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In many democratic societies there is a strong tendency for voters from ethnic or religious minorities to support the party of the ‘left’, however this may be locally defined. This was initially noticed in the United States, where it is an important concern of political scientists and partisans. Similar trends are noticeable in Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the seats where immigrant communities have concentrated, ethnic minority support for the ALP is consistently strong (Jupp 1981 and 1984). This support was largely sustained in 2013, despite general swings towards the Liberals. This chapter argues that predictions of a ‘wipeout’ for Labor in such electorates were unsound, both in Sydney and Melbourne. It does not argue for the overall impact of ‘ethnic and immigration issues’ as these were heavily focused on asylum seekers rather than immigration as a whole. Campaigning on such issues was aimed at the AngloAustralian majority. There was very little academic or journalistic debate on immigration issues, as both major parties were in full agreement on ‘stopping the boats’.

This short study by an eminent Australian scholar covers the entire period from the initiation of the White Australia policy in 1901 until the asylum seeker controversies of John Howard’s government in 2001. It will be of considerable value to those outside Australia who have only a limited knowledge of the radical changes during this century of organized mass immigration. They include many Asians who still believe that Australia implements a ‘whites only’ admission policy, which is far from being the case. It will also be of value to the many Australians who have only a distorted and populist view of recent developments. However, this is not a text for beginners. It starts with a detailed account of the various academic debates surrounding terms such as ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘racism’. These are drawn from several sources, not all of them Australian. Typically of academic texts there is a plethora of references to other scholars, rather than to other situations. There is an assumption that the dominant ethnicity is ‘Anglo-Celtic’ and the dominant race is ‘Caucasian’, both very contested terms. It was not true, as the author maintains, that the initial waves of migration before 1860 were ‘made up almost exclusively of British settlers of Protestant origin’ (p. 31). There were almost as many Catholic Irish as English in the three largest colonies by the 1880s, creating a social and political rift which was still apparent into the 1950s. However Jayasuriya, is correct in distinguishing racism against Aborigines from that against immigrants. The former were seen as a dying race, the latter as a threat. He is also correct in locating all forms of racism within those fashionable in Britain. British migrants brought their racism with them, planted it in virgin soil and watered it with imperialist pride. The greatest surge in hostility to Chinese and other Asians took place in the 1880s, coincidental with the greatest surge in British assisted

National governments have usually had first claim on the right to form national identities. In seeking votes or public support for their policies, political leaders have commonly made reference to national identity, as it was thought to be or as it could become. For example, in April 1993, newly elected Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating (1993e) argued that ‘Australia will be taken more seriously as a player in regional affairs if we are clear about our identity and demonstrate that we really mean to stand on our own feet practically and psychologically’. The first Australian prime minister to advocate a republic, he related his position to those demographic changes producing an Australia ‘where a growing proportion of the population has few if any ties with the United Kingdom; where our future increasingly lies within our own region; and where our identity as a nation is no longer derivative but our own’ (Keating 1993e). This eminently rational approach does, however, beg the question of whether governments can develop a clear and coherent identity in a society with many origins, and whether indeed they ought to do so. Australian governments have typically sought to shape and reshape national identity by two means. First, they have set restrictions and conditions upon foreign immigration into the country. Second, they have set criteria for granting citizenship and have framed domestic policies around such principles as integration or assimilation by which it was hoped to achieve social harmony, or even social justice.

Modern Australia was founded as a series of British colonies between 1788 and 1836, which became self-governing between the 1850s and the 1890s and were federated in 1901 into the Commonwealth of Australia. Following the normal processes of the former British Empire, Australia has become progressively independent but without any conclusive break with the United Kingdom. While Australia is fully independent in all respects, its cultural ties remain with the English-speaking world and over 80 per cent of its people speak only English. When asked their ancestry at the 1986 Census, almost 40 per cent replied ‘English’ — or twice the proportion who answered ‘Australian’ Only 1.9 per cent replied ‘Greek’ although this was the sixth largest category after English, Australian, Italian, Irish and Scottish.

