girls’ as material instruments of warfare: fighters, suicide bombers, human shields, bargaining tools, sex slaves, informants, and so on. This article appraises the gender push-pull factors responsible, motivation behind the current behavior, and proffers some policy guidance.

"The paper in front of you presents an attempt to give an answer to the hypothesis -is the use of force in accordance with the public international law and several issues arising from it- if the use of force is allowed then when it receives international legality and legitimacy? If it's legally prohibited, whether such prohibition is general rule without any derogations or there is an exception to that rule? The research was done using the method of contextual analysis of international documents (UN Charter, relevant UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly resolutions, and court cases from the practice of International Court of Justice). Some of the main conclusions are: UN member states are obligated to refrain from threat or use of force against territorial integrity and political independence of another state. The exclusive right of using force is situated only in the Security Council." (author's abstract)

The corona pandemic is currently defining politics and society. Especially in poorer regions of the world, it increases the threats to peace and security. At the same time, other risks to peace persist: climate change, the restriction of civil rights, the threat of an arms race in cyberspace, the rivalries between the Great Powers and the increase in right-wing violence. It is precisely in the face of the crisis that international cooperation - and a proactive EU to drive this cooperation forward, both within Europe and globally - is needed to secure peace. Against this background, the Peace Report 2020 analyses current violent conflicts, identifies trends in international foreign, security and development policy and makes recommendations for the Federal Government and the Bundestag. The German peace research institutes (BICC/HSF/IFSH/INEF) have been publishing the report since 1987. Die Corona-Pandemie bestimmt aktuell Politik und Gesellschaft. Vor allem in ärmeren Weltregionen verstärkt sie die Gefahren für Frieden und Sicherheit. Zugleich bestehen andere Friedensrisiken fort: der Klimawandel, die Einschränkung bürgerlicher Rechte, ein drohendes Wettrüsten im Cyberraum, die Rivalitäten der Großmächte und die Zunahme rechter Gewalt. Gerade angesichts der Krise bedarf es internationaler Zusammenarbeit, um Frieden zu sichern - und einer proaktiven EU, die diese Kooperation vorantreibt, sowohl innerhalb Europas als auch global. Das Friedensgutachten 2020 analysiert vor diesem Hintergrund aktuelle Gewaltkonflikte, zeigt Trends der internationalen Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik auf und gibt Empfehlungen für Bundesregierung und Bundestag. Die deutschen Friedensforschungsinstitute (BICC/HSF/IFSH/INEF) geben das Gutachten seit 1987 heraus.