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A variety of theories have been proposed to explain why states pass legislation to regulate professional groups, and why, more recently, they have acted to curtail professional privileges. While these theories have drawn attention to the importance of power dynamics and public protection, among other factors, the role of political interests has been downplayed. This article builds on ecological theory to argue that, with some modifications, the theory illuminates the centrality of state-profession relations and politics to regulatory change. The theory is applied to a case study of regulatory change in British Columbia, Canada impacting resources-sector professions, with particular attention to the controversies and political considerations that shaped reform. The case study suggests that when the political and professions ecologies are overlapping and symbiotic, as they were in BC, a challenge in the political ecology can implicate professions, prompting a solution that brings change within both ecologies., (© 2024 The Authors. The British Journal of Sociology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and Political Science.)

The politicization of science is a recurring phenomenon in US federal policymaking that is explained in part by the unstructured, collaborative nature of decision-making in most science-intensive US regulatory programs. In this chapter we spotlight some of the most significant worries arising from this longstanding approach to U.S. institutional design for expert agencies and offer recommendations for stronger institutional structures to help guard against the politicization of science., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Over the past century, governmental involvement in the delivery of health care has grown steadily through health policy initiatives and increased regulations. Traditionally, the involvement in this process for the orthopedic surgeon was minimal because they were focused primarily on direct patient care. These two pathways have met a crossroads, however, where it has now become necessary for the orthopedic surgeon to advocate on behalf of themselves and their patients to guide and influence the legislative and regulatory processes. This article reviews the background of orthopedic advocacy and discusses ways in which the interested surgeon can become involved., Competing Interests: Disclosure The author is a contributing member to the AAOS Orthopedic PAC, the Pennsylvania Orthopedic Society PAC, and the Rothman Orthopedic Institute PAC, a member of the AAOS Orthopedic PAC Advisor’s Circle., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Through an analysis of the FDA's approval of the controversial anti-influenza drug Relenza (zanamivir), we interrogate distinct social scientific theories of pharmaceutical regulation. We investigate why, despite internal negative opinions and an Advisory Committee's non-approval recommendation, the FDA approved Relenza in the late 1990s. Based on a close reading of FDA documents, we show how agency officials guided the manufacturer's analyses and participated in constructing a tenuous argument for approval. We show how regulators may strategically design drug labels that can justify their permissive regulation. We consider the explanatory power of official accounts and alternative, partially overlapping, theories of pharmaceutical regulation in the Relenza case, and develop new insights into the institutional dynamics of regulator-industry relations. We find little or no evidence that the FDA was primarily driven by public health concerns, pressure from disease-based patient activism, or a consumerist and neoliberal regulatory logic, although some of these explanations provided managers with convenient rhetoric to rationalize their actions. Rather, we argue that the Relenza case highlights contradictions between a scientific culture at FDA, conducive to rigorous product evaluations, and the agency's attempts to accommodate higher-level political (i.e. Congress) and industry demands conducive of permissive regulation - consistent with some aspects of reputational and capture theories, as well as with corporate bias theory.

What motivates corporate political action? Are corporations motivated by their own narrow economic self-interest; are they committed to pursuing larger class interests; or are corporations instruments for status groups to pursue their own agendas? Sociologists have been divided over this question for much of the last century. This paper introduces a novel case - that of Australia - and an extensive dataset of over 1,500 corporations and 7,500 directors. The paper attempts to understand the motives of corporate political action by examining patterns of corporate political donations. Using statistical modelling, supported by qualitative evidence, the paper argues that, in the Australian case, corporate political action is largely motivated by the narrow economic self-interest of individual corporations. Firms' interests are, consistent with regulatory environment theory, defined by the nature of government regulation in their industry: those in highly regulated industries (such as banking) and those dependent on government support (such as defence) tend to adopt a strategy of hedging their political support, and make bipartisan donations (to both major parties). In contrast, firms facing hostile regulation (such as timber or mining), and those without strong dependence on state support (such as small companies) tend to adopt a strategy of conservative partisanship, and make conservative-only donations. This paper argues that regulatory environment theory needs to be modified to incorporate greater emphasis on the subjective political judgements of corporations facing hostile regulation: a corporation's adoption of conservative partisanship or hedging is not just a product of the objective regulation they face, but also whether corporate leaders judge such regulation as politically inevitable or something that can be resisted. Such a judgement is highly subjective, introducing a dynamic and unpredictable dimension to corporate political action., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2017.)