Some years ago I foolishly predicted that the battle for multicultural ism in public policy was almost won.1 Today it seems more reason able to divide the history of official multiculturalism into three phases, all rather neatly lasting for five years. Between 1973 and 1978 there was the ‘euphoric phase’. Launched by Al Grassby and enthusiastically supported by Gough Whitlam, multiculturalism was awarded bi-partisan consensus by the Galbally Report of 1978.2 In between were the migrant worker’s conference of 1973, the forma tion of the major Ethnic Communities’ Councils in 1975 and the rapid development of ethnic media and political pressures. The next phase, from 1978 to 1983, might be termed one of ‘consensual consolida tion’. Multiculturalism was enthusiastically endorsed by the Fraser Liberal—National coalition, which set up the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (1979) and began multicultural television (1980). While the ALP Opposition was critical of some aspects, it was fully committed to the general policies based on Galbally, promising only to sustain and improve them. Then began the third phase, which might be termed one of ‘disillusion and retreat’. This has lasted since 1983 and, if the five-year cycle means anything, is now giving way to something else. Whether this will usher in a five-year period of ‘total abandonment’ or simply of ‘total confusion’ (or something else) cannot be scientifically predicted. But there is no doubt that multicul turalism in public policy is being fought over both between and within the parties. Perhaps this phase (starting fortuitously with the Fitz gerald Report on immigration policy in June 1988) will see many of the issues which seemed resolved becoming controversial and even bitterly contested.3

This article examines migration policy in Australia with reference to the "White Australia" policy prior to 1975 and the multicultural policy thereafter. Mass immigration has not caused major social tensions. Mass tourism has been welcomed. Australian attitudes have changed from fear of massive numbers of Asians and mass poverty and ignorance to multiculturalism. Suspicious attitudes toward Asians, however, are still present among a minority of Australians. The most influential arguments against Asians are the concerns about employment of new arrivals and the environmental impact of an increasing population. Although there are many cultural differences, Australia is linked to Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines in that all have a history of British or American influence. Educated Indians and Sri Lankans are linked to Australians by their common language and Christian religion. The integration of Asians in the business and financial community holds the potential for economic gain over the years. The author finds that the Australian relationship to Asia is more acceptable in public arenas than the comparable changing relationship between Britain and Europe. The roots of a Whites-only policy extend back to 1901, when the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act was ratified. The exclusion of non-European immigrants was not specified in the law. The mechanism for exclusion was included in the law. Undesirable immigrants could be excluded. Under mass migration programs after 1947 the population of non-English speaking Europeans increased. By 1973 government shifted from an assimilationist approach to a multicultural approach due to pressure from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Numerous historical events occurring during 1942-80 drew Australia out of its isolationist position in the world. At present about 25% of the total population are of non-British origin. Over 900,000 would have been excluded under the old migration policy. In 1991, 665,315 persons were born in Asia, of which the largest numbers came from Mainland China, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Asian immigrants are either refugees from Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos or voluntary Asian immigrants.

(1979). The development of party politics in the New Hebrides. The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics: Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 263-282.

Neil Kinnock, Making our Way, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp.200. $ 13.95 (paper) Roy Hattersley, Choose Freedom: The Future for Democratic Socialism, London, Michael Joseph, 1987, pp. 265. $39.95 (cloth) John Callaghan, The Far Left in British Politics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 249. $29.95 (paper) Maureen Mackintosh and Hillary Wainwright (eds), A Taste of Power: The Politics of Local Economics, London, Verso, 1987, pp. 441. $29.95 (paper) Peter Hain, Political Strikes: the State and Trade Unionism in Britain, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1986, pp. 357. $14.95 (paper) Roger Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes: 1893 to 1985, London, Methuen, 1986, pp. 171. $19.95 (paper) Derek Fatchett, Trade Unions and Politics in the 1980s: the 1984 Act and Political Funds, London, Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 135. $78.95 (cloth) Michael P. Jackson, Strikes: Industrial Conflict in Britain, USA and Australia, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1987. pp. 232. $34.95 (paper) Ken Coates and Tony Topham, Trade Unions and Pol...

(1981). The British social democrats and the crisis in the British Labour Party. Politics: Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 253-260.

Penelope Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa 1920–1940. Frank Cass, London, 1978, pp. xvi + 196. Price not stated on review copy. Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx, London, Allison and Busby in association with Spokesman Books, August, 1976, pp. 135. Cloth and paper, price as yet unavailable. P. Loveday, A. W. Martin and R. S. Parker (eds.), The Emergence of the Australian Party System, Sydney, Hale & Iremonger, 1977, pp. xviii + 538. $9.95 paper. Robin Evelegh, PEACE‐KEEPING IN ADEMOCRATIC SOCIETY; The Lessons of Northern Ireland. 1978, pp. 240, $7.50. Tony Bunyan, The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain, J. Friedmann, 1976. Abraham Ashkenasi, Modern German Nationalism. Schenkman, 1976. $20.00. Northern Ireland 1968–74 A Chronology of Events. (Blackstaff Press, Belfast). Volume 1 1968–71, (£3.95); Volume 2 1972–73. (£6.50); Volume 3 1974, (£7.50). All three volumes compiled by Richard Deutsch and Vivien Magowan. Peter Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism, Manchester ...

THE NEW CONSTITUTION of I 972, which changed the name of Ceylon to Sri Lanka, incorporates Principles of State Policy which promise "the progressive advancement towards the establishment in Sri Lanka of a Socialist democracy" and the elimination of "economic and social privilege, disparity and exploitation."1 The adoption of the constitution came fifteen years afer S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, founder of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and prime minister from I956 to I959, first set up a committee on constitutional reform. The constitution embodied many of the objectives of Bandaranaike's party led by his widow, the then prime minister of Sri Lanka, Sirimavo Bandaranaike.2 While there were objections to the constitution from the opposition United National Party, which wished to entrench the protection of property rights and institute a presidential system' and from the Federal Party which wished to federalise Sri Lanka for the protection of the Tamil minority, the great majority of the parliament, including the Marxist parties (the Lanka Samasamaja Party and the Communists), welcomed the commitment to socialism. Despite insurrection in I97i by the revolutionary Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the existence of a number of extra-parliamentary Leninist groups, the great bulk of political opinion in Sri Lanka accepted the term 'democratic' as implying the continued movement towards socialism through parliamentary means and through the regular testing of the government at the ballot box. This commitment to democratic socialism (as the term is conven

C EYLON STILL REMAINS a monarchy, still allows appeals to the Privy Council, still has regular elections at which it regularly changes its government, and still maintains, almost without modification, the constitution on which independence was granted in i948.1 The question to be asked is not "Why has the model failed?" but "Why, and to what extent, has it succeeded?" The authorship and guidance of Sir Ivor Jennings provide part of the answer. His understanding of British and local politics contrasted favourably with that of other constitutional lawyers drafting new constitutions which failed. However, much credit must go to the Ceylonese voters and politicians, without whom the system might have collapsed. Ceylon's people are wedded to parliamentary methods. Ceylon has no revolutionary tradition, no revolutionary parties worthy of the name, a tiny army whose occasional political incursions have been farcical rather than threatening, and, most important, politicians who are neither particularly corrupt nor hostile to democracy. Most of its political leaders have had British legal training.2 The administrators, too, have a long background of experience in working constitutional democracy. The Ceylon Civil Service (the administrative class) was Ceylonized to the extent of 33.3 per cent in i925, 64 per cent in I940, and go per cent by I949. The nature of the present constitutional situation in Ceylon can best be examined against the background of past developments.3 Ceylon has had universal suffrage since i93i. At independence it had a class of established politicians, drawn from the professional classes and landed aristocracy, educated in Britain and deeply committed to parliamentary methods. The dominant families-the Senanayakes, Goonetillekes, Bandaranaikes, Ratwattes, and so on-were well represented in the Legislative and State Councils