Effective obesity prevention requires a synergistic mix of population-level interventions including a strong role for government and the regulation of the marketing, labelling, content and pricing of energy-dense foods and beverages. In this paper we adopt the agenda of the Australian Federal Government (AFG) as a case study to understand the factors generating or hindering political priority for such 'regulatory interventions' between 1990 and 2011. Using a theoretically-guided process tracing method we undertook documentary analysis and conducted 27 interviews with a diversity of actors involved in obesity politics. The analysis was structured by a theoretical framework comprising four dimensions: the power of actors involved; the ideas the actors deploy to interpret and portray the issue; the institutional and political context; and issue characteristics. Despite two periods of sustained political attention, political priority for regulatory interventions did not emerge and was hindered by factors from all four dimensions. Within the public health community, limited cohesion among experts and advocacy groups hampered technical responses and collective action efforts. An initial focus on children (child obesity), framing the determinants of obesity as 'obesogenic environments', and the deployment of 'protecting kids', 'industry demonization' and 'economic costs' frames generated political attention. Institutional norms within government effectively selected out regulatory interventions from consideration. The 'productive power' and activities of the food and advertising industries presented formidable barriers, buttressed by a libertarian/neolibertarian rhetoric emphasizing individual responsibility, a negative view of freedom (as free from 'nanny-state' intervention) and the idea that regulation imposes an unacceptable cost on business. Issue complexity, the absence of a supportive evidence base and a strict 'evidence-based' policy-making approach were used as rationales to defer political priority. Overcoming these challenges may be important to future collective action efforts attempting to generate and sustain political priority for regulatory interventions targeting obesity., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The article describes a recent Swiss popular initiative, aiming to replace the current system of statutory health insurance run by 61 competing private insurers with a new system run by a single public insurer. Despite the rejection of the initiative by 62% of voters in late September 2014, the campaign and ballot results are interesting because they show the importance of (effective) public communication in shaping the outcome of a popular ballot. The relevance of the Swiss case goes beyond the peculiarities of its federalism and direct democracy and might be useful for other countries debating the pros and cons of national unitary health insurance systems versus models using multiple insurers. After this electoral ballot, the project to establish a public sickness fund in Switzerland seems definitely stopped, at least for the next decade. Insurers, who opposed the initiative, have effectively fed the "fear of change" of the population and have stressed the good outcomes of the Swiss healthcare system. However, the political pressure favoured by the popular initiative opened a "windows of opportunity" and led the federal Parliament to pass a stricter regulation of health insurers, improving in this way the current system., (Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

In 2009, a reregulation of the Swedish pharmacy sector took place, and a fundamental change in ownership and structure followed. The reregulation provides an opportunity to reveal the politicians' views on pharmacies. The aim of this study was to explore and analyze the political arguments for the reregulation of the Swedish pharmacy sector in 2009. The method used was a qualitative content analysis of written political documents regarding the reregulation. The primary rationales for the reregulation were better availability, efficiency, price pressure, and safe usage of medicines. During the preparatory work, the rationales of diversity on the market and entrepreneurship were added, while the original rationales of efficiency, price pressure, and better usage of medicines were abandoned. The reform can be seen as a typical New Public Management reform influenced by the notion that private actors are better equipped to perform public activities. The results point to that the reform was done almost solely in order to introduce private ownership in the pharmacy sector, and was not initiated in order to solve any general problems, or to enhance patient outcomes of medicine use., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.)